Hi Jim. I was noticing a 0.4.0-zope in distutils that looks patched with
NotImplementedErrors for the offending code in
docutils.parsers.rst.directives.misc. Can you when this will land in
the Zope3 trunk?
Jim Fulton wrote:
On Jul 8, 2006, at 11:49 AM, David Pratt wrote:
Jim Fulton wrote:
Recently, a serious security flaw was found in Zope 2 due to it's
improper support for allowing reStructuredText to be edited
through-the-web. reStructuredText has directives that allow
inclusion of any file a Zope process could read and inclusion of data
obtained from fetching arbitrary URLs. In a trusted environment,
these directives have legitimate uses. The feature of including
files and URL results should not be enabled for text entered from
untrusted sources, which applies to most through-the-web interactions.
Hi Jim. In the case of a wiki, it is the nature of a wiki that folks
are able to edit through the web.
But a wiki can be edited in other formats that restructured text.
(Personally, I think
wikis should use tools like Epoz or Kupu to allow direct HTML editing, but
that's a different matter.
Wouldn't data validation and any necessary alterations to the
directives some sense as opposed to removing it from the zope3 mix?
Sure, if someone is willing to do it and take responsibility. Note that
I'm not removing these from the release, because they've never been in
the release. I didn't even remove them from the repository, I just
removed them from the Zope 3 tree.
I'm convinced that TTW reST can be safe with suitable attention to detail.
So far though, that hasn't happened. No one has come forward yet and said
"I'll maintain this and be responsible for making sure we're secure wrt
The recent hotfix:
addresses the problem for Zope 2.
Perhaps. We don't know for sure. We don't have tests. We don't know if
be defeated using a reload product. It is also a very crude fix. It
from creating add-ons that make legitimate use of file-inclusion or the raw
directive. It was a great fix in an emergency -- and this was a serious
but I don't want to use such a fix in Zope 3.
It is safe to allow reStructuredText through the web with care. The
inclusion of files or URL results can be disabled, but the programmer
must explicitly disable the feature. It is not disabled by default.
It is also critical that a developer who exposes through-the-web
reStructuredText have tests to verify that the file/url inclusion
feature has been disabled.
Zope 3 itself, as released, doesn't have this problem because it
doesn't allow reST entry through the web. There are third-party
applications, however, including 2 packages in the Zope 3 subversion
tree that do have this problem. I strongly urge you to avoid using
any Zope package that allows through-the-web input of
reStructuredText unless you can verify that file/url has been
The zwiki and bugtracker packages do not currently disable file/url
inclusion and should not be used in situations in which users who are
not highly trusted have access to these applications.
Can you be explicit about the process of disabling file/url inclusion
for zope3 (if this is the critical point you are making ). The use of
restructured text is valuable in zope and obviously it is important to
understand security measures that would allow its continued use.
The reStructuredText documentation gives instructions for disabling it.
But something this risk needs people to be responsible. I'm not seeing
that. I expect someone to come forward eventually. Part of being
responsible is writing reasonably extensive tests.
If this can be done, why remove the products from the repository tree?
Would it not be better to apply the necessary fixes? Many thanks.
Because their presence in the Zope 3 tree put people at serious risk.
wants to work on them, great, and they can release them as add-on packages.
Jim Fulton mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Python Powered!
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