I think Marty's second point below about the Court's somewhat positive
reception to the least restrictive means argument is important because it
provides a basis for resolving this case in Hobby Lobby's favor that is
relatively limited in its application. Clement argues that this is a unique
ca
The employer's duty to accommodate is notoriously anemic. Forcing an employee
to violate his beliefs concerning right speech seems wrong as a matter of
morality and policy, but not law. If someone else can put the offensive words
on the communications, then there might be an accommodation case,
An employer's duty to accommodate is notoriously anemic. Here the Buddhist is
likely claiming the requirement forces the employee
Sent from Steve's iPhone
> On Mar 25, 2014, at 9:34 PM, "Volokh, Eugene" wrote:
>
> An interesting lawsuit that Howard Friedman blogged about,
>
Or would the view of the United States be that this wireless network
services company, as a for-profit corporation, cannot have religious
beliefs and therefore cannot impose the religious beliefs of its owners or
managers on its employees? ;-)
*Warning*
*: this message is subject to monitoring by
An interesting lawsuit that Howard Friedman blogged about, and
that I thought I’d pass along. I assume that in this situation, the employee
would win only if there were someone else who could have easily done the task
instead of the plaintiff, yes? I would think that, both as a
Yes, and the Crown Kosher case came up in today’s argument. – Dan Conkle
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marc Stern
Sent: Tuesday, March 25, 2014 6:21 PM
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu; 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Sub
Will beat me to it. There is a category of clothes that aren't kosher
(clothes made with both linen and wool fibers). But of course this isn't a
big category of clothing!
On Tuesday, March 25, 2014, Alan Brownstein
wrote:
> My dad had a hardware/housewares store in the Bronx. He was not an
> ob
One of the blue law cases did involve a kosher butcher - I think it was named Crown Kosher
My dad had a hardware/housewares store in the Bronx. He was not an observant
Jew. Everyone was closed on Sunday. He was open on Saturday. He told me he did
half of the week's business on Saturday and that it was impossible to be in
business and be closed both days.
Alan
_
But kosher clothes would have to avoid SHATNES.
- Original Message -
From: "Levinson, Sanford V"
To: "'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'"
Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2014 22:10:44 +
Subject: RE: Hobby Lobby transcript
> I stand thoroughly corrected! And, of course, there is no general
I stand thoroughly corrected! And, of course, there is no general category
called "kosher clothes." This is a good demonstration that it's always a good
idea to go back and read the cases before opining, because I also would have
sworn that the case arose in Massachusetts. I'm glad I'm taking
Braunfeld did not sell meat. From the opinion: "Appellants are merchants
in Philadelphia who engage in the retail sale of clothing and home
furnishings within the proscription of the statute in issue."
On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 5:53 PM, Levinson, Sanford V <
slevin...@law.utexas.edu> wrote:
> Wit
Is Hobby Lobby in the position of claiming a "right" to enlist in the armed
forces, but, at the same time, to avoid being assigned duties that violate
their religious views? I assume the general answer to such a request is "you
don't have to enlist, but if you do, then you have to do it on the
With regard to Braunfield, given that the customers are a distinct subset of
people who want Kosher meat, isn't the argument more that they are decidedly
inconvenienced by being unable to shop on Sunday (which is just another day to
them), but NOT that they will refrain from buying kosher meat f
Where is the complicity burden? The financial burden can’t be a burden. If
the alternative removes the complicity, and that alternative is available to
them, then where is the substantial burden on religion? It was plaintiff’s
complicity theory that was the driving force. They had the burden
In the context of discussing Marty's substantial burden argument, Justice Kagan
invoked Braunfeld. I made a similar comparison on the listserv back in
December:
> Braunfeld might support Marty's argument. The government provides an option
> to all employers: (1) pay a tax, or (2) provide cover
Marty's argument did seem to get some traction. But in addressing the
alternative of not providing insurance and simply paying the $26 million ($2000
per employee), Clement suggested that the overall cost to the employer -
including the need to pay higher wages and the adverse impact on attract
Given comments from Justices Breyer and Kagan, it does not look like there are
five votes for the proposition that no for-profit corporation, no matter how
closely held, may assert a free exercise interest.
Richard T. Foltin, Esq.
Director of National and Legislative Affairs
Office of Governmen
One caveat to Marty’s second point: Paul Clement quite pointedly would not
concede that his clients would be comfortable with the nonprofit-style
accommodation – which is of course being challenged by several nonprofit
entities represented by Becket Fund, which also represents Hobby Lobby.
To b
is here:
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-354_5436.pdf
Audio should be available later in the week.
I'd be curious to hear what others who attended thought of the argument.
I'll mention only three things of particular note:
First, several of the Justices, incl
Have there been any cases where someone has asserted that a spousal election to
take against the will has been challenged as violating a state RFRA?
--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017
Director of International Programs, Institute for Intellectual Property and
Social
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