On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:37:39 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 16 Mar 2014, at 14:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:40:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 15 Mar 2014, at 23:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ >> >> >> Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) >> >> Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any >> computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? >> >> >> The computational reason is that there is no computation at all there. >> There is no self-representation, no introspection in the computer science >> theoretical sense. >> > > How do you know though? > > > I don't know. > > I assume it. >
Then try not assuming it? > > > > This is the same argument that I give for machines, except I am saying > that there is no introspection in the sense of aesthetic phenomenal sense. > > > Where you confuse []p and []p & p. > > Before Gödel, it was thought they would obey the same logic, when the > machine is correct. But after Gödel, we know that they obey different > logic, even when the machine is always correct. > > The aesthetics phenomenal sense comes from the machine keeping its > umbilical chord with truth, which is natural for her to do, as it exists, > even if relatively. > I'm fine with an umbilical cord with truth, but why would there be any aesthetic phenomena or sense associated with it? I can see why sense would invent truth, but I cannot see why or how truth would invent sense. > > > > Maybe the VCR is just very young compared to the machines that you are > used to considering as capable of self-representation - indeed the jumpy > screen artifacts correlate perfectly with the events that are impacting the > VCR's body. Notice how each operation performed on the 'VCS' (VCR + Camera > System) generates a unique vocabulary of responses on the screen. Why not > assume that these are intelligent cries which reflect specific mechanical > emotions. If we reproduced the experiment on a variety of similar devices, > we could probably deduce a mathematical schema - a language through which > VCS' talk about themselves and their environment. We could interview them > and see whether they follow computationalist expectations for UMs or LUMs. > > > OK, but why would they not. You speculate on some analog machines, and you > speculate on an analog theory of mind. That might be more interesting than > assuming sense. You would make a theory of sense from a non comp theory of > machines. Go for it. > I present it only as a counter-example. I don't think that there is any sense there on that level. It's an example of how low level continuity across microphenomenal coincidence can be misattributed as having high level, phenomenal significance. > > > > > >> >> There is an interesting analogy, as the computational self-reference >> leads to similar fixed points, but the analogy stops there. The VCR is like >> a mirror, with some dynamical delay similar to a computer self-reference, >> but it lacks the computations. Simply. >> > > I think that you would have to be telepathic to say with certainty that it > lacks computations, just as I would have to be telepathic to 'know' that a > machine is not a p-zombie. > > > Oh, but if there are computations, I apologize. just show them to me. > That's like me saying show me the flavor of strawberry that the machine tastes. The whole point is that there is a sub-computational level which can't be detected by computation, but which is responsible for computation. > Keep in mind that with comp, a "material object like a mirror" does not > really exist, it is a map of your most probable future experience among > infinitely many: it is a "wave" of possible computations (arithmetical > relations, in our base). It is a common and sharable *experience*. > I don't think it needs to be an experience to compute though. In real life it does need to be an experience, because I think that it is the experience which underlies all computation and arithmetic rather than the other way around. In the hypothetical universe of comp though, I see no place for 'experience' at all. Computations within comp need not be felt or seen, only stored and processed. > > > > > Your argument is that the VCS is a an m-zombie. A mechanical zombie which > only seems to respond to its own condition as if it were a machine's 1p. > > > By definition, a zombie acts like you and me. The mirror does not act like > you and me. > We're talking about the VCS though, not a mirror. As you can see in the video, it does indeed act like you and me, squealing and squirming when we treat it harshly. > > My sun in law does. He can discuss with you on consciousness, zombie, > mind, brain, philosophy and also gastronomy, he works himself as a chef, > actually. He makes money with his nose. > We might think he can discuss it, but he may just be imitating the deep syntax of data he knows nothing about. His discussion is not automated intelligence, but automated mentalism. Your sun in law is not psychic, he just does a cold reading of the room. > But let me think, when was my last discussion on culinary art with a > mirror, hmm .... ? > If you compare a video tape shot of a wall versus a video tape of a mirror aimed at you having a discussion on culinary art, then you can see there is a big difference. > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance >> of developing that awareness than those which have not? >> >> >> No. >> > > Not when you have ruled out their right to compute from the start ;) > > > You can compute with a ruler, a compass, but with a mirror you can do only > simple symmetries, and dilations. Now, with many mirrors, it is different, > especially if you can make them transparent and reflecting by a switch, > then you can made them computing, by placing them in the right places. > With quantum semi-mirror you can do quantum computations. > The VCR is doing more than the mirror though. > > > > > > >> >> >> If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness >> to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? >> >> >> The VCR lacks the numbers, the digital information. It lack retrievable >> memories, and well, the whole universality/Löbianity stuff. >> > > Maybe its just very quiet about it. Any argument that you have used > against my objections to computationalism can be used as effectively here > to your objections to sub-computationalism. > > > > Well, if sub-computationalism is correct, then computationalism is > correct. It is just that one mirror does not compute much more than > addition or multiplication, but it can't do both, and lacks the ability of > a universal machine. > > There is a notion, in computer science, of sub-universality, and > sub-creativity, which is indeed where I think consciousness arises, if comp > is true. It has the speed-up abilities of the universal (creative) machines > (sets), but is closer to the tractable. > > I rarely mention this, as it is more technically involved, and not really > important for most of our topics. Here is a good book(*). > > Interesting... > Bruno > > (*) > http://www.amazon.ca/Subrecursive-Programming-Systems-Complexity-Succinctness/dp/0817637672<http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.ca%2FSubrecursive-Programming-Systems-Complexity-Succinctness%2Fdp%2F0817637672&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNFwW59P6PytFOKAvwAV8AS_JHpIJA> > > > Craig > > > >> The VCR just singles out one aspect of digital machine self-reference, >> but lacks the main part: the computations itself. >> >> How would those initial conditions appears? You can derive them from the >> laws of addition + multiplication. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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