It's less about bug completeness and more about the risks of breaking
users. The general rule for the whole distribution is backporting
specific fixes for specific bugs; however, there's a handful of packages
where that's not feasible, desired, etc.

Firefox and Chromium are the most obvious cases of wanting the same,
recent, version, on all supported releases. The upstream developers for
these projects have way more resources and way more comprehensive test
suites than we could ever hope to achieve ourselves, and they've got
loads of experience making frequent releases.

MySQL, MariaDB, PostgreSQL are common for "the most recent version of
the release that was used at the time of release" (or something like
that; it's an ugly mouthful). Moving from MySQL 5.5 to 8 would be a huge
jump, but 5.5.32 to 5.5.36 to 5.5.40 etc shouldn't be a big deal. (Alas,
it is. LP:2019203.) These are also far more complex than we can
realistically engineer ourselves.

We've done full-version jumps with Samba before; some of their security
fixes involve hundreds of patches with huge refactoring. There's no good
choices with Samba. The risks of backporting are huge, the opportunity
costs are even larger, and if we backport that much, we'll wind up with
software that nobody is familiar with. So, we will sometimes ship
entirely new versions, and just deal with all the fallout from
regressions.

OpenSSL is a challenging case. It'd be ideal to run the same version as
upstream, so when there's issues, there's a much larger community
working on them. Perhaps the OpenSSL upstream developers have an
extensive enough test suite today to reduce the risks of using entirely
new versions. I know that historically we've found some issues with
security patches via our testing that the OpenSSL upstream testing
missed. I also know that our testing is focused on what ships in our
distribution, it doesn't test the wide world of propriety software or
not-yet-packaged software, so we know we have blind spots.

If we explore shipping upstream OpenSSL packages, I'd really like to see
it trialed in our 'interim' releases: eg, ship an OpenSSL update halfway
through the support cycle for 23.04, 23.10, 24.10, 25.04, 25.10, and if
those all go well, consider it for 26.04 and future releases. There's
way fewer users of our interim releases (which is both a benefit and a
curse, here) and the consequences of a problem are thus constrained.

Users expect (if not appreciate) breaking changes at release points.
They don't expect (and detest) such changes in LTS releases.

Given the foundational importance of OpenSSL, I think it makes sense to
go very slowly in testing such a hypothetical change.

Thanks

-- 
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Touch seeded packages, which is subscribed to openssl in Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2019970

Title:
  OpenSSL 3.0.2 crash in Ubuntu 22.04.2 LTS

Status in openssl package in Ubuntu:
  Incomplete

Bug description:
  Full bug report at https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/20981

  No upstream impact: OpenSSL 3.0.9-dev does not contain the problem any
  more.

To manage notifications about this bug go to:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssl/+bug/2019970/+subscriptions


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