On 17 Mar 2014, at 18:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't think it needs to be an experience to compute though. In real life it does need to be an experience, because I think that it is the experience which underlies all computation and arithmetic rather than the other way around. In the hypothetical universe of comp though, I see no place for 'experience' at all. Computations within comp need not be felt or seen, only stored and processed.
Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/ bodies, or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is not what comp does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which own a body (well, infinitely many bodies).
Then by assuming "sense", sorry, but that does just not make sense to me, unless you mean God, but then you are not doing a theory, and if your god does not allow my sun in law to play genuinely his role in the spectacle, I am not sure I can discuss this anymore.
Your "theory" seems to be only an opinion that another theory is foolish. You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence, with respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by the first person associated naturally to the machine, by applying the oldest definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks to a remarkable, and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness and machine's understanding of incompleteness.
Anyway, I have not seen any theory, nor valid argument. Sorry. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
