On Fri, 22 Jun 2018 at 11:28, Andrew Ayer <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, 22 Jun 2018 10:54:55 -0700 > Ben Laurie <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Thu, 21 Jun 2018 at 18:07, Andrew Ayer <[email protected]> > > wrote: > > > > > On Thu, 21 Jun 2018 17:46:18 -0700 > > > Eric Rescorla <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > > I am not arguing for removal, but I don't think it's appropriate > > > > to have a recommendation which precludes the use of the mode of > > > > RSA that we are otherwise telling people to use. > > > > > > Thanks for clarifying what your concern is. > > > > > > The recommendation doesn't preclude the use of RSA-PSS, or any other > > > nondeterministic signature scheme. As reflected in the text, logs > > > can satisfy the recommendation by signing a particular STH/SCT only > > > once and storing the signature, instead of signing on demand. > > > > > > > That can't be a hard requirement without impacting availability, FWIW. > > Is that true of both STHs and SCTs, or just SCTs? > STHs already require a master, so just SCTs. Well, modulo some ingenious architecture I can't currently imagine. > > Regards, > Andrew >
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