Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-05 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
I will take the strong emotion to be both positive and competitive. It's a 
first draft cover piece and you are right to correct me concerning Frege's 
Sense and Reference, thank you. 

The mechanics of sense simply refers to the mechanism characterizing sense in 
biophysics, I assume that there is such a mechanism. Hence, I do not view sense 
as incorporeal, nor do I view the scientific mechanism as facing demise.

You are, I know, an authority on the lack of substance (Aetherometry). :-)

I appreciate your input Malgosia and will certainly consider it.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 4, 2012, at 10:06 PM, malgosia askanas wrote:

 I am sorry, but this inflated piece of vacuous hype would forever discourage 
 me from having anything to do with the book.  The only half-way informative 
 tidbit is that the book concerns a logic informed by recent advances in 
 biophysics.  By the way, On Sense and Reference is not a book but a 
 25-page journal article, and it has nothing to do with either the senses 
 (such as sight or smell) or with making sense of the world.  And what are the 
 mechanics of sense; have we now extended scientific mechanism to 
 incorporeals, just to forestall its demise?
 
 -malgosia
 
 At 6:35 PM -0800 3/4/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
 Dear List,
 
 I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book On The Origin Of 
 Experience and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you 
 challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have 
 developed an aversion to using the term consciousness, which seems to me 
 to be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my 
 wife) argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the 
 vague transhumanism concerns me.
 
 Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read the 
 book?
 
 
 Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience
 
 Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would not only 
 have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe itself could 
 not proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.
 
 This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of 
 mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than 
 viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it 
 suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes 
 that an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which it 
 would not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.
 
 Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be constructed with 
 a fundamental understanding of what is required to build living, thinking, 
 machines, machines that have the capability of any living system to heal and 
 reproduce.
 
 The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience, may be 
 an essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that 
 intelligent species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the 
 natural dynamics of the unfolding world.
 
 Such a species would become the evolved ³intelligent designers² of life, 
 extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary evolution, 
 an inevitable part of nature's ³plan² to move life beyond its dependence 
 upon the environment in which it first evolves.
 
 If this is the case then our species, along with other such species that may 
 appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the unfolding 
 of the world.
 
 In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding the 
 science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show us the detailed 
 composition and dynamics of biophysical structure. For the record, it's 
 nothing like a modern computer system.
 
 The results of this global effort are Galilean in their scope and pregnant 
 with implication. It is surely only a matter of time before we move to the 
 Newtonian stage in the development of our understanding and learn the 
 details of how sense is formed and modified, the role that sense plays in 
 our directed actions, and how intelligent thought functions.
 
 Today, however, there is only a poor understanding of the mechanics of 
 sense. Theorists have had little time to give the new data deep 
 consideration.
 
 Clearly, more biophysical experiments, more observational data, will help 
 us. If we look at the history of science this period is analogous to the 
 period before Newton, in which experimentalists and observers such as 
 Galileo and Copernicus built the foundations of Newton's inquiry. A 
 breakthrough of a kind similar to Newton's discovery of gravitation is 
 required.
 
 But to make this breakthrough it is the discipline of the logicians that we 
 need to recall. Before the age of sterile twentieth century logic, when 
 

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-05 Thread Khadimir
I would agree with the general thrust of the comments that more specificity
is needed early.  The current text appears to be motivated by a question
that it unfolds.  I think that is a fine rhetorical device, however, it
needs to unroll in a few sentences and then hit us with an answer very
quickly.

Jason

On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 7:24 AM, Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com wrote:

 I could not enter the text. The old journalistic *who what where when why
 and how* would perhaps be useful. Three or four brisk paragraphs
 addressing these questions.

 In this *adjective* study* name verb* *What*

 *Where* = into what stream of thought does this text fit

 *When* = past present or future

 *Why* = why is this needed - original - important

 *How *= The meat of the text - a CSP third - an implementation

 Cheers, S
 *ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/



 On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 4:15 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.uswrote:

 I will take the strong emotion to be both positive and competitive. It's
 a first draft cover piece and you are right to correct me concerning
 Frege's Sense and Reference, thank you.

 The mechanics of sense simply refers to the mechanism characterizing
 sense in biophysics, I assume that there is such a mechanism. Hence, I do
 not view sense as incorporeal, nor do I view the scientific mechanism as
 facing demise.

 You are, I know, an authority on the lack of substance (Aetherometry). :-)

 I appreciate your input Malgosia and will certainly consider it.

 With respect,
 Steven


 --
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info







 On Mar 4, 2012, at 10:06 PM, malgosia askanas wrote:

  I am sorry, but this inflated piece of vacuous hype would forever
 discourage me from having anything to do with the book.  The only half-way
 informative tidbit is that the book concerns a logic informed by recent
 advances in biophysics.  By the way, On Sense and Reference is not a
 book but a 25-page journal article, and it has nothing to do with either
 the senses (such as sight or smell) or with making sense of the world.  And
 what are the mechanics of sense; have we now extended scientific
 mechanism to incorporeals, just to forestall its demise?
 
  -malgosia
 
  At 6:35 PM -0800 3/4/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
  Dear List,
 
  I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book On The Origin Of
 Experience and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that
 you challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have
 developed an aversion to using the term consciousness, which seems to me
 to be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my
 wife) argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the
 vague transhumanism concerns me.
 
  Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read
 the book?
 
 
  Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience
 
  Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would
 not only have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe
 itself could not proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.
 
  This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of
 mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than
 viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it
 suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes
 that an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which
 it would not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.
 
  Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be
 constructed with a fundamental understanding of what is required to build
 living, thinking, machines, machines that have the capability of any living
 system to heal and reproduce.
 
  The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience,
 may be an essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that
 intelligent species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the
 natural dynamics of the unfolding world.
 
  Such a species would become the evolved ³intelligent designers² of
 life, extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary
 evolution, an inevitable part of nature's ³plan² to move life beyond its
 dependence upon the environment in which it first evolves.
 
  If this is the case then our species, along with other such species
 that may appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the
 unfolding of the world.
 
  In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding
 the science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show us the
 detailed composition and dynamics of biophysical structure. For the record,
 it's nothing like a modern computer system.
 
  The results of this global effort are Galilean in their scope and
 pregnant with implication. It is 

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-05 Thread malgosia askanas
Steven,  could you explain what you mean by sense in your post below (the 
sense for which you trust there is a mechanical explanation)?  In your blurb, 
you seem to use the word in at least 3 different meanings.  

Talking about Aetherometry, I think you might find the Correas' book 
Nanometric Functions of Bioenergy, large parts of which address questions of 
the specificity and logic of the living,  to be of considerable interest and 
relevance to your work.

-malgosia

At 1:15 AM -0800 3/5/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
I will take the strong emotion to be both positive and competitive. It's a 
first draft cover piece and you are right to correct me concerning Frege's 
Sense and Reference, thank you.

The mechanics of sense simply refers to the mechanism characterizing sense 
in biophysics, I assume that there is such a mechanism. Hence, I do not view 
sense as incorporeal, nor do I view the scientific mechanism as facing demise.

You are, I know, an authority on the lack of substance (Aetherometry). :-)

I appreciate your input Malgosia and will certainly consider it.

With respect,
Steven


--
   Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
   Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
   http://iase.info


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Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-05 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear Malgosia,

By sense I refer to the variety of differentiations of experience, be it the 
text book classifications, pain, electroception, or thought. I have only one 
meaning, one behavior, in mind.

A more extensive summary of the work can be found at http://iase.info. If you 
are interested I will be happy to send you a digital copy of Volume 1 of 
Explaining Experience In Nature: The Foundations Of Logic and Apprehension 
that provides more details of my work.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 5, 2012, at 8:37 AM, malgosia askanas wrote:

 Steven,  could you explain what you mean by sense in your post below (the 
 sense for which you trust there is a mechanical explanation)?  In your 
 blurb, you seem to use the word in at least 3 different meanings.  
 
 Talking about Aetherometry, I think you might find the Correas' book 
 Nanometric Functions of Bioenergy, large parts of which address questions 
 of the specificity and logic of the living,  to be of considerable interest 
 and relevance to your work.
 
 -malgosia
 
 At 1:15 AM -0800 3/5/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
 I will take the strong emotion to be both positive and competitive. It's a 
 first draft cover piece and you are right to correct me concerning Frege's 
 Sense and Reference, thank you.
 
 The mechanics of sense simply refers to the mechanism characterizing sense 
 in biophysics, I assume that there is such a mechanism. Hence, I do not view 
 sense as incorporeal, nor do I view the scientific mechanism as facing 
 demise.
 
 You are, I know, an authority on the lack of substance (Aetherometry). :-)
 
 I appreciate your input Malgosia and will certainly consider it.
 
 With respect,
 Steven
 
 
 --
  Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
  Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
  http://iase.info
 
 

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-05 Thread Phyllis Chiasson
Steven,

I like this and do not think it at all overblown. I don't have my Peirce
disk with me here in Tucson, but somewhere in it Peirce states that God
could not have consciousness because consciousness requires the capability
for sensation from which to experience and thus be conscious, something that
Peirce's conception of God does not have. 

However, it seems to me that a machine could be thought to fulfill that
requirement for a sort of consciousness as long as it possesses prostheses
that enable it to experience its environment and some way of interpreting
that experience. For example, the Mars-lander picked up (tactile) and
analyzed (interpreted) the contents of materials and then provided that
information (communicated) to scientists on earth. 

Yet, I suspect that you would encounter resistance from readers if you
termed the sort of possibilities you are addressing as consciousness, as we
are still a highly anthropomorphic civilization and many (though perhaps not
your intended readers) may be insulted by the idea that such non-living
constructions might be construed as conscious.

  Regards,
Phyllis

-Original Message-
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 7:36 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

Dear List,

I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book On The Origin Of
Experience and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you
challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have
developed an aversion to using the term consciousness, which seems to me
to be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my
wife) argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the
vague transhumanism concerns me. 

Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read the
book?


Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would not only
have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe itself could
not proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.

This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of
mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than
viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it
suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes
that an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which it
would not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.

Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be constructed with
a fundamental understanding of what is required to build living, thinking,
machines, machines that have the capability of any living system to heal and
reproduce.

The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience, may be
an essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that
intelligent species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the
natural dynamics of the unfolding world.

Such a species would become the evolved intelligent designers of life,
extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary evolution,
an inevitable part of nature's plan to move life beyond its dependence
upon the environment in which it first evolves.

If this is the case then our species, along with other such species that may
appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the unfolding
of the world.

In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding the
science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show us the detailed
composition and dynamics of biophysical structure. For the record, it's
nothing like a modern computer system.

The results of this global effort are Galilean in their scope and pregnant
with implication. It is surely only a matter of time before we move to the
Newtonian stage in the development of our understanding and learn the
details of how sense is formed and modified, the role that sense plays in
our directed actions, and how intelligent thought functions.

Today, however, there is only a poor understanding of the mechanics of
sense. Theorists have had little time to give the new data deep
consideration.

Clearly, more biophysical experiments, more observational data, will help
us. If we look at the history of science this period is analogous to the
period before Newton, in which experimentalists and observers such as
Galileo and Copernicus built the foundations of Newton's inquiry. A
breakthrough of a kind similar to Newton's discovery of gravitation is
required.

But to make this breakthrough it is the discipline of the logicians that we
need to recall. Before the age of sterile twentieth century logic, when
mathematical logic was first developed and before modern computers were
invented, it is the logicians that concerned themselves with 

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-05 Thread Phyllis Chiasson
-Original Message-
From: Phyllis Chiasson [mailto:ath...@olympus.net] 
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 12:48 PM
To: 'Catherine Legg'
Subject: RE: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
Induction

Gary, Cathy and Listers,

I have been a Peirce-list lurker for some time and have enjoyed reading
discussions. Until I finished galley proofs for my latest book I did not
allow myself to post. I have a short window here before I have to clean up
my next book and send it in.

Yes, Cathy, we have been applying these concepts to human subjects since
1978 when the non-verbal assessment was first developed, first in school
settings and in day treatment programs (mostly for adolescents). We began
applying the assessments in business settings in 1986 by performing
site-specific validations. In 2002, we received a grant to begin formal
validity and reliability studies; these were performed at the University of
Oregon decision sciences center. The study found very high inter-rater
reliability and good re-test reliability (though the re-tests were performed
too close to the original for us to feel comfortable with those results).
Discriminate validity studies found a strong correlation between different
non-verbal thinking processes and The Need for Cognition Scale, which is a
paper and pencil questionnaire that addresses intellectual curiosity.

However, thoroughgoing validity studies will require operational
evaluations, which is why Jayne and I wrote this new book: Relational
Thinking Styles and Natural Intelligence: Assessing inference patterns for
computational modeling. 

This information should be a useful platform for developing predictive
models of the operations and outcomes of human systems and programs modeled
on human systems. We refer throughout the book to E. David Ford's book:
Scientific Method for Ecological Research. It is a thoroughly Peircean guide
to researching complex open systems, as are eco-systems. These patterns will
require a similar approach. We are hoping to interest someone(s) with
research/computer modeling backgrounds (which neither of us possess) to
carry on this work.

Regards,
Phyllis

BTW Cathy: I see that you are in Auckland. My husband and I love New
Zealand! We visited our daughter and her family there (Torbay, to be exact)
during the years that her husband was posted there. They are now in Sydney.

-Original Message-
From: Catherine Legg [mailto:cl...@waikato.ac.nz] 
Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 PM
To: Phyllis Chiasson
Cc: PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list!

The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline
below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how
you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live
human subjects, but how / where /when?

Best regards, Cathy

On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote:
 This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this
 issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in
April
 from IGI Global).

 When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual
 (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like
 Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of
 exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to
 juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a
 phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and
 re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more
 phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to
be
 represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities
 and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a
 non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of
 them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed.

 On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in
 nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively
 quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before
determining
 a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in
 the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal,
all
 of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for
 achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process,
 except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve
the
 general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the
 abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily
 derivative.

 Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal
and
 apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither
 exploratory, nor 

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-05 Thread Catherine Legg
Very interesting - thanks, Phyllis!
Cathy

On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 8:47 AM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote:
 Gary, Cathy and Listers,

 I have been a Peirce-list lurker for some time and have enjoyed reading
 discussions. Until I finished galley proofs for my latest book I did not
 allow myself to post. I have a short window here before I have to clean up
 my next book and send it in.

 Yes, Cathy, we have been applying these concepts to human subjects since
 1978 when the non-verbal assessment was first developed, first in school
 settings and in day treatment programs (mostly for adolescents). We began
 applying the assessments in business settings in 1986 by performing
 site-specific validations. In 2002, we received a grant to begin formal
 validity and reliability studies; these were performed at the University of
 Oregon decision sciences center. The study found very high inter-rater
 reliability and good re-test reliability (though the re-tests were performed
 too close to the original for us to feel comfortable with those results).
 Discriminate validity studies found a strong correlation between different
 non-verbal thinking processes and The Need for Cognition Scale, which is a
 paper and pencil questionnaire that addresses intellectual curiosity.

 However, thoroughgoing validity studies will require operational
 evaluations, which is why Jayne and I wrote this new book: Relational
 Thinking Styles and Natural Intelligence: Assessing inference patterns for
 computational modeling.

 This information should be a useful platform for developing predictive
 models of the operations and outcomes of human systems and programs modeled
 on human systems. We refer throughout the book to E. David Ford's book:
 Scientific Method for Ecological Research. It is a thoroughly Peircean guide
 to researching complex open systems, as are eco-systems. These patterns will
 require a similar approach. We are hoping to interest someone(s) with
 research/computer modeling backgrounds (which neither of us possess) to
 carry on this work.

 Regards,
 Phyllis

 BTW Cathy: I see that you are in Auckland. My husband and I love New
 Zealand! We visited our daughter and her family there (Torbay, to be exact)
 during the years that her husband was posted there. They are now in Sydney.

 -Original Message-
 From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
 Behalf Of Catherine Legg
 Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 PM
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
 Induction

 Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list!

 The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline
 below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how
 you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live
 human subjects, but how / where /when?

 Best regards, Cathy

 On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote:
 This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this
 issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in
 April
 from IGI Global).

 When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual
 (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like
 Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of
 exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to
 juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a
 phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and
 re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more
 phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to
 be
 represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities
 and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a
 non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of
 them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed.

 On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in
 nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively
 quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before
 determining
 a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in
 the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal,
 all
 of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for
 achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process,
 except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve
 the
 general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the
 abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily
 derivative.

 Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal
 and
 apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither
 exploratory, nor analytical. 

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-05 Thread Jon Awbrey

Hi Phyllis,

Do you know the work of Sorrentino and Roney on orientations to uncertainty?

| Sorrentino, Richard M., and Roney, Christopher J.R. (2000),
| The Uncertain Mind : Individual Differences in Facing the Unknown,
| (Essays in Social Psychology, Miles Hewstone (ed.)), Taylor and Francis,
| Philadelphia, PA.

We had been discussing this on The Wikipedia Review a few years ago,
so there will be a few excerpts and additional links on this thread:

http://wikipediareview.com/index.php?showtopic=15318

Regards,

Jon

--

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

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[peirce-l] Fw: Peirce Society: Program and Business Meeting Agenda

2012-03-05 Thread Benjamin Udell
Forwarded. 

- Original Message - 
From: Robert Lane 
To: The Charles S. Peirce Society 
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 4:58 PM 
Subject: Peirce Society: Program and Business Meeting Agenda 

Dear Members and Friends of the Charles S. Peirce Society,

Below is the program for our upcoming meeting, as well as the agenda for the 
subsequent business meeting. The program and agenda are also available at the 
Peirce Society's website:  
http://www.peircesociety.org/agenda-2012-04-05.html

I hope to see you in Seattle!

Best regards,
Robert Lane
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society

***

Meeting of the Charles S. Peirce Society 
7-9:00 p.m., Thursday April 5, 2012 
Westin Seattle 
Seattle, Washington, USA

Program

Chair: Robert Lane (University of West Georgia)

Presidential Address: Risto Hilpinen (University of Miami), Types,  Tokens, 
and Words

Jean-Marie Chevalier (Collège de France), Peirce's Critique of the First 
Critique: A Leibnizian False Start (Winner of the 2011-12 Peirce Society Essay 
Contest)

Business Meeting Agenda

1. Approval of minutes of the 2011 meeting (Risto Hilpinen)
http://www.peircesociety.org/minutes/minutes-2011-04-21.html

2. Report from the Executive Committee (Risto Hilpinen)

3. Report from the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society

4. Financial statement (Robert Lane)

5. Report from the Peirce Edition Project

6. Report from the Nominating Committee and election of new officers  (Rosa 
Mayorga)

7. New business

8. Adjournment (Risto Hilpinen)

-- 

Robert Lane, Ph.D.
Associate Professor and Director of Philosophy 

Editor, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society

Department of English and Philosophy
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA 30118

[telephone and email] 
http://www.westga.edu/~rlane

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[peirce-l] Fwd: Peirce Society: Program and Business Meeting Agenda

2012-03-05 Thread Gary Richmond


 Robert Lane rl...@westga.edu 3/5/2012 4:58 PM 
Dear Members and Friends of the Charles S. Peirce Society,

Below is the program for our upcoming meeting, as well as the agenda  
for the subsequent business meeting. The program and agenda are also  
available at the Peirce Society's website:  
http://www.peircesociety.org/agenda-2012-04-05.html

I hope to see you in Seattle!

Best regards,
Robert Lane
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society

***

Meeting of the Charles S. Peirce Society
7-9:00 p.m., Thursday April 5, 2012
Westin Seattle
Seattle, Washington, USA


Program

Chair: Robert Lane (University of West Georgia)

Presidential Address: Risto Hilpinen (University of Miami), “Types,  
Tokens, and Words”

Jean-Marie Chevalier (Collège de France), “Peirce’s Critique of the  
First Critique: A Leibnizian False Start” (Winner of the 2011-12  
Peirce Society Essay Contest)



Business Meeting Agenda

1. Approval of minutes of the 2011 meeting (Risto Hilpinen)
[http://www.peircesociety.org/minutes/minutes-2011-04-21.html]

2. Report from the Executive Committee (Risto Hilpinen)

3. Report from the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society

4. Financial statement (Robert Lane)

5. Report from the Peirce Edition Project

6. Report from the Nominating Committee and election of new officers  
(Rosa Mayorga)

7. New business

8. Adjournment (Risto Hilpinen)




-- 
Robert Lane, Ph.D.
Associate Professor and Director of Philosophy

Editor, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society

Department of English and Philosophy
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA 30118

678 839 4745
rl...@westga.edu
http://www.westga.edu/~rlane

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[peirce-l] Varieties of Analytic Pragmatism

2012-03-05 Thread Catherine Legg
Read a paper the other day which I really enjoyed and wanted to share the
reference here:

*Danielle Macbeth, Varieties of Analytic Pragmatism, Philosophia 40
(1):27-39.*

*http://philpapers.org/rec/MACVOA*

Basically Macbeth dissects the version of pragmatism put forward by Robert
Brandom in his recent John Locke lectures, and argues that what he is doing
with logical diagrams is not at all what Kant and Peirce were doing.
Previously she had mainly worked on logical diagrams in Frege, so I'm
interested that she is turning to Peirce.

Anyway here is the official abstract:

In his Locke Lectures Brandom proposes to extend what he calls the project
of analysis to encompass various relationships between meaning and use. As
the traditional project of analysis sought to clarify various logical
relations between vocabularies so Brandom’s extended project seeks to
clarify various pragmatically mediated semantic relations between
vocabularies. The point of the exercise in both cases is to achieve what
Brandom thinks of as algebraic understanding. Because the pragmatist
critique of the traditional project of analysis was precisely to deny that
such understanding is appropriate to the case of natural language, the very
idea of an analytic pragmatism is called into question by that critique. My
aim is to clarify the prospects for Brandom’s project, or at least
something in the vicinity of that project, through a comparison of it with
what I will suggest we can think of as Kant’s analytic pragmatism as
developed by Peirce.

Cheers, Cathy

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