Arnold, list,
My apologies: here the Peirce quote from his "coda" to The Basis of
Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences" that I forgot to paste in at
the end of my last message, after I wrote
This he ends as follows:
-- quote Peirce MS 283 - EP2: 396-397
-
Arnold, thanks for a long and rich respnse.
For now I'll just confine myself to resonding to your brief "coda" --
which as any conversational discourse analyst - canonically in this
case William Labov - will tell you, is when the speaker - in this
case writer AS - tries to connect the possible
pt the magic of today's emergence and identity
theories.
Mid 20th century logicians threw the baby out with the bath water by
ignoring experience and not taking it seriously as a phenomenon (as
Peirce did). Their dismissal of it has left a hole that has been
filled by the very same irrati
Thanks Bill for your comments.
You wrote:
Patrick,
I'm don't know what in my post you're replying to. I don't keep my
posts, so I can't be sure, but I don't recall mentioning an
"expression continuum," "segments" or "meaning continuum." I may
have; I sometimes think I only think I know wha
Hi Steven,
You wrote:
Koch is fairly religious (Catholic) - and has recently written about
his religion on his web site - and without making aspersions upon
his integrity I do find that a number of scientists in the field
that are prepared to accept such magic are also religious. As a
resul
Hi Bill, you wrote:
I think it is not very useful to speak of signs as existing in the
same process as existential objects, but if we must, perhaps we can
say, "Yes, signs exist, but much faster than objects do."
Well yes I guess so. The sign function may be construed (rather
simplistically
Jerry, thanks for your comments,
Sorry for my rather slow reply, but family and
some university-political obligations have taken
quite a lot of time the last few days.
In any case, I can see I'll have my work cut out
to be brief in replying to your notes, since
brief though they may be, the
At 9:19 -0400 28-06-2006, Jim Piat wrote:
In any case, what I'm doing here is asking a question and would love
for someone to attempt to sort through how the terms real, existent
and true are related.
That's the big one Jim!
I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as "that
Hi Jim, and thanks for your comments.
You wrote:
At 8:47 -0400 28-06-2006, Jim Piat wrote:
Dear Patrick, Folks--
Whitehead, yes -- and also Wittgenstein's notion of family
resemblance. Signs, like thought are more or less continuous and
resist our attempts to pigeon hole them. OTOH contrasti
Thanks for your comments Arnold, and yes indeed, what Peirce and
Whitehead probably have most in common is their respective
competencies in mathematics, and the way in which they use these
competncies to consolidate and explicate their respective
philosophical projects.
It's their maths that
ously.
I may well be wrong here, of course -- indeed, I haven't been working
with Whitehead's ideas so long myself, and trying to see these in
relation to those of Peirce is actually quite a daunting task -- so
it would be interesting to hear some opinions from other Peirce
listers t
At 0:11 -0400 25-06-2006, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
I will be at the Whitehead Conference in Salzburg next week so I do
not anticipate much time for replies.
Talking of Whitehead, whose process philosophy, or "philosophy of
organism" is surely an interesting and challenging read for any
Peirc
Title: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign,
Qualisign
Ben, I wonder, have you, Gary or any of the others looked at and
evaluated any of the potential of the modelling applets mentioned
below (this comes from the Digital Peirce online site)?
http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/p-intfar.htm
Inte
13 matches
Mail list logo
