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> See discussion in https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2518
Great, thanks!
Best Regards,
Raffaele.
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On Thu, Feb 1, 2018 at 7:16 AM, 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
wrote:
> [...]
> I've a question about if is acceptable (in term of performance, specifically
> latency) to have some form of signed USB input, from a usbvm. A lot of laptop
> (the majority?) has
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Hi, I can also work on the Thunderbird extension.
However I've just submitted the Firefox extension to Mozilla for their signing.
Best Regards,
Raffaele.
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On 02/01/2018 07:16 AM, Raffaele Florio wrote:
> Hi all :),
> During past months I worked on idea [0]. Currently it's supported only by
> Firefox and Chrome. The repo is at [1] and the qubes-issue regarding
> contribution message is at [2]. It was assigned to the 4.1 milestone.
>
> I've a
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Hi all :),
During past months I worked on idea [0]. Currently it's supported only by
Firefox and Chrome. The repo is at [1] and the qubes-issue regarding
contribution message is at [2]. It was assigned to the 4.1 milestone.
I've a question about
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On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 06:35:25PM -0500, Michael Carbone wrote:
> On 01/09/2018 09:32 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> > In preparation for Google Summer of Code (GSoC) 2018 [1], we invite
> > the Qubes community to contribute ideas to the Qubes
On 01/09/2018 09:32 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> In preparation for Google Summer of Code (GSoC) 2018 [1], we invite
> the Qubes community to contribute ideas to the Qubes ideas list. [2]
> You can find our 2017 ideas list here:
>
> https://www.qubes-os.org/gsoc/
>
> (This page will be updated
On Sunday, 21 January 2018 22:19:37 CET bowa...@gmail.com wrote:
> OK understood now (limit to 2D square/line/bitmap/... rendering, obivously
> fonts will have to stay out ).
Agreed, which is not a problem :)
The way font rendering works in, for instance Qt (basing this on the first
version
On Sunday, 21 January 2018 12:33:59 UTC, Tom Zander wrote:
> On Saturday, 20 January 2018 15:03:38 CET bowa...@gmail.com wrote:
> > I don't think I have miss-understood. Your proposal is for the client VM
> > to sent OpenGL instruction to the Dom0 GPU.
>
> Your understanding isn't entire wrong,
On Saturday, 20 January 2018 15:03:38 CET bowa...@gmail.com wrote:
> I don't think I have miss-understood. Your proposal is for the client VM
> to sent OpenGL instruction to the Dom0 GPU.
Your understanding isn't entire wrong, but you miss the subtleties.
Applying your description to webbrowsers
On Thursday, 11 January 2018 15:47:30 CET 'Tom Zander' via qubes-devel
wrote:
> # Modernize painting pipeline
A poster (Foppe de Haan) in the user mailinglist pointed out this project
called "Looking-glass" that is very similar to the (very naive) proposal I
made;
On Thursday, 11 January 2018 14:47:39 UTC, Tom Zander wrote:
> On Wednesday, 10 January 2018 02:32:02 GMT Andrew David Wong wrote:
> > In preparation for Google Summer of Code (GSoC) 2018 [1], we invite
> > the Qubes community to contribute ideas to the Qubes ideas list. [2]
> > You can find our
Building off of the work done on Anti-Evil Maid last year, it would be
beneficial to upgrade AEM to use more up to date packages, in particular to
support TPM2.0. It's extremely difficult to find a device that is new
(important due to increased risk of persistent malware in used hardware),
On Monday, 15 January 2018 00:31:14 CET Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> I'm trying to show you how things one can consider a configuration, may
> enable you to compromise a VM.
This may show the underlying reason for the mis-communication.
What is considered a configuration is not really
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On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 11:54:38PM +0100, 'Tom Zander' via qubes-devel wrote:
> On Sunday, 14 January 2018 22:09:10 CET Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> > Ok, lets start with ~/.config/xdg/autostart/*.desktop. "files with
> > key/value pairs",
On Sunday, 14 January 2018 22:09:10 CET Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> Ok, lets start with ~/.config/xdg/autostart/*.desktop. "files with
> key/value pairs", right? Those don't have executable bit either.
I'm not sure why you are trying really hard to misunderstand me :(
I wrote that this
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On Sat, Jan 13, 2018 at 05:22:11PM +, Tom Zander wrote:
> On Friday, 12 January 2018 15:18:39 GMT Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> > Well, such sanitization would need to be application specific, and would
> > be *very* fragile element. For
Perhaps a method to change the presented screen resolution in a VM to
make browser fingerprinting more difficult?
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On Friday, 12 January 2018 15:18:39 GMT Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> Well, such sanitization would need to be application specific, and would
> be *very* fragile element. For example .bashrc is a plain ASCII file, not
> executable (as of permissions), but allow you to execute any command
>
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On Fri, Jan 12, 2018 at 02:12:47PM -, 'awokd' via qubes-devel wrote:
> On Fri, January 12, 2018 1:12 pm, 'Tom Zander' via qubes-devel wrote:
> > On Friday, 12 January 2018 11:21:27 GMT 'awokd' via qubes-devel wrote:
> >
> >> Securing this sounds
On Fri, January 12, 2018 1:12 pm, 'Tom Zander' via qubes-devel wrote:
> On Friday, 12 January 2018 11:21:27 GMT 'awokd' via qubes-devel wrote:
>
>> Securing this sounds hard,
>>
>
> My thinking is that using something like git controls setting files
> executables bits, serverside. So you can't
On Friday, 12 January 2018 11:21:27 GMT 'awokd' via qubes-devel wrote:
> Securing this sounds hard,
My thinking is that using something like git controls setting files
executables bits, serverside. So you can't magically get a new executable
scripts in your homedir.
Next its pretty easy to
On Wednesday, 10 January 2018 02:32:02 GMT Andrew David Wong wrote:
> Please feel free to submit pull requests against that page or send
> replies to this thread.
I have an idea for a standalone project that should be easy enough to setup,
but for a student it may be challenging enough to last a
Yes, this is interesting direction for research. I'd throw wayland into that
picture - it may make things much easier. The key point here is to keep it
simple and secure. For example allowing VM to send commands directly to GPU
could be very bad idea, because such VM could steal whole screen
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On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 02:47:30PM +, Tom Zander wrote:
> On Wednesday, 10 January 2018 02:32:02 GMT Andrew David Wong wrote:
> > In preparation for Google Summer of Code (GSoC) 2018 [1], we invite
> > the Qubes community to contribute ideas to
On Wednesday, 10 January 2018 02:32:02 GMT Andrew David Wong wrote:
> In preparation for Google Summer of Code (GSoC) 2018 [1], we invite
> the Qubes community to contribute ideas to the Qubes ideas list. [2]
> You can find our 2017 ideas list here:
Here is a suggestion that may be fun, it will
Hi all,
I propose a GSOC project to implement more converters (like the Qubes PDF
converter). For instance, converts for
* documents (such as Word) with pandoc
* video files with ffmpeg
* audio files with sox
* archive files (such as zip) -- perhaps this should work recursively?
* other
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On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 03:19:39AM -0500, Blacklight447 wrote:
> I might have some ideas,
>
> How about intergrating a dispvm as usb qube. The situation now is (to my
> knowledge, correct me if I am wrong) that if a usb infects the usb qube, it
>
I might have some ideas,
How about intergrating a dispvm as usb qube. The situation now is (to my
knowledge, correct me if I am wrong) that if a usb infects the usb qube, it
means all future usb`s may become infected too once they connect to sys-usb. By
using a dispvm, all traces of malware
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On 2018-01-09 20:32, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> In preparation for Google Summer of Code (GSoC) 2018 [1], we
> invite the Qubes community to contribute ideas to the Qubes ideas
> list. [2] You can find our 2017 ideas list here:
>
>
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In preparation for Google Summer of Code (GSoC) 2018 [1], we invite
the Qubes community to contribute ideas to the Qubes ideas list. [2]
You can find our 2017 ideas list here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/gsoc/
(This page will be updated for GSoC
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