[peirce-l] "Varieties of Analytic Pragmatism"

[Catherine Legg]

Read a paper the other day which I really enjoyed and wanted to share the
reference here:

*Danielle Macbeth, "Varieties of Analytic Pragmatism", Philosophia 40
(1):27-39.*

*http://philpapers.org/rec/MACVOA*

Basically Macbeth dissects the version of pragmatism put forward by Robert
Brandom in his recent John Locke lectures, and argues that what he is doing
with logical diagrams is not at all what Kant and Peirce were doing.
Previously she had mainly worked on logical diagrams in Frege, so I'm
interested that she is turning to Peirce.

Anyway here is the official abstract:

"In his Locke Lectures Brandom proposes to extend what he calls the project
of analysis to encompass various relationships between meaning and use. As
the traditional project of analysis sought to clarify various logical
relations between vocabularies so Brandom’s extended project seeks to
clarify various pragmatically mediated semantic relations between
vocabularies. The point of the exercise in both cases is to achieve what
Brandom thinks of as algebraic understanding. Because the pragmatist
critique of the traditional project of analysis was precisely to deny that
such understanding is appropriate to the case of natural language, the very
idea of an analytic pragmatism is called into question by that critique. My
aim is to clarify the prospects for Brandom’s project, or at least
something in the vicinity of that project, through a comparison of it with
what I will suggest we can think of as Kant’s analytic pragmatism as
developed by Peirce."

Cheers, Cathy

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Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

[Catherine Legg]

Hi Steven,

I'm afraid I must join my voice to those who feel they would not pick
up the book based on your blurb (or preface - why call it a
'Proemial'? What is a 'proemial'??) below.

Though many of the component ideas are interesting, your overall
expression of them seems to display a grandiosity which is a red flag
to a serious philosopher. In particular there is this sentence which
you put right upfront:

"...something so profound that it would not only have a broad impact
upon the entire species but the universe itself could not proceed,
could not evolve, without consideration of it."

I don't see how you could possibly know this - what scientific
methodology might deliver this result.

Loving the interesting range of 'hands-on' critical perspectives
already generously provided by Peirce-listers...

Cheers, Cathy

On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 3:35 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith  wrote:
> Dear List,
>
> I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book "On The Origin Of 
> Experience" and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you 
> challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have 
> developed an aversion to using the term "consciousness," which seems to me to 
> be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my wife) 
> argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the vague 
> "transhumanism" concerns me.
>
> Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read the book?
>
>
> Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience
>
> Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would not only 
> have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe itself could not 
> proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.
>
> This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of 
> mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than 
> viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it 
> suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes 
> that an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which it 
> would not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.
>
> Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be constructed with 
> a fundamental understanding of what is required to build living, thinking, 
> machines, machines that have the capability of any living system to heal and 
> reproduce.
>
> The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience, may be 
> an essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that 
> intelligent species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the 
> natural dynamics of the unfolding world.
>
> Such a species would become the evolved “intelligent designers” of life, 
> extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary evolution, 
> an inevitable part of nature's “plan” to move life beyond its dependence upon 
> the environment in which it first evolves.
>
> If this is the case then our species, along with other such species that may 
> appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the unfolding of 
> the world.
>
> In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding the 
> science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show us the detailed 
> composition and dynamics of biophysical structure. For the record, it's 
> nothing like a modern computer system.
>
> The results of this global effort are Galilean in their scope and pregnant 
> with implication. It is surely only a matter of time before we move to the 
> Newtonian stage in the development of our understanding and learn the details 
> of how sense is formed and modified, the role that sense plays in our 
> directed actions, and how intelligent thought functions.
>
> Today, however, there is only a poor understanding of the mechanics of sense. 
> Theorists have had little time to give the new data deep consideration.
>
> Clearly, more biophysical experiments, more observational data, will help us. 
> If we look at the history of science this period is analogous to the period 
> before Newton, in which experimentalists and observers such as Galileo and 
> Copernicus built the foundations of Newton's inquiry. A breakthrough of a 
> kind similar to Newton's discovery of gravitation is required.
>
> But to make this breakthrough it is the discipline of the logicians that we 
> need to recall. Before the age of sterile twentieth century logic, when 
> mathematical logic was first developed and before modern computers were 
> invented, it is the logicians that concerned themselves with explaining the 
> nature and operation of thought and sense. Recall that George Boole 
> (1815-1864) entitled his work on logic The Laws Of Thought[1] and the founder 
> of modern logic, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), wrote the book entitled Sense And 
> Reference[2]. I know from experience that it is a surprise to many that use

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

[Phyllis Chiasson]

No, I haven't heard of these; I will check them out. I do refer to the
research of Kanneman and Taversky who applied social research on
orientations to uncertainty to economic prediction.

Thanks

-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] 
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 3:37 PM
To: Phyllis Chiasson
Cc: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

Hi Phyllis,

Do you know the work of Sorrentino and Roney on orientations to uncertainty?

| Sorrentino, Richard M., and Roney, Christopher J.R. (2000),
| The Uncertain Mind : Individual Differences in Facing the Unknown,
| (Essays in Social Psychology, Miles Hewstone (ed.)), Taylor and Francis,
| Philadelphia, PA.

We had been discussing this on The Wikipedia Review a few years ago,
so there will be a few excerpts and additional links on this thread:

http://wikipediareview.com/index.php?showtopic=15318

Regards,

Jon

-- 

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

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[peirce-l] Fwd: Peirce Society: Program and Business Meeting Agenda

[Gary Richmond]

>>> Robert Lane  3/5/2012 4:58 PM >>>
Dear Members and Friends of the Charles S. Peirce Society,

Below is the program for our upcoming meeting, as well as the agenda  
for the subsequent business meeting. The program and agenda are also  
available at the Peirce Society's website:  
http://www.peircesociety.org/agenda-2012-04-05.html

I hope to see you in Seattle!

Best regards,
Robert Lane
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society

***

Meeting of the Charles S. Peirce Society
7-9:00 p.m., Thursday April 5, 2012
Westin Seattle
Seattle, Washington, USA


Program

Chair: Robert Lane (University of West Georgia)

Presidential Address: Risto Hilpinen (University of Miami), “Types,  
Tokens, and Words”

Jean-Marie Chevalier (Collège de France), “Peirce’s Critique of the  
First Critique: A Leibnizian False Start” (Winner of the 2011-12  
Peirce Society Essay Contest)



Business Meeting Agenda

1. Approval of minutes of the 2011 meeting (Risto Hilpinen)
[http://www.peircesociety.org/minutes/minutes-2011-04-21.html]

2. Report from the Executive Committee (Risto Hilpinen)

3. Report from the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society

4. Financial statement (Robert Lane)

5. Report from the Peirce Edition Project

6. Report from the Nominating Committee and election of new officers  
(Rosa Mayorga)

7. New business

8. Adjournment (Risto Hilpinen)




-- 
Robert Lane, Ph.D.
Associate Professor and Director of Philosophy

Editor, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society

Department of English and Philosophy
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA 30118

678 839 4745
rl...@westga.edu
http://www.westga.edu/~rlane

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[peirce-l] Fw: Peirce Society: Program and Business Meeting Agenda

[Benjamin Udell]

Forwarded. 

- Original Message - 
From: "Robert Lane" 
To: The Charles S. Peirce Society 
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 4:58 PM 
Subject: Peirce Society: Program and Business Meeting Agenda 

Dear Members and Friends of the Charles S. Peirce Society,

Below is the program for our upcoming meeting, as well as the agenda for the 
subsequent business meeting. The program and agenda are also available at the 
Peirce Society's website:  
http://www.peircesociety.org/agenda-2012-04-05.html

I hope to see you in Seattle!

Best regards,
Robert Lane
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society

***

Meeting of the Charles S. Peirce Society 
7-9:00 p.m., Thursday April 5, 2012 
Westin Seattle 
Seattle, Washington, USA

Program

Chair: Robert Lane (University of West Georgia)

Presidential Address: Risto Hilpinen (University of Miami), "Types,  Tokens, 
and Words"

Jean-Marie Chevalier (Collège de France), "Peirce's Critique of the First 
Critique: A Leibnizian False Start" (Winner of the 2011-12 Peirce Society Essay 
Contest)

Business Meeting Agenda

1. Approval of minutes of the 2011 meeting (Risto Hilpinen)
http://www.peircesociety.org/minutes/minutes-2011-04-21.html

2. Report from the Executive Committee (Risto Hilpinen)

3. Report from the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society

4. Financial statement (Robert Lane)

5. Report from the Peirce Edition Project

6. Report from the Nominating Committee and election of new officers  (Rosa 
Mayorga)

7. New business

8. Adjournment (Risto Hilpinen)

-- 

Robert Lane, Ph.D.
Associate Professor and Director of Philosophy 

Editor, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society

Department of English and Philosophy
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA 30118

[telephone and email] 
http://www.westga.edu/~rlane

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

[Jon Awbrey]

Hi Phyllis,

Do you know the work of Sorrentino and Roney on orientations to uncertainty?

| Sorrentino, Richard M., and Roney, Christopher J.R. (2000),
| The Uncertain Mind : Individual Differences in Facing the Unknown,
| (Essays in Social Psychology, Miles Hewstone (ed.)), Taylor and Francis,
| Philadelphia, PA.

We had been discussing this on The Wikipedia Review a few years ago,
so there will be a few excerpts and additional links on this thread:

http://wikipediareview.com/index.php?showtopic=15318

Regards,

Jon

--

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv.  To 
remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the 
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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

[Catherine Legg]

Very interesting - thanks, Phyllis!
Cathy

On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 8:47 AM, Phyllis Chiasson  wrote:
> Gary, Cathy and Listers,
>
> I have been a Peirce-list lurker for some time and have enjoyed reading
> discussions. Until I finished galley proofs for my latest book I did not
> allow myself to post. I have a short window here before I have to clean up
> my next book and send it in.
>
> Yes, Cathy, we have been applying these concepts to human subjects since
> 1978 when the non-verbal assessment was first developed, first in school
> settings and in day treatment programs (mostly for adolescents). We began
> applying the assessments in business settings in 1986 by performing
> site-specific validations. In 2002, we received a grant to begin formal
> validity and reliability studies; these were performed at the University of
> Oregon decision sciences center. The study found very high inter-rater
> reliability and good re-test reliability (though the re-tests were performed
> too close to the original for us to feel comfortable with those results).
> Discriminate validity studies found a strong correlation between different
> non-verbal thinking processes and The Need for Cognition Scale, which is a
> paper and pencil questionnaire that addresses intellectual curiosity.
>
> However, thoroughgoing validity studies will require operational
> evaluations, which is why Jayne and I wrote this new book: Relational
> Thinking Styles and Natural Intelligence: Assessing inference patterns for
> computational modeling.
>
> This information should be a useful platform for developing predictive
> models of the operations and outcomes of human systems and programs modeled
> on human systems. We refer throughout the book to E. David Ford's book:
> Scientific Method for Ecological Research. It is a thoroughly Peircean guide
> to researching complex open systems, as are eco-systems. These patterns will
> require a similar approach. We are hoping to interest someone(s) with
> research/computer modeling backgrounds (which neither of us possess) to
> carry on this work.
>
> Regards,
> Phyllis
>
> BTW Cathy: I see that you are in Auckland. My husband and I love New
> Zealand! We visited our daughter and her family there (Torbay, to be exact)
> during the years that her husband was posted there. They are now in Sydney.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
> Behalf Of Catherine Legg
> Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
> Induction
>
> Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list!
>
> The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline
> below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how
> you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live
> human subjects, but how / where /when?
>
> Best regards, Cathy
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson  wrote:
>> This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this
>> issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in
> April
>> from IGI Global).
>>
>> When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual
>> (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like
>> Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of
>> exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to
>> juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a
>> phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and
>> re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more
>> phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to
> be
>> represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities
>> and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a
>> non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of
>> them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed.
>>
>> On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in
>> nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively
>> quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before
> determining
>> a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in
>> the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal,
> all
>> of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for
>> achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process,
>> except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve
> the
>> general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the
>> abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily
>> derivative.
>>
>> Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal
> and
>> apply famil

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

[Phyllis Chiasson]

-Original Message-
From: Phyllis Chiasson [mailto:ath...@olympus.net] 
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 12:48 PM
To: 'Catherine Legg'
Subject: RE: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
Induction

Gary, Cathy and Listers,

I have been a Peirce-list lurker for some time and have enjoyed reading
discussions. Until I finished galley proofs for my latest book I did not
allow myself to post. I have a short window here before I have to clean up
my next book and send it in.

Yes, Cathy, we have been applying these concepts to human subjects since
1978 when the non-verbal assessment was first developed, first in school
settings and in day treatment programs (mostly for adolescents). We began
applying the assessments in business settings in 1986 by performing
site-specific validations. In 2002, we received a grant to begin formal
validity and reliability studies; these were performed at the University of
Oregon decision sciences center. The study found very high inter-rater
reliability and good re-test reliability (though the re-tests were performed
too close to the original for us to feel comfortable with those results).
Discriminate validity studies found a strong correlation between different
non-verbal thinking processes and The Need for Cognition Scale, which is a
paper and pencil questionnaire that addresses intellectual curiosity.

However, thoroughgoing validity studies will require operational
evaluations, which is why Jayne and I wrote this new book: Relational
Thinking Styles and Natural Intelligence: Assessing inference patterns for
computational modeling. 

This information should be a useful platform for developing predictive
models of the operations and outcomes of human systems and programs modeled
on human systems. We refer throughout the book to E. David Ford's book:
Scientific Method for Ecological Research. It is a thoroughly Peircean guide
to researching complex open systems, as are eco-systems. These patterns will
require a similar approach. We are hoping to interest someone(s) with
research/computer modeling backgrounds (which neither of us possess) to
carry on this work.

Regards,
Phyllis

BTW Cathy: I see that you are in Auckland. My husband and I love New
Zealand! We visited our daughter and her family there (Torbay, to be exact)
during the years that her husband was posted there. They are now in Sydney.

-Original Message-
From: Catherine Legg [mailto:cl...@waikato.ac.nz] 
Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 PM
To: Phyllis Chiasson
Cc: PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list!

The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline
below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how
you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live
human subjects, but how / where /when?

Best regards, Cathy

On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson  wrote:
> This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this
> issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in
April
> from IGI Global).
>
> When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual
> (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like
> Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of
> exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to
> juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a
> phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and
> re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more
> phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to
be
> represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities
> and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a
> non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of
> them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed.
>
> On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in
> nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively
> quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before
determining
> a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in
> the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal,
all
> of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for
> achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process,
> except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve
the
> general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the
> abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily
> derivative.
>
> Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal
and
> apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither
> exploratory

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

[Phyllis Chiasson]

Steven,

I like this and do not think it at all overblown. I don't have my Peirce
disk with me here in Tucson, but somewhere in it Peirce states that "God"
could not have consciousness because consciousness requires the capability
for sensation from which to experience and thus be conscious, something that
Peirce's conception of God does not have. 

However, it seems to me that a machine could be thought to fulfill that
requirement for a sort of consciousness as long as it possesses prostheses
that enable it to experience its environment and some way of interpreting
that experience. For example, the Mars-lander picked up (tactile) and
analyzed (interpreted) the contents of materials and then provided that
information (communicated) to scientists on earth. 

Yet, I suspect that you would encounter resistance from readers if you
termed the sort of possibilities you are addressing as consciousness, as we
are still a highly anthropomorphic civilization and many (though perhaps not
your intended readers) may be insulted by the idea that such non-living
constructions might be construed as conscious.

  Regards,
Phyllis

-Original Message-
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 7:36 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

Dear List,

I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book "On The Origin Of
Experience" and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you
challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have
developed an aversion to using the term "consciousness," which seems to me
to be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my
wife) argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the
vague "transhumanism" concerns me. 

Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read the
book?


Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would not only
have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe itself could
not proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.

This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of
mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than
viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it
suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes
that an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which it
would not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.

Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be constructed with
a fundamental understanding of what is required to build living, thinking,
machines, machines that have the capability of any living system to heal and
reproduce.

The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience, may be
an essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that
intelligent species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the
natural dynamics of the unfolding world.

Such a species would become the evolved "intelligent designers" of life,
extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary evolution,
an inevitable part of nature's "plan" to move life beyond its dependence
upon the environment in which it first evolves.

If this is the case then our species, along with other such species that may
appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the unfolding
of the world.

In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding the
science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show us the detailed
composition and dynamics of biophysical structure. For the record, it's
nothing like a modern computer system.

The results of this global effort are Galilean in their scope and pregnant
with implication. It is surely only a matter of time before we move to the
Newtonian stage in the development of our understanding and learn the
details of how sense is formed and modified, the role that sense plays in
our directed actions, and how intelligent thought functions.

Today, however, there is only a poor understanding of the mechanics of
sense. Theorists have had little time to give the new data deep
consideration.

Clearly, more biophysical experiments, more observational data, will help
us. If we look at the history of science this period is analogous to the
period before Newton, in which experimentalists and observers such as
Galileo and Copernicus built the foundations of Newton's inquiry. A
breakthrough of a kind similar to Newton's discovery of gravitation is
required.

But to make this breakthrough it is the discipline of the logicians that we
need to recall. Before the age of sterile twentieth century logic, when
mathematical logic was first developed and before modern computers were
invented, it is the logicians that concerned thems

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear Malgosia,

By "sense" I refer to the variety of differentiations of experience, be it the 
text book classifications, pain, electroception, or thought. I have only one 
"meaning," one behavior, in mind.

A more extensive summary of the work can be found at http://iase.info. If you 
are interested I will be happy to send you a digital copy of Volume 1 of 
"Explaining Experience In Nature: The Foundations Of Logic and Apprehension" 
that provides more details of my work.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 5, 2012, at 8:37 AM, malgosia askanas wrote:

> Steven,  could you explain what you mean by "sense" in your post below (the 
> "sense" for which you trust there is a mechanical explanation)?  In your 
> blurb, you seem to use the word in at least 3 different meanings.  
> 
> Talking about Aetherometry, I think you might find the Correas' book 
> "Nanometric Functions of Bioenergy", large parts of which address questions 
> of the specificity and logic of the living,  to be of considerable interest 
> and relevance to your work.
> 
> -malgosia
> 
> At 1:15 AM -0800 3/5/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
>> I will take the strong emotion to be both positive and competitive. It's a 
>> first draft cover piece and you are right to correct me concerning Frege's 
>> Sense and Reference, thank you.
>> 
>> "The mechanics of sense" simply refers to the mechanism characterizing sense 
>> in biophysics, I assume that there is such a mechanism. Hence, I do not view 
>> sense as incorporeal, nor do I view the scientific mechanism as facing 
>> demise.
>> 
>> You are, I know, an authority on the lack of substance (Aetherometry). :-)
>> 
>> I appreciate your input Malgosia and will certainly consider it.
>> 
>> With respect,
>> Steven
>> 
>> 
>> --
>>  Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>>  Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
>>  http://iase.info
>> 
> 

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Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

[malgosia askanas]

Steven,  could you explain what you mean by "sense" in your post below (the 
"sense" for which you trust there is a mechanical explanation)?  In your blurb, 
you seem to use the word in at least 3 different meanings.  

Talking about Aetherometry, I think you might find the Correas' book 
"Nanometric Functions of Bioenergy", large parts of which address questions of 
the specificity and logic of the living,  to be of considerable interest and 
relevance to your work.

-malgosia

At 1:15 AM -0800 3/5/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
>I will take the strong emotion to be both positive and competitive. It's a 
>first draft cover piece and you are right to correct me concerning Frege's 
>Sense and Reference, thank you.
>
>"The mechanics of sense" simply refers to the mechanism characterizing sense 
>in biophysics, I assume that there is such a mechanism. Hence, I do not view 
>sense as incorporeal, nor do I view the scientific mechanism as facing demise.
>
>You are, I know, an authority on the lack of substance (Aetherometry). :-)
>
>I appreciate your input Malgosia and will certainly consider it.
>
>With respect,
>Steven
>
>
>--
>   Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>   Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
>   http://iase.info
>

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the 
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Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

[Khadimir]

I would agree with the general thrust of the comments that more specificity
is needed early.  The current text appears to be motivated by a question
that it unfolds.  I think that is a fine rhetorical device, however, it
needs to unroll in a few sentences and then hit us with an answer very
quickly.

Jason

On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 7:24 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:

> I could not enter the text. The old journalistic *who what where when why
> and how* would perhaps be useful. Three or four brisk paragraphs
> addressing these questions.
>
> In this *adjective* study* name verb* *What*
>
> *Where* = into what stream of thought does this text fit
>
> *When* = past present or future
>
> *Why* = why is this needed - original - important
>
> *How *= The meat of the text - a CSP third - an implementation
>
> Cheers, S
> *ShortFormContent at Blogger* 
>
>
>
> On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 4:15 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
>
>> I will take the strong emotion to be both positive and competitive. It's
>> a first draft cover piece and you are right to correct me concerning
>> Frege's Sense and Reference, thank you.
>>
>> "The mechanics of sense" simply refers to the mechanism characterizing
>> sense in biophysics, I assume that there is such a mechanism. Hence, I do
>> not view sense as incorporeal, nor do I view the scientific mechanism as
>> facing demise.
>>
>> You are, I know, an authority on the lack of substance (Aetherometry). :-)
>>
>> I appreciate your input Malgosia and will certainly consider it.
>>
>> With respect,
>> Steven
>>
>>
>> --
>>Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>>Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
>>http://iase.info
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mar 4, 2012, at 10:06 PM, malgosia askanas wrote:
>>
>> > I am sorry, but this inflated piece of vacuous hype would forever
>> discourage me from having anything to do with the book.  The only half-way
>> informative tidbit is that the book concerns "a logic informed by recent
>> advances in biophysics."  By the way, "On Sense and Reference" is not a
>> book but a 25-page journal article, and it has nothing to do with either
>> the senses (such as sight or smell) or with making sense of the world.  And
>> what are the "mechanics of sense"; have we now extended scientific
>> mechanism to incorporeals, just to forestall its demise?
>> >
>> > -malgosia
>> >
>> > At 6:35 PM -0800 3/4/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
>> >> Dear List,
>> >>
>> >> I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book "On The Origin Of
>> Experience" and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that
>> you challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have
>> developed an aversion to using the term "consciousness," which seems to me
>> to be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my
>> wife) argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the
>> vague "transhumanism" concerns me.
>> >>
>> >> Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read
>> the book?
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience
>> >>
>> >> Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would
>> not only have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe
>> itself could not proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.
>> >>
>> >> This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of
>> mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than
>> viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it
>> suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes
>> that an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which
>> it would not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.
>> >>
>> >> Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be
>> constructed with a fundamental understanding of what is required to build
>> living, thinking, machines, machines that have the capability of any living
>> system to heal and reproduce.
>> >>
>> >> The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience,
>> may be an essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that
>> intelligent species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the
>> natural dynamics of the unfolding world.
>> >>
>> >> Such a species would become the evolved ³intelligent designers² of
>> life, extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary
>> evolution, an inevitable part of nature's ³plan² to move life beyond its
>> dependence upon the environment in which it first evolves.
>> >>
>> >> If this is the case then our species, along with other such species
>> that may appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the
>> unfolding of the world.
>> >>
>> >> In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding
>> the science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show u

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

[Stephen C. Rose]

I could not enter the text. The old journalistic *who what where when why
and how* would perhaps be useful. Three or four brisk paragraphs addressing
these questions.

In this *adjective* study* name verb* *What*

*Where* = into what stream of thought does this text fit

*When* = past present or future

*Why* = why is this needed - original - important

*How *= The meat of the text - a CSP third - an implementation

Cheers, S
*ShortFormContent at Blogger* 



On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 4:15 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

> I will take the strong emotion to be both positive and competitive. It's a
> first draft cover piece and you are right to correct me concerning Frege's
> Sense and Reference, thank you.
>
> "The mechanics of sense" simply refers to the mechanism characterizing
> sense in biophysics, I assume that there is such a mechanism. Hence, I do
> not view sense as incorporeal, nor do I view the scientific mechanism as
> facing demise.
>
> You are, I know, an authority on the lack of substance (Aetherometry). :-)
>
> I appreciate your input Malgosia and will certainly consider it.
>
> With respect,
> Steven
>
>
> --
>Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
>http://iase.info
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mar 4, 2012, at 10:06 PM, malgosia askanas wrote:
>
> > I am sorry, but this inflated piece of vacuous hype would forever
> discourage me from having anything to do with the book.  The only half-way
> informative tidbit is that the book concerns "a logic informed by recent
> advances in biophysics."  By the way, "On Sense and Reference" is not a
> book but a 25-page journal article, and it has nothing to do with either
> the senses (such as sight or smell) or with making sense of the world.  And
> what are the "mechanics of sense"; have we now extended scientific
> mechanism to incorporeals, just to forestall its demise?
> >
> > -malgosia
> >
> > At 6:35 PM -0800 3/4/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
> >> Dear List,
> >>
> >> I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book "On The Origin Of
> Experience" and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that
> you challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have
> developed an aversion to using the term "consciousness," which seems to me
> to be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my
> wife) argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the
> vague "transhumanism" concerns me.
> >>
> >> Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read
> the book?
> >>
> >>
> >> Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience
> >>
> >> Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would not
> only have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe itself
> could not proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.
> >>
> >> This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of
> mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than
> viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it
> suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes
> that an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which
> it would not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.
> >>
> >> Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be constructed
> with a fundamental understanding of what is required to build living,
> thinking, machines, machines that have the capability of any living system
> to heal and reproduce.
> >>
> >> The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience,
> may be an essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that
> intelligent species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the
> natural dynamics of the unfolding world.
> >>
> >> Such a species would become the evolved ³intelligent designers² of
> life, extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary
> evolution, an inevitable part of nature's ³plan² to move life beyond its
> dependence upon the environment in which it first evolves.
> >>
> >> If this is the case then our species, along with other such species
> that may appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the
> unfolding of the world.
> >>
> >> In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding
> the science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show us the
> detailed composition and dynamics of biophysical structure. For the record,
> it's nothing like a modern computer system.
> >>
> >> The results of this global effort are Galilean in their scope and
> pregnant with implication. It is surely only a matter of time before we
> move to the Newtonian stage in the development of our understanding and
> learn the details of how sense is formed and modified, the role that sense
> plays in our directed actions, and how intelligent thou

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

I will take the strong emotion to be both positive and competitive. It's a 
first draft cover piece and you are right to correct me concerning Frege's 
Sense and Reference, thank you. 

"The mechanics of sense" simply refers to the mechanism characterizing sense in 
biophysics, I assume that there is such a mechanism. Hence, I do not view sense 
as incorporeal, nor do I view the scientific mechanism as facing demise.

You are, I know, an authority on the lack of substance (Aetherometry). :-)

I appreciate your input Malgosia and will certainly consider it.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 4, 2012, at 10:06 PM, malgosia askanas wrote:

> I am sorry, but this inflated piece of vacuous hype would forever discourage 
> me from having anything to do with the book.  The only half-way informative 
> tidbit is that the book concerns "a logic informed by recent advances in 
> biophysics."  By the way, "On Sense and Reference" is not a book but a 
> 25-page journal article, and it has nothing to do with either the senses 
> (such as sight or smell) or with making sense of the world.  And what are the 
> "mechanics of sense"; have we now extended scientific mechanism to 
> incorporeals, just to forestall its demise?
> 
> -malgosia
> 
> At 6:35 PM -0800 3/4/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
>> Dear List,
>> 
>> I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book "On The Origin Of 
>> Experience" and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you 
>> challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have 
>> developed an aversion to using the term "consciousness," which seems to me 
>> to be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my 
>> wife) argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the 
>> vague "transhumanism" concerns me.
>> 
>> Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read the 
>> book?
>> 
>> 
>> Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience
>> 
>> Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would not only 
>> have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe itself could 
>> not proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.
>> 
>> This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of 
>> mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than 
>> viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it 
>> suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes 
>> that an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which it 
>> would not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.
>> 
>> Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be constructed with 
>> a fundamental understanding of what is required to build living, thinking, 
>> machines, machines that have the capability of any living system to heal and 
>> reproduce.
>> 
>> The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience, may be 
>> an essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that 
>> intelligent species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the 
>> natural dynamics of the unfolding world.
>> 
>> Such a species would become the evolved ³intelligent designers² of life, 
>> extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary evolution, 
>> an inevitable part of nature's ³plan² to move life beyond its dependence 
>> upon the environment in which it first evolves.
>> 
>> If this is the case then our species, along with other such species that may 
>> appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the unfolding 
>> of the world.
>> 
>> In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding the 
>> science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show us the detailed 
>> composition and dynamics of biophysical structure. For the record, it's 
>> nothing like a modern computer system.
>> 
>> The results of this global effort are Galilean in their scope and pregnant 
>> with implication. It is surely only a matter of time before we move to the 
>> Newtonian stage in the development of our understanding and learn the 
>> details of how sense is formed and modified, the role that sense plays in 
>> our directed actions, and how intelligent thought functions.
>> 
>> Today, however, there is only a poor understanding of the mechanics of 
>> sense. Theorists have had little time to give the new data deep 
>> consideration.
>> 
>> Clearly, more biophysical experiments, more observational data, will help 
>> us. If we look at the history of science this period is analogous to the 
>> period before Newton, in which experimentalists and observers such as 
>> Galileo and Copernicus built the foundations of Newton's inquiry. A 
>> breakthrough of a kind similar to Newton's discovery of gravitation is 
>> required.
>>