, 11 May 2012 20:30:53 -0400
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Hi, Jim,
Sorry, I'm not following you here. F and a look like
logical constants
Re: Jim Willgoose
At: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8141
JA = Jon Awbrey
JW = Jim Willgoose
JA: Just to be sure we start out with the same thing in mind, are you talking
about
the notion of judgment that was represented by the judgment stroke in
Frege's
:14 -0400
From: jawb...@att.net
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: Jim Willgoose
At: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8141
JA = Jon Awbrey
JW = Jim Willgoose
JA: Just to be sure we start out with the same thing
JW = Jim Willgoose
JW: I followed up on two paper suggestions by Irving (Sluga and Van Heijenoort)
in
the context of the language or calculus topic. With Sluga, I detect the
idea
that the Begriffsshrift is a universal language because it is meaningful in
a way that the Boolean
of the quantifier, and the confusion that results from a
lack of analysis of a judgment and the poverty of symbolism for expressing the
results of the analysis. Jim W Date: Fri, 11 May 2012 12:24:33 -0400
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans
To: PEIRCE-L
Jon,
The way I learned it, (formal) implication is not the /assertion/ but
the /validity/ of the (material) conditional, so it's a difference
between 1st-order and 2nd-order logic, a difference that Peirce
recognized in some form. If the schemata involving p and q are
considered to expose
, and the confusion
that results from a lack of analysis of a judgment and the poverty of
symbolism for expressing the results of the analysis.
Jim W
Date: Fri, 11 May 2012 12:24:33 -0400
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
Subject: Re: [peirce-l
Sorry, corrections in bold:
Jon,
The way I learned it, (formal) implication is not the /assertion/ but
the /validity/ of the (material) conditional, so it's a difference
between 1st-order and 2nd-order logic, a difference that Peirce
recognized in some form. If the schemata involving p and
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Hi, Jim
Thanks, but I'm afraid that a lot of this is over my head.
Boolean quantifier 'v' ? Is that basically the backward E? A
'unity' class? Is that a class with just one element
Date: Fri, 11 May 2012 16:41:32 -0400
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Hi, Jim
Thanks, but I'm afraid that a lot of this is over my head. Boolean
quantifier
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Hi, Jim,
Sorry, I'm not following you here. F and a look like logical
constants in the analysis. I don't know how you're using v, and so
on. I don't know why there's a question raised about
JW = Jim Willgoose
JW: List, Irving, John et. al., Sluga (Frege against the Booleans;
Notre Dame Journal of Formal logic 1987)) places great emphasis
upon the priority principle in Frege, which stresses that the
judgement is epistemically, ontologically, and methodologically
-l] Frege against the Booleans
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
JW = Jim Willgoose
JW: List, Irving, John et. al., Sluga (Frege against the Booleans;
Notre Dame Journal of Formal logic 1987)) places great emphasis
upon the priority principle in Frege, which stresses
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