2021-08-27 15:13 GMT+02:00 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <u...@ll.mit.edu>: >> Thanks for all the discussion on this topic. There are several modes that >> TLS 1.2 can operate with respect to DH. Below is a proposal on cases to >> merge some of the cases covered by this draft into the obsolete keyex draft. >> I'd like to see if there is some consensus to make this change before we >> adopt it into the working group. >> >> 1. static-static where both client and server have DH certificates with >> long term keys. I think we have general consensus that this mode should be >> a must not. To deprecate this mode I think we need to state that clients >> MUST NOT use certificates of type rsa_fixed_dh and dsa_fixed_dh and server >> MUST NOT request them. Would the working group support merging this >> guidance into the obsolete keyex draft? >> >> Static-static is OK only when coupled with ephemeral (for forward secrecy), >> using the static part for implicit mutual authentication. Not good when used >> “alone”. Within the TLS context, OK to “MUST NOT”. >> >> 1. ephemeral-static where the client uses an ephemeral key and the server >> uses a long term key. This mode does not provide forward secrecy. I'm not >> sure we have reached consensus on how far to deprecate this option. Would >> the working group support MUST NOT use these ciphersuites unless forward >> secrecy does not matter for your use case and any implementation guidance >> provided to avoid weaknesses is followed? >> Forward secrecy here is “asymmetric”: “server fails” -> “secrecy fails”. >> There are use cases… >> I recommend “SHOULD NOT” here. > > [FV] The implementation guidance to avoid weaknesses in any ephemeral-static > exchange is "don't get anything wrong, anything at all, all the way down to > your field arithmetic libraries". I don't think that's a workable > recommendation, and I believe we should deprecate modes that are so unsafe to > implement. > > Static-ephemeral is _not_ “so unsafe to implement”, not any more than any > other mode. It shouldn’t be encouraged, but shouldn’t be killed off either.
This is empirically disproved by a number of vulnerabilities that are exploitable (or near-misses for other reasons) only in ephemeral-static mode, such as CVE-2016-0701, CVE-2016-7055, CVE-2017-3732, CVE-2017-3736, CVE-2017-3738, CVE-2019-1551 just in the past 5 years in OpenSSL, and CVE-2017-8932 and CVE-2021-3114 in Go. https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/633 gives a good explanation of how these attacks work, and you might find https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Wed-August-8/us-18-Valsorda-Squeezing-A-Key-Through-A-Carry-Bit-wp.pdf interesting as well. Anyway, we keep going in circles around what deprecation is. In my opinion, an IETF deprecation doesn't "kill off" anything, it just says it's not encouraged, so it sounds like you support deprecation in those terms. > >> 1. ephemeral-ephemeral - I think these are already covered in the obsolete >> keyex draft. >> Absolutely no reason to deprecate or obsolete this mode. >> >> >> On Sun, Aug 22, 2021 at 9:32 PM Carrick Bartle <cbartle...@icloud.com> wrote: >>>> > which is a main reason cited for deprecating RSA in >>>> > draft-aviram-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex. >>>> >>>> Have the authors look at Post-Quantum KEMs? >>> >>> I'm not sure why PQ KEMs are relevant here. >>> >>> >>>> On Aug 17, 2021, at 10:41 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL >>>> <u...@ll.mit.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>> > Regardless of the Raccoon attack, the static DH and ECDH ciphersuites >>>> > do not provide >>>> > forward secrecy, >>>> >>>> Unless you use semi-static exchange, which in many cases makes sense. >>>> >>>> > which is a main reason cited for deprecating RSA in >>>> > draft-aviram-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex. >>>> >>>> Have the authors look at Post-Quantum KEMs? >>>> >>>> > Do you object to just the citation of the Raccoon attack or do you also >>>> > feel that we >>>> > should keep these ciphersuites that do not provide forward secrecy >>>> > around? >>>> >>>> I think these suites should stay around. >>>> >>>> While static-static indeed do not provide forward secrecy (and many of us >>>> – though not everybody! – carry for that), static-ephemeral DH and ECDH >>>> are perfectly fine from that point of view. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Aug 13, 2021 at 10:20 AM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL >>>> <u...@ll.mit.edu> wrote: >>>>> I agree with Rene’s points. >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Regards, >>>>> Uri >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *From: *TLS <tls-boun...@ietf.org> on behalf of Rene Struik >>>>> <rstruik....@gmail.com> >>>>> *Date: *Friday, August 13, 2021 at 09:58 >>>>> >>>>> Dear colleagues: >>>>> >>>>> I think this document should absolutely *not* be adopted, without >>>>> providing far more technical justification. The quoted Raccoon attack is >>>>> an easy to mitigate attack (which has nothing to do with finite field >>>>> groups, just with poor design choices of postprocessing, where one uses >>>>> variable-size integer representations for a key). There are also good >>>>> reasons to have key exchanges where one of the parties has a static key, >>>>> whether ecc-based or ff-based (e.g., sni, opaque), for which secure >>>>> implementations are known. No detail is provided and that alone should be >>>>> sufficient reason to not adopt. >>>>> >>>>> Rene >>>>> >>>>> On 2021-07-29 5:50 p.m., Joseph Salowey wrote: >>>>>> This is a working group call for adoption for Deprecating FFDH(E) >>>>>> Ciphersuites in TLS (draft-bartle-tls-deprecate-ffdhe-00 >>>>>> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bartle-tls-deprecate-ffdhe/>). >>>>>> We had a presentation for this draft at the IETF 110 meeting and since >>>>>> it is a similar topic to the key exchange deprecation draft the chairs >>>>>> want to get a sense if the working group wants to adopt this draft >>>>>> (perhaps the drafts could be merged if both move forward). Please >>>>>> review the draft and post your comments to the list by Friday, August >>>>>> 13, 2021. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks, >>>>>> >>>>>> The TLS chairs >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> TLS mailing list >>>>>> TLS@ietf.org >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> email: rstruik....@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik >>>>> cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 287-3867 >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> TLS mailing list >>>> TLS@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> > > > *Attachments:* > * smime.p7s
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