Fascinating. I can picture setting up a bunch of transmitters in the hills to send out strong GPS-like signals to mimic the real thing. I suppose you could control those signals to fool the device it is somewhere else. That bit is very clever - you'd have to adjust the signals taking into account current positions of all current satellites. Smart bit of work there.
But it would also need incredible timing. Even a few ns out and it wouldn't work. So how do you set up fantastic timing at different locations of transmitters throughout a country. Well you've blocked the GPS - so that's no good. It would require local atomic clocks (good ones) at each location. Do they have access to such things? Maybe I'm being naive. Jim On 16 December 2011 08:10, J. Forster <j...@quikus.com> wrote: > Iran hijacked US drone, claims Iranian engineer Tells Christian Science > Monitor that CIA's spy aircraft was 'spoofed' into landing in enemy > territory instead of its home base in Afghanistan > Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside > hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the > US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured > drone's systems inside Iran. > > Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off communications > links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who > works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently trying > to unravel the drone’s stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could not > be named for his safety. > > Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a > technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the Iranian > specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it land > in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in Afghanistan. > > "The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the > Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's > "electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise > [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This is > where the bird loses its brain." > > The “spoofing” technique that the Iranians used – which took into account > precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data – > made the drone “land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to > crack the remote-control signals and communications” from the US control > center, says the engineer. > > The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US, > Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an ever-widening > covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear > scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and the > Stuxnet computer virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program. > > Now this engineer’s account of how Iran took over one of America’s most > sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The > techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less > sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the > engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS > signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites. > Rock Center: Iran's growing influence in > Iraq< > http://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9398341-a-growing-iranian-threat-in-wake-of-us-military-withdrawal-from-iraq-this-month > > > > Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS spoofing > indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is plausible. > > "Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible” to manipulation, says > former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding that > it is “certainly possible” to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it > flies on a different course. “I wouldn't say it's easy, but the technology > is there.” > > In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have downloaded > live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with > inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Iran’s apparent ability now to > actually take control of a drone is far more significant. > > Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted over > its nuclear program. > > Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air > defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), > described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided > missile – a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone. > > *Downed US drone: How Iran caught the > 'beast'*< > http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1209/Downed-US-drone-How-Iran-caught-the-beast > > > > “We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning > ‘deception’ of the aggressive systems,” said Gholizadeh, such that “we can > define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile would > change to our desired destination.” > > Gholizadeh said that “all the movements of these [enemy drones]” were being > watched, and “obstructing” their work was “always on our agenda.” > > That interview has since been pulled from Fars’ Persian-language website. > And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack, > which some Iranian news sites called suspicious – suggesting the electronic > warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran. > > *Iran's growing electronic capabilities > *Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to be > "in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code." > > Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US will > "absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence of > any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such surveillance, > now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones. > > US officials skeptical of Iran’s capabilities blame a malfunction, but so > far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American analyst > ridiculed Iran’s capability, telling Defense News that the loss was “like > dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.” > > A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There are > a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan." > > “Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and other > advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem > like a dream for us … but it could be amazing for others,” deputy IRGC > commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week. > Iran: Obama should apologize for drone > 'spying'< > http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/12/13/9417003-iran-obama-should-apologize-for-drone-spying-operation > > > > According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western > intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took place > sometime in the past two years, when it managed to “blind” a CIA spy > satellite by “aiming a laser burst quite accurately.” > > More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says the > engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were made > accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial evidence" > pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on > users. > > Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more > difficult, asserts the engineer. > > *US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability > *Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone > countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of > vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the > Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s. > Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all drone > data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – after finding militant > laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq – and acknowledged that > they were "subject to listening and exploitation."Perhaps as easily > exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the modern > military depends. > "GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by poorly > controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and MP3 > players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a professor > from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial > Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in > Australia. > > "This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and > civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked out > how they can jam GPS," he says. > > *Unmanned drone attacks and shape-shifting robots: War's remote-control > future*< > http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/1022/Unmanned-drone-attacks-and-shape-shifting-robots-War-s-remote-control-future > > > > The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to the > GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian > purposes. In 2003, a “Vulnerability Assessment Team” at Los Alamos National > Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were easily > overwhelmed with a stronger local signal. > > “A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS > signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time that > it is not,” reads the Los Alamos report. “In a sophisticated spoofing > attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving > target’s true position and then gradually walk the target to a false > position.” > > The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago > communications security conference in October laid out parameters for > successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a > "seamless takeover" of drones or other targets. > > To “better cope with hostile electronic attacks,” the US Air Force in late > September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation > warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to the > Defense Update website. > > Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization program" > for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the military > GPS service, making it more robust." > > *Why the drone's underbelly was damaged > *Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer, > and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 – the same year that the > RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then > state-of-the-art surveillance systems. > In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth) > drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones – > including one that had been watching over the underground uranium > enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom. > > In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside > northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two years > of close observation. > > Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the left > wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American > banners. > > The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we > made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same > altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few > meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in > landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage." > > Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month, Iran’s > electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown – and often dismissed. > > "We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer. "Have > you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied many-fold." > When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware it > might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could not > stay away." > > ** **Scott Peterson* <http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Scott+Peterson > >*, > the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an Iranian > journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot be > further identified for security reasons. > * > > *© 2011 The Christian Science Monitor* > > < > http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45685870/ns/world_news-christian_science_monitor/# > > > > > Best, > > -John > =============== > > > _______________________________________________ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to > https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > _______________________________________________ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.