On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 05:59:13PM +0300, Yaron Sheffer wrote:
> Thanks for your comments!
>
> I agree we SHOULD tone down a few of the requirements, to make sure we do
> accommodate the opportunistic use case.
Thanks.
> OTOH I agree with Aaron on (for example) still forbidding export-level
> ciphers.
Absolutely on board for export-grade ciphers, since they are in
practice no longer in use. So banning them has no operational impact.
I may not be able to convince Wietse that Postfix should default
to disabling these, but I have no objections to a draft that states
that these MUST NOT be used.
> We all should compromise a little bit so that we can have a single BCP for
> both the authenticated and unauthenticated use cases.
Understood. There is room to state stronger requirements for
mandatory TLS and somewhat more liberal requirements for unauthenticated
opportunistic TLS (already vulnerable to many active attacks).
E.g.:
* Mandatory TLS MUST NOT use RC4, SSL 3.0, ...
* Unauthenticated opportunistic TLS MAY only as a last resort,
when no stronger options are available, negotiate RC4, SSL 3.0, ...
[ Note that when opportunistic DANE TLS determines via appropriate
TLSA records that the peer is to be authenticated with DANE, the
applicable requirements are those for mandatory TLS. ]
--
Viktor.
_______________________________________________
Uta mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta
