On Tue, Dec 21, 2010 at 2:49 PM, Udhay Shankar N ud...@pobox.com wrote:
I am finding it fascinating too - not least because of the geographical
distribution of the participants in this thread. I can see postings (so
far) from people in Germany, India, USA and Kenya. Will folks from
Australia
On Sat, Dec 18, 2010 at 8:56 PM, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote:
Paper is self-documenting. It creates its own documentation trail.
Paper is offline, so it can't be scrambled. Paper is distributed
over multiple independant physically securable compartments.
People understand sealed urns,
On Mon, Dec 20, 2010 at 11:54:09AM +0300, underscore wrote:
All the above could be true ... but the problem in most developing
countries is the word people -- who have greater involvement in a
paper based process ... there are enough documented rigged elections
Technology doesn't help with
On Monday 20 December 2010 07:58 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
People who design such systems can attack them. And do it so cleverly,
you won't realize until the entire vote is stolen. And you won't even
be able to prove it's been stolen.
Eugen, can you imagine a system that is vulnerable to
On Monday 20 December 2010 10:48 AM, J. Alfred Prufrock wrote:
I've run one election with EVMs and been an observer in 3 more.
It would be good to have views from JAP, Eugen, and others on each of
the attacks demonstrated in Hari K. Prasad, et al., 'Security Analysis
of India’s Electronic
On Mon, Dec 20, 2010 at 10:27:52PM +0530, Pranesh Prakash wrote:
Eugen, can you imagine a system that is vulnerable to (undetectable)
attack, but because of (external, non-software) processes in place, is
Why having an electronic system in place, then, if you're already
using non-software
What I've understood of the discussion so far -
1 - EVMs are not perfect
2 - therefore electoral systems using EVMs are not perfect
3 - systems NOT using EVMs are not perfect either; it is a matter of testing
/ perception / context as to which system is closer to perfection
I know this is
This is a fascinating discussion, and Yet Another Reason I Am Grateful
that Udhay Invited Me to Join Silklist.
On 12/20/10 6:28 AM December 20, 2010, Eugen Leitl wrote:
On Mon, Dec 20, 2010 at 11:54:09AM +0300, underscore wrote:
If you have a well audit sealed electronic voting box
On 21-Dec-10 3:31 AM, Heather Madrone wrote:
This is a fascinating discussion, and Yet Another Reason I Am Grateful
that Udhay Invited Me to Join Silklist.
I am finding it fascinating too - not least because of the geographical
distribution of the participants in this thread. I can see
Fascinating thread.And since Eugen asked what booth-capturing, may I
attempt a description of what it does, and why EVMs were thought of as
a solution in the first place?
In many parts of India, primarily in the North, all political parties
tried what's called booth-capturing. Armed thugs of
I've run one election with EVMs and been an observer in 3 more.
Indian EVMs are simple. They are inspected by reps from all parties before
polling begins (to ensure that all candidates start from 0) and again at
close of polls.There are backup records from poll day of the number of votes
cast in
On Sat, Dec 18, 2010 at 8:26 AM, Biju Chacko biju.cha...@gmail.com wrote:
Nothing is completely tamperproof.
A more pertinent question is how easy is it to tamper with them under
normal field conditions?
Agreed. That's precisely why the EC's stand raises questions. Why can't they
come
On Sat, Dec 18, 2010 at 08:26:11AM +0530, Biju Chacko wrote:
On Wed, Dec 15, 2010 at 9:33 PM, Nikhil Mehra nikhil.mehra...@gmail.com
wrote:
I must add though that most independent experts I've spoken to truly believe
that these machines are completely tamper proof.
Nothing is completely
On Saturday 18 December 2010 05:24 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Everybody knows that voting machines are dead, and anyone
who pushes them should be regarded with extreme suspiction,
right?
(Presuming you mean electronic voting machines,) I completely
disagree. Two points:
1. Not all EVMs are
On Sat, Dec 18, 2010 at 10:26:21PM +0530, Pranesh Prakash wrote:
1. Not all EVMs are created equal, and each design must be evaluated on
its own merit.
No, electronic voting is dead for fundamental reasons. It doesn't matter
how secure or insecure the architecture is. Read what Schneier has to
On Saturday 18 December 2010 11:26 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
No, electronic voting is dead for fundamental reasons. It doesn't matter
how secure or insecure the architecture is. Read what Schneier has to
say about it. He's usually right on the money.
I've almost never found myself disagreeing
On Sun, Dec 19, 2010 at 12:53:37AM +0530, Pranesh Prakash wrote:
Most of the problems discussed are very design-dependent. The e-voting
The most daming objections are meta-level, and not design-dependent.
machines used in India, for instance, aren't touch-screen based.
Not relevant.
On Wed, Dec 15, 2010 at 9:33 PM, Nikhil Mehra nikhil.mehra...@gmail.com wrote:
I must add though that most independent experts I've spoken to truly believe
that these machines are completely tamper proof.
Nothing is completely tamperproof.
A more pertinent question is how easy is it to tamper
- Forwarded message from Frederick Noronha fredericknoro...@gmail.com
-
From: Frederick Noronha fredericknoro...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2010 17:26:10 +0530
To: nettim...@kein.org
Subject: nettime US prof behind EVM study deported on arrival
US prof behind EVM study deported on
I've done a case before the Supreme Court, where we used a lot of his
research and that of others. The EC essentially is uncompromising on EVMs to
the extent that they aren't even willing to introduce a paper trail. I'm not
surprised by the reaction of the Indian authorities. This guy could come
On 15 December 2010 20:04, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote:
- Forwarded message from Frederick Noronha fredericknoro...@gmail.com
-
US prof behind EVM study deported on arrival
An American computer scientist, J Alex Halderman, who had co-authored
a study titled “India’s EVMs are
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