On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:31:32 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 17 Mar 2014, at 18:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > I don't think it needs to be an experience to compute though. In real life > it does need to be an experience, because I think that it is the experience > which underlies all computation and arithmetic rather than the other way > around. In the hypothetical universe of comp though, I see no place for > 'experience' at all. Computations within comp need not be felt or seen, > only stored and processed. > > > > Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/bodies, > or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is not what comp > does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which own a body (well, > infinitely many bodies). >
Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/computation, with no improvement on bridging it. > > Then by assuming "sense", sorry, but that does just not make sense to me, > unless you mean God, > God has to make sense too. > but then you are not doing a theory, and if your god does not allow my sun > in law to play genuinely his role in the spectacle, I am not sure I can > discuss this anymore. > His genuine role is not in the spectacle, it is in the intangible processing of meaningless data. > > Your "theory" seems to be only an opinion that another theory is foolish. > Not at all. My attack on CTM is only part of MSR because MSR seeks to pick up where CTM leaves off. The theory is about the relation of sense, information, and physics, and about the spectrum of sense, not just about pointing out the mistake of comp. > You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence, with > respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by the first > person associated naturally to the machine, by applying the oldest > definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks to a remarkable, > and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness and machine's > understanding of incompleteness. > This is one of your points that I find the most flawed, and I have explained why many times. If we are both machines under comp, how can you say that my view is consistent with the stereotypical machine views if your view is not? You would have to be placing yourself above me arbitrarily and escaping your own 1p machine nature somehow. Why doesn't Bruno machine succumb to incompleteness and his understanding of incompleteness? > > Anyway, I have not seen any theory, nor valid argument. Sorry. > Maybe that's what 1p machines say when they are infected with the comp virus ;) > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
