Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Charles Pyle]

John,


On this paragraph I don't see how one could justify the claim that phonemes are 
physical, or letters. Phonemes and letters are types that are represented by 
tokens in the medium of sound or visual marks respectively. The representations 
could be considered to be physical, but are categories physical?


The original mark (such as a representation of an icon or a mixture
of letters or phonemes) is something physical. The tokens, which
are marks that have been interpreted by the type, are also physical.
But the meaning (type) grows over time.


> On April 10, 2018 at 3:46 PM John F Sowa wrote:
> 
> 
> On 4/10/2018 12:33 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> 
> > > I... view 'the Sign' not as an intellectual construct but as
> > an actual morphological unit, as an existential spatiotemporal
> > unit of matter, formed by Mind, existent within constant relations
> > with other Signs/morphological units. So, for me, this Sign is
> > itself existential as a crystal, a rock, a spider, a plant, a
> > word..and even, a society.
> > 
> > > For the basic triad of mark (or tone)/token/type, the mark or tone
> is always physical. As an interpreted mark, the token is also physical,
> and the type is some abstract mediation (law, habit...).
> 
> From CP 2.302:
> 
> > > Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other 
> signs,
> > particularly from icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the nature
> > of icons and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs are
> > of mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If a
> > man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it
> > is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de
> > symbolo. A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In use
> > and in experience, its meaning grows. Such words as force, law, 
> > wealth,
> > marriage, bear for us very different meanings from those they bore
> > to our barbarous ancestors.
> > 
> > > The original mark (such as a representation of an icon or a 
> > mixture
> of letters or phonemes) is something physical. The tokens, which
> are marks that have been interpreted by the type, are also physical.
> But the meaning (type) grows over time.
> 
> For the examples above, I can accept "a crystal, a rock, a spider,
> a plant, a word" as sinsigns that I could recognize and name. But
> I doubt that I have ever seen a "society".
> 
> I believe that societies exist, but I would treat them as roles
> that are defined by some kind of Thirdness. For example, you
> can recognize a cat just by looking at it. But you can't tell
> whether it's a pet or a stray without determining how it's
> related to some people.
> 
> John
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui 
> mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui .edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to 
> PEIRCE-L but to list@list.iupui mailto:list@list.iupui .edu with the line 
> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
> 
> 
> 

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[John F Sowa]

On 4/10/2018 12:33 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

I... view 'the Sign' not as an intellectual construct but as
an actual morphological unit, as an existential spatiotemporal
unit of matter, formed by Mind, existent within constant relations
with other Signs/morphological units.  So, for me, this Sign is
itself existential as a crystal, a rock, a spider, a plant, a
word..and even, a society.


For the basic triad of mark (or tone)/token/type, the mark or tone
is always physical.  As an interpreted mark, the token is also physical,
and the type is some abstract mediation (law, habit...).

From CP 2.302:

Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs,
particularly from icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the nature
of icons and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs are
of mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If a
man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it
is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de
symbolo. A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In use
and in experience, its meaning grows. Such words as force, law, wealth,
marriage, bear for us very different meanings from those they bore
to our barbarous ancestors.


The original mark (such as a representation of an icon or a mixture
of letters or phonemes) is something physical.  The tokens, which
are marks that have been interpreted by the type, are also physical.
But the meaning (type) grows over time.

For the examples above, I can accept "a crystal, a rock, a spider,
a plant, a word" as sinsigns that I could recognize and name.  But
I doubt that I have ever seen a "society".

I believe that societies exist, but I would treat them as roles
that are defined by some kind of Thirdness.   For example, you
can recognize a cat just by looking at it.  But you can't tell
whether it's a pet or a stray without determining how it's
related to some people.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



Here is an interesting alternate translation; both from Jessica Moss:



The desired and the wished for is either the good or the apparent good
(*phainomenon
agathon*). And this is why the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent
good; for some believe it is, and to some it appears [so] although they do
not believe it so. For *phantasia* and belief do not reside in the same
part of the soul. (EE VII.2 1235b26-29) ~ *Aristotle on the Apparent Good*



The desired and the wished for is either the good or the apparent good
(*phainomenon
agathon*). And this is why the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent
good; for some believe it is, and to some it appears [good] although they
do not believe it so. For *phantasia* [quasi-perceptual appearance] and
*doxa* [rational belief] do not reside in the same part of the soul. (EE
1235b26–29)

~ *Aristotle’s Non-Trivial, Non-Insane View that Everyone Always Desires
Things under the Guise of the Good*



With best wishes,

Jerry R


On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 11:39 AM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear list,
>
>
>
> Helmut said:
>
> controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and again.
>
> I wonder what could we do about this.
>
>
>
> And Edwina said:
>
> our difficulties are based on our own knowledge bases and agendas.
>
>
>
> To which Peirce had said:
>
>
>
> *It appears, then, that*   ~Commens
>
>
>
> ... the rule for attaining the third [the highest] grade of clearness is
> as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical
> bearings, we con- ceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our
> conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object
> (5.402, 1878).
>
> ~ Haack, The Meaning of Pragmatism: The Ethics of Terminology and the
> Language of Philosophy
>
>
>
> This maxim once accepted, – *intelligently accepted*, in the light of the
> evidence of its truth, – speedily sweeps all metaphysical rubbish out of
> one’s house.
>
> We must therefore attempt to decide about these matters and others akin to
> them, taking as a starting point the following.
>
> The thing desired and wished is either the good or the apparent good.
> Therefore also the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good, since
> some people think it good, and to others it appears good even though they
> do not think it so (as appearance and opinion are not in the same part of
> the spirit). [Note] Yet it is clear that both the good and the pleasant
> are dear.
>
> This being decided, we must make another assumption. Things good are some
> of them absolutely good, others good for someone but not good absolutely;
> and the same things are absolutely good and absolutely pleasant.
>
> With best wishes,
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 11:33 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Helmut, list
>>
>> I think it's very difficult, not at all due to Peirce, but to our
>> own developed knowledge bases and our own agendas, to find agreement.
>>
>> For example, many view 'the Sign' as a conceptual re-presentation of an
>> object, with the human agent as an interpreter of some object or word 'out
>> there'. The focus is on 'the ultimate truth' of the image, in this
>> interpreter's mind, of that 'out there' object/word.
>>
>> I, on the other hand, view 'the Sign' not as an intellectual construct
>> but as a actual morphological unit, as an existential spatiotemporal unit
>> of matter, formed by Mind, existent within constant relations with other
>> Signs/morphological units.  So, for me, this Sign is itself existential
>> as a crystal, a rock, a spider, a plant, a word..and even, a
>> society. Operating within the three categorical modes. Constantly
>> interactive via the basic format of the Sign Process of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI
>>
>> Not many people are interested in such a perspective - and, I maintain,
>> that it does not deny or contradict any Peircean theory. Most people are
>> interested in the human conceptual domain - where a human interprets what
>> someone said or did - and this re-presentation is deemed 'the Sign'.
>>
>> So- again, our difficulties, I maintain, have nothing to do with Peirce.
>> His insights permit both views - our difficulties are based on our own
>> knowledge bases and agendas.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue 10/04/18 12:04 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>>
>> Edwina, Mike, list,
>> I too don´t see a versus there. Maybe that is because I see sign, object,
>> interpretant as examples for 1ns, 2ns, 3ns. But I guess that this is a
>> subject both fundamental and controversial like some others (e.g whether
>> sign is the same as representamen or not, whether the DO (same problem with
>> the DI and the FI) is external to the sign, being the subject it is about,
>> or the subject´s function in the sign, therefore internal, which
>> controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and again.
>> I wonder what could we do about 

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



Helmut said:

controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and again.

I wonder what could we do about this.



And Edwina said:

our difficulties are based on our own knowledge bases and agendas.



To which Peirce had said:



*It appears, then, that*   ~Commens



... the rule for attaining the third [the highest] grade of clearness is as
follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical
bearings, we con- ceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our
conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object
(5.402, 1878).

~ Haack, The Meaning of Pragmatism: The Ethics of Terminology and the
Language of Philosophy



This maxim once accepted, – *intelligently accepted*, in the light of the
evidence of its truth, – speedily sweeps all metaphysical rubbish out of
one’s house.

We must therefore attempt to decide about these matters and others akin to
them, taking as a starting point the following.

The thing desired and wished is either the good or the apparent good.
Therefore also the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good, since
some people think it good, and to others it appears good even though they
do not think it so (as appearance and opinion are not in the same part of
the spirit). [Note] Yet it is clear that both the good and the pleasant are
dear.

This being decided, we must make another assumption. Things good are some
of them absolutely good, others good for someone but not good absolutely;
and the same things are absolutely good and absolutely pleasant.

With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 11:33 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Helmut, list
>
> I think it's very difficult, not at all due to Peirce, but to our
> own developed knowledge bases and our own agendas, to find agreement.
>
> For example, many view 'the Sign' as a conceptual re-presentation of an
> object, with the human agent as an interpreter of some object or word 'out
> there'. The focus is on 'the ultimate truth' of the image, in this
> interpreter's mind, of that 'out there' object/word.
>
> I, on the other hand, view 'the Sign' not as an intellectual construct but
> as a actual morphological unit, as an existential spatiotemporal unit of
> matter, formed by Mind, existent within constant relations with other
> Signs/morphological units.  So, for me, this Sign is itself existential
> as a crystal, a rock, a spider, a plant, a word..and even, a
> society. Operating within the three categorical modes. Constantly
> interactive via the basic format of the Sign Process of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI
>
> Not many people are interested in such a perspective - and, I maintain,
> that it does not deny or contradict any Peircean theory. Most people are
> interested in the human conceptual domain - where a human interprets what
> someone said or did - and this re-presentation is deemed 'the Sign'.
>
> So- again, our difficulties, I maintain, have nothing to do with Peirce.
> His insights permit both views - our difficulties are based on our own
> knowledge bases and agendas.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue 10/04/18 12:04 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Edwina, Mike, list,
> I too don´t see a versus there. Maybe that is because I see sign, object,
> interpretant as examples for 1ns, 2ns, 3ns. But I guess that this is a
> subject both fundamental and controversial like some others (e.g whether
> sign is the same as representamen or not, whether the DO (same problem with
> the DI and the FI) is external to the sign, being the subject it is about,
> or the subject´s function in the sign, therefore internal, which
> controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and again.
> I wonder what could we do about this.
> Best, Helmut
>
>  10. April 2018 um 14:35 Uhr
> "Edwina Taborsky"
>
>
> Mike, list
>
> Nice post - I'll just comment briefly before specifically commenting on
> Gary R's post.
>
> I'm not in the camp of 'signs and semiosis' vs the three categories. I
> don't see how the one can function without the other. I self-define my
> perspective as a focus on morphology - on how energy, so to speak,
> transforms into matter or how the unformed becomes the formed. This matter
> can be within the physical-chemical realm, the biological, the conceptual,
> the societal. I'm NOT focused on re-presentation, which is, in my view, a
> purely cerebral focus on words; or words to images. I'm focused on
> morphology, and view this transformation as taking place within the
> semiosic triad and the three categories.
>
> So, a plethora of cells is transformed from one morphological primitive
> form into a more complex form via the habit formations [Thirdness]...But
> Thirdness is complex with three types [3-3, 3-2, 3-1] and this enables
> information exchange with the environment [via 3-2] rather than simple
> repetition of type [3-1]. So, Firstness is involved to enable adaptation,
> and Secondness is involved to 

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut, list

I think it's very difficult, not at all due to Peirce, but to our
own developed knowledge bases and our own agendas, to find agreement.

For example, many view 'the Sign' as a conceptual re-presentation of
an object, with the human agent as an interpreter of some object or
word 'out there'. The focus is on 'the ultimate truth' of the image,
in this interpreter's mind, of that 'out there' object/word.

I, on the other hand, view 'the Sign' not as an intellectual
construct but as a actual morphological unit, as an existential
spatiotemporal unit of matter, formed by Mind, existent within
constant relations with other Signs/morphological units.  So, for me,
this Sign is itself existential as a crystal, a rock, a spider, a
plant, a word..and even, a society. Operating within the three
categorical modes. Constantly interactive via the basic format of the
Sign Process of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI

Not many people are interested in such a perspective - and, I
maintain, that it does not deny or contradict any Peircean theory.
Most people are interested in the human conceptual domain - where a
human interprets what someone said or did - and this re-presentation
is deemed 'the Sign'. 

So- again, our difficulties, I maintain, have nothing to do with
Peirce. His insights permit both views - our difficulties are based
on our own knowledge bases and agendas.

Edwina
 On Tue 10/04/18 12:04 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, Mike, list, I too don´t see a versus there. Maybe that is
because I see sign, object, interpretant as examples for 1ns, 2ns,
3ns. But I guess that this is a subject both fundamental and
controversial like some others (e.g whether sign is the same as
representamen or not, whether the DO (same problem with the DI and
the FI) is external to the sign, being the subject it is about, or
the subject´s function in the sign, therefore internal, which
controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and
again. I wonder what could we do about this. Best, Helmut 10.
April 2018 um 14:35 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
Mike, list 

Nice post - I'll just comment briefly before specifically commenting
on Gary R's post. 

I'm not in the camp of 'signs and semiosis' vs the three categories.
I don't see how the one can function without the other. I self-define
my perspective as a focus on morphology - on how energy, so to speak,
transforms into matter or how the unformed becomes the formed. This
matter can be within the physical-chemical realm, the biological, the
conceptual, the societal. I'm NOT focused on re-presentation, which
is, in my view, a purely cerebral focus on words; or words to images.
I'm focused on morphology, and view this transformation as taking
place within the semiosic triad and the three categories. 

So, a plethora of cells is transformed from one morphological
primitive form into a more complex form via the habit formations
[Thirdness]...But Thirdness is complex with three types [3-3, 3-2,
3-1] and this enables information exchange with the environment [via
3-2] rather than simple repetition of type [3-1]. So, Firstness is
involved to enable adaptation, and Secondness is involved to enable
direct contact with the local environmental realities. The result -
is an adapted insect. 

Edwina
 On Mon 09/04/18 10:34 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:  

Hi Gary R, List, 

I thought this exchange was very worthwhile, esp. your current
response. I have read your points multiple times and tried to think
clearly about what you said. I find that I am in 'general agreement'
with all that you have written in this response. As a result, I
changed the subject line from 'Re: Order of Determination' to reflect
my view. We have found at least one overlap in the Venn diagram. 

What I especially like is your basing your points on the universal
categories. Thirdness is the mode of habit, mediation, generality,
continuity. Genuine Thirdness must, as Peirce says and you quote, be
a medium "between a Second and its First." In the sense I frequently
use it, namely categorization of things for knowledge representation,
this is the same as saying we find general types (Thirdness) of
particulars (Secondness) by looking at their essences and shared
qualities (Firstness). I frankly do not see why we need to use
language such as "quasi-necessarily" as Edwina poses. I can not see
where habit or any of the other senses of Thirdness may occur without
Secondness and Firstness.  

I also like your pointing to the use of prescission to look at these
questions. One observation I would make is that there is a community
of Peirce researchers who see their investigations primarily through
the lens of signs and semiosis. I believe Edwina would place herself
in this group. That is well and good and in the sense of sign use and
making and representation may