On 26 May 2017, at 00:18, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 5/25/2017 8:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Also, "my" theory is believed by almost all scientists. Diderot
call it simply "rationalism". If Brent does not believe in
mechanism, he should tell us what is his explanation for
consciousness. But here, he clearly dismiss the problem when saying
that once machine will be intelligent, the "hard" problem will
dissolve. But he never explained why and how.
Because it will be recognized that consciousness is not one thing,
but something that can be implemented in different ways having
different relations to memory and emotions.
OK with this. But that does not solve the mind-body problem.
I think Brent just do not see the problem raised by mechanism,
which is that we cannot invoke the physical universe to explain the
appearance of the physical universe.
I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.
"Invoke" is a pejorative attribution. The physical universe is an
inference to explain appearances (and a very successful one at that).
I was alluding to the use of the metaphysical assumption of a primary
physical universe, which does not work when we assume mechanism.
Bruno
PS very busy days. I might not been able to answer all comments before
sunday. I let you know. I might answer during pause.
Brent
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