> 2) Most people on Freenet have no real enemies and so care far too > much about their friends' feelings and not enough about their actual > enemies, compared to our threat model.
I think it's slightly different. Let's imagine I'm a passive pedophile; a stranger sees me watching child porn in the park and calls the police. If I scram immediately, chances of me getting caught would be (relatively) low. If my friend will see me watching child porn (or doing anything similarly offensive), chances are high that I'm doomed, as he'll be able to provide law enforcing agencies with enough information to virtually guarantee my capture. Same with Freenet. When a stranger (no matter if he's an active attacker or a casual observer) detects that my node transfers objectionable material, it's one thing. "They" - at least, with the current judicial system in the (more or less) developed countries - still have to seize my computer and find the evidence there, attempting which will, or will not be, successful. If a friend detects that same transfer, and finds it objectionable enough to alert the authorities - and, let's face it, most *real* free speech contents *will be* objectionable for the majority of people - I'm doomed, as he'll be able to provide enough evidence - possibly even by using my trust to compromise my computer, etc. Regards, Victor Denisov.
