William Young wrote:
> LingBo Tang wrote:
>> Hi all,
>> The attached file is the summary of investigation on TX with
>> virtual console project. Your feedback are appreciated.
> This looks like a good summary to me.
> A few concerns I have are:
> Whether the system will remain properly usable without the hotkeys and
> will not leave open hidden sessions. I.e. when starting X it must move
> automatically to the new VT (if X is started on a new VT) and must kill
> any existing commandline login and must also transition back correctly.
When X start on a new VT, it will not kill anything because it will
open a fresh VT to use. For instance, there are 6 VTs in text mode,
and the default X server runs on the 7th VT. Whenever we start a new
X server via gdmflexiserver or other ways, the new X server will open
the 8th VT to use.
Because the console login was disabled and can not be switch, I think
this way is safe.
> While it is necessary for TX systems to have hotkeys off by default, we
> do allow administrators to intentionally enable solaris features that
> would not pass evaluation. My preference would be to first use a (SMF?)
> property if the administrator has explicitely set it but otherwise
> determine the default of whether hot keys are enabled by
> From the perspective of solaris secure by default, I do not think it is
> acceptable if hotkeys are session remappable either. I think you need
> the keys to be administrator configurable and then need to deliver key
> events first to the VT management and if they do not match a VT hot key,
> on to the active VT session.
> Multiple X servers and a gui switch event is an interesting problem. It
> will be necessary to disable the possibility of any single label X
> sessions or one can visually emulate the switcher with trusted path. I
> don't think that is a concern right now, but should be a noted
> requirement if a secure X switcher is mentioned.
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