Jerry LR Chandler, list,
Yes! I both humbly (just pretending?) and provocatingly ask: Is biosemiotics cenoscopic, and language-based logic idioscopic?
Best,
Helmut
14. September 2018 um 18:07 Uhr
"Jerry LR Chandler" wrote:
List:
The recent post by Jerry Rhee and Edwina
an example - if we take the comment:
" However it has recently been uncovered that more than 40 per cent
of proteins have no well-defined structure at all".
This suggests to me that Firstness is a basic component of an
organism, an organism that is obviously operating
Helmut, list
Could you explain to me the functional difference, to a research
program, whether you define it as cenoscopic [study of the data
already acquired] vs idioscopic [discovers new phenomena]. And what
is 'language-based idioscopic' in biology?
If you are a
List:
The recent post by Jerry Rhee and Edwina deserve deep perusal.
In spirit , these posts parallel my own feelings.
Semantics alone is merely philosophy abused.
Mathematics alone is not even logic.
In my view, CSP focused on language as a path of syntaxies to arguments that
illuminated
For example - here's an outline of some research. I'm not suggesting
that we are experts in molecular biology, but I AM suggesting that it
might be possible to both explain and explore more possibilities,
using a Peircean semiosis infrastructure - of what is going on in
this realm.
Gary F., John S., List:
I agree with Gary F.--the whole point of Peirce's three phenomenological
Categories is to identify the *irreducible *elements of the Phaneron, only *one
*of which is mediation (including representation). The other two--quality
and brute reaction--are not Signs themselves,
Dear John, list,
My question was a follow-up to your own question on where to place semiotic
in CSPsemiotic.jpg.
Question: Where is semeiotic?
To which, you said,
As a formal theory, it would be classified with formal logic
under mathematics. But semeiotic is also an applied science when
Jon, list,
Thank you for clarification! Is it so, that the general object and the final interpretant (of a rheme) are what in some other theory is the extension and the intension of a term?
Before, I had assumed, that these (in- and extension) might be the two submodes (2.2.1) and (2.2.2)
Jon, List
>
> He seems to be basing his understanding of the Immediate Object on
> Peirce's writings of 1904-1906 and downplaying what came later, especially
> when defending his innovative hypothesis that Rhemes do not have Immediate
> Objects at all. +
>
Just to clarify, I by no means want to
Edwina, Jerry R, Jon AS, and Jerry LRC,
Peirce answered your questions. I like his 1903 *outline* because
it's a clean and simple summary of everything he wrote about the
sciences and their interrelationships. But as an outline, it omits
nearly all the details.
ET
I wonder if this list will
Edwina, list,
I apologize, I was just provocating by reversing the classification of logic as cenoscopis, and biology as idioscopic. I agree that both are or can be both (if that is what you meant) Sorry!
14. September 2018 um 18:35 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
Helmut, list
Could you
John S., List:
Just to clarify, the quote attributed to Francesco below is actually
something that I wrote in response to him. He seems to be basing his
understanding of the Immediate Object on Peirce's writings of 1904-1906 and
downplaying what came later, especially when defending his
Dear John, list,
You quotes Margolis:
The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance-
forming bacteria become isomorphic with our thought, with our happiness,
our sensitivities and stimulations.
I agree with this, too.
But my reservation about not treating bacteria
Helmut, List:
I share Peirce's preference for the terms Breadth and Depth, rather than
extension and intension, and suspect that there are subtle differences in
their meanings. What I have proposed is that the Immediate Object
corresponds to Essential Breadth and the General Object corresponds
John, list,
linguistics can only be better developed than biosemiotics, if it is not a branch of it´s, i.e. if there are inanimate things that speak. Logic is only a ready, unchanged by new experience science, if it is not based on words, like the greek root meaning both suggests. Mathematics is
John S., List:
JAS: Peirce repeatedly made it very clear that he considered Logic as
Semeiotic to be a Normative Science, not a branch of phenomenology.
JFS: No. He explicitly said that logic is a branch of mathematics.
Please provide a citation for this claim. The first branch of
On 9/13/2018 11:27 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
How do you classify biosemiotic using your scheme?
Very simply. Every living thing, from a bacterium on up, has
a quasi-mind with a phaneron that contains the kinds of signs
it recognizes and responds to.
When Peirce said "present to the mind in any
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}John, list
I fully agree with your admiration for Peircean classification. I'm
not against it. I'm not saying that his classifications don't cover
everything!
My point - which you don't seem to get, is
John, you wrote, “If Peirce ever said that there are things in the mind, in
thought, or in the phaneron that are not signs, I'd like to see the quotation.”
Peirce to James, 1904: “Percepts are signs for psychology; but they are not so
for phenomenology” (CP 8.300)
On the “ultimate logical
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}John, list
Agreed - and Pierce was quite specific that you don't need a
conscious and separate Mind to be involved in semiosis.
My point, again, is that I don't see the function of this list's
focus on
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