Re: [qubes-users] Supercookies / Zombie cookies / Web Tracking — how effective are Qubes security domains against this
Roger that, thank you Leo so it sounds as though Qubes ought to be up to snuff for all contemporary ad instustry practices that Google, Facebook, Doubleclick etc are liable to try but that Qubes + anonymizing browser is a better bet against more sophisticated tracking in case that were a concern. Great news. :) On Monday, September 18, 2017 at 2:39:34 PM UTC-7, Leo Gaspard wrote: > On 09/18/2017 09:27 PM, jes...@gmail.com wrote: > > Thank you Micah and Michał, but I am not actually asking about a standard > > as strong as 100% bulletproof anonymity or anything. I really am just > > concerned about whether any of the methods on that list that I linked to > > would be enough to leak cookie-like reference data between two separate > > Qubes security domains. > > Cookie-like reference data between two separate Qubes security domains > cannot happen. This would mean one VM is able to influence the hard disk > of another, which would be a vulnerability in Qubes. > > > Being tracked as I browse around *in* a given security domain is entirely > > my problem of course, and I understand that. My only concern is working to > > ensure that to an outside observer such as webservers and ad networks > > nothing short of the shared IP address (and via Tor or VPN or different IPs > > honestly allocated to different domains perhaps not even that) can act as a > > reliable indicator that web browsing activity in one Qubes security domain > > is "linked" to activity from another security domain via any secretly > > stored cookie-like reference identifiers that get somehow leaked across > > domains. > > What can however happen is things like hardware fingerprinting through > the browser, like CPU frequency measurements. > > Also, Qubes doesn't guarantee two VMs can't talk together, so if you > have at the same time a browser in two VMs in two websites they may be > able to talk together using such side channels (timing the cache, > ultra-low-level stuff like that). > > So even though supercookies and the like aren't shared in Qubes, if you > use an insufficiently anonymising web browser, a web site may be able to > fingerprint your hardware through the browser (Qubes/Xen does nothing to > prevent that for performance reasons), and then to link your hardware to > different identities you used to browse different pages in different VMs. > > I don't know of any website that would try to talk to others through > side-channels, but I seem to remember articles on hardware > fingerprinting (esp. the cpu frequency and drift, iirc) through JS from > a few years back, so I guess against state-of-the-art tracking systems > Qubes will not be enough. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/68d78695-e01b-43d8-807d-ca6e7b795531%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Supercookies / Zombie cookies / Web Tracking — how effective are Qubes security domains against this
Thank you Micah and Michał, but I am not actually asking about a standard as strong as 100% bulletproof anonymity or anything. I really am just concerned about whether any of the methods on that list that I linked to would be enough to leak cookie-like reference data between two separate Qubes security domains. Being tracked as I browse around *in* a given security domain is entirely my problem of course, and I understand that. My only concern is working to ensure that to an outside observer such as webservers and ad networks nothing short of the shared IP address (and via Tor or VPN or different IPs honestly allocated to different domains perhaps not even that) can act as a reliable indicator that web browsing activity in one Qubes security domain is "linked" to activity from another security domain via any secretly stored cookie-like reference identifiers that get somehow leaked across domains. For example: if I browse to a Flash or Silverlight website using Browser X in my [untrusted] domain, would those plugins be able to store any kinds of LSOs or HTML5 local storage or cached E-tags or anything else deep enough into the system backend that they could pull them back out again in my [work] domain when I browse back to that same site again? >From a differential diagnostic perspective, I know that running two COMPLETELY >separate VMs via XenServer et al with completely separate OSen and completely >separate installs of the same browser and Flash plugin — where they don't even >view a single shred of the same filesystem — should be safe from any industry >standard client tracking data (EG, short of malware like Bluepill or direct >exploits against the incumbent hypervisor) leaking between said domains. However two different browsers on the same computer/OS combo, such as Firefox and Opera, might get Flash installed via the same process which gives the Flash plugin on both browsers access to the same LSO store squirreled away somewhere. So I'm just trying to confirm how close to case 1 Qubes security domains rate, even when you are still only installing the OS, the browser, and the Flash plugin once for use by both light VMs. I hope this helps to clarify my inquiry, thank you! - - Jesse On Monday, September 18, 2017 at 11:02:31 AM UTC-7, rysiek wrote: > Dnia Monday, September 18, 2017 10:56:33 AM CEST Micah Lee pisze: > > Qubes security domains don't necessarily help solve this problem because > > really the problem is how your web browsers are configured. > > > > So a tracking company can't link your browsing activity between Qubes > > domains -- your "personal" traffic and "work" traffic might look like > > two separate people -- but within one of those domains, they can still > > track you, and do all of those tricks. > > > > If you want web privacy, you'll have to configure your browser within > > Qubes the same way you have to outside of Qubes. Or, you can do all of > > your browser in DisposableVMs. Or use Tor Browser, which has taken many > > steps to prevent browser tracker as a design goal. > > Damn, beat me to it! > > -- > Pozdrawiam, > Michał "rysiek" Woźniak > > Zmieniam klucz GPG :: http://rys.io/pl/147 > GPG Key Transition :: http://rys.io/en/147 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/299c63e1-3e81-408b-a0cb-7c4fedfc7843%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] Supercookies / Zombie cookies / Web Tracking — how effective are Qubes security domains against this
In the past I have used a Firefox plugin called "Better Privacy" to try to push back against multi-front user fingerprinting and analysis mechanisms such as the kind used by large advertising and user demographics companies which include the abuse of Flash LSOs, HTML5 local storage, Silverlight, et al to confirm that the same user is browsing along a website or a distributed ad network even when they "clear private data" or use incognito mode, even when they switch to different browsers installed on the same machine, even if they're using coffee shop wifi or VPNs so that they appear from different IP addresses, etc. The take home being that it only takes one (1) fingerprint hit through one (1) of the avenues available to tracking organizations to confirm that they are dealing with the same end-user (or household unit, or something close enough to pad their toxic dossier with) and thus to link every cookie fingerprint that they know for this user across both domains under the same umbrella. A pretty thorough look at all of the strategies that I am at least aware of can be had at this url: https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/client-identification-mechanisms So I am curious to what extent Qubes security domains may be sufficiently complete as to defeat potentially all of these mechanisms simultaneously? Especially if end-user configures one or more domains to pipe all network traffic over a VPN or tor to additionally differentiate their IP address? I am especially interested to hear about how Qubes security domains interact with Flash LSOs, and .. whatever-it-is that Silverlight and other multi-browser plugins do, and whether *that* data leaks between domains. :/ Thank you for any insight you guys may have on this matter, as it sounds like it speaks directly to Qubes primary mission goals of security by compartmentalization. :D -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/2c1d96d1-14f9-4522-b4e1-169da312e756%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
