Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities" Segment 5
Dear Sally,
The Nubiola article mentioned by Michael DeLaurentis is: Nubiola,
Jaime. 1996. "Scholarship on the Relations between Ludwig Wittgenstein and
Charles S. Peirce." Proceedings of the III Symposium on History of Logic,
edited by I. Angelelli and M. Cerezo. Berlin: Gruyter. Retrieved December 5,
2007, from: http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/scholar.htm
Re: the compatibility of Wittgenstein and Peirce. I have a brief
discussion of early Wittgenstein from a Peircean perspective on pp. 240-243 in
the last chapter of my book Meaning and Modernity. It is in a section titled
"Principia Diaboli," and I criticize the broader culture of nominalism; its
split between thought and things, and denial of the reality of the symbol. I
contrast the diabolic (to throw apart) with the symbolic (to throw together).
Later Wittgenstein's broader idea of "meaning as use" still seems
to me be far more contracted than Peirce's idea of meaning as found in
conceivable consequences.
Perhaps this might also have some interest, in the context of
communicative community virtues. In a recent blog, Michael Weinman attempted to
apply Peirce's idea of fallibilism to a conception of political fallibilism:
http://www.deliberatelyconsidered.com/2011/08/two-forms-of-political-fallibilism/
My attempt at a Peircean response to him is also there.
Gene
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf
Of Sally Ness
Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2011 5:51 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities"
Segment 5
Gary F., List,
Thanks, Gary, for this response. I didn't really know what to make of JR's
assertion regarding the distributive vs. collective existence of the
communicational community--the translation into Peircean terms is very helpful.
I take your point about JR having the life of a Peircean symbol in mind in
paragraph 23, with all that that concept implies. When this is factored in, it
is clear that the form of life is something to which the inquirer belongs, not
one that is coterminous with the inquirer's individual being (my initial
reading). This is one moment in the paper when it seems particularly difficult
to speak in the spirit of Peirce, as JR certainly is doing, without also
speaking in his exact terms as well--without using explicitly Peirce's
definition of the symbol and making all that that definition entails clear. In
this respect, JR's use of "form of life" does seem to be a good alternative,
however. Even if the physicists weren't familiar with Wittgenstein's
distinctive notion of "grammar" and its relation to the practices of language
games and the forms of life they sustain, the phrase still conveys in a common
sensical way that there is a larger reality to which an individual inquirer, as
an "inquirer," necessarily belongs.
The compatibility of Wittgenstein and Peirce is a topic of interest to me. I
have been struck repeatedly by how closely Wittgenstein's thinking can align
with Peirce's. If any listers know of work done that compares these two
philosophers, I would appreciate any references. Perhaps this needs a
different thread, however.
Thanks again,
Sally
Sally,
JR's "overall form of life" does sound more like Wittgenstein's Lebensform than
a Peircean idiom, but as i think you mentioned before, he seems to be going out
of his way here to avoid Peircean terminology that might put off the people
he's addressing. However it does seem to me quite compatible with Peirce's
ideas on scientific inquiry. I don't think i'd agree that JR "locates truth
entirely within the "life" of the inquirer, not in the subject matter that
determines the inquirer's inquiry, and not in any relation that the inquirer
and the subject-matter might be maintaining to one another". We're talking
about the life of a symbol here, and a genuine symbol must involve both
indexical and iconic components in generating an interpretant, which does imply
a relation between the inquirer and the subject-matter (to put it in less
Peircean terms).
Speaking of the "communicational community", JR's assertion that it "exists
distributively not collectively" looks at first more individualistic than
anything Peirce would say, but i think makes a more Peircean sense if we bear
in mind the typical Peircean distinction between reality and existence. I think
Peirce would say that the community as a "form of life" is more real than the
individual inquirer, but it only exists in the actual practice of individual
inquirers. And that practice, to be genuine, requires an objective focus on
"subject-specific properties", as JR puts it in paragraph 23.
That's how i see it, anyway.
Gary F.
} Sincerity is incommunicable because it becomes insincere by being
communicated. [Luhmann] {
www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities" Segment 5
PS - The speculation is that some CSP may have rubbed off on Wittgenstein
via Frank Ramsey, who was apparently rather impressed with CSP's work,
though there are no references to CSP in any Wittgenstein writing, I think.
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
Behalf Of Michael J. DeLaurentis
Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2011 7:23 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational
Communities" Segment 5
Sally - On Wittgenstein and CSP: you can mine a fair number of downloadable
articles if you Google the two names [and I'd be happy to send some I have
downloaded]. John Upper [who was at Queens U, Ontario] had done an early
master's thesis, I believe, comparing the two. Later, Jaime Nubiola, on this
list still, I believe, did an overview of scholarship on the two in 1996.
Catherine Legg [Melbourne] - also on this list for some time, and possibly
still -- had an interesting piece on rules, pragmatism, and skepticism. And
there was some years back, and may still be, a Peirce-Wittgenstein research
group at U Quebec. The themes of doubt, certainty, and rules seem to run
through most of these articles, with reference a few times to this comment
from Wittgenstein's "On Certainty": "So I am trying to say something that
sounds like pragmatism."
Similarities, yes; but many differences, too. It would be an interesting
thread.
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
Behalf Of Sally Ness
Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2011 5:51 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational
Communities" Segment 5
Gary F., List,
Thanks, Gary, for this response. I didn't really know what to make of JR's
assertion regarding the distributive vs. collective existence of the
communicational community--the translation into Peircean terms is very
helpful.
I take your point about JR having the life of a Peircean symbol in mind in
paragraph 23, with all that that concept implies. When this is factored in,
it is clear that the form of life is something to which the inquirer
belongs, not one that is coterminous with the inquirer's individual being
(my initial reading). This is one moment in the paper when it seems
particularly difficult to speak in the spirit of Peirce, as JR certainly is
doing, without also speaking in his exact terms as well--without using
explicitly Peirce's definition of the symbol and making all that that
definition entails clear. In this respect, JR's use of "form of life" does
seem to be a good alternative, however. Even if the physicists weren't
familiar with Wittgenstein's distinctive notion of "grammar" and its
relation to the practices of language games and the forms of life they
sustain, the phrase still conveys in a common sensical way that there is a
larger reality to which an individual inquirer, as an "inquirer,"
necessarily belongs.
The compatibility of Wittgenstein and Peirce is a topic of interest to me. I
have been struck repeatedly by how closely Wittgenstein's thinking can align
with Peirce's. If any listers know of work done that compares these two
philosophers, I would appreciate any references. Perhaps this needs a
different thread, however.
Thanks again,
Sally
Sally,
JR's "overall form of life" does sound more like Wittgenstein's Lebensform
than a Peircean idiom, but as i think you mentioned before, he seems to be
going out of his way here to avoid Peircean terminology that might put off
the people he's addressing. However it does seem to me quite compatible with
Peirce's ideas on scientific inquiry. I don't think i'd agree that JR
"locates truth entirely within the "life" of the inquirer, not in the
subject matter that determines the inquirer's inquiry, and not in any
relation that the inquirer and the subject-matter might be maintaining to
one another". We're talking about the life of a symbol here, and a genuine
symbol must involve both indexical and iconic components in generating an
interpretant, which does imply a relation between the inquirer and the
subject-matter (to put it in less Peircean terms).
Speaking of the "communicational community", JR's assertion that it "exists
distributively not collectively" looks at first more individualistic than
anything Peirce would say, but i think makes a more Peircean sense if we
bear in mind the typical Peircean distinction between reality and existence.
I think Peirce would say that the community as a "form of life" is more real
than the individual inquirer, but it only exists in the actual practice of
individual inquirers. And that practice, to be genuine, requires an
objective focus on "subject-specific properties", as JR puts it in paragraph
23.
That's how i see it, anyway.
Gary F.
} Sincerity is incommunicable because it becomes insincere by being
communicated. [Luhmann] {
www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studie
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities" Segment 5
Michael,
Thanks so much. I look forward to pursuing this.
Sally
Sally - On Wittgenstein and CSP: you can mine a fair number of
downloadable articles if you Google the two names [and I'd be happy
to send some I have downloaded]. John Upper [who was at Queens U,
Ontario] had done an early master's thesis, I believe, comparing the
two. Later, Jaime Nubiola, on this list still, I believe, did an
overview of scholarship on the two in 1996. Catherine Legg
[Melbourne] - also on this list for some time, and possibly still --
had an interesting piece on rules, pragmatism, and skepticism. And
there was some years back, and may still be, a Peirce-Wittgenstein
research group at U Quebec. The themes of doubt, certainty, and
rules seem to run through most of these articles, with reference a
few times to this comment from Wittgenstein's "On Certainty": "So I
am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism."
Similarities, yes; but many differences, too. It would be an
interesting thread.
From: C S Peirce discussion list
[mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Sally Ness
Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2011 5:51 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational
Communities" Segment 5
Gary F., List,
Thanks, Gary, for this response. I didn't really know what to make
of JR's assertion regarding the distributive vs. collective
existence of the communicational community--the translation into
Peircean terms is very helpful.
I take your point about JR having the life of a Peircean symbol in
mind in paragraph 23, with all that that concept implies. When this
is factored in, it is clear that the form of life is something to
which the inquirer belongs, not one that is coterminous with the
inquirer's individual being (my initial reading). This is one
moment in the paper when it seems particularly difficult to speak in
the spirit of Peirce, as JR certainly is doing, without also
speaking in his exact terms as well--without using explicitly
Peirce's definition of the symbol and making all that that
definition entails clear. In this respect, JR's use of "form of
life" does seem to be a good alternative, however. Even if the
physicists weren't familiar with Wittgenstein's distinctive notion
of "grammar" and its relation to the practices of language games and
the forms of life they sustain, the phrase still conveys in a common
sensical way that there is a larger reality to which an individual
inquirer, as an "inquirer," necessarily belongs.
The compatibility of Wittgenstein and Peirce is a topic of interest
to me. I have been struck repeatedly by how closely Wittgenstein's
thinking can align with Peirce's. If any listers know of work done
that compares these two philosophers, I would appreciate any
references. Perhaps this needs a different thread, however.
Thanks again,
Sally
Sally,
JR's "overall form of life" does sound more like Wittgenstein's
Lebensform than a Peircean idiom, but as i think you mentioned
before, he seems to be going out of his way here to avoid Peircean
terminology that might put off the people he's addressing. However
it does seem to me quite compatible with Peirce's ideas on
scientific inquiry. I don't think i'd agree that JR "locates truth
entirely within the "life" of the inquirer, not in the subject
matter that determines the inquirer's inquiry, and not in any
relation that the inquirer and the subject-matter might be
maintaining to one another". We're talking about the life of a
symbol here, and a genuine symbol must involve both indexical and
iconic components in generating an interpretant, which does imply a
relation between the inquirer and the subject-matter (to put it in
less Peircean terms).
Speaking of the "communicational community", JR's assertion that it
"exists distributively not collectively" looks at first more
individualistic than anything Peirce would say, but i think makes a
more Peircean sense if we bear in mind the typical Peircean
distinction between reality and existence. I think Peirce would say
that the community as a "form of life" is more real than the
individual inquirer, but it only exists in the actual practice of
individual inquirers. And that practice, to be genuine, requires an
objective focus on "subject-specific properties", as JR puts it in
paragraph 23.
That's how i see it, anyway.
Gary F.
} Sincerity is incommunicable because it becomes insincere by being
communicated. [Luhmann] {
www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{
gnoxic studies: Peirce
From: C S Peirce discussion list
[mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Sally Ness
Sent: September-23-11 6:11 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational
Communities" Segment 5
Segment 5
List,
As Jerry Chandler has commented, how much weight the scientific
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities" Segment 5
Sally - On Wittgenstein and CSP: you can mine a fair number of downloadable
articles if you Google the two names [and I'd be happy to send some I have
downloaded]. John Upper [who was at Queens U, Ontario] had done an early
master's thesis, I believe, comparing the two. Later, Jaime Nubiola, on this
list still, I believe, did an overview of scholarship on the two in 1996.
Catherine Legg [Melbourne] - also on this list for some time, and possibly
still -- had an interesting piece on rules, pragmatism, and skepticism. And
there was some years back, and may still be, a Peirce-Wittgenstein research
group at U Quebec. The themes of doubt, certainty, and rules seem to run
through most of these articles, with reference a few times to this comment
from Wittgenstein's "On Certainty": "So I am trying to say something that
sounds like pragmatism."
Similarities, yes; but many differences, too. It would be an interesting
thread.
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
Behalf Of Sally Ness
Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2011 5:51 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational
Communities" Segment 5
Gary F., List,
Thanks, Gary, for this response. I didn't really know what to make of JR's
assertion regarding the distributive vs. collective existence of the
communicational community--the translation into Peircean terms is very
helpful.
I take your point about JR having the life of a Peircean symbol in mind in
paragraph 23, with all that that concept implies. When this is factored in,
it is clear that the form of life is something to which the inquirer
belongs, not one that is coterminous with the inquirer's individual being
(my initial reading). This is one moment in the paper when it seems
particularly difficult to speak in the spirit of Peirce, as JR certainly is
doing, without also speaking in his exact terms as well--without using
explicitly Peirce's definition of the symbol and making all that that
definition entails clear. In this respect, JR's use of "form of life" does
seem to be a good alternative, however. Even if the physicists weren't
familiar with Wittgenstein's distinctive notion of "grammar" and its
relation to the practices of language games and the forms of life they
sustain, the phrase still conveys in a common sensical way that there is a
larger reality to which an individual inquirer, as an "inquirer,"
necessarily belongs.
The compatibility of Wittgenstein and Peirce is a topic of interest to me. I
have been struck repeatedly by how closely Wittgenstein's thinking can align
with Peirce's. If any listers know of work done that compares these two
philosophers, I would appreciate any references. Perhaps this needs a
different thread, however.
Thanks again,
Sally
Sally,
JR's "overall form of life" does sound more like Wittgenstein's Lebensform
than a Peircean idiom, but as i think you mentioned before, he seems to be
going out of his way here to avoid Peircean terminology that might put off
the people he's addressing. However it does seem to me quite compatible with
Peirce's ideas on scientific inquiry. I don't think i'd agree that JR
"locates truth entirely within the "life" of the inquirer, not in the
subject matter that determines the inquirer's inquiry, and not in any
relation that the inquirer and the subject-matter might be maintaining to
one another". We're talking about the life of a symbol here, and a genuine
symbol must involve both indexical and iconic components in generating an
interpretant, which does imply a relation between the inquirer and the
subject-matter (to put it in less Peircean terms).
Speaking of the "communicational community", JR's assertion that it "exists
distributively not collectively" looks at first more individualistic than
anything Peirce would say, but i think makes a more Peircean sense if we
bear in mind the typical Peircean distinction between reality and existence.
I think Peirce would say that the community as a "form of life" is more real
than the individual inquirer, but it only exists in the actual practice of
individual inquirers. And that practice, to be genuine, requires an
objective focus on "subject-specific properties", as JR puts it in paragraph
23.
That's how i see it, anyway.
Gary F.
} Sincerity is incommunicable because it becomes insincere by being
communicated. [Luhmann] {
www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
Behalf Of Sally Ness
Sent: September-23-11 6:11 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities"
Segment 5
Segment 5
List,
As Jerry Chandler has commented, how much weight the scientific community
places on the concept of sincerity may be open to doubt. However, there is
little doubt about the weight the community places on the co
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities" Segment 5
Gary F., List,
Thanks, Gary, for this response. I didn't really know what to make
of JR's assertion regarding the distributive vs. collective existence
of the communicational community--the translation into Peircean terms
is very helpful.
I take your point about JR having the life of a Peircean symbol in
mind in paragraph 23, with all that that concept implies. When this
is factored in, it is clear that the form of life is something to
which the inquirer belongs, not one that is coterminous with the
inquirer's individual being (my initial reading). This is one moment
in the paper when it seems particularly difficult to speak in the
spirit of Peirce, as JR certainly is doing, without also speaking in
his exact terms as well--without using explicitly Peirce's definition
of the symbol and making all that that definition entails clear. In
this respect, JR's use of "form of life" does seem to be a good
alternative, however. Even if the physicists weren't familiar with
Wittgenstein's distinctive notion of "grammar" and its relation to
the practices of language games and the forms of life they sustain,
the phrase still conveys in a common sensical way that there is a
larger reality to which an individual inquirer, as an "inquirer,"
necessarily belongs.
The compatibility of Wittgenstein and Peirce is a topic of interest
to me. I have been struck repeatedly by how closely Wittgenstein's
thinking can align with Peirce's. If any listers know of work done
that compares these two philosophers, I would appreciate any
references. Perhaps this needs a different thread, however.
Thanks again,
Sally
Sally,
JR's "overall form of life" does sound more like Wittgenstein's
Lebensform than a Peircean idiom, but as i think you mentioned
before, he seems to be going out of his way here to avoid Peircean
terminology that might put off the people he's addressing. However
it does seem to me quite compatible with Peirce's ideas on
scientific inquiry. I don't think i'd agree that JR "locates truth
entirely within the "life" of the inquirer, not in the subject
matter that determines the inquirer's inquiry, and not in any
relation that the inquirer and the subject-matter might be
maintaining to one another". We're talking about the life of a
symbol here, and a genuine symbol must involve both indexical and
iconic components in generating an interpretant, which does imply a
relation between the inquirer and the subject-matter (to put it in
less Peircean terms).
Speaking of the "communicational community", JR's assertion that it
"exists distributively not collectively" looks at first more
individualistic than anything Peirce would say, but i think makes a
more Peircean sense if we bear in mind the typical Peircean
distinction between reality and existence. I think Peirce would say
that the community as a "form of life" is more real than the
individual inquirer, but it only exists in the actual practice of
individual inquirers. And that practice, to be genuine, requires an
objective focus on "subject-specific properties", as JR puts it in
paragraph 23.
That's how i see it, anyway.
Gary F.
} Sincerity is incommunicable because it becomes insincere by being
communicated. [Luhmann] {
www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{
gnoxic studies: Peirce
From: C S Peirce discussion list
[mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Sally Ness
Sent: September-23-11 6:11 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational
Communities" Segment 5
Segment 5
List,
As Jerry Chandler has commented, how much weight the scientific
community places on the concept of sincerity may be open to doubt.
However, there is little doubt about the weight the community places
on the concept of truth. The fifth segment of the paper, "Sciences
as Communicational Communities," which is composed of paragraphs 22
and 23 (reproduced below), focuses directly and mainly on the
concept of truth.
Given the interest that has already been shown in this concept on
previous posts, and the expertise many listers have already
demonstrated with respect to philosophical discourses focusing on
this concept, I am going to leave the main points of this segment
open for response by those who have much greater philosophical
understanding of them than I. I will attempt little more in what
follows than a reprise of the contents of the segment that
identifies a few instances where more elaboration, definition, and
discussion from those who would be inclined to provide it would be
particularly helpful. I hope that listers with greater knowledge of
Peirce's thinking with respect to the concept of truth will come
forward to fill in the record in these and other respects.
JR's language seems to depart more markedly from the letter, if not
the spirit, of Peirce in this penultimate segment than in any other
part of the pap
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities" Segment 5
Sally,
JR's “overall form of life” does sound more like Wittgenstein's Lebensform than
a Peircean idiom, but as i think you mentioned before, he seems to be going out
of his way here to avoid Peircean terminology that might put off the people
he’s addressing. However it does seem to me quite compatible with Peirce’s
ideas on scientific inquiry. I don’t think i’d agree that JR “locates truth
entirely within the "life" of the inquirer, not in the subject matter that
determines the inquirer's inquiry, and not in any relation that the inquirer
and the subject-matter might be maintaining to one another”. We’re talking
about the life of a symbol here, and a genuine symbol must involve both
indexical and iconic components in generating an interpretant, which does imply
a relation between the inquirer and the subject-matter (to put it in less
Peircean terms).
Speaking of the “communicational community”, JR’s assertion that it “exists
distributively not collectively” looks at first more individualistic than
anything Peirce would say, but i think makes a more Peircean sense if we bear
in mind the typical Peircean distinction between reality and existence. I think
Peirce would say that the community as a “form of life” is more real than the
individual inquirer, but it only exists in the actual practice of individual
inquirers. And that practice, to be genuine, requires an objective focus on
“subject-specific properties”, as JR puts it in paragraph 23.
That’s how i see it, anyway.
Gary F.
} Sincerity is incommunicable because it becomes insincere by being
communicated. [Luhmann] {
www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf
Of Sally Ness
Sent: September-23-11 6:11 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities"
Segment 5
Segment 5
List,
As Jerry Chandler has commented, how much weight the scientific community
places on the concept of sincerity may be open to doubt. However, there is
little doubt about the weight the community places on the concept of truth.
The fifth segment of the paper, "Sciences as Communicational Communities,"
which is composed of paragraphs 22 and 23 (reproduced below), focuses directly
and mainly on the concept of truth.
Given the interest that has already been shown in this concept on previous
posts, and the expertise many listers have already demonstrated with respect to
philosophical discourses focusing on this concept, I am going to leave the main
points of this segment open for response by those who have much greater
philosophical understanding of them than I. I will attempt little more in what
follows than a reprise of the contents of the segment that identifies a few
instances where more elaboration, definition, and discussion from those who
would be inclined to provide it would be particularly helpful. I hope that
listers with greater knowledge of Peirce's thinking with respect to the concept
of truth will come forward to fill in the record in these and other respects.
JR's language seems to depart more markedly from the letter, if not the spirit,
of Peirce in this penultimate segment than in any other part of the paper. JR
acknowledges this somewhat at the outset of the segment, but claims that what
he is presenting is an original insight from Peirce, forging one of the
strongest explicit links to Peirce that appears in the paper in so doing. JR
uses the concept of "assertion indicator" to identify the "force" of truth in
the predicate "is true." "Assertion indicator" is the first of several
concepts, such as "speech-act," "communicational act," and "appropriate
responsiveness" that appear to be referencing something other than Peirce's
own terminology. I am guessing that Austin's speech act theory is in the
background here, but I doubt this is the only non-Peircean frame of reference.
Additional identification of what literature JR is most likely drawing on here
would be much appreciated. JR indicates that he has gone further elsewhere in
his work with these concepts. Perhaps we will see them again in a later paper.
In any case, JR's key point in paragraph 22 is that truth ought to be
understood, for the purposes at hand at least, in terms of its manifestation in
relation to a verbal sign, and a predicate sign specifically, a sign that does
not convey "content" (as the subject of the sentence would be doing). Rather,
the predicate sign directs those who are interpreting the sentence to do so in
a manner that is in accordance with the norms that govern their communicational
processes generally speaking. In other words, the phrase, "is true," is a
signal designed to compel normative communicative action, nothing more, nothing
less. JR specifies that this signalling is not to be confused with any
function that spee
