Re: [qubes-users] using two whonix-gw instances

2019-10-01 Thread Sven Semmler
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 10/1/19 2:59 AM, tetrahe...@danwin1210.me wrote: > > A 2nd sys-whonix gateway for this situation would seem to reduce the > vulnerability. Or maybe I am just being paranoid? I agree and decided to go with two gateways for the following reason:

Re: [qubes-users] using two whonix-gw instances

2019-09-30 Thread tetrahedra via qubes-users
On Thu, Sep 26, 2019 at 10:09:04AM -0500, Sven Semmler wrote: My understanding is that TOR actually runs in the gateway and the the workstation(s) enable typical Qubes style compartmentalization. Meaning that if app-anon-1 is compromised, the sys-whonix and a potential app-anon-2 are not. When I

Re: [qubes-users] using two whonix-gw instances

2019-09-30 Thread Sven Semmler
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 9/25/19 8:31 PM, Claudia wrote: > One way to find out for sure. Open /etc/torrc (or ~/.config/tor/torrc, or > other torrc location), and look for stream isolation flags. Make sure you > understand exactly what each one means. Thank you! /Sven

Re: [qubes-users] using two whonix-gw instances

2019-09-27 Thread Claudia
tetrahedra via qubes-users: On Wed, Sep 25, 2019 at 11:32:20PM +, 'awokd' via qubes-users wrote: Sven Semmler: On 9/25/19 5:26 PM, 'Jackie' via qubes-users wrote: even different applications within the same vm, will use different tor circuits. I know this is true of apps that come with

Re: [qubes-users] using two whonix-gw instances

2019-09-27 Thread Claudia
'Jackie' via qubes-users: Sven Semmler: In addition to my fairly standard dvm based on whonix-ws connected to sys-whonix based on whonix-ws I have now done the following: 1) cloned sys-whonix to sys-whonix-id 2) created app-signal based on whonix-ws 3) installed signal in whonix-ws 4)

Re: [qubes-users] using two whonix-gw instances

2019-09-26 Thread Sven Semmler
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 My understanding is that TOR actually runs in the gateway and the the workstation(s) enable typical Qubes style compartmentalization. Meaning that if app-anon-1 is compromised, the sys-whonix and a potential app-anon-2 are not. When I create a

Re: [qubes-users] using two whonix-gw instances

2019-09-26 Thread tetrahedra via qubes-users
On Wed, Sep 25, 2019 at 11:32:20PM +, 'awokd' via qubes-users wrote: Sven Semmler: On 9/25/19 5:26 PM, 'Jackie' via qubes-users wrote: even different applications within the same vm, will use different tor circuits. I know this is true of apps that come with whonix-ws, but is it the

Re: [qubes-users] using two whonix-gw instances

2019-09-25 Thread 'awokd' via qubes-users
Sven Semmler: On 9/25/19 5:26 PM, 'Jackie' via qubes-users wrote: even different applications within the same vm, will use different tor circuits. I know this is true of apps that come with whonix-ws, but is it the case for apps added later like Signal? I think you'd still be OK if Signal

Re: [qubes-users] using two whonix-gw instances

2019-09-25 Thread Sven Semmler
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 9/25/19 5:26 PM, 'Jackie' via qubes-users wrote: > Whonix vms have stream isolation so different whonix appvms, or even > different applications within the same vm, will use different tor circuits. Oh wow... that sounds great. I just discovered

Re: [qubes-users] using two whonix-gw instances

2019-09-25 Thread 'Jackie' via qubes-users
Sven Semmler: In addition to my fairly standard dvm based on whonix-ws connected to sys-whonix based on whonix-ws I have now done the following: 1) cloned sys-whonix to sys-whonix-id 2) created app-signal based on whonix-ws 3) installed signal in whonix-ws 4) connected both app-email-private

[qubes-users] using two whonix-gw instances

2019-09-25 Thread Sven Semmler
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 In addition to my fairly standard dvm based on whonix-ws connected to sys-whonix based on whonix-ws I have now done the following: 1) cloned sys-whonix to sys-whonix-id 2) created app-signal based on whonix-ws 3) installed signal in whonix-ws 4)