It is now possible to do it. I'm not sure when it started but, I know PB/SBC/ATT in CA. offered me SS7 connectivity many years ago. I'm pretty sure all of the Baby Bells now offer the service. I am sure SNET does as well. Now the choice is up to you if you want them to see all of your PSTN-bound traffic. The technology still holds true that your SS7 provider is all or nothing. You can't have multiple SS7 providers yet.
Kidd On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 7:28 PM, Christopher Aloi <cta...@gmail.com> wrote: > I didn't realize you can now connect to another company without ordering > the route-set from a third party. How does this work ? I feel old ! > > On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 2:40 PM Kidd Filby <kiddfi...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Very well said Mike. >> >> Back In The Day... Interconnection between 2 companies had to occur via a >> 3rd party, like Illuminet. Their had to be SS7 gateway providers and >> that's all they were allowed to do. Route SS7 traffic between >> LEC/ILEC/CLEC networks. Oh... do I remember the pains... >> Gateway-Screened... CNAM database corruption, LIDB services not >> provided.... Still makes my head hurt. >> >> Kidd >> >> On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 12:28 PM, Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE < >> m...@astrocompanies.com> wrote: >> >>> It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the latest >>> result of all of the de-regulation that’s been going on for the past… two >>> decades or so. There was a time that you could not buy commercial access >>> to the SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a real carrier. Also, >>> back at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling could only occur on >>> established, ordered signaling routes where both parties placed an order to >>> open the route between them. Therefore, this would not have been possible >>> back then because the carrier would not have ordered a route to the >>> hacker’s point code(s) and it therefore would not exist. >>> >>> >>> >>> If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a signaling >>> route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having full access to a >>> German carrier’s network would not compromise my network. (in response to >>> the nation-state issue) To get a call to Germany, I signal to the access >>> tandem or IXC switch I’ve chosen to interconnect with in the US and that >>> switch signals upstream, etc. >>> >>> >>> >>> If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes >>> commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to >>> un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn’t be here. At some point, a decision >>> was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company signaling over >>> the SS7 network between two point codes that would not, under the original >>> implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other in the first place. >>> >>> >>> >>> If the drumbeat of “solve everything with IP!” continues, I hope that at >>> least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the VPF was >>> supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice traffic across >>> the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn’t bode well for >>> reliability or security. >>> >>> >>> >>> Mike >>> >>> >>> >>> Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE >>> >>> Astro Companies, LLC >>> >>> 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401 >>> >>> Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202 >>> >>> DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207 >>> >>> http://www.astrocompanies.com >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-boun...@voiceops.org] *On Behalf Of *Dan >>> York >>> *Sent:* Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM >>> *To:* Kidd Filby <kiddfi...@gmail.com> >>> *Cc:* voiceops@voiceops.org >>> *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7 >>> >>> >>> >>> This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP... >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <kiddfi...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's call >>> is MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course. ;-) >>> >>> >>> >>> ... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e) >>> encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include voice. >>> >>> >>> >>> WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e encryption on >>> April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice and video calls as >>> well as file transfers ( >>> https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption ). Just >>> yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon have e2e >>> encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com ) also does >>> e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats. >>> >>> >>> >>> In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of >>> Homeland Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps would >>> have prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS answer was >>> that it would mitigate the interception of the content, although the >>> location meta-data would still be available. (You can view the exchange >>> via the link in this tweet: >>> https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794 ) >>> >>> >>> >>> The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where the >>> communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more secure >>> than what we had before. >>> >>> >>> >>> Interesting times, >>> >>> Dan >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> >>> Dan York >>> >>> dy...@lodestar2.com +1-802-735-1624 Skype:danyork >>> >>> My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/ >>> >>> http://www.danyork.com/ >>> >>> http://twitter.com/danyork >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> VoiceOps mailing list >>> VoiceOps@voiceops.org >>> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Kidd Filby >> 661.557.5640 (C) >> http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby >> _______________________________________________ >> VoiceOps mailing list >> VoiceOps@voiceops.org >> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops >> > -- Kidd Filby 661.557.5640 (C) http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
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