Static-ephemeral is not “so unsafe to implement”, not any more than any other mode. It shouldn’t be encouraged, but shouldn’t be killed off either.
This is empirically disproved by a number of vulnerabilities that are exploitable (or near-misses for other reasons) only in ephemeral-static mode, such as CVE-2016-0701, CVE-2016-7055, CVE-2017-3732, CVE-2017-3736, CVE-2017-3738, CVE-2019-1551 just in the past 5 years in OpenSSL, and CVE-2017-8932 and CVE-2021-3114 in Go. https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/633 gives a good explanation of how these attacks work, and you might find https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Wed-August-8/us-18-Valsorda-Squeezing-A-Key-Through-A-Carry-Bit-wp.pdf interesting as well. Anyway, we keep going in circles around what deprecation is. In my opinion, an IETF deprecation doesn't "kill off" anything, it just says it's not encouraged, so it sounds like you support deprecation in those terms. Do we agree on “SHOULD NOT”? On Sun, Aug 22, 2021 at 9:32 PM Carrick Bartle <[email protected]> wrote: > which is a main reason cited for deprecating RSA in > draft-aviram-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex. Have the authors look at Post-Quantum KEMs? I'm not sure why PQ KEMs are relevant here. On Aug 17, 2021, at 10:41 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <[email protected]> wrote: > Regardless of the Raccoon attack, the static DH and ECDH ciphersuites do not > provide > forward secrecy, Unless you use semi-static exchange, which in many cases makes sense. > which is a main reason cited for deprecating RSA in > draft-aviram-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex. Have the authors look at Post-Quantum KEMs? > Do you object to just the citation of the Raccoon attack or do you also feel > that we > should keep these ciphersuites that do not provide forward secrecy around? I think these suites should stay around. While static-static indeed do not provide forward secrecy (and many of us – though not everybody! – carry for that), static-ephemeral DH and ECDH are perfectly fine from that point of view. On Fri, Aug 13, 2021 at 10:20 AM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <[email protected]> wrote: I agree with Rene’s points. -- Regards, Uri From: TLS <[email protected]> on behalf of Rene Struik <[email protected]> Date: Friday, August 13, 2021 at 09:58 Dear colleagues: I think this document should absolutely *not* be adopted, without providing far more technical justification. The quoted Raccoon attack is an easy to mitigate attack (which has nothing to do with finite field groups, just with poor design choices of postprocessing, where one uses variable-size integer representations for a key). There are also good reasons to have key exchanges where one of the parties has a static key, whether ecc-based or ff-based (e.g., sni, opaque), for which secure implementations are known. No detail is provided and that alone should be sufficient reason to not adopt. Rene On 2021-07-29 5:50 p.m., Joseph Salowey wrote: This is a working group call for adoption for Deprecating FFDH(E) Ciphersuites in TLS (draft-bartle-tls-deprecate-ffdhe-00). We had a presentation for this draft at the IETF 110 meeting and since it is a similar topic to the key exchange deprecation draft the chairs want to get a sense if the working group wants to adopt this draft (perhaps the drafts could be merged if both move forward). Please review the draft and post your comments to the list by Friday, August 13, 2021. Thanks, The TLS chairs _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls -- email: [email protected] | Skype: rstruik cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 287-3867 _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls Attachments: · smime.p7s
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
_______________________________________________ TLS mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
