he did apparently did
contribute some things to it -- not, however, to the definition
of "pragmatic", etc. in that later volume.
François also said that he thinks they "will be finished by 2008 or
so", so publication of Volume 7 presumably will not be until 2008 or
2009.
Mark, Joe, Clark, list,
First, a general note to the list. I've finally put the Century Dictionary
definitions of words like "empirical," "experience," and "pragmatic" at
http://peircematters.blogspot.com . I've finally found no way to make it easy
for anybody to be able to do it the way that I
Joe, Gary, Clark,
You're all quite welcome, but I haven't done much actual work on the blog! I
mostly thought about trying to make it be the way that I wanted it but it just
didn't work out, so I finally got off my duff and just forged ahead. What can I
say? And it's pre-designed as a blog when
List,
Well, Peirce's comments on Royce are proof beyond all doubt that Peirce did
indeed sometimes write ironically or sarcastically without use of quotation
marks. That's relevant to the following, though of course it doesn't _prove_
that Peirce was at least somewhat being tongue-in-cheek abou
List,
Just a note to let people know, that, besides adding "entelechy" to the
definitions, I've modified the http://peircematters.blogspot.com/ blog in order
to include a jump table that takes the user directly to specific definitions.
However, the user's browser's "back" button won't work wi
Gary, Gary, Joe, list,
Regarding the absence of "interpretant" from the Century Dictionary: For
Peirce's technical terms, fortunately there's another resource, The Commens
Dictionary of Peirce's Terms, Peirce's Terminology in His Own
Words, Edited by Mats Bergman & Sami Paavola http://www.h
Joe, list,
I think you've got it right -- the cognitive content rather than either the act
of interpretation or the activity of interpretation. This distinction may get
slippery, though, insofar as obect - sign - interpretant are agent - patient -
act! Well, let's burn that bridge when we come
ation of any number of causes. There has been of late a rapid increase in
the use of resultant in a sense secondary to its physical one-- namely, to
represent that which is the result of a complex of moral forces, and would be
precisely the result of no one of them acting alone.
Best,
Mats
B
Gary F., list,
>>[Ben] I argued also that calling it an "interpretant" tended
to minimize the idea that it had to be a _human_ interpretation. >[Gary]
That's a good place to start, i think.
I was thinking in general of the quasimind http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/quasimind.ht
Gary,
It's a good thing for Peirce's consistency, that he makes metaphysics sound
like cenoscopy. It's good for his consistency because, generally, Peirce
equates cenoscopy with philosophy. I.e., generally the things which Peirce says
about cenoscopy are things which he means to say about philo
Gary, list
Without a doubt, Peirce can be subtle and complicated on the subject of truth,
falsehood, belief, & doubt. "Critical commonsensism" is a very good name for
his view.
Peirce does believe that the real determines true belief, that true belief
depends on the real, and in this sense he d
Arnold, Gary, list,
Well, having finally read up on Arrow's Theorem for the first time, and about
Sen's impossibility proofs, my initial impression is that a rough comparison
with the uncertain principle is valid if one keeps in mind certain obvious
differences, including what a big difference
Theresa, list,
I think that you are quite right to point out a seeming tension between
critical commonsensism and Scholastic realism, such that it does need to be
affirmed that Peirce was both (with an increase in the Scholastic realism --
when did he become modal-realist) from the beginning to
Gary R., Gary F., list,, also welcome to David & François,
Regarding "event" & "fact" I thought that the Century Dict. might shed a little
light.
Both "event" & "fact" appear on the PEP (UQAM)
http://www.pep.uqam.ca/index_en.pep list of the words with Peirce
documentation.
Thank you to David
Joe, Gary,
Thanks, Gary, for letting me know that I'm not out to lunch on this one. I
think that you're right, that the same distinction appears, just with different
words, and when Peirce gets down to the business of defining, he's persistently
clear which words mean what.
Joe, you'll ce
Joe, Gary, list,
>[JOE] I AM satisfied with Peirce's account of signs in works of fiction, Ben,
>and agree with all that. I don't know why you would think otherwise.
I guess I just misunderstood you, or maybe I used too strong a word "satisfied"
-- I meant, not that you had decided that that
Joe, list,
Your response sends me back to the Kaina Stoicheia, in search of Peirce's
search for unexpressed thought. I'll have to ponder that till I can think of
something to say about a connection among difficulties with the idea of
connotation, the use of "real" where usually "actual" would b
Darrel, Tori, Gary,
I knew it!
I shoulda, woulda, coulda posted my surmise that it was from nothing.com.
By the way, did you check out something.com? There's been something there,
though the server seems to be down right now.
Best, Ben Udell
Tori,
Being an optimist by nature, I typed www.n
Theresa, Darrel, Gary Richmond, Gary F., Bernard, Claudio, Victoria, Joe, Jim,
list,
Thanks, Theresa, for passing the Kant excerpt along, it's interesting.
I thought I'd try to do Kant's four categories of nothing(ness) in terms of the
same examples for all four. For me, it's proven to be not t
Joe, list,
Thank you for your recollections of Morgenbesser.
He sounds so New York Jewish!
To B.F. Skinner, "Let me see if I understand your thesis. You think we
shouldn't anthropomorphize people?"
Yes, I've come to think that the NYT claim sounds ridiculous (I didn't know
what to think back
Gary, list,
Thanks for the unintentionally pubic compliment. But what's this about my
living in the City? You know I'm out in Queens. :-)
http://www.pulp.tc/manholecover1-7-05.pdf (& enlarge the view) How well I
remember that day! A humongous THUMP! & soft like rustling sound of shattering
gl
Jim, list,
Jim Piat wrote:
>>[Joe Ransdell] Good point, Gary. Still another way of thinking about it
>>might be to suppose that the emphasis is supposed to fall on "thing" rather
>>than "sign": "no sign is a real THING" rather than "no sign is a REAL
>>thing"; but that doesn't sound very
eal, in being determined _by_ the ideal.
Intelligent life shouldn't let it go to his/her head, though. Hard it is to be
good; harder still to confirm & solidify it by entelechy = by staying good =>
continual renovation and occasional rearchitecting (entelechy is not
necessarily a freeze) a
Thomas, list
Sorry it took me a few days to respond. I've been busied with various
practical matters.
> [Thomas] this thread on "The New Elements of Mathematics" started with
Charles Peirce writing:
> "None of them approved of my book, because it put perspective before
metrical geometry,
Joe, list
> Ben says:
>> Peirce divides the discovery sciences into (1) mathematics, (2) cenoscopy
>> (=philosophy), and (3) idioscopy (=the special sciences). Joe Ransdell has
>> associated those, respectively with 1stness, 2ndness, 3rdness, though I
>> don't know his argument for it or maybe
Joe, list,
You did exactly the right thing for exactly the right reasons. Thank you.
Best, Ben Udell
- Original Message -
From: "Joseph Ransdell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum"
Sent: Saturday, February 18, 2006 9:23 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] questionable member deleted
Joe, list,
> [Joe] Ben, you say:
>> [Ben] I don't pose a tetradic reduction thesis applicable to all relations.
>> I just say that there's a fourth semiotic term that isn't any of the classic
>> three.
A sign stands for an object to an interpretant on the basis of a recognition. I
think that
Gary, Joe, list,
I will stoutly ignore further posts until I finish my response to Gary's
post from yesterday. It's my top priority now. But first I wanted to respond to
this post of his from today, 'cuz the iron is hot, or something like that.
Gary asked how else was the collateral experi
Stephen, Gary, Jim, Joe, list,
I've been so combinately busy with practical matters & trying to whittle my
next peirce-l post down to size & increase its readability, that I haven't
responded lately, but I hope to do so soon.
My initial take is that a transparency-requirent version of Wikipedia
Gary, Jim, Joe, Thomas, list,
Erratum. In fact I should probably have cut the kinematic quantities out
since there's room to explain what the heck I'm thinking about with them, but,
since I mentioned them, I should at least get them right. Change of observer's
time should appear where I put
Hi, Thomas,
Some of what you say is quite suggestive. I hope somebody here at peirce-l
understands it better than I do.
I'm hardly acquainted with the EGs. I had a notion that they're basically a
visual form of 1st-order logic. I had no idea that Peirce's "exploding-point"
cuts and his maths o
Claudio, list,
It's fine with me if you or others modify my graphics for the purposes of
discussion, and you seem good at the graphics.
The discussion has advanced considerably beyond the point which you seem to
have reached. You seem to have isolated a few of my remarks and addressed them
Frances,
In Peirce's discussions of collateral experience, notice how he repeatedly says
that the sign, the interpretant, the sign system, do not convey experience of
the object. Instead, they convey meaning about the object.
http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005/02/collateral-observation-quot
Sorry, one-word correction, but it's needed. It's indicated in the text. - Ben
- Original Message -
From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum"
Sent: Thursday, March 09, 2006 1:05 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Design and Sem
Second correction! I must be tired. Sorry. I've gone over it extra carefully
this time. - Ben.
Sorry, one-word correction, but it's needed. It's indicated in the text. - Ben
- Original Message -
From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peir
Hi, Jim,
I don't know which blog you visited! If the scrollbar doesn't show up, I've got
a problem. Is your computer a Mac?
This link shoud take you directly to the blog post with the quotes.
http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005/02/collateral-observation-quotes.html
There, you should be abl
Jim,
I don't know what could be wrong. It works fine on my MS Internet Explorer
& Mozilla. Ah, the heck with it! Here they are. - Best, Ben
Collateral observation
(quotes) Update: Thomas
L. Short points to “a long and important
section of MS318, first published by Helmut Pape in Nous 199
Jim, list,
Jim wrote:
Ben,I have a question. What is the relation between cognition and
recognition? It seems that 3a and 3b respond to two different questions, namely,
what is a correct logical description of the structure of cognition and how is
that structure *validated* for any given pe
You're welcome & thank you, Jim,
> Thanks Ben,
> I guess we are speaking past each other a bit. In a simple sense,
re-cognition has for its object something previously cognized. I took this to be
where experience comes in. Maybe I should just drop cognition. ( I had in mind
the NLC) 3a s
Dear Jim,
> I want to respond to your post but could not find your blog site scroll bar
> in order to read the collateral experience quotes. I want to review them
> before commenting. Have you posted them elsewhere -- seems I recall you may
> have.
> I think how we are viewing the distincti
Hi, Claudio,
Thank you for liking my posts & diagrammatic efforts.
I haven't received the pdf yet, but looking over what you sent in html
form, I can see that it will be an challenge for me! There's a lot of Peircean
organization there. The challenge for me is, that the material which is
Frances, Gary, Steven, Joe, Theresa, list,
I've taken a while to respond to this, partly because I've been busy, and
partly because I wished, despite my difficulty in understanding it, to be
responsive to it. I admit I've simplified my task by only briefly skimming all
the posts that have follo
Thomas, list,
> Peirce's version of the proof for Cantor's theorem can be mapped in a quite
> straightforward way to the structure of the New List of 1867. At the same
> time the proof of Cantor's theorem can be extended by continued
> diagonalization (which latter, by the way, Peirce discovere
Claudio, list
>> [Ben] But I have a feeling that I'll need to make more than
one try before I come up with something that might be useful to you.
> [Claudio] I think that it is very important that you are aware off
this difficulty. What would be philosophy as the only one discipline...
Gary, Jim P., Jim W., Frances, Claudio, Steven, Joe, list,
It's bothered me -- but I had deferred unto forgetfulness my doing
something about it -- that the conception of recognition which I've been
discussing has been more in the sense of acknowledgement rather than in the
sense of remembe
Bernard, list,
> I returned to the sources and fell short with the
following:--CP
3.175175. The forms A -< B, or A implies B,
and A ~-< B, or A does not imply B 3, embrace both hypothetical and
categorical propositions. Thus, to say
Joe, Jim,
Joe wrote,
> Jim:
> "Subindex" is not a Peircean term, is it? What is it and why should Peirce
> be concerned to distinguish an index from it?
> Joe Ransdell
I recently posted about the index and the subindex. Friday, February 10, 2006
2:51 PM, Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: S
sentative character may be general. But it may not be. The law
may stipulate that it names one and only one individual. Nothing
follows as to whether the representative character determines the sort of
sign it is. The name "Ben" occurs twice on this page. That cannot be the
issue
like "The Beatles"
picks out plural individuals, but is supposed to do that, picking them out
collectively or distributively. Again, it's important to treat Peirce's
introduction of the subindex as a development in his thought -- rather than,
say, as a fluctuation over whi
t below with 'Ben." Note: it's an index or subindex in singling me
out, or singling some other Ben out. It's not a legisign in virtue of such
ambiguity.
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Sent: Sunday, March 19, 2006 1:32 P
Jim, list,
I don't have it that the definite character is a function of the quality of
the sign. I'm saying that there are TWO kinds of nonsingulars in Peirce's
system.I'll say more on this later, but for the moment I'd like to note that
your paragraphs are both cut off, something seems wro
Hi, Wilfred,
I just said in another post to peirce-l:
"Note: it's an index or subindex in singling me out, or singling some other Ben
out. It's not a legisign in virtue of such ambiguity." For many purposes, it's
more convenient to treat "Ben" in its ambiguity as just that -- an
inconvenie
Jim, list,
You sound like you've gotten it partly right.
Sometimes Peirce characterizes the index as something that can be general
or singular (individual). But sometimes instead he says that an index has to be
singular (individual). Once, he defines as the subindex that
which is a sign
Bernard, Jim, list
I had figured that Peirce invented the word "subindex" because it was like
"hypoicon" which surely he invented, and because of parallels between the issues
which they address. But it turns out that the word "subindex" already existed,
as shown in the Century Dictionary, a
Bernard, Jim, list,
I should have noted that EP 2.273, combined with EP 2.274, in fact
contains "The Answer!" about subindices. A subindex is a degenerate
index. It can be singular or general. I would note to Mats Bergman &
the Commens Dictionary folks, that the passage from 2.273 might be
Bernard, Jim, list,
I got too excited, I'm not at all sure that "subindex" can be equated with
"degenerate index."
Best, Ben
==
Bernard, Jim, list,
I should have noted that EP 2.273, combined with EP 2.274, in fact
contains "The Answer!" about subindices. A subindex is a de
signing a designation to that individual, or, if it is a set, to each single
unit of the set. Until a better designation is found, such a term may be called
a _Precept_."
~~~~~99
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Sent: Monday
French phrasing where "other" ("autres") is meant to emphasize that we,
speaker and recipient, know very well and otherwise that they are the
same! Some case of imputed context if I can say so. I infer from your
reply that such a language artifice does not work the same way in
Bernard, Jim, list,
Bernard wrote,
> Apologies for writing in a previous message the phrasing
"subindices or other hyposemes". I did not intend to mean that there could be a
distinction between both of them. I was just replicating a typical French
phrasing where "other" ("autres") is mean
Gary,
Thanks for letting me know. I just checked at mail-archive.com, and found the
complete versions. They made more sense, too!
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: "gnusystems" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum"
Sent: Monday, March 20, 2006 4:53 PM
Subject: [peirce-l
Hi, Jim, Bernard, list,
> [Jim] Ben says,
>> [Ben] "But I was WRONG all the times that I spoke of a
"subindexical qualisign." A subindex is a symbol, and a symbol is
always a legisign." (end)
>[Jim] Is every subindex primarily a symbol?
In the case of that question, it was a
matte
> [Jim] Peirce says that there is an "assocation of ideas
operating to cause the symbol to refer to the object." But with
natural events we run causality from the object to the
index. The symbol refers to the cause. Does a natural
index "refer?" Better yet, we use symbols to refer to both
ould
treat the weather vane only as index, effect, in his system.
Bill
Benjamin Udell wrote:
> > [Jim] Peirce says that there is an "assocation of ideas operating to cause
> the symbol to refer to the object." But with natural events we run causality
> from the object to
being used as something other than it empirically is, all
signs seem to me to involve some degree of arbitrariness in
the assigned function. But that is not how I've understood
Peirce.
Benjamin Udell wrote:
> Bill, Jim, list,
>
> Peirce defines the index as being in real reaction o
Jim, Frances,
At those times when Peirce was restricting indices to individuals and
restricting proper names (as subindices) to symbols, I think he would have
called the individually used "Frances" a replica of the subindex "Francis." The
subindex, as a symbol, is embodied in a replica, whi
as reflecting a proportion among "ratios"
of categories to quantifications rather than a set of equations between
various categories and quantifications.
Best, Ben
-Original Message-From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Mo
t;
Peirce following DeMorgan called the domain a "universe of discourse." The
variables x,y are general terms; as is the predicate letter J. (My post right
before this raises a lot of questions about that predicate letter.) The
schema ExAy(Jy<-->x=y) translates "there i
MSubject: [Norton
AntiSpam] [peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Thanks Ben,It seems that there has to be a rule or law that governs
the quality or aggregate of qualities with respect to their embodiment in a
singular occurence. That is what I meant by
"assigns." -Original Message-
Jim, list,
I'm not familiar with Robert Lang's interpretation of Peircean vagueness,
so I'll search around the Web to find out about it. And , upon finishing writing
this post, I just received your latest post, which I need a little time to
digest but I have to go out tonight and start gett
d? etc.) Leave the object variable unbound; bind
the property. "(EF) Fx" translates "there is some aggregate of qualities such
that x has it." x is vague. Isn't "(Ex) Fx" just as vague anyway? Jim W
-Original Message-From: Benjamin Udell
<[EMAIL
Jim,
Quick question: is "F" a variable in "(EF) Fx" or is it a
constant?
What I really want to ask but don't know how to phrase schematically (till
I know the method for expressing distinctly the variable predicate and the
constant predicate) is,
In that predicate logic which you're useing,
Frances, list,
It'll take me a day or two more to respond to this & your previous post. I've
gotten in a bit over my head in various things that I'm supposed to be doing.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
Frances to Claudio and Ben and others,
In regard to its phenomenal categorization,
Il-Young Son, list,
Il-Young Son wrote,
> I am not sure how many, if many, when pressed, would object to the notion
> that there are fundamental limits to models and that the mapping (or the
> mediator) between models and their corresponding natural phenomena cannot
> just dissolve into the mod
Frances, list,
It's a bit hard to respond to this because, though it's okay for you to
disagree with Peirce, you do so in ways that are vague to me; I don't really see
clearly the viewpoint which you hold, so it's hard for me to address it. For
instance, you say things like "...which signs
of no value to consider evolution of laws of nature as a potential source of
formal inquiry by the scientific community. I hope I didn't give that
impression.
- Original Message -
From: "il-young son" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum"
Sent: T
aying is only to be applied to
a slight determination of our system of diagrammatization, which it will only
slightly affect; so that, should it be incorrect, the utmost certain effect
will be a danger that our system may not represent every variety of non-human
thought." ('Prolegomena to an
Il-Young, list,
Il-Young wrote,
> [Il-Young] Thank you for that bit of information and citation. I
will search for that article at the library tomorrow. But, let me respond
to this issue of "mind over matter". It is still not completely clear to
me what he means by mind and matter in
Joe,
I don't know how Gary will respond, but I googled around a bit and I think that
the main thing to keep in mind is that the knowledge involved is not at all
necessarily _theoretical_ knowledge. It could be practical facts about who sits
where, what's their phone number, who's in charge of w
France, list
> [Frances] My position is to generally agree with Peirce and pragmatism, to
> include the trichotomic structure of the phenomenal categories.
> One metaphysical thorn for me however is whether all the things in the world
> as posited by Peirce are indeed phenomenal, or rather if th
articular interpretant
in terms of further semiosis? It might be the functional equivalent, but that's
just to say that it keeps having some same effect on interpretants, and that
those interpretants have, in common, that same effect on still further
interpretants, some common legisignic con
I'd have to agree wih Victoria about questioning "the appropriateness of saying
that the reduction of the gradient is the purpose of the universe or the
purpose of any organism. This seems to confuse the means with the ends." It
does seem exactly a confusion of means with ends.
It's like sayin
Gary,
I started to think, from reading your response below, that maybe the problem
was my understanding of the word "dissipative." So I looked up "dissipative" on
the Web and found out what the misunderstanding was. I took it to mean simply
smoothing energy out, making it more random, producing
Bill,
Thank you. Talking about cause & effect does seem a bit of an art and when I
think about it too much, I tend to feel like I'm on thin ice. With other
factors held the same, when one wiggles something x, and something y behaves in
some corresponding manner and otherwise does not, then we s
Gary,
Actually, you weren't taking too much for granted, at least not with most of
the listers, only with ignorant me. I think most listers have either read
Prigogine or read discussions about him. I have a book of his somewhere but
haven't read it.
>[Gary] However i still don't find anything
List,
Just wanted to note that I'm having second thoughts about the idea that decay
is not an end!
But I'll keep it at least somewhat short because Jerry LR Chandler's post looks
interesting. (I read some things at http://www.hyle.org/ (philosophy of
chemistry) a few years ago, including some
Gary,
I may have read something by Salthe. It more than rings a bell. I don't think I
read the article in Cosmos & History (I skimmed the beginning just now), but I
read something along the same lines -- life as a better way to increase entropy
-- but maybe the writing was a bit less formal, I
Joe, list,
The popular discussions of category theory on the Internet haven't helped me
very much. Apparently the basic explanational problem is that it's based on
higher math, so it's just hard to explain.
I once asked a singularity theorist, "okay, it's about categories, so what are
the resu
Joe, list,
Arguably category theory may have a specific relevance to Peirce on account
of the kinds of treatment of continuity which it has turned out to allow. (As to
whether it's directly relevant _as_ a category theory to Peirce's
categorial system, I've no idea.) There are, between cate
Joe, list,
I had a thought about an topic from February 2006.
- Original Message - From: "Joseph Ransdell" To: "Peirce Discussion
Forum"
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2006 9:32 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS:
So what is it all about?
>>[Ben] Yet attributions, ascriptions, copul
cal exploration if I want to pursue choosing verbs
for these various aspects of signifying.
Anyway, while I'm at it, I've made a few syntatically & stylistically
desperately needed corrections, between astrisks in blue, to my own previous
post, after Gary's quotes from Peirce.
Best
d I'm
plagued by the ruin of my old hard drive which had most of the peirce-l posts
from during the first three years that I was here. This is not the first time
that I've been winging it. I did find you talking about acceptance in the other
sense, and Peirce uses the word "accep
Jim, Gary, list,
>[Jim] Ben Udell wrote:
>>[Ben] But first, on a general note, let me say that among the issues driving
>>my current display of confusion & error, is the question: if comprehension
>>is for quality & predicate, while denotation is for objects
>>(resistances/reactions), then wh
Joe, list,
>[Joe] CORRECTED VERSION OF PREVIOUS POST :
>[Joe] Ben quotes Peirce as follows:
>>66~
>>A symbol, in its reference to its object, has a triple reference:--
>>1st, Its direct reference to its object, or the real things which it
>>represents;
>>2d, Its reference to its ground
Jim, list,
Ben wrote: (Beginning with a quote from my earlier remarks)
>>>[Jim] One can indicate the location of an object (or at least to its center
>>>of gravity). An object which perfoms this function is called an index. One
>>>can not readily point to the quality or form an object becaus
Gary F, list,
>[Gary] I've been following this thread with great interest -- "following" in
>the sense that it's always a step or two ahead of me! But i'd like to insert
>something with reference to Ben's question about words like "not," "probably,"
>"if," etc.
>[Gary] I don't think it is help
Gary F., list
An addendum
>>[Gary] Another relevant distinction from linguistics is between semantics and
>>syntax. If we want to study what (or how) how closed-class words mean, then
>>we have to focus mainly on syntax, or the structure of utterances as
>>determined not by objects denoted or
Jerry,
Your thumbnail sketch of chemical logic seems clear to me, and my memories from
long-ago high-school chemistry fit with it.
The striking thing to a gawker like me who knows very little about chemistry is
those symbols, and it's encouraging to one's intuition to be reassured that
chemist
Gary F, Jim, list,
Thank you for having plowed through my posts! I'm gratified to read that they
make sense to you. I don't actually mind being tuckered out by my own posts,
but I know that people have more things to do than read my posts.
Gary wrote,
> This seems tantalizingly close to a con
Dear Jim, list,
One thing is that I wouldn't underrate the importance of the conception of
resistance/reaction -- I wouldn't replace it with location. Location has a lot
to do with resistance and reaction! Space, shortest distances, straight lines,
least action, fields, -- there's quite a set o
Dear Jim,
Yeah, I think that the idea is that Peirce was _already_ working on the
questions of classifying the elements when Mendeleev published his.Periodic
Table. Peirce might have already worked out some of the picture, so it could
have been contemporaneous with his work on philosophical thr
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