Ben and list, In part it is a reflection of what I like to talk about, but they tend to reject a variant of your fourth bullet point, especially either the direct or indirect implications of "Four Incapacities," "Consequences of Four Incapacities," and the continuity of inference and semiotic. However, the discussion never reaches that level of detail.
Instead, I ask such questions as--as I did at a conference last weekend to a superbly inviting, mostly analytic audience--"why do you think that conscious intentionality must begin as a conscious (noetic/attentive) phenomenon rather than in bodily intentionality?" In this case, the interlocutor was treating conscious intentionality as if it were ex nihilo and was insouciant on the point, though one does not need Peircean continuity to answer that question. This is the kind of "Cartesian dualism" that I see in the wild, i.e., a species of "discontinuity." Jason On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 2:17 PM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > ** > I said this wrong. Changed below between pairs of asterisks. Sorry! - > Best, Ben > > ----- Original Message ----- > > Jason, list, > > That's interesting. What aspects of synechism do they reject? > > - Continuity of space and time? Lorentz symmetries seem to make such > continuity pretty credible. > - Idea of espousing continuity of space and time for philosophical > reasons instead of physics reasons? > - Real infinitesimals? > - Continuity of semiosis and of inference process? **Idea that > incapacities such as that of a cognition devoid of determination by > inference help** prove the reality of the continuous and therefore of the > general? (Some Consequences of Four Incapacities) > > Or if discussions of synechism don't get into such detail, still what do > they say is wrong with synechism? > > Best, Ben > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Khadimir > *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU > *Sent:* Thursday, March 29, 2012 1:44 PM > *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos > > Steven, > > This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse > one. If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes > being a scientific dualist on your view? I would agree that many > contemporary positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you > mean, a hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases > (thinkers). However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they > always reject the view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've > seen is a rejection of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of > continuity (synechism). > > Best, > Jason > > > > On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote: > > Dear Cathy, > > "Non-Peirceans," if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two > camps: > > 1. the religious dualist, > 2. the scientific dualist. > > Often they are in both. > > One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls "Thirdness" (more > generally, "the mind") in their conception of "God," the other does not > know how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics. > In-other-words, there are two dogmas working against the Peircean. > > It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I > respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here: > > Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One? > > http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72 > > This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago. > > Peirce's objection to the "Russelization" of logic is relevant here, > because the eradication of "psychologism" placed "the mind" (esp. > "Thirdness") beyond the reach of 20th Century science and logic. > > It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin, > did indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called > "Thirdness," as grounded in both a conception of "God" and a conception of > Physics. Now I rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this > "God" conception is not the usual one but one that is really "non-theistic" > in the modern sense, in that it is without personification and clearly not > the god of popular western conception. > > This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent > contradiction in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's > "Ideality in the physical sciences" and in the writings of Charles Peirce. > Their view is more like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although > it maintains the passion of the later). > > So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it > is important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma. > If you do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to > the audience unfamiliar with them. > > With respect, > Steven > > > -- > Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith > Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering > http://iase.info > > > On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:08 AM, Catherine Legg wrote: > > > Gary R wrote: > > * > >>> For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see > esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial > relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic > vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow the > order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may also > look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in turn, > involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of representation > (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to ethics which > Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars have taken up > tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and I are the only > folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of movement > (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not* follow > the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns. > > > > This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-) > > > >>> Indeed, with a few exceptions, there appears at present to be > relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking. Given > the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and considering > how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck me as quite > odd. > > * > > > > I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in > seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much > sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system. > > > > Cathy > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body > of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. 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