On 08/29/2017 12:22 AM, Andrew Morgan wrote:
> On 08/28/2017 10:27 PM, Reg Tiangha wrote:
>> FYI, trying to view the qubes-devel Google Group on a web browser
>> currently displays this message:
>>
>> Banned Content Warning
>> The group that you are attempting to view (qubes-devel) has been
>> iden
On Monday, August 28, 2017 at 10:46:22 PM UTC-7, Eric wrote:
> The question as always is, what are you protecting? If it's your user data,
> compartmentalize differently. If it's some kind of root privilege escalation,
> that's a lost cause, as the vm sudo page explains. If it's some kind of
> m
just remembered, a couple other ssh exploits, and googled for them, found a
couple others. so that does come up once in a while.
On Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 12:54 AM pixel fairy wrote:
> On Monday, August 28, 2017 at 10:46:22 PM UTC-7, Eric wrote:
> > The question as always is, what are you protecti
On Wednesday, June 28, 2017 at 6:14:07 AM UTC+5:30, Unman wrote:
>
> I think you need to work on your search skills :-)
> The same question was asked on this list 3 days ago.
> The mount error arises because 'mount' isn't on the path - copy the
> export PATH statement from template_debian/vars.sh
On Monday, August 28, 2017 at 6:36:08 PM UTC-4, Leo Gaspard wrote:
> Just encrypting /boot would bring little, as it would still be possible
> to modify the unencrypted part of GRUB (that decrypts /boot) to have it
> overwrite the /boot with malicious kernel images (or even to not use the
> ones pr
I dont dual boot, as implied earlier. I have had suspicious activity happen
before in Qubes3.2 at a certain location several times; errors from Xen saying
that my machine is not returning all of its memory and while viewing Xen logs I
have seen the creation of domains which I surely did not do
Leo Gaspard,
I have read about AEM but have never used it, it seems like it is geared
towards protecting from USB's with malicious firmware on them.
Does AEM actually verify the integrity of /boot before using? This is what I
am looking for, either a method of encrypting /boot or even better,
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 08/29/2017 04:50 PM, cyberian@national.shitposting.agency wrote:
> Leo Gaspard,
>
> I have read about AEM but have never used it, it seems like it is
> geared towards protecting from USB's with malicious firmware on
> them.
>
> Does AEM actually
Thank you for the detailed description, Patrik. That sounds like exactly what
I am looking for.
Much appreciated.
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On Tuesday, August 29, 2017 at 10:47:14 AM UTC-4,
cybe...@national.shitposting.agency wrote:
> I dont dual boot, as implied earlier. I have had suspicious activity happen
> before in Qubes3.2 at a certain location several times; errors from Xen
> saying that my machine is not returning all of i
On Tuesday, August 29, 2017 at 12:18:45 PM UTC-4, cooloutac wrote:
> On Tuesday, August 29, 2017 at 10:47:14 AM UTC-4,
> cybe...@national.shitposting.agency wrote:
> > I dont dual boot, as implied earlier. I have had suspicious activity
> > happen before in Qubes3.2 at a certain location several
On Tuesday, August 29, 2017 at 11:38:59 AM UTC-4, Patrik Hagara wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA256
>
> On 08/29/2017 04:50 PM, cyberian@national.shitposting.agency wrote:
> > Leo Gaspard,
> >
> > I have read about AEM but have never used it, it seems like it is
> > geared
On Tuesday, August 29, 2017 at 12:25:51 PM UTC-4, cooloutac wrote:
> On Tuesday, August 29, 2017 at 11:38:59 AM UTC-4, Patrik Hagara wrote:
> > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> > Hash: SHA256
> >
> > On 08/29/2017 04:50 PM, cyberian@national.shitposting.agency wrote:
> > > Leo Gaspard,
> > >
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Hash: SHA256
On 08/29/2017 06:25 PM, cooloutac wrote:
> On Tuesday, August 29, 2017 at 11:38:59 AM UTC-4, Patrik Hagara
> wrote: On 08/29/2017 04:50 PM, cyberian@national.shitposting.agency
> wrote:
Leo Gaspard,
I have read about AEM but have nev
On 08/29/2017 04:01 PM, cooloutac wrote:
> On Monday, August 28, 2017 at 6:36:08 PM UTC-4, Leo Gaspard wrote:
>> Just encrypting /boot would bring little, as it would still be possible
>> to modify the unencrypted part of GRUB (that decrypts /boot) to have it
>> overwrite the /boot with malicious k
On 08/29/2017 06:32 PM, cooloutac wrote:
On Tuesday, August 29, 2017 at 12:25:51 PM UTC-4, cooloutac wrote:
On Tuesday, August 29, 2017 at 11:38:59 AM UTC-4, Patrik Hagara wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 08/29/2017 04:50 PM, cyberian@national.shitposting.agency wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
On 08/29/2017 07:38 PM, David Hobach wrote:
> On 08/29/2017 06:32 PM, cooloutac wrote:
>> On Tuesday, August 29, 2017 at 12:25:51 PM UTC-4, cooloutac
>> wrote:
>>> On Tuesday, August 29, 2017 at 11:38:59 AM UTC-4, Patrik Hagara
>>> wrote:
-B
W dniu niedziela, 13 sierpnia 2017 14:17:33 UTC+2 użytkownik Epitre napisał:
> Le dimanche 13 août 2017 09:41:53 UTC+2, Foppe de Haan a écrit :
> > On Sunday, August 13, 2017 at 9:38:06 AM UTC+2, Epitre wrote:
> > > Le dimanche 13 août 2017 09:19:25 UTC+2, Epitre a écrit :
> > > > Le dimanche 13 ao
I switched to the new FC25 template and now get a checksum doesn't match on
xen-libs-4.6.6-29.fc25.x86_64.
Anyone have any ideas?
On Wednesday, August 23, 2017 at 2:35:29 PM UTC-6, Pete Howell wrote:
> Running a fresh install of Qubes-R3.2, and when doing an FC23 update, all the
> packages down
Does Qubes block this? If not, should it? In either case, how?
-- Forwarded message --
From: Henry Baker
Date: Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 7:51 AM
Subject: Re: [Cryptography] How to find hidden/undocumented instructions
To: cryptogra...@metzdowd.com
FYI --
http://blog.ptsecurity.com/20
As I probably should have known, Qubes developers are already well
aware of this. See for example:
https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/x86_harmful.pdf
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Just wanted to bump this.
How are HVM disks resized on Qubes 4.0rc1?
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I'm using R4.0 rc1.
I wanted to install a Linux distro inside a disk image located in dom0 home,
using QEMU in an AppVM.
I've created a new disk image in dom0, set it up (dos partition label and a
primary ext4 partition) and attached with `kpartx` to loopX, but `qvm-block`
doesn't list in the
I'm using R4.0 rc1.
I wanted to install a Linux distro inside a disk image located in dom0 home,
using QEMU in an AppVM.
I've created a new disk image in dom0, set it up (dos partition label and a
primary ext4 partition) and attached it with `kpartx` to loopX, but `qvm-block`
doesn't list it i
If your laptop contains an active TPM and a TCG Opal 2.0 compliant SED
(SSD or spinning platter) drive, then you can create a range, install
the bootstrap/OS, and then mark that range as read-only.
After doing that *nothing* will be able to write to that area without
the password unlocking tha
Solved:
Resizing disks is now done in GUI from the Qubes drop-down menu in dom0 under
[MyHVM] > VM Settings
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to qube
[MyHVM] > VM Settings > Applications no longer will add selected applications
to the dom0 VM drop down menu in Qubes 4.0
Expected: going into VM preferences and choosing programs to appear in the
Qubes drop down menu for selected VM should cause the applications to be added
to the quickstart t
On 08/29/2017 11:02 PM, Sandy Harris wrote:
> As I probably should have known, Qubes developers are already well
> aware of this. See for example:
> https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/x86_harmful.pdf
Exactly.
To give a little more context:
* Intel ME is a totally independent, totally op
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