Mike; HOLY smokes... they let anything thru??? The it way scary. Does the word *RUN *come to mind.
Kidd On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE < [email protected]> wrote: > I didn’t realize that either until we switched SS7 providers recently. > Our former one (Whom I am beginning to miss, truth be told) made it > impossible to exchange signaling traffic with anything that you didn’t have > a route built (and paid) for, which is how it’s been as far as I know since > I got into this biz nearly two decades ago. > > > > However, our new SS7 provider apparently lets any SS7 point code > communicate with ours, as we started seeing random traffic from unknown > point codes shortly after we switched providers. We reported it and they > blocked that traffic, but in the process it became clear that they let > anything through until and unless we ask them to block it. There’s also > language in our ICA with them that says that if we are communicating with > any point code that we haven’t purchased a route for, they have the right > to back-bill it one they discover it. > > > > We’re in a contract now for three years, but at the end of it we may > switch back to the original provider for this and other reasons. SS7 > certainly feels a lot less secure than it did before. Luckily, our Class 5 > End Office switch does not provide any data nor redirection capabilities > over SS7 such as those exploited in the article. We also found that while > we received the traffic from the unknown point code, our switch did not > respond because we did not have a route built for it on the switch. But it > still means that a DOS attack may be possible, and it feels like assigning > our switch a public IP without a firewall in place, which makes me crazy. > > > > Mike > > > > Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE > > Astro Companies, LLC > > 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401 > > Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202 > > DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207 > > http://www.astrocompanies.com > > > > > > > > > > *From:* Christopher Aloi [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* Friday, April 22, 2016 9:28 PM > *To:* Kidd Filby <[email protected]>; Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE < > [email protected]> > *Cc:* VoiceOps <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7 > > > > I didn't realize you can now connect to another company without ordering > the route-set from a third party. How does this work ? I feel old ! > > On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 2:40 PM Kidd Filby <[email protected]> wrote: > > Very well said Mike. > > Back In The Day... Interconnection between 2 companies had to occur via a > 3rd party, like Illuminet. Their had to be SS7 gateway providers and > that's all they were allowed to do. Route SS7 traffic between > LEC/ILEC/CLEC networks. Oh... do I remember the pains... > Gateway-Screened... CNAM database corruption, LIDB services not > provided.... Still makes my head hurt. > > Kidd > > > > On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 12:28 PM, Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE < > [email protected]> wrote: > > It seems to me that this SS7 vulnerability issue is just the latest result > of all of the de-regulation that’s been going on for the past… two decades > or so. There was a time that you could not buy commercial access to the > SS7 network; to get that access you had to be a real carrier. Also, back > at that time, inter-company SS7 signalling could only occur on established, > ordered signaling routes where both parties placed an order to open the > route between them. Therefore, this would not have been possible back then > because the carrier would not have ordered a route to the hacker’s point > code(s) and it therefore would not exist. > > > > If I am a US local carrier in 2001, I have no need to order a signaling > route to a German carrier either so even the hacker having full access to a > German carrier’s network would not compromise my network. (in response to > the nation-state issue) To get a call to Germany, I signal to the access > tandem or IXC switch I’ve chosen to interconnect with in the US and that > switch signals upstream, etc. > > > > If we were not on this path of de-regulation where whatever makes > commercial sense for one company can open up the whole SS7 network to > un-trusted parties, we likely wouldn’t be here. At some point, a decision > was made somewhere to allow this loosy-goosy inter-company signaling over > the SS7 network between two point codes that would not, under the original > implementation of SS7, be able to talk to each other in the first place. > > > > If the drumbeat of “solve everything with IP!” continues, I hope that at > least it gets solved by establishing something close to what the VPF was > supposed to be, and not just a general dumping of all voice traffic across > the internet between carriers. That certainly wouldn’t bode well for > reliability or security. > > > > Mike > > > > Mike Ray, MBA, CNE, CTE > > Astro Companies, LLC > > 11523 Palm Brush Trail #401 > > Lakewood Ranch, FL 34202 > > DIRECT: call or text 941 600-0207 > > http://www.astrocompanies.com > > > > > > > > > > *From:* VoiceOps [mailto:[email protected]] *On Behalf Of *Dan > York > *Sent:* Thursday, April 21, 2016 3:45 PM > *To:* Kidd Filby <[email protected]> > *Cc:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [VoiceOps] SS7 > > > > This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP... > > > > On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's call is > MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course. ;-) > > > > ... BUT... what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e) > encryption among IP-based communications platforms that include voice. > > > > WhatsApp, for instance, just completed the rollout of e2e encryption on > April 5, and not just for messaging, but also for voice and video calls as > well as file transfers ( > https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000618/end-to-end-encryption ). Just > yesterday the team behind Viber announced that they will soon have e2e > encryption for all clients. The app Wire ( http://wire.com ) also does > e2e encryption for voice, video and group chats. > > > > In a US Congress hearing this week, a Congressman asked a Dept of Homeland > Security representative if e2e encryption available in apps would have > prevented this interception that happened via SS7. The DHS answer was that > it would mitigate the interception of the content, although the location > meta-data would still be available. (You can view the exchange via the > link in this tweet: > https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/722854012567969794 ) > > > > The end result is that we're definitely moving to a space where the > communication over IP-based solutions will wind up being far more secure > than what we had before. > > > > Interesting times, > > Dan > > > > -- > > > > Dan York > > [email protected] +1-802-735-1624 Skype:danyork > > My writing -> http://www.danyork.me/ > > http://www.danyork.com/ > > http://twitter.com/danyork > > > _______________________________________________ > VoiceOps mailing list > [email protected] > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops > > > > -- > > Kidd Filby > 661.557.5640 (C) > http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby > > _______________________________________________ > VoiceOps mailing list > [email protected] > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops > > > _______________________________________________ > VoiceOps mailing list > [email protected] > https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops > > -- Kidd Filby 661.557.5640 (C) http://www.linkedin.com/in/kiddfilby
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