Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Stephen, list, You said, “*There is no great prototype* and *if there were Brent or the author of the other bio, would have said so*. “ To which, I would add, "My dear sir, it is unlikely that you are not mistaken but why such absolute truth?" From CP 5.402 to CP 5.189 With best

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Yes to both questions. Even values which I regard as absolute cannot be claimed as absolute though they can be commended and even proved by a process of triadic thinking and be doing Truth, actuality, and horizon seem to me terms that are general but not absolute. The Absolute as a category or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Dear Stephen, list, I don’t want to distract from the main purpose of this line of argument. The issue is not whether and how you use triadic reasoning, for I am sure it works for you. The question is whether Peirce has successfully and obviously put forth an elegant perfect copy of the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

So, you are saying that considering things triadically does not end at this or that? Then what of the Absolute? Absolute Truth, Absolute Actuality, Absolute Horizon... On Sat, Dec 9, 2017 at 4:32 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > I am going to write some sentences which I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

I am going to write some sentences which I believe are consistent with Peirce. I think we are fallible and therefore what reasoning we do is always subject to amendment and correction. Continuity is the reality within which we act and express. We are capable of thinking triadically -- in three

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Stephen, list, There are also other matters that are not so obvious in its obviousness, although they ought to be; such as the use of method in pragmaticism. For instance, a syllogism is a '*logos* in which, certain things being posited, something other than what is posited follows of necessity

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Dear Stephen, list, I suspect the answer to your entire list of questions depends on recognition of eudaimonia as the ultimate aim; that is, the manner in which we classify those who have membership in the river of pragmaticism. Best, J On Fri, Dec 8, 2017 at 4:32 PM, Stephen C. Rose

Brent Bio (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14))

Hi Stephen, List, On 12/8/2017 4:32 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: These are some issues we might chew on. Given the fact that the Brent bio. seems sidely discredited, is a new biography

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

These are some issues we might chew on. Does Pierce's influence extend beyond the academy? Did Peirce see ethics and aesthetics as essential to triadic thinking? Did he intend his philosophy to have wide influence beyond the scientific community? Are there any public intellectuals who have

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Dear list: Gary said: "I would be very interested in why you think that anyone here is making such an effort toward consensus building on Peirce-L, and examples are always quite helpful." There are numerous conversations between list participants, eg., Edwina-Jon exchanges, in which “this is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Mike, List, Indeed you have as much right to say what you want to say here as the moderator, and similarly, I have a right to disagree with you. As it turns out, I can't say I disagree with much of anything you've* just* written (except see further down). I did disagree with several things you

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Hi Gary, List, No, I am not trying to stifle debate, just go on the record as to my own position. Gary, you imply it yourself, when you assume I have a tout court disagreement with what Jon has proposed. I never said such a thing. There are frequently

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Mike, Jon S, list, MB: I question whether this list should be used for "terminological proposals" or attempts to create some sort of faux consensus on various points of Peircean scholarship. While I think that attempting to reach consensus on matters of Peircean scholarship in this forum is

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

List, when i read about the question, whether possibility is a matter of seeming or speculating, then another definition of it comes into my mind: possible is everything that is not impossible, and what is impossible is all that is ruled out by deduction. So possibility is everything minus

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon, list - I think that if YOU wish to use the term 'possibility' as confined to metaphysics, then, that is your prerogative. But I don't think that it's beneficial to suggest that WE [all] should use the term in that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Hi Jon, List, I always appreciate the points and commentary on this list, but I question whether this list should be used for "terminological proposals" or attempts to create some sort of faux consensus on various points of Peircean scholarship. Through

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Jeff, List: Once more, I am not making an interpretative claim, but a terminological proposal. Indeed, there are other senses of "possibility" besides the one that I have articulated, but I am suggesting that--at least in some circumstances--it would be better for the sake of clarity if we only

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

' and I >>>>> immediately took his advice. In this branch of phenomenology one goes >>>>> beyond Iconoscopy/Imagoscopy and arranges trichotomies of aspects >>>>> identified in that branch. The paper and ppt presentation I linked to in >>>&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

ey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Thursday, December 7, 2017 4:14:21 PM To: Gary Richmond Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categorie

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

her >>>> analysis, especially that using the tools of logic as semeiotic (and even >>>> a *logica >>>> utens*), can analyze phenomena in consideration of the other >>>> categories as well allowing for the two other possible branches just >>>&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

(718)%20482-5690>* >>> >>> On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 11:05 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon, >>>> >>>> I think your proposal looks pretty good, considering that (as you said >>>> in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

of phenomenology and that of metaphysics — especially when the >>> metaphysics takes principles from logic and logic takes principles (or >>> “categories”) from phenomenology, as is the case in Peirce’s classification >>> of sciences. >>> >>> H

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

econds and Thirds, but >> *abstracts* from them the Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness which is >> present in anything “before the mind” in any way. In their Firstness, by >> the way, there is no difference between a phenomenon and the experience of >> i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

o:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 5-Dec-17 22:16 > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture > 2.14) > > > > List: > > > > For the sake of spurring further discussion, here is a proposal for >

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

degenerate). Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 5-Dec-17 22:16 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14) List: For the sake of spurring further discussion, here is a proposal

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Jon, I want to respond to this more fully in the next few days. Today has been hectic and demanding, while at the same time I'm feeling a bit under the weather. So take these preliminary comments in *that* context. You wrote: JAS: For the sake of spurring further discussion, here is a proposal

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Dear list: ..*individuals imagine* what the consequences of fully carrying out what their ideals would be- and then question the esthetic quality of these imagined consequences. Reflecting upon these ideals, he [the agent] is led”, Peirce suggests, “to *intend* to make his own conduct conform

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Jerry, Please explain what you mean by this comment: "From the limits of JAS to CP 5.189"? Your apparent fixation on CP 5.189 has turned from being a mere irritant to approaching an insult to list culture. Best, Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator) [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond*

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

>From the limits of JAS to CP 5.189 J On Tue, Dec 5, 2017 at 9:18 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > Why that and not CP 5.189? > > J > > On Tue, Dec 5, 2017 at 9:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > >> List: >> >> For the sake of spurring further

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Why that and not CP 5.189? J On Tue, Dec 5, 2017 at 9:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > List: > > For the sake of spurring further discussion, here is a proposal for > parsing out Peirce's philosophical terminology. > >- In phaneroscopy, we discover the three

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

List: For the sake of spurring further discussion, here is a proposal for parsing out Peirce's philosophical terminology. - In phaneroscopy, we discover the three Categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns as divisions of Phenomena according to the elements of experience: quality/reaction/mediation.

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

List, is it so, that categories are the er...,well, categories?  everything (real and existing, possible and impossible, phenomena and metaphysical ideas) is due to, so both elements and universes are not synonyms for, but things to be classified by categories. Whatever is meant by universes ,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Mike, List: Thanks for the link. Unfortunately--and somewhat surprisingly--Ika does not say anything about the Universes. The closest is the statement on page 61, "The concern of the phenomenologist is entirely with phenomena as such, regardless of whether they correspond to any real object in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Hi Jon, List: I go back and forth on whether the Universes are intended to be phenomenological or metaphysical.  Calling them "Universes of Experience" certainly suggests phenomenology, but Peirce's descriptions of their

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

“hypothesis.” It’s more a matter of nomenclature, isn’t it? > > Gary f. > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > > *Sent:* 30-Nov-17 17:39 > *To:* Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> > *Cc:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sub

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

e List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14) Gary F., List: I just stumbled across an interesting passage within "Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics" (NEM 4:285-300, c. 1903?) that might shed some further light o

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Dear list, Oh were that we are ever condemned to take soul as discovery and not invention.. “I cannot forget that there are the germs of the theory of the categories which is (if anything is) the gift I make to the world. That is my child. In it I shall live when oblivion has me — my body..

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Gary F., List: I just stumbled across an interesting passage within "Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics" (NEM 4:285-300, c. 1903?) that might shed some further light on this terminological issue. Here are a few key excerpts. CSP: Form is quality, suchness,--red, for example ... The quality or

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

    I wrote both, "a sign consists of sign, object, and interpretant", and: "A sign consists of sign relation, object relation, and interpretant relation". To me (in my theory) the first kind of consisting is functional composition, and the latter is composition from traits. I just wanted to add

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Gary, Jon, List, To the question, whether "categories" are "elements" or "universes" I can say little how Peirce has answered to this, but I would say, based on my contemporary dealing with the difference between composition and classification: I think, that "universes" sounds like

[PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Jon A.S., Thanks very much for posting here some of the Peirce passages which demonstrate that, as you put it, “"categories" and "elements" were effectively interchangeable for Peirce, precisely at the time of the Lowell Lectures” (and, I would add, afterwards, depending on Peirce’s context