On 10/15/14, 3:27 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
On 15/10/14 21:21, Orit Levin (LCA) wrote:
If the list agrees with Victor's technical assessment of "O" TLS,
then I join those who think that it doesn't make much sense to
include any of the specific "O" TLS recommendations in the baseline
BCP.
Apologies, I've not read Viktor's comments in detail but I do
think the above is correct. My reasoning is that since we're not
yet done with the definitional draft for OS, it'd be premature
to start writing BCP text for OS. I do accept that some few
folks (incl. Viktor) have real experience with OS for SMTP/STARTTLS
but I also think we might be better off to punt on BCP text for
OS for a while nonetheless.
I suggest that we put Viktor to work on a document about "opportunistic"
(I still prefer the term "unauthenticated") encryption if he feels that
a more general document is needed.
The initial UTA BCP was supposed to be a quick win for authenticated
encryption with TLS. All this discussion of OE/UE is distracting us from
that goal.
An OE/UE BCP can quite easily update the "AE" BCP if the WG decides
that's appropriate.
Peter
--
Peter Saint-Andre
https://andyet.com/
_______________________________________________
Uta mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta
