to set the Default
DisposableVM Template for this qube to one with equally restrictive
Networking settings.
Related issue:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5115
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://w
] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
```
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/04/canary-20/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-B
imal as possible.
In any case, it would better to have both signed packages _and_
transit via HTTPS. If I had to choose just one, I'd pick signed
packages, since it wouldn't be difficult for an attacker to serve
malicious packages over HTTPS. But, again, both would be better.
- --
Andrew David
which is bloody
> insecure thanks to being just plaintext and susceptible to MITM
> attacks.
>
> [...]
Fedora packages are digitally signed. dnf checks the signature by
default. If the signature is not valid, the package will not be
installed.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager,
ps://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/07/01/whonix-15-has-been-released/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAl0axvkACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDA1bQ/6ArxTBwZFUDs/Y8tAafPkKNcDbYOfUg0r4zx
Hi,
I've recently updated to a fedora-30 + rpmfusion template for many of my
AppVMs. I've begun to experience a lot of instability in the following
situations:
* mpv playing video (often segfaults even before playback starts)
* vlc playing video (often segfaults before playback starts)
*
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 27/06/2019 8.15 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> On 27/06/2019 6.44 PM, haaber wrote:
>> Hi, by running qvm-ls a directed graph of which qubes depends on
>> which other as netVM can be obtained. I thought that this would
>
-journey-to-mirage-os-as-xen-pvh-marek-marczykowski-gorecki-invisible-things-lab
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/06/27/marek-marczykowski-gorecki-xen-summit-2019/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.
seem to find it now, though, so either:
1. It was in 3.2 but not carried over to 4.0, or
2. It's accessed from Qubes Global Settings, which is currently broken.
There's also this open issue:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2575
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Man
es/4792#issuecomment-502472832
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAl0GhC0ACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDA5zQ/+JuDEs6kSqKRTexH82jfkTskirrY23wIjQkIcdWstbf3kotVGCtZXQsmS
YXoo1IIxH0qd4O
es-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
>
Unman is correct. You tried to unsubscribe from qubes-announce, not
qubes-users. The attempt to unsubscribe from qubes-announce failed
because you were not subscribed to that list.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Commun
one else has done so either.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAl0GgZkACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDBsbw/+MpmHKuf9m5gZvriA6dah5aT0Drhh/GvlCrn8nbhpAuRB5ov
ach such file in my
home directory so that they get included in my normal dom0 backups.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlz/BrgACgkQ203TvD
ted the same problem and was able to fix it by
enabling "SVM Mode" in their BIOS settings.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlz91IAACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDBtxg/+MBt
able to find one. All I found was these two somewhat
related issues:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1835
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2443
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIz
stable repo is 5.1.2 which doesn't contain the
> wireguard module.
>
> So any idea how I can put this to work?
>
> Thank you
>
It looks like this was just addressed in this issue:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3591
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager,
hy the retailer matters
if you already know the precise model of the machine. Surely that's
sufficient to find search for it online?
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDA
ge has been rejected
because it was a duplicate.)
Please see:
https://www.qubes-os.org/support/#do-not-send-duplicates
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlz1vhsACgkQ203TvDlQ
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 02/06/2019 4.13 PM, Yethal wrote:
> W dniu sobota, 1 czerwca 2019 22:29:31 UTC+2 użytkownik Andrew David Wong
> napisał:
> Dear Qubes Community,
>
> A new Fedora 30 TemplateVM is now available. We previously announced
> that
hanks! I found them:
>
> Brightness: FN+Brightness +/-
> Volume Up: amixer set Master 5%+
> Volume Up: amixer set Master 5%-
> Volume Mute/Unmute: amixer set Master toggle
>
> Documented the findings so far here:
> https://github.com/csriq/qubes-os-usage/blob/master/qubes-
related, but when booting to Qubes,
>>>>> and watching the boot process, I can still see Qubes is
>>>>> trying to boot AppVMs which are for months deleted, with
>>>>> "Failed to start" the VM. How do I delete it permanently?
>
>&
/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlzy4B4ACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDCgTw//Yn4xHJxAIhGq6PgZW99FwAz+5/lI8JYy0H62aC5ngZG7MnNrRlw/+cx9
YtdtCXF
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 01/06/2019 1.05 AM, Side Realiq wrote:
>> On 31/05/2019 10.33 AM, Side Realiq wrote:
>>> Thank you Andrew!
>>>
>>> Wouldn't described scenario be mitigated, if one downloads the
>>> backup in a se
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 31/05/2019 10.33 AM, Side Realiq wrote:
> Thank you Andrew!
>
> Wouldn't described scenario be mitigated, if one downloads the
> backup in a separate disposable non-internet VM, decrypt it, and
> transfer the decrypted fil
ch are for months deleted, with "Failed to
>>> start" the VM. How do I delete it permanently?
>
>
>> I haven't heard of this problem before. Please consider
>> reporting this bug if it hasn't been reported yet:
>
>> https://www.qubes-os
ad:
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/DlCcShB-kbU/discussion
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlzwkhEACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDAywBAAjeXrdR2cItYI
an announcement, as
>> usual.
>
> Actually, it is already in the stable repo:
> https://ftp.qubes-os.org/repo/yum/r4.0/templates-itl/rpm/
>
Thank you; I wasn't aware of that. I'll follow up on this on the issue.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
ht
quot; the VM.
> How do I delete it permanently?
>
I haven't heard of this problem before. Please consider reporting this
bug if it hasn't been reported yet:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/reporting-bugs/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-B
mented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/tools/
In particular, the qubes-prefs man page is available here:
https://dev.qubes-os.org/projects/core-admin-client/en/latest/manpages/qubes-prefs.html
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-B
.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#note-on-dom0-and-eol
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlzwjSMACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDCaexAAi5PzP+sAwzFYhEydSXG5l5Wy+7HefNe41rdcSxl2D0YaBEiiGd
attacker, it could exploit a hypothetical vulnerability
in your restore process (e.g., by feeding malformed input to the
program performing decryption), possibly resulting in a silent
compromise of your vault.
This is the sort of attack scenario that qvm-backup was designed to
protect against.
- --
/templates/fedora/#installing
[5] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#note-on-dom0-and-eol
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/05/29/fedora-28-eol/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes
release of Fedora 31:
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_Release_Life_Cycle
> Just curious, haven't heard anything.
>
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlz
click this link, it should just download the file:
https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
(This is also in the instructions.)
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGI
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 27/05/2019 11.28 AM, drok...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Sunday, May 26, 2019 at 7:21:54 PM UTC-7, Andrew David Wong
> wrote: On 26/05/2019 9.17 PM, drok...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>> On Sunday, May 26, 2019 at 6:54:40 PM UTC-7,
>&
searched so I thought I'd suggest putting a link to thier
> qubes setup page.
>
Thanks. Added:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/#security-guides
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-B
eedback on updates-status:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlzrSbcACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDCqshAAiNESVvVnar/IB4i94uoEScf
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 26/05/2019 5.04 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
>
> On 26/05/2019 3.39 PM, Eva Star wrote:
>
>>>> If 4.19 is this problematic, should the update be pulled?
>>>
>>> Yes, please pull 4.19.43-1 kernel update, if
>
> Chris, thanks! Now solved. I'm at EFI. It was not possible to select
> something on the boot time or I don't know how to do this.
>
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBC
The devs have been notified:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4934#issuecomment-496034991
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlzrDiAACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDC
, problems :(
> Currently, you can install all dom0 updates, but before actual reboot change
> kernel manually to previous that reboot and all must be fine
>
Thanks, all. I've posted a question for Marek about whether the update
should be pulled:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issu
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 26/05/2019 4.47 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> On 26/05/2019 3.31 PM, drok...@gmail.com wrote:
>> Can't launch Qubes Global settings window. I get:
>
>> [Dom0] Houston, we have a problem...
>
>> Whoops. A
>> delete them all.
>>
>> See https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4946 on how to move
>> the restored dom0 files to the right place, it's pretty straight-forward.
>
> Thanks that was very helpful.
>
Thanks for sharing your experience. I've updated the
broken. Maybe I should just wipe the drive
> and start all over again. One more time after all of this is just
> par for the course. Then again, I might as well wait until there
> is a fix for the current kernel not liking my Radeon card.
>
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Commun
or legwork. Please send an email to Michael and me
if you're interested. Thank you!
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlzWe8wACgkQ203TvDlQ
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 19/04/2019 10.15 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> On 19/04/2019 1.12 AM, Michael Carbone wrote:
>> On 3/20/19 3:53 PM, Michael Carbone wrote:
>>> On 3/15/19 3:27 AM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
>>>> On 14/03/2019
g/doc/templates/fedora-minimal/#customization
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAly6jfEACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDB55RAA0Ezlnn14cwUGlveYmEmwtWSiVwaWmoArOasqu7V9Pi3nLtybYOPrAGcg
Lb+rTrxkACnW
eds* action too: [...]
>
Thank you for bringing this to our attention. There was a
miscommunication with the Whonix project that led to this error in the
announcement. After consulting with the Whonix project, I have corrected
the announcement to say that the Debian instructions also apply
bes-os.org/news/2018/01/23/qubes-whonix-next-gen-tor-onion-services/
[2] https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Onionizing_Repositories
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/17/tor-onion-services-available-again/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Communi
l-devel-5.0.4-200.fc29.x86_64
> kernel-modules-5.0.4-200.fc29.x86_64
>
>
> How do I get this right?
> Thank you!
>
This looks like:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4074
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manage
k.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
```
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/04/08/canary-19/
t suggesting anyone run out and do it.
>
> https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v4/
>
Right. The authentication check prior to decryption is critical to
protecting dom0.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 02/04/2019 8.04 AM, Ryan Tate wrote:
>> On Apr 1, 2019, at 10:01 PM, Andrew David Wong
>> wrote: On 01/04/2019 2.54 PM, Ryan Tate
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> If the wish is not “restore” but rather to copy some files —
> imperfect, that is OK — it would be better to have an imperfect
> restore (with, for example, some phantom menus) than to have no
> restore at all, from the standpoint of user expectations, judging
> purely from myself.
>
> Just my $.02.
>
Clearly the best thing would
-and-the-future
[6] https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/02/20/qubes-3-2-approaching-eol
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/03/28/qubes-3-2-has-reached-eol
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 24/03/2019 7.30 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> Dear Qubes Community,
>
> We regret to announce that the Qubes Tor onion services will no longer
> be maintained due to lack of resources. This includes all Qubes onion
> serv
ead use the corresponding
clearnet domain (usually qubes-os.org). Note that you can still use
Tor with clearnet domains.
If you were not using any Qubes Tor onion services, then this
announcement does not affect you.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qube
available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/03/24/tor-onion-services-no-longer-maintained/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlyYIQ8ACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDDCfg
are of the problem and are currently looking into it.
Apologies for any inconvenience.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlyXD90ACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDDjxw/9Htbku2Mcj64/MWOvpLBlLL3aJvJ0gZ676IY
bility issues.
>
Agreed. I think that many of us have been motivated to become
"security techies" by our desire to use Qubes. This isn't a bad thing
in itself (it's good to learn new skills), but we don't want it to be
a requirement either.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager
available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/03/05/xsa-284-290-291-293-294-qubes-not-affected/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlx+neUACgkQ203TvDlQ
xen.org/xsa/advisory-288.html
[4] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-292.html
[5] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/assigning-devices/
- --
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/
```
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/03/0
in
LVM can benefit?
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlx9z54ACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDD0OxAAojuRtAdTDPAWIFxlH9dXLhx2L0ql22DZzybNlwOyW8LHhuhtaNuGi1aU
GKDh627WtIwxylb+rroIpkSjT5iP1yPdipuYC0
security updates as soon as they're available to you, but
always make a backup first.)
> There are no templates to save you.
That's what backups are for. :)
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATUR
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
All,
Please keep discussions on-topic, and please follow our discussion
list guidelines and Code of Conduct:
https://www.qubes-os.org/support/#discussion-list-guidelines
https://www.qubes-os.org/code-of-conduct/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon
reserved for developer
discussions, so it might be what you're looking for. For more
information, please see:
https://www.qubes-os.org/support/#qubes-devel
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
he impression is because its a bit of a PITA).
> Anyway, i'd be curious to know. Thanks!
>
Your question is answered here:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3704
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os
c/security-guidelines/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlxy+/cACgkQ203TvDlQ
MDBNChAAuqB56ZEUGJMS53K85SVJrs1QQrYC62eDDDorLW8IZ6U
ttps://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/06/27/qubes-admin-api/
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/10/03/core3/
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/01/22/qubes-air/
Companies interested in enterprise extensions and deployments of
Qubes OS are welcome to contact us at .
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
C
Whonix page specifically
mentions TorVM and links to the the TorVM page. [1]
As you know, the decision to deprecate TorVM was years ago, [2][3] and
it's been unmaintained ever since. Using it now could be dangerous,
unless you really know what you're doing.
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/wh
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 20/02/2019 9.14 PM, Chris Laprise wrote:
> On 2/20/19 9:26 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
>> On 20/02/2019 2.53 PM, Chris Laprise wrote:
>>> On 2/20/19 2:46 PM, Stuart Perkins wrote:
>>>> On Wed, 20 Feb 2019 10:3
] https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/02/20/qubes-3-2-approaching-eol/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE
orms authentication and encryption/decryption
in dom0 without having to install any additional programs in dom0.
It's time-tested, reliable, and secure: exactly what I want from a
backup tool. Really the only major thing it's missing is, as you say,
incremental backup funct
sers might feel no reason for doing so. It is (obviously) up to you, but I
> suggest adding this information somewhere near downloads.
>
PR submitted: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc/pull/790
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
in
> the installation process would I break out (how) to the CLI to get it
> done?
>
> Thanks for any hints.
>
> Sincerely, Joh
>
This sounds like what you're looking for:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/custom-install/
- --
Andrew Dav
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 05/02/2019 6.03 PM, unman wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 05, 2019 at 12:21:53PM -0500, kitchm via Forum wrote:
>> Andrew, thanks for that. Much appreciated.
>>
>> unman, this has nothing whatsoever to do with google groups,
&g
lanation.
>
> I have since found this link, not on that main page:
> https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/01/08/canary-18/
> so it does appear that we can breathe a sigh of relief.
>
> At least for a little while.?.? :?
>
> I hope that helps a little.
>
- --
Andrew Da
"Then why did you issue a QSB at
all?" Even though there was no failure in the Qubes security model
here (in fact, it did exactly what it was supposed to by limiting the
damage this bug could do), we care far more about keeping users safe
than about the "optics" of issuing a
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On 26/01/2019 2.39 AM, 799 wrote:
> Am Sa., 26. Jan. 2019, 04:33 hat Andrew David Wong
> geschrieben:
>
>>
>> Please take a look at this issue:
>>
>> https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3571
>
witch somewhere that says I am going to be
> careful and do it? Feature request?
>
> Only for package names into dom0 and error text out when things
> don't work - like just recently.
>
> Thanks, Eric
>
Please take a look at this issue:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/
erE/discussion
TL;DR: In the TemplateVM on which sys-net is based:
$ sudo chmod 0700 /var/lib/private/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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On 24/01/2019 9.03 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
> On 24/01/2019 7.53 AM, qubes-...@tutanota.com wrote:
>> hi, I reinstalled successfully the whonix-ws-14, whonix-gw-14 and debian-9
>> templates as described here:
>> https://
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On 24/01/2019 9.15 PM, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 08:57:16PM -0600, Andrew David Wong wrote:
>> On 23/01/2019 11.54 PM, Chris Laprise wrote:
>>> On 01/23/2019 10:39 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
lay package info as it begins downloading. The package
> version-date should begin with "4.0.1-20190123" or later.
>
Will this step work with templates where installed_by_rpm = false?
> 3. Shutdown all VMs so the upgrade can take effect...
>
> [dom0]$ qvm-shutdown --all
et connection is working smoothly.
> Thank you!
>
The correct way to (re)create sys-whonix is:
$ sudo qubesctl state.sls qvm.anon-whonix
For details, see: https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Install
We neglected to include this in the QSB.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Commu
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On 23/01/2019 11.54 PM, Chris Laprise wrote:
> On 01/23/2019 10:39 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
>> On 23/01/2019 9.36 PM, pixel fairy wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 7:24:57 PM UTC-8, Andrew David Wong
>>> w
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On 23/01/2019 9.36 PM, pixel fairy wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 7:24:57 PM UTC-8, Andrew David Wong wrote:
>
>> The Whonix packages are in qubes-templates-community-testing.
>
>
> $ sudo qubes-dom0-upda
qubes-templates-itl and
> qubes-templates-itl-testing.
>
The Whonix packages are in qubes-templates-community-testing.
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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. This XSA has been
added to the XSA Tracker. [2]
[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/09/02/qsb-43/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/#289
This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2019/01/21/xsa-289-qubes-not-affected/
- --
Andrew David Wong
? sys-firewall?
Why do you change it? Do you see some security risk with using sys-net?
If so, should we file a bug report to have this changed by default?
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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ork.
> I had to change grub to fix.
>
Comment added:
https://github.com/QubesOS/updates-status/issues/850#issuecomment-455826016
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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/3983
>
> for myself it's not the minimal fedora-29 its the regular one ;
> and it appears if fedora-29 is having time issues that that may
> be why my thunderbird appvm based on it, is also timestamping the
> messages wrong ?
>
Try the workaround mentioned in the comments
t;.
>
Similar experience here. Reopened:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4667
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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-template-available/
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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Q
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On 1/4/19 1:13 PM, John S.Recdep wrote:
> On 1/4/19 1:37 AM, Andrew David Wong wrote:
>> On 1/3/19 11:31 PM, John S.Recdep wrote:
>>> On 1/3/19 2:51 PM,
>>> 22rip-2xk3N/kkaK1Wk0Htik3J/w...@public.gmane.org wrote:
section on qubes website nor here
> ..
>
See:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4223
and
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc/pull/739
>
> Seems like this happened with 28 release as well
>
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.q
I just started noticing the message also.
>
Yes, this is a known issue:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3652
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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On 1/1/19 10:10 PM, 22...@tutamail.com wrote:
> Same thing here...no answers/solutions but your not alone!
>
The fix is already in testing:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4616
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community M
ou to any one with insight they are willing to share...
>
I'm not sure if you've already read the QSB that Marco linked upthread,
but I think it answers most of your questions:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-045-2018.txt
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community M
> Yes, its fedora 25.
>
For future reference, this information is documented for each Qubes
version here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#dom0
- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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