Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

[Eugene Halton]

John characterized Aristotle: “5. Rational psyche of an animal having logos
(zôon logon echein).

Each psyche inherits all the abilities of the more primitive
psyches.

For Aristotle, the rational psyche of humans is the most advanced.”



I prefer “Rational psyche of an animal having logos (zôon logon echein).”
The idea that humans adequately meet that criterion, if that is Aristotle’s
opinion and if I am correctly understanding it, is problematic.

 It would be typical of humans to overrate the rational capacity and to
self-glorify the rational as the most “advanced.” One could also say that
the rational psyche of humans is the most advanced in destructive
irrationality. The human rational psyche’s most notable achievement
retrospectively may be the now developing anthropocene extinction event,
which will likely have virtually extinguished the current model of humans
and decimated life more generally.

 Another perspective is that the “rational psyche of humans,” rather
than being the most advanced, is the most dependent on the rest of the
community of life. This is the way it was and still is usually conceived by
peoples of the earth, with understanding of the need for limits on the
overweening rational human psyche. And it may prove to be the more proper
balance, of a piece with Peirce’s ideas on rational mind as “Unmatured
Instinctive Mind”:

“The conception of the Rational Mind as an Unmatured Instinctive Mind which
takes another development precisely because of its childlike character is
confirmed, not only by the prolonged childhood of men, but also by the fact
that all systems of rational performances have had instinct for their first
germ” CP 7.381.

The others, us, the civilized peoples who in various ways thought and still
think that the earth could be controlled and transcended through
technology, religions of transcendence, and the progress of power, are in
the process of having that hubris brought down to earth.

James Lovelock, who invented the electron capture detector in 1957, with
which he was the first to measure CFCs in the atmosphere, and who later,
while working for NASA, proposed the Gaia hypothesis, said in an interview
in 2008:

"There have been seven disasters since humans came on the earth, very
similar to the one that’s just about to happen. I think these events keep
separating the wheat from the chaff. And eventually we’ll have a human on
the planet that really does understand it and can live with it properly.
That’s the source of my optimism.” For more of his optimism of the long
run:
https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2008/mar/01/scienceofclimatechange.climatechange

Gene Halton

On Fri, Dec 7, 2018 at 10:48 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> Thanks for this post as it appears to me from these passages (and many
> other which I'm sure could be cited and which I vaguely recall) that I will
> *not* have to revise/upend/reverse everything I've ever thought about how
> Peirce viewed form and matter; and that I can continue to safely associate
> form with 1ns, matter with 2ns.
>
> Whew! I was worried there for a moment!
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 7, 2018 at 9:52 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary F., List:
>>
>> Here is what Peirce actually wrote at EP 2:373 (1906).
>>
>> CSP:  *The idea of growth,*--the stately tree springing from the tiny
>> grain,--was the key that Aristotle brought to be tried upon this intricate
>> grim lock. In such trials he came upon those wonderful conceptions, *δύναμις
>> *and *ἐ**νέργεια*, *ὕ**λη *and *μορφή *or *ε**ἶ**δος*, or, as he might
>> still better have said, *τύπος*, the blow, the *coup*. (*A propos* of
>> what was said above about the way to read, the sentence just set down is an
>> instance of one beyond which a reader had better not proceed, until he
>> pretty nearly understands the point of view from which the force of that
>> remark appears.) This idea of Aristotle's has proved marvellously fecund;
>> and in truth it is the only idea covering quite the whole area of cenoscopy
>> that has shown any marked uberosity.
>>
>>
>> Notice what he stated immediately after mentioning *τύπος*.
>> Unfortunately, per the EP endnotes, the earlier pages where he apparently
>> discussed "the way to read" are missing.  That only gives greater weight to
>> his warning about not proceeding without understanding "the point of view
>> from which the force of that remark appears."
>>
>> It seems very tenuous to me to conclude from this one sentence that "
>> *form* is the active and forceful side of the matter/form duality, while
>> *matter* is the passive side," such that "*matter* corresponds to
>> Firstness and *form* to Secondness."  On the contrary, Peirce quite
>> unambiguously associated Form with 1ns and Matter with 2ns, not only in
>> "New 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

[gnox]

Gary R, Jon, list,

Gary, to answer your question first: If matter corresponds to 1ns in this 
selection, what corresponds to 2ns seems to be experience, or perhaps more 
specifically, experience of the unfamiliar. Or we might say that 2ns is the 
force of determination. Read the whole selection and see what you think. But 
these correspondences can’t be exact because form/matter is a dyad while 
1ns/2ns/3ns is a triad. In the sexuality metaphor, bearing in mind that it’s a 
metaphor for logical principles and not for anything biological or 
psychological, it seems clear that female is matter and male is form, just as 
δύναμις is matter and ἐνέργεια is form (as Aristotle says). But of course that 
is an oversimplification; as Peirce says,

[[ One special feature of growth has always received great attention; yet its 
lessons are far from having today been completely learned. It is that growth 
cannot proceed very far until those elements of it which constitute the 
functions of the two sexes get well separated. The female function, the 
function of the seed, has always been recognized as the δύναμις. The female is 
the general and essential sex; the male merely executes a hunch, the τύπος of 
the μορφή. It is the principle of unrest. But do not forget that the seed needs 
to be left to itself to grow as far as it can alone, before the coup of 
fertilization disturbs it. In order that it could so have grown alone, and 
indeed, in low organisms have reached the height of their attained 
potentiality, the female must have had an admixture of the restless.  ]EP2:374]

There is no pure femininity or pure masculinity, just as there is no pure 
firstness or secondness or thirdness in phenomena or experience. But “the τύπος 
of the μορφή” seems to be the secondness of experience.

Jon, my comments are inserted between yours below.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 7-Dec-18 21:52



Gary F., List:

Here is what Peirce actually wrote at EP 2:373 (1906).

CSP:  The idea of growth,--the stately tree springing from the tiny grain,--was 
the key that Aristotle brought to be tried upon this intricate grim lock. In 
such trials he came upon those wonderful conceptions, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, ὕλη 
and μορφή or εἶδος, or, as he might still better have said, τύπος, the blow, 
the coup. (A propos of what was said above about the way to read, the sentence 
just set down is an instance of one beyond which a reader had better not 
proceed, until he pretty nearly understands the point of view from which the 
force of that remark appears.) This idea of Aristotle's has proved marvellously 
fecund; and in truth it is the only idea covering quite the whole area of 
cenoscopy that has shown any marked uberosity.

Notice what he stated immediately after mentioning τύπος.  Unfortunately, per 
the EP endnotes, the earlier pages where he apparently discussed "the way to 
read" are missing.  That only gives greater weight to his warning about not 
proceeding without understanding "the point of view from which the force of 
that remark appears."

It seems very tenuous to me to conclude from this one sentence that "form is 
the active and forceful side of the matter/form duality, while matter is the 
passive side," such that "matter corresponds to Firstness and form to 
Secondness."  

GF: I am not trying to conclude anything. I am trying to follow Peirce’s 
argument in this particular essay from his point of view, and it was that 
attempt which generated my paraphrase. I’ve done my best to understand the 
point of view from which Peirce’s remark appears, by going back to the original 
text of Aristotle’s De Anima and carefully noting the relationships between 
what Aristotle said there and what Peirce says about Aristotle’s concepts (here 
and elsewhere); by consulting several other pieces that Peirce wrote in early 
1906, notably his draft letter to Welby dated March 9, 1906 (SS 195-201); and 
especially by studying this essay by Peirce very closely, thinking through his 
argument over the course of several complete rereadings of it. If my 
understanding of all this differs from yours, that is not surprising, nor is it 
a problem to be solved, in my view.

 

JAS: On the contrary, Peirce quite unambiguously associated Form with 1ns and 
Matter with 2ns, not only in "New Elements" but also in "Sketch of Dichotomic 
Mathematics" (NEM 4:292-300; 1904) and other contemporaneous manuscripts. 

GF: Yes, that’s exactly why I found this argument of Peirce’s “a bit startling” 
(putting it mildly) and took up the challenge of thinking it through with him, 
from his perspective at the time.  

 

JAS: For example ...

CSP:  A Quality, or Form, of which qualities of feeling, such as red, are 
examples, is something which is whatever it is quite regardless of anything 
else ... A Quoddam, or Matter ... of which a non-ego, or resisting something, 
is an example, is such that its being consists entirely in its reactions with 
other quoddams. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

Thanks for this post as it appears to me from these passages (and many
other which I'm sure could be cited and which I vaguely recall) that I will
*not* have to revise/upend/reverse everything I've ever thought about how
Peirce viewed form and matter; and that I can continue to safely associate
form with 1ns, matter with 2ns.

Whew! I was worried there for a moment!

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Fri, Dec 7, 2018 at 9:52 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary F., List:
>
> Here is what Peirce actually wrote at EP 2:373 (1906).
>
> CSP:  *The idea of growth,*--the stately tree springing from the tiny
> grain,--was the key that Aristotle brought to be tried upon this intricate
> grim lock. In such trials he came upon those wonderful conceptions, *δύναμις
> *and *ἐ**νέργεια*, *ὕ**λη *and *μορφή *or *ε**ἶ**δος*, or, as he might
> still better have said, *τύπος*, the blow, the *coup*. (*A propos* of
> what was said above about the way to read, the sentence just set down is an
> instance of one beyond which a reader had better not proceed, until he
> pretty nearly understands the point of view from which the force of that
> remark appears.) This idea of Aristotle's has proved marvellously fecund;
> and in truth it is the only idea covering quite the whole area of cenoscopy
> that has shown any marked uberosity.
>
>
> Notice what he stated immediately after mentioning *τύπος*.
> Unfortunately, per the EP endnotes, the earlier pages where he apparently
> discussed "the way to read" are missing.  That only gives greater weight to
> his warning about not proceeding without understanding "the point of view
> from which the force of that remark appears."
>
> It seems very tenuous to me to conclude from this one sentence that "
> *form* is the active and forceful side of the matter/form duality, while
> *matter* is the passive side," such that "*matter* corresponds to
> Firstness and *form* to Secondness."  On the contrary, Peirce quite
> unambiguously associated Form with 1ns and Matter with 2ns, not only in
> "New Elements" but also in "Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics" (NEM
> 4:292-300; 1904) and other contemporaneous manuscripts.  For example ...
>
> CSP:  A *Quality*, or *Form*, of which qualities of feeling, such as *red*,
> are examples, is something which is whatever it is quite regardless of
> anything else ... A *Quoddam*, or *Matter* ... of which a *non-ego*, or
> resisting something, is an example, is such that its being consists
> entirely in its reactions with other quoddams.  As reacting, it really
> exists and is *individual* ... (R 5:25-26[6-7]; 1904)
>
>
> And even more so ...
>
> CSP:  *Form*,--the true, Aristotelian form,--brings matter together, but
> is quite passive, being all that it is within itself ... When we ask what a
> form is, we set out from the immediately known qualities of feeling and
> suppose that there is something of the same sort beyond feeling, out of
> consciousness.  When we ask what matter is, we set out from the directly
> experienced resistance of an obstacle against which we push, and suppose
> that something like that fills the outer world.  This philosophy cannot be
> improved upon ... (R 5:48-49[33-34]; 1904)
>
>
> He even highlighted a key difference between Aristotle's concepts of Form
> vs. Matter and those of the scholastics, characteristically aligning
> himself with the latter.
>
> CSP:  Aristotle's metaphysics undoubtedly belongs to the general type of
> evolutionary systems ...  Matter is, for him, that which is what it is in
> itself.  Form is that which is only so far as it is embodied in matter, and
> is essentially dichotomic, as Plato made it.  The scholastic metaphysics,
> on the other hand, looks upon the pure nature, or Form, as that which is
> what it is in itself, and as prior to any embodiment of it ... From this
> point of view, matter (it is always the Aristotelian matter I speak of, or
> that which simply exists) ought to be held to exist only by reaction, and
> so to be that which is what it is by force of *another*.  It is not
> necessary for the logician to embrace either of these theories (of which I
> prefer the second.) (R 517:92-93[18-19]; 1904)
>
>
> Lest anyone wonder if perhaps Peirce changed his mind about all of this
> over the ensuing two years ...
>
> CSP:  Matter is that by virtue of which an object gains Existence, a fact
> known only by an Index, which is connected with the object only by brute
> force; while Form, being that by which the object is such as it is, is
> comprehensible. (NEM 4:322; 1906)
>
>
> He even discussed Form and Matter as they specifically pertain to
> Existential Graphs.
>
> CSP:  ... I ask you to recall the definitions of Matter and Form that go
> back to Aristotle (though it is hard to believe they are not earlier; and
> the metaphysical application of *ϋλη* sounds 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Here is what Peirce actually wrote at EP 2:373 (1906).

CSP:  *The idea of growth,*--the stately tree springing from the tiny
grain,--was the key that Aristotle brought to be tried upon this intricate
grim lock. In such trials he came upon those wonderful conceptions, *δύναμις
*and *ἐ**νέργεια*, *ὕ**λη *and *μορφή *or *ε**ἶ**δος*, or, as he might
still better have said, *τύπος*, the blow, the *coup*. (*A propos* of what
was said above about the way to read, the sentence just set down is an
instance of one beyond which a reader had better not proceed, until he
pretty nearly understands the point of view from which the force of that
remark appears.) This idea of Aristotle's has proved marvellously fecund;
and in truth it is the only idea covering quite the whole area of cenoscopy
that has shown any marked uberosity.


Notice what he stated immediately after mentioning *τύπος*.  Unfortunately,
per the EP endnotes, the earlier pages where he apparently discussed "the
way to read" are missing.  That only gives greater weight to his warning
about not proceeding without understanding "the point of view from which
the force of that remark appears."

It seems very tenuous to me to conclude from this one sentence that "*form* is
the active and forceful side of the matter/form duality, while *matter* is
the passive side," such that "*matter* corresponds to Firstness and *form* to
Secondness."  On the contrary, Peirce quite unambiguously associated Form
with 1ns and Matter with 2ns, not only in "New Elements" but also in
"Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics" (NEM 4:292-300; 1904) and other
contemporaneous manuscripts.  For example ...

CSP:  A *Quality*, or *Form*, of which qualities of feeling, such as *red*,
are examples, is something which is whatever it is quite regardless of
anything else ... A *Quoddam*, or *Matter* ... of which a *non-ego*, or
resisting something, is an example, is such that its being consists
entirely in its reactions with other quoddams.  As reacting, it really
exists and is *individual* ... (R 5:25-26[6-7]; 1904)


And even more so ...

CSP:  *Form*,--the true, Aristotelian form,--brings matter together, but is
quite passive, being all that it is within itself ... When we ask what a
form is, we set out from the immediately known qualities of feeling and
suppose that there is something of the same sort beyond feeling, out of
consciousness.  When we ask what matter is, we set out from the directly
experienced resistance of an obstacle against which we push, and suppose
that something like that fills the outer world.  This philosophy cannot be
improved upon ... (R 5:48-49[33-34]; 1904)


He even highlighted a key difference between Aristotle's concepts of Form
vs. Matter and those of the scholastics, characteristically aligning
himself with the latter.

CSP:  Aristotle's metaphysics undoubtedly belongs to the general type of
evolutionary systems ...  Matter is, for him, that which is what it is in
itself.  Form is that which is only so far as it is embodied in matter, and
is essentially dichotomic, as Plato made it.  The scholastic metaphysics,
on the other hand, looks upon the pure nature, or Form, as that which is
what it is in itself, and as prior to any embodiment of it ... From this
point of view, matter (it is always the Aristotelian matter I speak of, or
that which simply exists) ought to be held to exist only by reaction, and
so to be that which is what it is by force of *another*.  It is not
necessary for the logician to embrace either of these theories (of which I
prefer the second.) (R 517:92-93[18-19]; 1904)


Lest anyone wonder if perhaps Peirce changed his mind about all of this
over the ensuing two years ...

CSP:  Matter is that by virtue of which an object gains Existence, a fact
known only by an Index, which is connected with the object only by brute
force; while Form, being that by which the object is such as it is, is
comprehensible. (NEM 4:322; 1906)


He even discussed Form and Matter as they specifically pertain to
Existential Graphs.

CSP:  ... I ask you to recall the definitions of Matter and Form that go
back to Aristotle (though it is hard to believe they are not earlier; and
the metaphysical application of *ϋλη* sounds to me like some late Ionic
philosopher, and not a bit like Aristotle, whom it would also have been
more like to claim it, if it were his). Form is that which makes anything
such as it is, while matter makes it to be. From this pair of beautiful
generalizations are born a numerous family of harmonious and
interresemblant acceptions of the two words. In speaking of Graphs we may
well call the Principles of their Interpretation (such as the Endoporeutic
Principle) the Form; the way of shaping and scribing them (such as leaving
the Line without barbs) the Matter. Nothing could be in better accord with
the general definitions of Form and of Matter. (NEM 4:329-330; 1906)


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, 

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

[Edwina Taborsky]

 should like to write a little book on ‘The Conduct of
Thoughts’ in which the introductory chapter should introduce the
reader to my existential graphs, which would then be used throughout
as the apparent subject, the parable or metaphor, in terms of which
everything would be said,—which would be far more scientific than
dragging in the “mind” all the time, in German fashion, when the
mind and psychology has no more to do with the substance of the book
than if I were to discourse of the ingredients of the ink I use.  

He goes on to explain that in EGs, “the blank leaf itself [i.e.
the sheet of assertion] is the quasi-mind.” Now, if we apply the
matter/form distinction to EGs, I think we would have to say that the
blank sheet is the matter which gets determined by some form being
scribed upon it, just as any sign is determined by its object to
determine an interpretant. For Peirce, what is essential both to
quasi-minds and to symbols is that they are  indeterminate, i.e.
subject to further determination. That is pretty close to the concept
of matter (ὕλη) as Aristotle defined it in Book 2 of De Anima. In
this sense, then, mind is matter, not form. No wonder, then, that the
mind/matter distinction seems quite foreign to Peirce’s late
semeiotic.

 I don’t know how much sense this makes to readers of the list,
but I’ll try to clarify if necessary. I do find it significant in
that this same period saw the publication of Peirce’s
“Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism,” his most elaborate
attempt to connect his EGs with his “proof” of pragmatism and
thus with the rest of his philosophy.

 Gary f.
-Original Message-
 From: John F Sowa  
 Sent: 6-Dec-18 13:30
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'
In discussing quasimind, it's important to consider Aristotle's
hierarchy of psyches in _De Anima_.  Since Peirce was familiar with
Aristotle, that hierarchy may have had some influence on his views: 
  1. Vegetative psyche of plants.
  2. Sensitive psyche of sessile animals like sponges and clams.

 (Aristotle was the first to note that sponges were animals.) 
  3. Locomotive pysche of worms.
  4. Psyche of animals having imagery (phantasia).
  5. Rational psyche of an animal having logos (zôon logon echein).

Each psyche inherits all the abilities of the more primitive
psyches.

For Aristotle, the rational psyche of humans is the most advanced.
For discussion of that hierarchy, see Martha Nussbaum & Hilary
Putnam, "Changing Aristotle's Mind", 
http://moodle.nthu.edu.tw/file.php/28946/M._Nussbaum_and_H._Putnam_Changing_Aristotle_s_Mind.pdf
[1]
Interesting point:  Nussbaum and Putnam cite the way Thomas Aquinas
used Aristotle's hierarchy to justify the resurrection of the body at
the Last Judgment.  (Quotations below)
They say that Aquinas had a more integrated interpretation of
Aristotle than many later philosophers.  But they don't claim that
the resurrection of the body is essential to that view.
John 


Links:
--
[1]
http://moodle.nthu.edu.tw/file.php/28946/M._Nussbaum_and_H._Putnam_Changing_Aristotle_s_Mind.pdf

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

[Gary Richmond]

was saying this in a draft which dealt
> largely with Existential Graphs, for a reason which he explained in this
> paragraph (SS:195):
>
> I should like to write a little book on ‘The Conduct of Thoughts’ in which
> the introductory chapter should introduce the reader to my existential
> graphs, which would then be used throughout as the apparent subject, the
> parable or metaphor, in terms of which everything would be said,—which
> would be far more scientific than dragging in the “mind” all the time, in
> German fashion, when the mind and psychology has no more to do with the
> substance of the book than if I were to discourse of the ingredients of the
> ink I use.
>
> He goes on to explain that in EGs, “the blank leaf itself [i.e. the sheet
> of assertion] is the quasi-mind.” Now, if we apply the matter/form
> distinction to EGs, I think we would have to say that the blank sheet is
> the *matter* which gets *determined* by some *form* being scribed upon
> it, just as any sign is determined by its object to determine an
> interpretant. For Peirce, what is essential both to quasi-minds and to
> symbols is that they are *indeterminate*, i.e. subject to further
> determination. That is pretty close to the concept of *matter* (ὕλη) as
> Aristotle defined it in Book 2 of *De Anima.* In this sense, then, *mind*
> is *matter*, not form. No wonder, then, that the *mind/matter*
> distinction seems quite foreign to Peirce’s late semeiotic.
>
> I don’t know how much sense this makes to readers of the list, but I’ll
> try to clarify if necessary. I do find it significant in that this same
> period saw the publication of Peirce’s “Prolegomena to an Apology for
> Pragmaticism,” his most elaborate attempt to connect his EGs with his
> “proof” of pragmatism and thus with the rest of his philosophy.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa 
> Sent: 6-Dec-18 13:30
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'
>
>
>
> In discussing quasimind, it's important to consider Aristotle's hierarchy
> of psyches in _De Anima_.  Since Peirce was familiar with Aristotle, that
> hierarchy may have had some influence on his views:
>
>
>
>   1. Vegetative psyche of plants.
>
>
>
>   2. Sensitive psyche of sessile animals like sponges and clams.
>
>  (Aristotle was the first to note that sponges were animals.)
>
>
>
>   3. Locomotive pysche of worms.
>
>
>
>   4. Psyche of animals having imagery (phantasia).
>
>
>
>   5. Rational psyche of an animal having logos (zôon logon echein).
>
>
>
> Each psyche inherits all the abilities of the more primitive psyches.
>
> For Aristotle, the rational psyche of humans is the most advanced.
>
>
>
> For discussion of that hierarchy, see Martha Nussbaum & Hilary Putnam,
> "Changing Aristotle's Mind",
> http://moodle.nthu.edu.tw/file.php/28946/M._Nussbaum_and_H._Putnam_Changing_Aristotle_s_Mind.pdf
>
>
>
> Interesting point:  Nussbaum and Putnam cite the way Thomas Aquinas used
> Aristotle's hierarchy to justify the resurrection of the body at the Last
> Judgment.  (Quotations below)
>
>
>
> They say that Aquinas had a more integrated interpretation of Aristotle
> than many later philosophers.  But they don't claim that the resurrection
> of the body is essential to that view.
>
>
>
> John
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

[gnox]

 leaf itself [i.e. the sheet of 
assertion] is the quasi-mind.” Now, if we apply the matter/form distinction to 
EGs, I think we would have to say that the blank sheet is the matter which gets 
determined by some form being scribed upon it, just as any sign is determined 
by its object to determine an interpretant. For Peirce, what is essential both 
to quasi-minds and to symbols is that they are indeterminate, i.e. subject to 
further determination. That is pretty close to the concept of matter (ὕλη) as 
Aristotle defined it in Book 2 of De Anima. In this sense, then, mind is 
matter, not form. No wonder, then, that the mind/matter distinction seems quite 
foreign to Peirce’s late semeiotic.

I don’t know how much sense this makes to readers of the list, but I’ll try to 
clarify if necessary. I do find it significant in that this same period saw the 
publication of Peirce’s “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism,” his most 
elaborate attempt to connect his EGs with his “proof” of pragmatism and thus 
with the rest of his philosophy.

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa  
Sent: 6-Dec-18 13:30
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

 

In discussing quasimind, it's important to consider Aristotle's hierarchy of 
psyches in _De Anima_.  Since Peirce was familiar with Aristotle, that 
hierarchy may have had some influence on his views:

 

  1. Vegetative psyche of plants.

 

  2. Sensitive psyche of sessile animals like sponges and clams.

 (Aristotle was the first to note that sponges were animals.)

 

  3. Locomotive pysche of worms.

 

  4. Psyche of animals having imagery (phantasia).

 

  5. Rational psyche of an animal having logos (zôon logon echein).

 

Each psyche inherits all the abilities of the more primitive psyches.

For Aristotle, the rational psyche of humans is the most advanced.

 

For discussion of that hierarchy, see Martha Nussbaum & Hilary Putnam, 
"Changing Aristotle's Mind",  
<http://moodle.nthu.edu.tw/file.php/28946/M._Nussbaum_and_H._Putnam_Changing_Aristotle_s_Mind.pdf>
 
http://moodle.nthu.edu.tw/file.php/28946/M._Nussbaum_and_H._Putnam_Changing_Aristotle_s_Mind.pdf

 

Interesting point:  Nussbaum and Putnam cite the way Thomas Aquinas used 
Aristotle's hierarchy to justify the resurrection of the body at the Last 
Judgment.  (Quotations below)

 

They say that Aquinas had a more integrated interpretation of Aristotle than 
many later philosophers.  But they don't claim that the resurrection of the 
body is essential to that view.

 

John


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

[John F Sowa]

In discussing quasimind, it's important to consider Aristotle's
hierarchy of psyches in _De Anima_.  Since Peirce was familiar with
Aristotle, that hierarchy may have had some influence on his views:

 1. Vegetative psyche of plants.

 2. Sensitive psyche of sessile animals like sponges and clams.
(Aristotle was the first to note that sponges were animals.)

 3. Locomotive pysche of worms.

 4. Psyche of animals having imagery (phantasia).

 5. Rational psyche of an animal having logos (zôon logon echein).

Each psyche inherits all the abilities of the more primitive psyches.
For Aristotle, the rational psyche of humans is the most advanced.

For discussion of that hierarchy, see Martha Nussbaum & Hilary Putnam,
"Changing Aristotle's Mind", 
http://moodle.nthu.edu.tw/file.php/28946/M._Nussbaum_and_H._Putnam_Changing_Aristotle_s_Mind.pdf


Interesting point:  Nussbaum and Putnam cite the way Thomas Aquinas
used Aristotle's hierarchy to justify the resurrection of the body
at the Last Judgment.  (Quotations below)

They say that Aquinas had a more integrated interpretation of
Aristotle than many later philosophers.  But they don't claim
that the resurrection of the body is essential to that view.

John
_

From Nussbaum and Putnam (1992)

in the Summa Theologiae [Aquinas] concludes... that soul and body
are so unified, so fitly and fully together in all their activity,
that the separated soul has cognition only in a confused and unnatural
way. With the death of the body, sensing and phantasia go; but then,
he holds, all cognition of particulars and all modes of cognition
built on this must go as well. But then the natural human way of
cognizing must go: "To be separated from the body is contrary to the
principle of its nature, and similarly to cognize without turning to
phantasms is contrary to its nature. So it is united to the body so
that it should be and act according to its nature" (ST I, q. 89, a. 1).
What remains is only an imperfect cognition, 'confusam in communi'

If the human mode of cognition is different, in its embodiment, from 
that of God and the angels, still it is exactly suited to human life,

life in a world of changing perceptible particulars. Matter is suited
to its function, and cognition's embodied modes to the nature of
cognition's worldly objects (ST I, q. 84, a. 7).

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

You wrote:

ET: I'd say that 'resonance' can be equated with 'semiosis', which in my
view, is a constant ongoing reality in our material world. As the article
says ' all things are constantly in motion, vibrating'. I'd say that all
things are in a constant process of semiosis.

I can't say that I completely follow you here although, I must admit, I
have only begun thinking about Hunt's theory and am still quite confused
about it.

How can 'resonance' be '*equated*' (as you wrote; a rather strong term to
use in this context, I think) with 'semiosis'? In physics resonance is
typically defined along the lines of its being "the oscillating,
reciprocating, or other periodic motion of a body or medium forced from its
original position or state., etc" I'm not yet sure how this 'equates' with
semiosis?  But Hunt's use of the term is technical, and I'm still uncertain
exactly how he's using it.

But, similarly, how is it that all things being in constant vibrational
movement is similar to "being in a constant process of semiosis"? Semiosis
has a definite structure involving, as you yourself frequently point out,
all three categories, a direction, etc.. I don't YET see anything
corresponding to this in the constant vibration underlying all matter in
the universe. You continued:

ET: Coherence - can be compared with Thirdness or synchronization.

I think I might begin to see what you're suggesting here were this comment
phrased somewhat differently, say: "Coherence (or synchronization in the
context of the discussion in the article) - can be compared with
Thirdness."  For 'synchronization' is generally understood as the activity
of two or more things operating at the same time/rate (perhaps,
consequently, in a closely related manner, etc.) While this synchronizing
would no doubt involve a kind of 3ns, it's hard for me to see *how *it
should be "compared" with 3ns.

And yet, as Hunt employs synchronization in his theory as likely involved
in generating self-organization, I do, perhaps, begin to see
how--especially when welded to the idea of 'coherence'--that it might have
some significant relation to semiosis and, so, be an expression of 3ns. In
this connection Hunt writes;

Resonance is a truly universal phenomenon and at the heart of what can
sometimes seem like mysterious tendencies toward self-organization.

Obviously, I will have to do a great deal more thinking on this matter, and
especially as 'coherence', tending as it does towards forming unities
involving qualities of logicality and consistency, does seem aligned to 3ns.

   1. ET: With regard to the article's use of consciousness - they seem to
   refer to a process going on  within individualism or Secondness, rather
   than a mental reflection of the external environment. This process is
   mental. So,  I'd substitute 'Mind' for 'consciousness' in these
   situations.  So, yes, all things are individual instances of Mind/Matter. A
   bacterium has a sense of its own finiteness and also, is an expression of
   Mind and as such, can interact with other expressions of Mind.

While from the standpoint of Peirce's theory I can certainly see why you
might prefer 'mind' to 'consciousness',  yet to do that would deeply
undercut Hunt's theory from the get go as he summarizes it near the
conclusion of the piece:

The central thesis of our approach is this: the particular linkages that
allow for macro-consciousness to occur result from a shared resonance among
many micro-conscious constituents. The speed of the resonant waves that are
present is the limiting factor that determines the size of each conscious
entity.

So, personally, I would prefer to give his hypothesis some
considerable reflection
on its own principles before rejecting 'consciousness' as the appropriate
term for what he's getting at. Perhaps he's onto something suggesting
that "It’s
resonating structures all the way down—and up," and that these 'resonating
structues' are, indeed, conscious to some degree or another.


ET: And I'd agree that 'as matter becomes more complex, 'so does mind'.


I think I might agree with this, but at the moment can think of so many
possible exceptions at both the micro- and macro-levels as to make me
question even that.

Meanwhile, thank you ever so much for this post as it has helped me to
begin to wrestle with Hunt's theory.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 1:57 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Thanks for the article - and yes, although it doesn't mention Peirce, it
> fits right in with his more exact theory.
>
> A few points:
>
> I'd say that 'resonance' can be equated with 'semiosis', which in my view,
> is a constant ongoing reality in our material world. As the article says '
> all things are constantly in motion, vibrating'. I'd say that all things
> are in a constant process of semiosis.
>
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

[Gary Richmond]

Mike, Jon, Gene, list,

I'm not sure the article has much--if anything--to do with 'quasi-mind' as
Peirce conceived of it, Mike, but I am intrigued, as I have been for some
time, by the idea of 'panpsychism', to which the article's author's
'resonance theory of consciousness' suggests, perhaps, an approach to
testing that hypothesis.

While Jon is, of course, quite right that  Peirce wrote that matter was
mind "hidebound with habits," and that matter was "effete mind," and while
Peirce occasionally even suggested that matter was 'dead', he didn't always
see it exactly that way, and even in the passage in which he referred to
matter as "hidebound with habits":.

1892 | The Law of Mind | W 8:155; CP 6.158

…what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound
with habits. It still retains the element of diversification; and i*n that
diversification there is life *(*in Commens* dictionary, emphasis added by
me).


I would suggest that holding, as the author of the article does, that mind
and matter are "complexified" together, may re-introduce the very dualism
which Peirce's philosophy is at pains to overcome. On the other hand, to
insist that there is *no* life in matter, that it is completely dead, is to
again risk introducing that self-same duality.

And, I would suggest, Jon, that however things may be in consideration of
logic in itself, let's not forget that the *science* is 'logic as
*semeiotic'* and NOT 'logic as *semiosis*.' Which is to say that in the
science there is necessarily a great deal of abstraction from living
semiosis.

Peirce, who, of course, knew nothing of the quantum realm, and so what
might be 'happening' *there*, yet in the context of his tychism thought
that atoms must 'swerve' a little. How else would there ever be variety in
nature? So, now, looking at both the atomic and the quantum levels, it
seems to me that there is indeed quite a bit of 'swerving' at every level
at which one might look at matter.


Or, as Tam Hunt, the author of the article writes:


All things in our universe are constantly in motion, vibrating. Even
objects that appear to be stationary are in fact vibrating, oscillating,
resonating, at various frequencies. Resonance is a type of motion,
characterized by oscillation between two states. And ultimately all matter
is just vibrations of various underlying fields

.


I agree with Gene that the article you posted, Mike, is most
thought-provoking. So thanks for sharing it with us. I think there may be,
at least potentially, much Peirce-related thinking in it even it doesn't
directly relate to Peirce's concert of 'quasi-mind'. Indeed, I hope we
might find ways to pursue Hunt's resonance theory of consciousness further
on the list.

Best,

Gary






 "

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*


On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 1:03 PM Eugene Halton 
wrote:

> Thought provoking article I can ... resonate ... with. Thanks for sending,
> Mike.
> Gene Halton
>
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 11:59 AM Mike Bergman  wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> Speaking of quasi-minds, this reference is very thought provoking,
>> though the author does not mention Peirce:
>>
>>
>> https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-hippies-were-right-its-all-about-vibrations-man/
>>
>> Mike
>>
>>
>>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Thanks for the article - and yes, although it doesn't mention
Peirce, it fits right in with his more exact theory.

A few points:

I'd say that 'resonance' can be equated with 'semiosis', which in my
view, is a constant ongoing reality in our material world. As the
article says ' all things are constantly in motion, vibrating'. I'd
say that all things are in a constant process of semiosis.

Coherence - can be compared with Thirdness or synchronization.

With regard to the article's use of consciousness - they seem to
refer to a process going on  within individualism or Secondness,
rather than a mental reflection of the external environment. This
process is mental. So,  I'd substitute 'Mind' for 'consciousness' in
these situations.  So, yes, all things are individual instances of
Mind/Matter. A bacterium has a sense of its own finiteness and also,
is an expression of Mind and as such, can interact with other
expressions of Mind. 

And I'd agree that 'as matter becomes more complex, 'so does mind'. 

Edwina
 On Wed 05/12/18 11:58 AM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:
 List, 
 Speaking of quasi-minds, this reference is very thought provoking,  
 though the author does not mention Peirce: 

https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-hippies-were-right-its-all-about-vibrations-man/
[1] 
 Mike 


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fblogs.scientificamerican.com%2Fobservations%2Fthe-hippies-were-right-its-all-about-vibrations-man%2F

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

[Eugene Halton]

Thought provoking article I can ... resonate ... with. Thanks for sending,
Mike.
Gene Halton



On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 11:59 AM Mike Bergman  wrote:

> List,
>
> Speaking of quasi-minds, this reference is very thought provoking,
> though the author does not mention Peirce:
>
>
> https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-hippies-were-right-its-all-about-vibrations-man/
>
> Mike
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another Perspective on 'Quasi-Mind'

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Mike, List:

According to Peirce, consciousness is not logically necessary for something
to be a Quasi-mind involved in semiosis.

CSP:  For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for
the communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that anything
possessing consciousness, that is, feeling of the peculiar common quality
of all our feeling, should be concerned. But it is necessary that there
should be two, if not three, *quasi-minds*, meaning things capable of
varied determination as to forms of the kind communicated. (EP 2:544n22;
1906)


The Sheet of Assertion or Phemic Sheet in Existential Graphs obviously does
not possess consciousness, yet Peirce called it a Quasi-mind (cf. CP 4.550
& EP 2:545n25; both 1906).

My main issue with the linked article is its claim that matter and mind
"complexified" together, whereas Peirce viewed matter as "effete mind" (CP
6.25; 1891) that has become "hidebound with habits" (CP 6.158; 1892).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:59 AM Mike Bergman  wrote:

> List,
>
> Speaking of quasi-minds, this reference is very thought provoking,
> though the author does not mention Peirce:
>
>
> https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-hippies-were-right-its-all-about-vibrations-man/
>
> Mike
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .