Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Khadimir]

Ben and list,

In part it is a reflection of what I like to talk about, but they tend to
reject a variant of your fourth bullet point, especially either the direct
or indirect implications of "Four Incapacities," "Consequences of Four
Incapacities," and the continuity of inference and semiotic.  However, the
discussion never reaches that level of detail.

Instead, I ask such questions as--as I did at a conference last weekend to
a superbly inviting, mostly analytic audience--"why do you think that
conscious intentionality must begin as a conscious (noetic/attentive)
phenomenon rather than in bodily intentionality?"  In this case, the
interlocutor was treating conscious intentionality as if it were ex nihilo
and was insouciant on the point, though one does not need Peircean
continuity to answer that question.  This is the kind of "Cartesian
dualism" that I see in the wild, i.e., a species of "discontinuity."

Jason

On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 2:17 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> **
> I said this wrong. Changed below between pairs of asterisks. Sorry! -
> Best, Ben
>
> - Original Message -
>
> Jason, list,
>
> That's interesting. What aspects of synechism do they reject?
>
>- Continuity of space and time? Lorentz symmetries seem to make such
>continuity pretty credible.
>- Idea of espousing continuity of space and time for philosophical
>reasons instead of physics reasons?
>- Real infinitesimals?
>- Continuity of semiosis and of inference process? **Idea that
>incapacities such as that of a cognition devoid of determination by
>inference help** prove the reality of the continuous and therefore of the
>general? (Some Consequences of Four Incapacities)
>
> Or if discussions of synechism don't get into such detail, still what do
> they say is wrong with synechism?
>
> Best, Ben
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Khadimir
> *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 29, 2012 1:44 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
>
> Steven,
>
> This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse
> one.  If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes
> being a scientific dualist on your view?  I would agree that many
> contemporary positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you
> mean, a hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases
> (thinkers).  However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they
> always reject the view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've
> seen is a rejection of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of
> continuity (synechism).
>
> Best,
>Jason
>
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
>
> Dear Cathy,
>
> "Non-Peirceans," if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two
> camps:
>
>1. the religious dualist,
>2. the scientific dualist.
>
> Often they are in both.
>
> One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls "Thirdness" (more
> generally, "the mind") in their conception of "God," the other does not
> know how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics.
> In-other-words, there are two dogmas working against the Peircean.
>
> It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I
> respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here:
>
>Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One?
>
> http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72
>
> This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago.
>
> Peirce's objection to the "Russelization" of logic is relevant here,
> because the eradication of "psychologism" placed "the mind" (esp.
> "Thirdness") beyond the reach of 20th Century science and logic.
>
> It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin,
> did indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called
> "Thirdness," as grounded in both a conception of "God" and a conception of
> Physics. Now I rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this
> "God" conception is not the usual one but one that is really "non-theistic"
> in the modern sense, in that it is without personification and clearly not
> the god of popular western conception.
>
> This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent
> contradiction in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's
> "Ideality in the 

Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Khadimir]

Steven,

This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse
one.  If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes
being a scientific dualist on your view?  I would agree that many
contemporary positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you
mean, a hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases
(thinkers).  However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they
always reject the view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've
seen is a rejection of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of
continuity (synechism).

Best,
   Jason



On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

> Dear Cathy,
>
> "Non-Peirceans," if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two
> camps:
>
>1. the religious dualist,
>2. the scientific dualist.
>
> Often they are in both.
>
> One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls "Thirdness" (more
> generally, "the mind") in their conception of "God," the other does not
> know how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics.
> In-other-words, there are two dogmas working against the Peircean.
>
> It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I
> respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here:
>
>Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One?
>
> http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72
>
> This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago.
>
> Peirce's objection to the "Russelization" of logic is relevant here,
> because the eradication of "psychologism" placed "the mind" (esp.
> "Thirdness") beyond the reach of 20th Century science and logic.
>
> It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin,
> did indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called
> "Thirdness," as grounded in both a conception of "God" and a conception of
> Physics. Now I rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this
> "God" conception is not the usual one but one that is really "non-theistic"
> in the modern sense, in that it is without personification and clearly not
> the god of popular western conception.
>
> This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent
> contradiction in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's
> "Ideality in the physical sciences" and in the writings of Charles Peirce.
> Their view is more like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although
> it maintains the passion of the later).
>
> So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it
> is important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma.
> If you do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to
> the audience unfamiliar with them.
>
> With respect,
> Steven
>
>
> --
>Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
>http://iase.info
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:08 AM, Catherine Legg wrote:
>
> > Gary R wrote:
> > *
> >>> For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see
> > esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial
> > relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways.
> Trichotomic
> > vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow
> > the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may
> > also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in
> > turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of
> > representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to
> > ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars
> > have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier
> and
> > I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths
> of
> > movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does
> *not*
> > follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns.
> >
> > This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-)
> >
> >>> Indeed, with a  few exceptions, there appears at present to be
> > relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking.
> > Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and
> > considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck
> > me as quite odd.
> > *
> >
> > I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in
> > seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make
> much
> > sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system.
> >
> > Cathy
> >
> >
> -
> > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the
> PEIRCE-L listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
> lists...@listserv.iupui.edu wi

Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

[Khadimir]

I can confirm that last bit about the difficulty of explaining these
concepts, though I do so as a Deweyan always wondering exactly how did he
borrow and deviate from Peirce's concepts.  I do hear a number of people
say that they "like Peirce," but it is never clear to what they are
referring.  That might be due to my ignorance of the received view of
Peirce.  Perhaps someone could enlighten me?

Jason

On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 4:08 AM, Catherine Legg  wrote:

> Gary R wrote:
> *
> >>For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see
> esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial
> relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic
> vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow
> the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may
> also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in
> turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of
> representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to
> ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars
> have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and
> I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of
> movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not*
> follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns.
>
> This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-)
>
> >>Indeed, with a  few exceptions, there appears at present to be
> relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking.
> Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and
> considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck
> me as quite odd.
> *
>
> I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in
> seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much
> sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system.
>
> Cathy
>
>
> -
> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L
> listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
> lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body
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> PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
>

-
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Re: [peirce-l] Meeting Peirceans in New York, blogs

[Khadimir]

Uh oh, I have been called out.

I will share the link to my blog, *Immanent Transcendence*:
http://immanenttranscedence.blogspot.com/ .  The blog covers American,
continental, and cross-tradition thought, though I spent many months
discussing object-oriented ontology.  I tend to write fairly involved,
technical posts about American philosophy, especially process metaphysics,
phenomenology, and most things pragmatism.  There are a lot of Peircean
moments, but I am primarily a Dewey scholar and historian as well as
writing in realist phenomenology informed by process metaphysics.  A review
of old posts might be of interest, e.g., discussion with object-oriented
ontology, the implications and descriptions of the causal closure of
nature, what realist pragmatic phenomenology (per Dewey) is, etc.

Of note, I post almost every CFP on American philosophy that I can find,
and every post on pragmatism (pragmaticism).

The name *Immanent Transcendence *is meant to imply multiple things,
including emergent naturalism, ecstatic temporality, self-transcendence,
etc. It makes a lot more sense with triadic and modal views of reality, and
wherein time and chance are real features ... but we all know that's a
minority view in contemporary philosophy in English.

I sadly missed SAAP this year--the first time in 6 years.

Best,
   Jason Hills


On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 1:09 AM, Catherine Legg  wrote:

> For my part, I just want to say I enjoyed the SAAP session on Richard
> Robin very much, and it was particularly lovely to meet in person for the
> very first time those legendary behind-the-scenes supporters of Arisbe and
> the Peirce-L: Gary Richmond and Ben Udell! Guys, I never realised before
> quite how much you were doing to keep alive the Peirce online community,
> particularly since Joe's passing. Thank you. I know the work you do comes
> from a genuine passion for Peirce's ideas.
>
> 2 more members of this list who I happen to know have philosophical blogs
> are Jason Hills and Tom Gollier. I wonder whether they might be persuaded
> to share the URLs with everyone...:-)
>
> Cheers, Cathy
>
> On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 8:24 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
>> Ben, List,
>>
>> I hope to 'file' a brief report to the list on SAAP in the next few days,
>> but wanted to quickly follow up on your remark concerning the philosophical
>> "sweethearts" attending the conference, at least some of those whose work
>> many list members may be familiar with including, Tom Short, Robert Lane,
>> Jaime Nubiola, and Cathy Legg. I did not get the opportunity to meet him
>> personally, but was able to ask Richard Bernstein a question at the Keynote
>> Panel organized to honor him and his work. He is clearly a sweetheart too.
>> Yes, philosophers can be really nice people!
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary
>>
>> On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 4:14 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>>
>>>  Jon, list,
>>>
>>> Let's toss Michael Shapiro's blog a link while we're at it.
>>>
>>> Language Lore http://www.languagelore.net/. Shapiro persistently
>>> brings a pragmatist's perspective to linguistics.
>>>
>>> I actually ventured into the S.A.A.P. session in honor of Richard Robin
>>> on Thursday and met some of the people whom I slightly know from online.
>>> Contrary to the reputations of philosophers in general as "mean," they were
>>> a bunch of what Gary Richmond called "sweethearts." One person
>>> self-identified as a linguist and made an interesting statement (but I
>>> wasn't taking notes). I wondered whether it was Michael Shapiro. Later I
>>> realized that I had omitted Shapiro's five-volume _*Peirce Seminar
>>> Series*_ from the Arisbe page of journals and book series. I've added
>>> it now http://www.cspeirce.com/journals.htm
>>>
>>> Some blogs and home pages are listed at
>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/individs.htm
>>>
>>> The blogs are those of some peirce-l members and, I've notice, aren't
>>> always focused on Peirce, but, well, they're blogs, we're not all focused
>>> on Peirce all the time.
>>>
>>> If anybody has a more-or-less Peirce-related blog or a home page that
>>> s/he would like to see added, please let me know.
>>>
>>> Best, Ben
>>>
>>> - Original Message -
>>> From: "Jon Awbrey"
>>> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
>>> Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 1:40 PM
>>> Subject: [peirce-l] Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and Peirce
>>>
>>> Peircers,
>>>
>>> A recent blog post by Michael Shapiro on “The Pragmatistic Force of
>>> Analogy in Language Structure”
>>> reminded me of some work I started on “Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle
>>> and Peirce”, parts of which
>>> may be of service in our discussions of the “Categorical Aspects of
>>> Abduction, Deduction, Induction”.
>>>
>>> Here is the link --
>>>
>>> •
>>> http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
>>> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
>>> mwb: ht

Re: [peirce-l] a question

[Khadimir]

Would it not be fair to say that the conscious experience of the immediate
present must always be at least a second?  That is the view I hold.

Jason H.

On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> **
>
> Claudio, Eduardo, Diane, Gary R., list,
>
> I've found more of Peirce on the present-past-future trichotomy. This
> time, from Chapter 1 of the _Minute Logic_ (1902) manuscript, in CP 2.84
> (on the past as Second), 2.85 (on the present as First), and 2.86 (on the
> future as Third). From CP 2.85:
>
> Let us now consider what could appear as being in the present instant were
> it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess; for nothing is
> more occult than the absolute present. There plainly could be no action;
> and without the possibility of action, to talk of binarity would be to
> utter words without meaning. There might be a sort of consciousness, or
> feeling, with no self; and this feeling might have its tone.
> Notwithstanding what William James has said, I do not think there could be
> any continuity like space, which, though it may perhaps appear in an
> instant in an educated mind, I cannot think could do so if it had no time
> at all; and without continuity parts of the feeling could not be
> synthetized; and therefore there would be no recognizable parts. There
> could not even be a degree of vividness of the feeling; for this [the
> degree of vividness] is the comparative amount of disturbance of general
> consciousness by a feeling. At any rate, such shall be our hypothesis, and
> whether it is psychologically true or not is of no consequence. The world
> would be reduced to a quality of unanalyzed feeling. Here would be an utter
> absence of binarity. I cannot call it unity; for even unity supposes
> plurality. I may call its form Firstness, Orience, or Originality. It would
> be something _*which is what it is without reference to anything else*_
> within it or without it, regardless of all force and of all reason. Now the
> world is full of this element of irresponsible, free, Originality. Why
> should the middle part of the spectrum look green rather than violet? There
> is no conceivable reason for it nor compulsion in it. [...]
>
> Note that there he discusses "what could appear as being in the present
> instant were it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess;
> for nothing is more occult than the absolute present."
>
> Elsewhere, at the end of CP 7.536 in an undated manuscript, he says "The
> consciousness of the present, as the boundary between past and future,
> involves them both.":
>
> Thus, every reasoning involves another reasoning, which in its turn
> involves another, and so on _*ad infinitum*_. Every reasoning connects
> something that has just been learned with knowledge already acquired so
> that we thereby learn what has been unknown. It is thus that the present is
> so welded to what is just past as to render what is just coming about
> inevitable. The consciousness of the present, as the boundary between past
> and future, involves them both. Reasoning is a new experience which
> involves something old and something hitherto unknown. The past as above
> remarked is the _*ego*_. My recent past is my uppermost _*ego*_; my
> distant past is my more generalized _*ego*_. The past of the community is
> _*our ego*_. In attributing a flow of time to unknown events we impute a
> quasi-_*ego*_ to the universe. The present is the immediate
> representation we are just learning that brings the future, or non-ego, to
> be assimilated into the _*ego*_. It is thus seen that learning, or
> representation, is the third Kainopythagorean category.
>
> So that _*consciousness of*_ the present seems to match that which Gary
> Richmond said at peirce-l on April 8, 2011 about the present "moment" as
> distinguished from the present "instant," the present moment as a "triadic
> moment" http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/6995
>
> I also find that, in Peirce's letter of Oct. 12, 1904 to Lady Welby, if I
> had looked at what he had written in the same (long) paragraph (CP 8.330)
> before the excerpt that I sent, I would have seen Peirce discusses
> Firstness of the quiet and Firstness of a shrill piercing whistle, and does
> so in a way that supports the idea of the present as a First. For it is the
> breaking of the quiet by the shrill whistle that he says involves
> Secondness, and that is the breaking of one moment by another, though each
> moment, taken apart, simply has its quality, its Firstness.
>
> Bet, Ben
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Benjamin Udell
> *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> *Sent:* Friday, March 16, 2012 7:10 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] a question
>
> Claudio, Eduardo, Diane, list,
>
> Let's note that, especially for Diane, that Jon has pointed us to passage
> where Peirce DOES associate the present with Firstness, in "The Reality of
> Thirdness" from the 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism

Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce edition

[Khadimir]

This latest post caught my attention.

Since my first degree was a B.S. in "computational mathematics," I thought
that I would weigh-in.

One can make the distinctions as follows, beginning with pure vs. applied
mathematics.  I will give a negative definition, since I am not so skilled
with the Peircean terminology used so far; applied mathematics is the use
of mathematics as a formal, ideal system to specific problems of existence.
 For instance, consider the use of statistical confidence intervals to
solve problems in manufactoring relating to the rate of production of
defective vs. non-defective goods.  Pure mathematics is not bound by
existent conditions, but "pure" becomes "applied" when used in that
context.  Hence, I am treated applied mathematics as an informal,
existential constraint that alters the purpose and use of pure mathematics.

Computational mathematics is for the most part a subset of applied
mathematics, which focuses on how to adapt computational formulas so that
they may be run or run more efficiently on a given computation system,
e.g., a binary computer.  Computational mathematics, then, is primarily
focused on formulas and computation of said formulas, which is to be more
specific about the limits that make it an applied mathematic.

I offer this as a different viewpoint, one coming from where the
distinction has practical effects.

Jason H.

On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 12:47 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> **
>
> Malgosia, Irving, Gary, list,
>
> I should add that this whole line of discussion began because I put the
> cart in front of the horse. The adjectives bothered me. "Theoretical math"
> vs. "computational math" - the latter sounds like of math about
> computation. And "creative math" vs. what - "consumptive math"?
> "consumptorial math"?  Then I thought of theorematic vs. corollarial,
> thought it was an interesting idea and gave it a try. The comparison is
> interesting and there is some likeness between the distinctions.  However I
> now think that trying to align it to Irving's and Pratt's distinctions just
> stretches it too far.  And it's occurred to me that I'd be happy with the
> adjective "computative" - hence, theoretical math versus computative math.
>
> However, I don't think that we've thoroughly replaced the terms "pure" and
> "applied" as affirmed of math areas until we find some way to justly
> distinguish between so-called 'pure' maths as opposed to so-called
> 'applied' yet often (if not absolutely always) mathematically nontrivial
> areas such as maths of optimization (linear and nonlinear programming),
> probability theory, the maths of information (with laws of information
> corresponding to group-theoretical principles), etc.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Benjamin Udell  *
> **To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU *
> *
> *Sent:* Monday, March 12, 2012 1:14 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of
> Moore's Peirce edition
>
> Malgosia, list,
>
> Responses interleaved.
>
> - Original Message -
> From: malgosia askanas
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Sent: Monday, March 12, 2012 12:31 PM
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's
> Peirce edition
>
> >>[BU] Yes, the theorematic-vs.-corollarial distinction does not appear in
> the Peirce quote to depend on whether the premisses - _up until some lemma_
> - already warrant presumption.
> >>BUT, but, but, the theorematic deduction does involve the introdution of
> that lemma, and the lemma needs to be proven (in terms of some postulate
> system), or at least include a definition (in remarkable cases supported by
> a "proper postulate") in order to stand as a premiss, and that is what
> Irving is referring to.
>
> >[MA] OK, but how does this connect to the corollarial/theorematic
> distinction?  On the basis purely of the quote from Peirce that Irving was
> discussing, the theorem, again, could follow from the lemma either
> corollarially (by virtue purely of "logical form") or theorematically
> (requiring additional work with the actual mathematical objects of which
> the theorem speaks).
>
> [BU] So far, so good.
>
> >[MA] And the lemma, too, could have been obtained either corollarially (a
> rather needless lemma, in that case)
>
> [BU] Only if it comes from another area of math, otherwise it is
> corollarially drawn from what's already on the table and isn't a lemma.
>
> >[MA] or theorematically.   Doesn't this particular distinction, in either
> case, refer to the nature of the _deduction_ that is required in order to
> pass from the premisses to the conclusion, rather than referring to the
> warrant (or lack of it) of presuming the premisses?
>
> [BU] It's both, to the extent that the nature of that deduction depends on
> whether the premisses require a lemma, a lemma that either gets something
> from elsewhere (i.e., the lemma must refer to where its content is
> established elsewhere), or needs to be proven on t

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

[Khadimir]

Steven,

I think the recent post below by you is a much clearer and forthright style
than in your draft.

Jason H.

On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

> Dear Cathy,
>
> Let us ignore for a moment the contents of the book, which presents for a
> general audience a theory dealing with the foundations of logic and
> apprehension, considered by many audiences on first sight to be a tired
> subject.
>
> Today's audience will require some motivation to read the book in the face
> of an education and professional dogma that considers that work in logic is
> complete. In the face also of late twentieth century presentations of logic
> in the media, whose ambassador is Star Trek's Spock, where logic is
> ridiculed as an art, the domain of aliens, lacking the passion of the human
> endeavor.
>
> Is it not the case that life created by an evolved intelligent species and
> placed into environments in which it would not otherwise appear suggests
> that such species may play a role in the bigger picture, that in fact, it
> may be necessary for the universe to evolve and realize its potential? How
> many times in the unfolding of life in the universe will such an
> opportunity appear? If we are presented with it how can we, how dare we,
> ignore it?
>
> To suggest such a thing seems no more outrageous than Copernicus proposing
> that our planet is not the center of things or Newton suggesting that the
> observations made before him suggest a universal previously unconsidered.
> Of course, I am well aware of the reluctance to make such associations,
> they appear arrogant and immodest. But must we not be immodest to challenge
> received authority and dream of new and grander conceptions?
>
> The observations upon which the arguments of Copernicus and Newton are
> founded are no less compelling that recent advances in biophysics. The veil
> is being lifted and whether it be my theory or another that enables it, it
> now seems inevitable that we will understand the nature of living systems
> to the degree possible in order to create them by our design and for our
> purpose.
>
> This view is surely more plausible than the alternative in popular
> culture, which is to see this potential in descendants of current computing
> systems and robotics, which relies upon sterile machines to awaken and tell
> us what to do.
>
> I understand the caution, and in large part it is the reason for my
> seeking feedback outside of my immediate circle. It is a simple and
> startling observation. As I note, it is one that amuses me but is
> none-the-less seriously made.
>
> How does one know such a thing? It is an abduction, a speculation from
> current circumstance. The bigger question is, can it be verified or
> falsified by science? And surely, it can. It is not merely plausible in the
> fictional sense, it is plausible in fact. To which discipline must we turn
> to ensure this verification or denial? Who has given greater and deeper
> consideration to the operation of the senses, to the function of the mind,
> if it is not the logicians, and especially Peirce?
>
> How does one understate such a thing?
>
> With respect,
> Steven
>
> --
>Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
>http://iase.info
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mar 5, 2012, at 7:52 PM, Catherine Legg wrote:
>
> > Hi Steven,
> >
> > I'm afraid I must join my voice to those who feel they would not pick
> > up the book based on your blurb (or preface - why call it a
> > 'Proemial'? What is a 'proemial'??) below.
> >
> > Though many of the component ideas are interesting, your overall
> > expression of them seems to display a grandiosity which is a red flag
> > to a serious philosopher. In particular there is this sentence which
> > you put right upfront:
> >
> > "...something so profound that it would not only have a broad impact
> > upon the entire species but the universe itself could not proceed,
> > could not evolve, without consideration of it."
> >
> > I don't see how you could possibly know this - what scientific
> > methodology might deliver this result.
> >
> > Loving the interesting range of 'hands-on' critical perspectives
> > already generously provided by Peirce-listers...
> >
> > Cheers, Cathy
> >
> > On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 3:35 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
> wrote:
> >> Dear List,
> >>
> >> I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book "On The Origin Of
> Experience" and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that
> you challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have
> developed an aversion to using the term "consciousness," which seems to me
> to be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my
> wife) argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the
> vague "transhumanism" concerns me.
> >>
> >> Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read
> the book?
> >>
> >>
> >> Proemial: On The Origin 

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

[Khadimir]

I would agree with the general thrust of the comments that more specificity
is needed early.  The current text appears to be motivated by a question
that it unfolds.  I think that is a fine rhetorical device, however, it
needs to unroll in a few sentences and then hit us with an answer very
quickly.

Jason

On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 7:24 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:

> I could not enter the text. The old journalistic *who what where when why
> and how* would perhaps be useful. Three or four brisk paragraphs
> addressing these questions.
>
> In this *adjective* study* name verb* *What*
>
> *Where* = into what stream of thought does this text fit
>
> *When* = past present or future
>
> *Why* = why is this needed - original - important
>
> *How *= The meat of the text - a CSP third - an implementation
>
> Cheers, S
> *ShortFormContent at Blogger* 
>
>
>
> On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 4:15 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
>
>> I will take the strong emotion to be both positive and competitive. It's
>> a first draft cover piece and you are right to correct me concerning
>> Frege's Sense and Reference, thank you.
>>
>> "The mechanics of sense" simply refers to the mechanism characterizing
>> sense in biophysics, I assume that there is such a mechanism. Hence, I do
>> not view sense as incorporeal, nor do I view the scientific mechanism as
>> facing demise.
>>
>> You are, I know, an authority on the lack of substance (Aetherometry). :-)
>>
>> I appreciate your input Malgosia and will certainly consider it.
>>
>> With respect,
>> Steven
>>
>>
>> --
>>Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>>Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
>>http://iase.info
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mar 4, 2012, at 10:06 PM, malgosia askanas wrote:
>>
>> > I am sorry, but this inflated piece of vacuous hype would forever
>> discourage me from having anything to do with the book.  The only half-way
>> informative tidbit is that the book concerns "a logic informed by recent
>> advances in biophysics."  By the way, "On Sense and Reference" is not a
>> book but a 25-page journal article, and it has nothing to do with either
>> the senses (such as sight or smell) or with making sense of the world.  And
>> what are the "mechanics of sense"; have we now extended scientific
>> mechanism to incorporeals, just to forestall its demise?
>> >
>> > -malgosia
>> >
>> > At 6:35 PM -0800 3/4/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
>> >> Dear List,
>> >>
>> >> I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book "On The Origin Of
>> Experience" and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that
>> you challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have
>> developed an aversion to using the term "consciousness," which seems to me
>> to be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my
>> wife) argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the
>> vague "transhumanism" concerns me.
>> >>
>> >> Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read
>> the book?
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience
>> >>
>> >> Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would
>> not only have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe
>> itself could not proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.
>> >>
>> >> This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of
>> mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than
>> viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it
>> suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes
>> that an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which
>> it would not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.
>> >>
>> >> Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be
>> constructed with a fundamental understanding of what is required to build
>> living, thinking, machines, machines that have the capability of any living
>> system to heal and reproduce.
>> >>
>> >> The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience,
>> may be an essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that
>> intelligent species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the
>> natural dynamics of the unfolding world.
>> >>
>> >> Such a species would become the evolved ³intelligent designers² of
>> life, extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary
>> evolution, an inevitable part of nature's ³plan² to move life beyond its
>> dependence upon the environment in which it first evolves.
>> >>
>> >> If this is the case then our species, along with other such species
>> that may appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the
>> unfolding of the world.
>> >>
>> >> In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding
>> the science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show u

[peirce-l] A Question about Metaphysics and Logic

[Khadimir]

Greetings,

I have a question for those knowledgeable and willing to answer a general
question for those more steeping in classical metaphysics and logic than I.

What are the distinctions between claiming the reality of universals vs.
generals?  How would one argue that universals are not merely merely
generals?  By the latter, for example, I mean general concepts created
through a process of induction or what Locke called "abstraction."  I offer
an example to indicate what I mean by generality, though the definition is
informal.  I am familiar with Peirce's article on Berkeley, which I enjoy,
and I would look forward to Peircean and other views on the matter.
 Citations and references with limited explanation would be a fine way to
answer, as I would not ask too much of anyone's time.

Best and Thank You,
   Jason Hills

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Re: [peirce-l] Emergence, semiotic, Deacon and Peirce

[Khadimir]

Gary,

Thank you for your detailed explanation and consideration.

I have not read the book, and I took the terminology as just-coined
neologisms.  Thank you for the explanation, and I am following it as I
am familiar with basic physics; my bachelor's is in science.  I am a
junior Dewey scholar working my way through Peirce, and thus am
grateful for these explanations.

I would be delighted to read that book, given this section.

Best,
Jason


On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 5:03 PM, Gary Fuhrman  wrote:
> Jason, Gary and list,
>
>
>
> Yes, i guess it's time to change the subject line, so i've started a new one
> that i hope will reflect where this discussion is heading. I should mention
> that my own interest in this topic is intimately related with the chapter in
> my own work in progress that i'm now struggling with, which overlaps a lot
> with Deacon and with some Peircean passages on "thought" and semiosis. I'm
> trying to squeeze a lot into this chapter, so it has to be concise without
> being too abstract and abstruse. I haven't yet found what feels like a good
> way to do that yet, and my musings toward the right expression sort of
> spilled over into my "reply" to your message, Gary ... i didn't really think
> that i was telling you anything that you didn't already know, i was just
> trying to clarify matters for those who haven't yet read Deacon's book, so
> my post was an experiment along those lines rather than a reply to what i
> thought you were saying.
>
>
>
> Jason, i'm wondering whether you've read the book, or are basing your
> suggestions on the definitions of teleo- and morphodynamics that Gary
> provided a few messages back. I agree that emergence itself is a bottom-up
> process – because top-down causality can only happen in highly emergent
> systems. But i don't think Deacon's argument supports what you say here:
>
>
>
> JH: [[ But is not the distinction relative to analytic perspective?  That
> is, what is may be described in terms of morphodynamics, but what might
> (will) be in terms of teleodynamics?  The distinction is more temporal than
> substantive? ]]
>
>
>
> If i understand what you're suggesting here, i don't agree with it.
> Morphodynamic processes arise from far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics, as
> in Bénard cells for instance. But these in themselves are not enough to
> generate life or sentience; those arise with teleodynamics. The distinction
> is in how they work, not in whether they are present or future processes.
> The great value in Deacon's book is that he explains exactly how they can
> arise spontaneously, i.e. without a "designer". But in order to follow his
> explanations, you have to absorb his explications of basic concepts of
> physics such as "work", and in order to digest those, you have to get used
> to thinking in terms of orthograde and contragrade change and how they
> affect each other. Basically, each level of emergence enables new varieties
> of orthograde change. But i'd better not go any further until i know more
> about what i can assume about your background knowledge. I'm shooting in the
> dark here, can't tell whether i'm taking too much for granted or too little.
>
>
>
> It might be helpful if i insert here a slice of my chapter in progress that
> incorporates some of Deacon’s ideas. The chapter is about closure; this part
> of it i’m more or less satisfied with, so far. Here goes:
>
>
>
> Cells enclose themselves in membranes in order to insulate internal
> processes, but must import energy and selected materials across the boundary
> in order to maintain those processes. This raises the question of how they
> could have organized themselves in the first place: how did biological
> systems emerge from the inorganic? Stuart Kauffman identified one crucial
> step as catalytic closure, in which the product of one spontaneous reaction
> acted as a catalyst for another reaction, which in turn produced the raw
> materials of the first reaction. Such an autocatalytic loop can involve many
> more than two separate reactions, but it can sustain itself and grow as long
> as it produces its own catalysts – provided that it has a source of raw
> materials which it can ‘eat’ or transform into the molecular forms which
> constitute it.
>
> “Catalytic closure means that every molecule in the system either is
> supplied from the outside as ‘food’ or is itself synthesized by reactions
> catalyzed by molecular species within the autocatalytic system. Catalytic
> closure is not mysterious. But it is not a property of any single molecule;
> it is a property of a system of molecules. It is an emergent property”
> (Kauffman 1995, 275).
>
>
>
> However, Thompson (2007, 105) points out that autocatalytic systems do not
> qualify as autonomous agents if they do not produce their own boundary. “In
> summary, the form or pattern of the autopoietic organization is that of a
> peculiar circular interdependency between an interconnected web of
> self-regenerating process

Re: [peirce-l] Logic is rooted in the social principle is rooted in logic

[Khadimir]

Greetings.

Gary, your last point on morpho- vs. teleo-dynamics is excellent.

But is not the distinction relative to analytic perspective?  That is,
what is may be described in terms of morphodynamics, but what might
(will) be in terms of teleodynamics?  The distinction is more temporal
than substantive?

I would not describe processive teleology as "top-down" causation, but
"bottom-up," and supporting the notion of "structural" causation.
Aristotle over Plato, in a manner of speaking.  Earlier in the thread
"top-down" was stated.

I have supposed that the potentialities of processes may be integrated
ad infinitum, part and part to new whole, where the morphodynamics
generate teleodynamics.  The former on the order of potentiality, what
can be here and now, and the latter of the order of a horizon of
possibility, what might be here and later.  This would be bottom-up.

Best,
Jason H.

On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 10:24 AM, Gary Fuhrman  wrote:
> Gary,
>
> GR: [[ Still, the question remains: whence the greater system? Sometimes this 
> strikes me as one of those "chicken or egg" conundrums (I see Deacon 
> wrestling with this too, but in an entirely different way). So, what can be 
> 'built up' or 'emerge' or 'evolve' occurs in a systemic context (as the 
> result of the reciprocal relations within a system--and as the system) and 
> within an Umwelt. ]]
>
> GF: I don't think Deacon really deals with the cosmological question of the 
> origin of matter and energy, if that's what you're asking here; he just takes 
> them as the original ground on which emergence built, so to speak, without 
> asking where that ground came from. He also takes evolution to be emergent, 
> in other words he doesn't trace it all the way back to the original nothing 
> as Peirce does. But i don't think Peirce would refer to the not-yet-organized 
> as a "system" -- anyway i know i wouldn't, because to me a system is 
> organized by definition.
>
> The term "context" is also problematic in this ... um, context. The whole 
> idea of emergence and self-organization is that one kind of process (e.g. 
> teleodynamics) can arise from interactions of lower-level processes (e.g. 
> morphodynamics) even though no teleodynamic process has ever happened before, 
> so there is no teleodynamic context at that point (though it will evolve from 
> then on ... and the way it evolves will change the situation, so that the 
> spontaneous emergence of a *new* teleodynamic process may be precluded in 
> that environment -- as has very likely happened on this planet). Also it 
> seems to me that a species and its Umwelt have to co-evolve, so that the 
> species develops not *within* but *with* its Umwelt. -- But maybe i'm reading 
> something into your utterance that's not what you intended.
>
> Gary F.
>
> } Everything is always becoming something other than what it was becoming. 
> [Floyd Merrell] {
>
> www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce
>
> -Original Message-
> Sent: January-11-12 1:58 PM
>
> Gary,
>
> I think that you're right in suggesting that it's probably not a good idea to 
> mix creation myths and the like--even Peirce's "non-scientific"
> early cosmological musings--with emergent or evolutionary theory. I would 
> suggest, however, that such ideas do have semiotic and metaphysical 
> significance for Peirce (say, as much as Big Bang theory has in the physical 
> theories of some). Nonetheless, I would tend to agree with this statement:
>
> GF: Top-down causation, like Aristotelian formal cause, consists in the 
> constraints imposed by an emergent system on the processes it has emerged 
> from (and still depends on for its existence). For instance, the 
> self-organization of the brain emerges from the constant chaotic “firing”
> of individual neurons, yet it organizes itself by imposing constraints on 
> them, and it's the latter part of this circle that is “top-down”.
> This is indeed “from the whole to the parts” but not in the sense where the 
> “whole” is the world of possibilities and actualities are parts.
>
> GR: Still, the question remains: whence the greater system? Sometimes this 
> strikes me as one of those "chicken or egg" conundrums (I see Deacon 
> wrestling with this too, but in an entirely different way). So, what can be 
> 'built up' or 'emerge' or 'evolve' occurs in a systemic context (as the 
> result of the reciprocal relations within a system--and as the system) and 
> within an Umwelt. In any event, I'll look forward to your further thoughts 
> regarding " the connection between Thirdness and reciprocality."
>
> As to your thoughts as to an approach for reflecting on Deacon's book in the 
> forum, I think your ideas are excellent. So let's continue to toss this 
> around a bit and see what we list members come up with. You and I seem in 
> agreement that *Incomplete Science* represents some extraordinary research 
> with implications for semiotics generally, and reaching, perhaps, even beyond