On Jul 12, 2008, at 1:11 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Chris Benham replied:
This particular horrible idea would create a strong incentive
for the major power-brokers
to sponsor the nomination of a lot of fake candidates just to
collect votes for one or other
of the major parties.
Am I mising something here? I thought IRV was clone free.
I link this to the problems in Fiji http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Voting_system_of_Fiji. In some circumstances the voters don't seem to
check where their votes will go.
In conjunction with the candidate withdrawal option, it might
enable the (other) losing candidates to save the
Condorcet candidate, or otherwise compensate for IRV's non-
monotonicity.
All actions that take place after the election are risky (withdrawal,
votes as assets etc.). The problem is that these the actions of the
candidates/parties may work against the interest of the voters, the
decision power moves to few people only, and also strategic moves are
easier after the vote counts are known. As a result some voters may
be quite disappointed. (Maybe Chris Benham referred to these problems
when talking about candidates commandeering the votes.)
There are many options for ballot completion and vote inheritance,
e.g. voter determined order, candidate determined order and party
determined order. The actual vote could be in some scenarios just a
bullet vote. To simplify further the parties and subgroups could form
a tree like structure. (One needs to plan a balance between the
number of candidates, how complex the ballots can be, how many
candidates the voters need to analyse and how complex inheritance
structures the voters can follow (Fiji had problems here).)
Juho
And what do you have in mind as? "Australia's worst problems
with their version of IRV"?
It has degenerated into a defacto second rate version of Asset Voting.
Why do you want to "stop" IRV? Do you agree with Kathy Dopp?
that? IRV is worse than
FPP?
I would stop IRV if we could get a better method in its place.
If we cannot stop IRV, why not search for acceptable tweaks that
would improve it?
It is better than FPP in some ways and worse in others, especially
in complexity.
Do you think that Asset Voting is worse than FPP?
Just to clarify, I think that Condorcet Methods and Range, though
better than IRV, share this complexity
defect with IRV to some degree. I have suggested the same tweak
for them.
In fact, that is the essence of DYN, wihich is simply carrying this
tweak to its logical conclusion in the case
of Range, which is the only one of the three (Range, Condorcet, and
IRV) that satisfies the FBC.
This tweak works best for Range, because (in the case of Range) the
ballot that accomodate this tweak is
of the extremely simple "Yes/No/Favorite" style. The Favorite
category could easily be augmented to
include Eppley's "Published Ballots" idea.
Forest
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