Chris, Peter, Stephen, Jim, Marc, et al, Keep this up! It is very interesting. I must admit that I'm often taken aback at the lack of sophistication of psychologists (painting with a rather large brush, I admit) in terms of a) the history of science, b) the philosophy of science, c) science in general. But then our modal number of publications is reported (no source except memory cited) as zero! :) I should also note that I'm sometimes heartened by different members of the same group!
Let's not forget that many of our peers aren't scientists (overly broad view of peer?) but practitioners. That doesn't , of course, excuse active ignorance but does explain, I think, avoidance (sic) of such matters. I teach what science is to liberal arts undergrads so that's very important to me (and to them if they wish to pass). But the realities of therapy would indicate that a practitioner is not likely to give up a therapy they see as working based on a single disconfirming study (ok, some won't even with large and persistent refutation). I think it unlikely that practitioners are going to "change their tune" (I believe that's the phrase Stephen originally used) until we give them a better tool. As I said, it isn't good science but application often has to operate in a boundary to the scientific- depending somewhat on what is often labeled (mis?) as clinical judgment. As to whether there is evidence to support clinical judgment necessary for some of the arguments being made on the list, I'll leave that to someone else. :) Tim _______________________________ Timothy O. Shearon, PhD Professor and Chair Department of Psychology Albertson College of Idaho Caldwell, ID 83605 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] teaching: intro to neuropsychology; psychopharmacology; general; history and systems -----Original Message----- From: Jim Clark [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sun 3/4/2007 3:10 PM To: Teaching in the Psychological Sciences (TIPS) Subject: [tips] Re: Giving Kubler-Ross some grief Hi With respect to Kuhn (albeit on a slightly different issue, perhaps), he was himself quite concerned about some misinterpretations of his work, especially those who cited it (and continue to cite it) as favoring a relativistic view of scientific knowledge. In an addendum to a later printing of his book, he wrote: "A number of them [philosophers], however, have reported that I believe the following: the proponents of incommensurable theories cannot communicate with each other at all; as a result, in a debate over theory-choice there can be no good reasons; instead theory must be chosen for reasons that are ultimately personal and subjective; some sort of mystical apperception is responsible for the decision actually reached. More than any other parts of the book, the passages on which these misconstructions rest have been responsible for charges of irrationality. ... Nothing about that relatively familiar thesis [i.e., importance of persuasion] implies either that there are no good reasons for being persuaded or that those reasons are ultimately decisive for the group. Nor does it even imply that the reasons for choice are different from those usually listed by philosophers of science: accuracy, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like." (Kuhn, 1970, p. 198-199) Given this explicit rejection of relativism over 35 years ago, it is interesting how many in that camp continue to cite Kuhn. This issue might be relevant to the current discussion in that the "paradigms" at odds may not be Kubler-Ross vs. some other theory, but epistemological paradigms, with some strongly wedded to the scientific world-view and others wedded to a more experiential view of knowledge where anecdotes and personal experience carry more weight. Although perhaps not individuals on this list, even those who have spoken in support of Kubler-Ross, there would be many, I am sure, working in the area of grief (or other forms of) counselling committed far more strongly to the experiential epistemology camp (paradigm) than to the scientific. Indeed they might even be critical that science can address the kinds of issues with which they work in practice. The above quote from Kuhn demonstrates clearly that they should not be citing him in support of their idea that there are alternative routes to valid knowledge other than science. Take care Jim James M. Clark Professor of Psychology 204-786-9757 204-774-4134 Fax [EMAIL PROTECTED] >>> "Christopher D. Green" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 04-Mar-07 3:04:05 PM >>> Harzem Peter wrote: > > On Mar 3, 2007, at 6:26 PM, jim guinee wrote: > >> "Are grief counsellors going to change their tune? I wouldn't bet on it." >> >> Is anyone on this list going to make a paradigm shift in their >> professional endeavors based on one study? > > > Why not? Physics did on the basis of one study (Einstein's three > brief theoretical papers in one year). > Actually not. Almost no one took Einstein's theory of relativity seriously until after Eddington published the solar eclipse study of 1920. (Indeed, there's a standing joke that when a reporter said to Eddington that only three people in the world even understood -- much less believed -- the theory of relativity, Eddington quipped back, "Really? Who's the third?") Many, many more studies had to come along before relativity came to be generally accepted among physicists. Perhaps you didn't mean relativity though: The photoelectric effect paper, while a landmark, did not by itself overturn a "paradigm." Indeed, it drew on Planck's earlier blackbody raditation research. The Brownian motion paper, while it solidified realism with resepct to atoms, hardly overturned a "paradigm." All that said, the real problem with Jim's characterization of the situation, I think, is the knee-jerk Kuhnianism of there being definitie "paradigms." Psychologists seem to have grabbed on ot Kuhn as being the ONE TRUE model of the history of science. This error is probably due to a set of historically contingent reasons (mainly having to do with the relative simultaneity of the publication of Kuhns's _Structure of Scientific Revolution_ with the start of the decline of behaviorism in psychology), but it now makes psychologists look rather silly and self-aggrandizing to those outside of the discipline. Although Kuhn's model was an interesting generalization 45 years ago, it has since been found wanting in all kinds of scientific particulars and is now mainly of only historical interest among historians and philosophers of science. Morever, the Kuhnian model was never intended to apply to psychology (which, even if one takes the Kuhnian model seriously, is obviously in the preparadigmatic multiple schools of thought stage). In addition, WHATEVER the Kubler-Ross approach to death and dying is, is certainly ISN'T a Kuhnian paradigm. It *might* be regarded as a theory of a particular phenomenon buried deep within very broad science (though it is so loose and impressionistic, the term "theory" probably inflates its importance beyond all reason). Finally, going Popperian (i.e., sure one study can overturn a theory) isn't really going to get much more respect. Popper's most infliuential student, Imre Lakatos, presented example after example of situations in the natural science in which what initially looked like a refutation turned out to be simply motivation to adjust (rather than reject) the theory to accomodate the new data and then declare the theory to be stronger and broder than ever before. Regards, Chris -- Christopher D. Green Department of Psychology York University Toronto, ON M3J 1P3 Canada 416-736-5115 ex. 66164 [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.yorku.ca/christo ====================================== --- To make changes to your subscription go to: http://acsun.frostburg.edu/cgi-bin/lyris.pl?enter=tips&text_mode=0&lang=english --- To make changes to your subscription go to: http://acsun.frostburg.edu/cgi-bin/lyris.pl?enter=tips&text_mode=0&lang=english
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