Jerry,
I think I need to make it clear that I have been providing an
exposition of van Heijenoort's characterizations of the history of
logic and his classifications.
In fact, I do not myself adhere to these. (Indeed, as Volker Peckhaus
had correctly noted, I myself, in my book on van
Yes, 1-Dimensional Man and 2 Cultures were part of the canon on the 60s. Later
I would encounter Polanyi in Personal Tacit Knowledge and Raymond Wilder on
Mathematics as a Cultural System.
Jon
On Dec 4, 2011, at 10:20 AM, Irving ianel...@iupui.edu wrote:
Jon,
Just out of curiosity, how,
A one word revision to my previous post:
On Dec 4, 2011, at 4:18 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
...
Keeping in mind the various dimensions of experience, I took some pains
to give an even-handed account of the tensions involved in integration:
On the one hand I am much in favor of seeking
* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm
Peircers,
I would like to return to an earlier point in the discussion
and continue with the thoughts
* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm
Re: Comments by Auke van Breemen
Auke,
I thought it best to go back and recover the context before
On Nov 18, 2011, at 4:51 AM, Irving wrote:
...
All of this having been said, the best answer I can give is that, the
points, lines, and planes and tables, chairs, and beer mugs remark
aside, Hilbert would give different axiomatizations for different parts
of mathematics. That is to say,
An adjustment to my email from last night.
I wrongly used the term meaningless, slipping into old habits. The
distinction, JR suggests, produces a meaning (by the more rigorous use of that
term): the separation of concerns that concerns him. I should have said: *in
semeiotic theory* the
Re: [peirce-l] On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for
SemioticCORRECTION, sorry. - Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: Neal Bruss ; PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Friday, November 25, 2011 4:07 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] ³On the Paradigm of Experience
List:
On Nov 25, 2011, at 10:50 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
The sign classifications that we commonly see discussed in semiotics
are all classifications of different types of sign relation elements,
and not classifications of sign relations themselves, which is a far
more difficult task, since
Claudio, List ...
I realize that many of us have been through these sorts of discussions
many times before, so let me just highlight what I consider to be some
of the most important points.
1. We must not confuse the roles in a sign relation or the components
of a sign relational 3-tuple,
Jerry,
I suggest that this is a very good question, but I am not certain that
I can give you a straightforward answer. In particular, I have to
altogether beg off attempting to respond to the part of your question
concerning Aristotelian causality.
I think that we have to consider Hilbert's
Jerry,
As far as grammar goes, I read semiotic as formed on the pattern of logic
and I read semiotics as formed on the pattern of mathematics. US speakers
typically abbreviate mathematics as math while UK speakers call it maths.
I have no idea what to make of that.
The definition of a sign
Jon,
Thanks for bringing into my attention 'maxim', in relation to 'precept'.
I'm not so sure, though, that 'precept' and 'maxim' are interchangeable.
So-called synonyms seldom, if ever, are. The relation between synonyms I view
as something depicted in Venn's diagrams. There is an overlap,
Kirsti,
I was of course thinking of the pragmatic maxim,
which is a regulative principle whose function
is to guide the conduct of thought toward the
object of its aim, advising the addressee on
a way to “attain clearness of apprehension”.
http://knol.google.com/k/pragmatic-maxim
That is why
Irving, Jon, List;
From Jon's Post:
Peirce's most detailed definition of
a sign relation, namely, the one given in 2 variants in NEM 4, 20-21 54.
Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be
given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition
Kirsti,
Another word for precept is maxim.
The distinction between concept and precept
brings us again to the distinction between
descriptive and normative.
--
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
mwb:
* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm
Peirce List,
Here is the reply I made to John Sowa's earlier remarks on the CG List:
I am not saying
Dear Irving, Is it fair to say that a calculus of Logic looks at the relates of
operators as values of a 2-element set, 'true' and 'false.' (at least
classically) The universe of discourse is about the true and the false, and
thus it is restricted to those two values and is not about any
* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm
Peirce List,
I copied some of my earlier comments on the current slow reading to
the Conceptual Graphs
In response to posts and queries from Steven, Jon, and Jerry,
(1) Regarding Steven's initial post: My initial discomfort stemmed from
associating Hilbert's remark with the Peircean idea of logic as an
experiential or positive science, since Hilbert as a strict formalist
did not regard
* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm
Peirce List,
Here is John Sowa's second reply to comments shared on the CG List:
On 11/8/2011 12:18 AM,
* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm
Peirce List, CG List,
It's a little too late for Halloween, but probably about time to revisit our
old
Dear List,
I am presenting a new proposed computing paradigm Computing With Structure
based upon my work at the Supercomputing 2011 Disruptive Technologies exhibit
next week. Don't panic, this exhibit is aimed at technologies that may have an
impact on large scale computing architectures and
Dear Irving,
Thank you for the correction regarding the source of Hilbert's remarks. I
believe I read it in Unger's translation of The Foundations of Geometry,
perhaps in the foreword or annotations, but I still have to check this. I
assume that Hilbert is making a remark that appeals to
Dear Steven,
There is a growing body of scholarship among philosophers of
mathematics, including Douglas Jesseph and Mick Detlefsen, that
identifies Hilbert as influenced by, if not an actual disciple of,
Berkeley, and who at the same time argue that Berkeley was a formalist
and in that sense a
* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm
Peirce List, CG List,
Without meaning to jump ahead of the slow reading, let me just give
a preview of
Jerry,
I remember NEM listing for something like a King's Ransom,
like a lot of books out of Hyperborea. I was lucky enough
to find all but the 1st volume in a used bookstore years ago,
but I do not know if there are any online alternatives today.
The analogy that connects the arity of
JR = Joe Ransdell
SE = Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Joseph Ransdell,
On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm
JR: The thesis of my paper is that it is doubtful that any distinction
should be drawn between empirical
Peirce used the word formal in a couple of senses, the first of which
is closer to its general meaning of concerned with form, and here he
can mean either the forms of objects or the forms of syntax, whereas
the tradition following Russell tends to focus on syntax exclusively.
In that sense of
Good One!
That reminds me, I should probably correct what I wrote before to say
that the definition of formal figures prominently in the definition
of logic as formal semiotics, but not essentially in the definition of
semiotics itself, which has both descriptive and normative subdivisions.
Jon
Gary, Irving, Steven, and All,
One of the continuing problems that we have in reading Peirce is the fact that
logical atomists, logical positivists, and later writers tend to attach rather
different meanings to words like formal logical atom, and positive than
Peirce did himself.
The meaning of
Irving, Jon, List:
Thanks for your posts on CSP and Logic.
Irving: after reading your recent papers and your post here, I am curious about
a two questions:
Do you have a crisp exposition on what factors separate CSP's notion of logic
from Hilbert's formalizations?
Do you have a personal
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