http://www.japantimes.co.jp/print/eo20121129a3.html
Good time to show he deserves the Nobel Prize
By RALPH A. COSSA and DAVID SANTORO
HONOLULU - At a recent international conference, a colleague asked,
somewhat irreverently (but not irrelevantly), "Now that Obama has
been re-elected, will he finally earn his Nobel Prize?"
It's a fair question. Hopes were high in the international
disarmament community after President Barack Obama's 2009 Prague
speech when he pledged to move toward a nuclear weapons-free world.
But those who cheered the loudest then are among the most
disappointed now, frustrated over the slow progress toward this goal.
To be fair, some important steps forward were taken. The 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) focused on "Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear
Weapons" while stating the objective of making deterrence of nuclear
attack "the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons." While this fell
far short of a "no first use" pledge, it was a significant step in
that direction. The NPR also states unequivocally that the United
States will not develop new nuclear warheads. Obama also achieved
ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ("New START")
with Russia, which reduced both nations' nuclear weapons inventories.
The administration's willingness to "immediately and aggressively"
seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
proved in vain, as did efforts to conclude a fissile material cut-off
treaty. The Obama-initiated Nuclear Security Summit's goal to secure
all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years has not materialized;
at home the administration stepped back from the spent fuel
repository at Yucca Mountain without any alternative in sight and the
North Korean and Iranian nuclear crises remain unresolved.
While it would be unfair to blame Obama for failing to find solutions
to all these problems, it is important to reflect on what we can
realistically expect him to accomplish over the next four years.
In the Asia-Pacific, the major power agenda consists of two sets of
relationships: one among the U.S., Russia and China, the other among
China, India, and Pakistan. The U.S., Russia, and China essentially
deter one another. While Washington (and Moscow) may worry that
deeper reductions may tempt Beijing to "sprint to parity," China's
"minimal deterrence" strategy already provides strategic stability.
China, for its part, worries not only about the U.S. (and Russia?),
but also increasingly about India, while Pakistan has been rapidly
building up its own arsenal in response to India's military
capabilities. Attempts by New Delhi to counter Pakistan's moves would
likely drive China to respond, which would in turn impact the U.S.
and Russia. The future of this agenda will be determined mainly by
decisions made in Beijing, New Delhi and Islamabad.
Similarly, America's ability to strengthen deterrence and reassure
its Asian allies is increasingly under stress. China's slow but
steady military modernization and North Korea's nuclear weapon
development are transforming the Asian security environment and
raised concerns about the reliability of the U.S. extended deterrent.
Despite the U.S. "rebalancing" toward Asia, regional partners
question the role the U.S. intends to play in the region and if it is
sustainable in a fiscally constrained environment.
Significantly, despite Tokyo and Seoul's proclaimed continued faith
in U.S. security assurances, a growing number of voices in both
countries (especially South Korea) have argued for the development of
independent nuclear weapon capabilities. And while Canberra has
continued to stress the centrality of the U.S. alliance (and accepted
additional U.S. forces on Australian territory), a growing number of
Australians have begun to contemplate a reduced U.S. presence in the
region: Some support the U.S. strategic presence but reject the
nuclear dimension of that presence; a minority is ambivalent about
whether the alliance is good for Australia.
Finally, the U.S. ability to combat the proliferation-terrorism nexus
has proved limited. Although U.S. endorsement of nuclear disarmament
has improved the atmospherics, little tangible progress has been
achieved on the nonproliferation and nuclear security fronts. Many
Non-Aligned Movement members in Asia (and beyond) continue to argue
that the "baby steps" undertaken thus far do not justify more efforts
from them on nonproliferation and nuclear security. This seems
remarkably shortsighted since proliferation and especially acts of
nuclear terrorism will have a much greater impact on their societies
and economies than most seem willing to acknowledge. But the quid pro
quo mentality remains nonetheless.
Be it to address the major power agenda, to reassure its allies and
partners, or to combat nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation,
U.S. power and influence to respond to these challenges is much more
modest than is often assumed.
Let us be clear, however: The U.S. remains a critical player for
generating the forces of change and setting the broader example. This
was illustrated during Obama's landmark visit to Myanmar when
President Thein Sein announced that his country would sign the IEA's
Additional Protocol and allow nuclear inspectors on its territory.
This policy shift is not only a measure of how much (and how quickly)
Myanmar wants to change, but also how much it felt Obama's visit
needed to be acknowledged in a tangible way.
Likewise, however apprehensive they may be about the U.S. commitment,
our Asian allies and partners continue to actively seek protection
from Washington. And it would be foolish to think that the evolution
of major power relations in the Asia-Pacific will not depend in large
part on U.S. policy choices.
As his final four years begin, it is important to have realistic
expectations about what Obama can achieve in the nuclear domain. One
hopes that at a minimum, we will see a resumption of bilateral
U.S.-Russia discussions aimed at further reductions in nuclear
arsenals and that the P-5 process initiated three years ago will
begin to bear fruit in a more tangible way and, hopefully, be
expanded to include all nuclear-armed states to help stabilize the
arms buildup in China and South Asia. An earnest effort to bring the
CTBT into force would also be a major step, as would the opening of
meaningful dialogues with Iran and North Korea.
Finally, U.S. allies need to better understand and embrace the
nonnuclear dimension of extended deterrence and the nonaligned world
needs to throw its weight behind efforts to combat the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and enhance the security of sensitive
materials and technologies.
If Obama can help move the world in this direction, he will have
earned his Nobel.
Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu. David
Santoro is a senior fellow for nonproliferation and disarmament at
the Forum.
The Japan Times: Thursday, Nov. 29, 2012
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/print/eo20121126gd.html
Anti-nuclear madness doesn't jibe with concern about global warming
By GWYNNE DYER
LONDON - After the loss of 10 million American lives in the
Three-Mile Island calamity in 1979, the death of 2 billion in the
Chernobyl holocaust in 1986, and now the abandonment of all of
northern Japan following the death of millions in last year's
Fukushima nuclear catastrophe, it is hardly surprising that the
world's biggest users of nuclear power are shutting their plants
down.
Dyer was **so*obviously** hacking for the nuke industry on this one. the
piece is so riddled with industry distortions and
and falsehoods, either he (or the nuke PR guy who wrote it for him) must
have been making progressive commission on
a per-deviation-from-the-truth basis. Seriously, seriously twisted and
slanted.
On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 10:20 AM, Darryl McMahon <dar...@econogics.com>wrote:
Jason, I disagree. I usually expect better of Gwyn Dyer, but I think he
> missed the mark on this one.
Assuming that nuclear generation can only be replaced by fossil fuels in
the medium to long term is a relic of a 'hard path' mindset. Shifting to
> fossil fuels in the short term is a matter of convenience, familiarity and
> subsidized fossil fuel pricing.
>
On 28/11/2012 2:01 AM, Jason Mier wrote:
man... no matter which "longview" you take the results suck. more
nukes mean more radioactive slag piles and brownfield sites, but
fewer nukes means more smokestacks.
honestly, the idea of multimillion year damages bothers me more than
something that has the potential to be remediated in a century or
two... but the problem there is how much can we adapt in that
timeframe?
there won't be any islands left in any ocean, a lot of the known
coastlines around the world will be gone, and the weather... well...
the sahara's probably going to grow up and take a trip around the
>> world...
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/print/eo20121126gd.html
Anti-nuclear madness doesn't jibe with concern about global warming
By GWYNNE DYER
LONDON - After the loss of 10 million American lives in the
Three-Mile Island calamity in 1979, the death of 2 billion in the
Chernobyl holocaust in 1986, and now the abandonment of all of
northern Japan following the death of millions in last year's
Fukushima nuclear catastrophe, it is hardly surprising that the
world's biggest users of nuclear power are shutting their plants
down.
<snip>
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