Would it not be fair to say that the conscious experience of the immediate present must always be at least a second? That is the view I hold.
Jason H. On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > ** > > Claudio, Eduardo, Diane, Gary R., list, > > I've found more of Peirce on the present-past-future trichotomy. This > time, from Chapter 1 of the _Minute Logic_ (1902) manuscript, in CP 2.84 > (on the past as Second), 2.85 (on the present as First), and 2.86 (on the > future as Third). From CP 2.85: > > Let us now consider what could appear as being in the present instant were > it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess; for nothing is > more occult than the absolute present. There plainly could be no action; > and without the possibility of action, to talk of binarity would be to > utter words without meaning. There might be a sort of consciousness, or > feeling, with no self; and this feeling might have its tone. > Notwithstanding what William James has said, I do not think there could be > any continuity like space, which, though it may perhaps appear in an > instant in an educated mind, I cannot think could do so if it had no time > at all; and without continuity parts of the feeling could not be > synthetized; and therefore there would be no recognizable parts. There > could not even be a degree of vividness of the feeling; for this [the > degree of vividness] is the comparative amount of disturbance of general > consciousness by a feeling. At any rate, such shall be our hypothesis, and > whether it is psychologically true or not is of no consequence. The world > would be reduced to a quality of unanalyzed feeling. Here would be an utter > absence of binarity. I cannot call it unity; for even unity supposes > plurality. I may call its form Firstness, Orience, or Originality. It would > be something _*which is what it is without reference to anything else*_ > within it or without it, regardless of all force and of all reason. Now the > world is full of this element of irresponsible, free, Originality. Why > should the middle part of the spectrum look green rather than violet? There > is no conceivable reason for it nor compulsion in it. [...] > > Note that there he discusses "what could appear as being in the present > instant were it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess; > for nothing is more occult than the absolute present." > > Elsewhere, at the end of CP 7.536 in an undated manuscript, he says "The > consciousness of the present, as the boundary between past and future, > involves them both.": > > Thus, every reasoning involves another reasoning, which in its turn > involves another, and so on _*ad infinitum*_. Every reasoning connects > something that has just been learned with knowledge already acquired so > that we thereby learn what has been unknown. It is thus that the present is > so welded to what is just past as to render what is just coming about > inevitable. The consciousness of the present, as the boundary between past > and future, involves them both. Reasoning is a new experience which > involves something old and something hitherto unknown. The past as above > remarked is the _*ego*_. My recent past is my uppermost _*ego*_; my > distant past is my more generalized _*ego*_. The past of the community is > _*our ego*_. In attributing a flow of time to unknown events we impute a > quasi-_*ego*_ to the universe. The present is the immediate > representation we are just learning that brings the future, or non-ego, to > be assimilated into the _*ego*_. It is thus seen that learning, or > representation, is the third Kainopythagorean category. > > So that _*consciousness of*_ the present seems to match that which Gary > Richmond said at peirce-l on April 8, 2011 about the present "moment" as > distinguished from the present "instant," the present moment as a "triadic > moment" http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/6995 > > I also find that, in Peirce's letter of Oct. 12, 1904 to Lady Welby, if I > had looked at what he had written in the same (long) paragraph (CP 8.330) > before the excerpt that I sent, I would have seen Peirce discusses > Firstness of the quiet and Firstness of a shrill piercing whistle, and does > so in a way that supports the idea of the present as a First. For it is the > breaking of the quiet by the shrill whistle that he says involves > Secondness, and that is the breaking of one moment by another, though each > moment, taken apart, simply has its quality, its Firstness. > > Bet, Ben > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Benjamin Udell > *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU > *Sent:* Friday, March 16, 2012 7:10 PM > *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] a question > > Claudio, Eduardo, Diane, list, > > Let's note that, especially for Diane, that Jon has pointed us to passage > where Peirce DOES associate the present with Firstness, in "The Reality of > Thirdness" from the 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism. I missed it > because I narrowed my search too much. Peirce: "The immediate present, > could we seize it, would have no character but its Firstness." Peirce also > in that passage (CP 1.343–349) associates Secondness with the past and > Thirdness with the future. > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/03/16/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-the-reality-of-thirdness/. > It looks like I misinterpreted the quote (from Peirce's letter to Lady > Welby) that I sent a day or two ago, unless Peirce changed his mind. > Somehow I remember reading somebody's claim (I think in a discussion about > the light cone) of an association by Peirce of Secondness with both present > and past, but it's too long ago, I forget. So now we can say: > Firstness Possibility, the may-be. The vague Quality. Present. > Secondness Actuality. The determinate/singular Fact Past. Thirdness > (Conditional) > necessity/destiny, the would-be. The general. Law. Future. > > Yes, I was a little surprised by Claudio's "logical time" comment too. > > Time is for Peirce a 'logical time', so there is no real duration... > Past, Present and Future are just logical considered in a synchronic > triadic analysis > > Maybe Peirce did so in logic, but I'd have thought that he did otherwise > in metaphysics. The quote that I offered from Peirce's letter to Lady Welby > does not seem a synchronic analysis of time without real duration. > > I agree with you, Claudio, that your "design - construction - > habitability" trichotomy seems to work with better with the trichotomy of > possibility/quality - actuality/reaction - necessity/habit than with the > trichotomy of present - past - future. Well, Peirce seems not to have > focused on the trichotomy of present - past - future too often. > > Best, Ben > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Eduardo Forastieri > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body > of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
