Russ,
I think switching to a subject that's simpler to model, (in this case
studying computers as a stand-in for studying brains) works well for
lots of things, when the new subject is an approximation of the
original. Are brains and computers comparable subjects? I think we
don't model brains because the problem can't be defined yet, not because
computers are a good analog.
Nick's proposition [paraphrasing] was doesn't 'intentionality' in living
systems (homing in on goal) mean we're no different from thermostats,
and mine was sort of the same thing backwards, asking if the biggest
step to 'consciousness' isn't actually for a system to act as a whole
simply for having internal loops. The basic language abuse required for
both is both a valid complaint and key to appreciating the difficulty of
the problem. The exercise is to try to frame a scale across all forms
of systems that has a place for everything.
Computers are chock full of homing devices and loops, but I don't think
they make it onto the 'vitality' scale. Some of the basic differences
from 'wet ware' seem like they might be overcome using with virtual
models so that it appears that a whole environment is full of
independent actors. That means comparing physical systems to mental
categories with lists of quite certain mathematical properties.
What I see is that natural systems are nature's work-around for
absolutely massive improbability. One thing that shows it is how living
things seem to be modeled on free enterprise (absent a few human
adaptations). In living systems independent parts connect to each other
by free exchange, in open environments, through the bloodstream, within
cellular fluid, etc., communicating by nothing more reliable than
sending messages in a bottle. I think clearly that's why we abandoned
the real thing for a virtual model, because modeling the former is just
nowhere near the fun. Apparently the most efficient way for a liver
cell to talk to a hair cell is for them both to dump whatever they're
done with and grab whatever comes along...! :)
On Behalf Of Russell Standish
> Sent: Thursday, July 13, 2006 3:12 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; The Friday Morning Applied
> Complexity Coffee Group
> Cc: echarles
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Intentionality is the mark of the vital
>
>
> I think that intentionality is a modelling property -
> something has intentionality because it is useful to model a
> given system as if it had a mind like ours, more useful than
> any other model we might have.
>
> So we can say a computer has intentionality, if it is useful
> model the machine as having a mind. This obviously depends on
> the software application, and how technical the person is
> (someone who programs a computer - like me - is more likely
> to have a machine model, rather than mind model of a computer).
>
> So - in terms of answering your question about whether
> intentionality is the mark of the vital, I would have to
> answer no. I do not see much intentional behaviour amongst
> simple animals (eg insects) or plants - rather I tend to
> think of these as complex machine. On the contrary, to a well
> designed artificial human (as in a computer game character) I
> will assign intentionality, even though I know they're only
> the outputs of algorithms.
>
> Cheers
>
> On Fri, Jul 14, 2006 at 09:36:54PM -0400, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> > Jochen,
> >
> > Thanks for your kind response.
> >
> > Your question churns my head. I was keen to argue that
> intentionality
> > is a property not only of thinking things but of any
> biological thing.
> > But I never imagined that intentionality could be used as a
> criterion
> > of vitality. I do believe that every living system displays
> > intentionality, but I now have to think about whether I
> think that all intentional systems
> > are living. I guess NOT. However, my reasons for holding
> this belief are
> > probably robotophobic.
> >
> > Nick
> >
> >
> > PS My first response to your question was to write the
> following 100
> > words of baffle-gab, like the good academic I am. It might be
> > marginally interesting in and off itself, but it didnt seem
> to answer
> > your question. I had put too much effort into it to throw
> it away, so
> > I stuck it below. Feel free to ignore it.
> >
> > BEGIN BAFFLEGAB
> > =======================================================
> >
> > Intentionality is one of those words that leads to endless
> confusion.
> > It can refer to having an intention or it can refer to a peculiar
> > propert to assertions containing verbs of mentation, wanting,
> > thinking, feeling, etc. The sentence, "Jones's intention
> was that the
> > books be placed on the table" is intentional in both senses:
> > intentional in sense one because it tells us something
> about what Jones is up to, and intentional in the second sense
> > because it displays the odd property of referential
> opacity. Unlike the
> > statement "the books are on the table" , the statement
> about Jones's
> > intentions cannot be verified nor disconfirmed by gathering
> > information about the location of the books.
> >
> > The two are intimately connected. Any statement one makes
> about the
> > intentions of others in sense one is inevitably an intensional
> > utterance in sense two because the truth value of the
> statement lies
> > in the organization of Jones's behavior, rather than
> whether Jones's
> > intention is ever fulfilled.
> >
> > It was in this second, perhaps strained, philosophic sense, that I
> > think the cue relation is necessarily intentional. When we
> say that C
> > is a cue to X, we mean that from the point of view of the
> system we are interested
> > in, C stands in for X. ("In the Human respiratory system,
> Blood acidity
> > is a cue for blood oxygenation") To the extent that robots
> use cues,
> > they MUST be intentional in this sense.
> >
> > ===========================================================
> > end BAFFLEGAB.
> >
> > Nicholas Thompson
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson
> >
> >
> > > [Original Message]
> > > From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > To: <friam@redfish.com>
> > > Date: 7/14/2006 12:00:29 PM
> > > Subject: Friam Digest, Vol 37, Issue 17
> > >
> > > Send Friam mailing list submissions to
> > > friam@redfish.com
> > >
> > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> > > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> > > [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > >
> > > You can reach the person managing the list at
> > > [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > >
> > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is
> more specific
> > > than "Re: Contents of Friam digest..."
> > >
> > >
> > > Today's Topics:
> > >
> > > 1. Re: 100 billion neurons (George Duncan)
> > > 2. Re: 100 billion neurons (Jim Rutt)
> > > 3. Re: 100 billion neurons (Frank Wimberly)
> > > 4. Intentionality - the mark of the vital (Jochen Fromm)
> > >
> > >
> > >
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > --
> > >
> > > Message: 1
> > > Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2006 10:38:47 -0600
> > > From: "George Duncan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] 100 billion neurons
> > > To: "The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group"
> > > <friam@redfish.com>
> > > Message-ID:
> > > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> > >
> > > Shall this conversation be neuronic rather than neurotic?
> > >
> > > Or try this
> > >
> http://www.technologyreview.com/read_article.aspx?id=17164&ch=infote
> > > ch
> > >
> > >
> > > On 7/13/06, Giles Bowkett <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > I'm inclined to agree. The model I use is nonlinear fluid
> > > > dynamics. Say you've got a thought which you began
> thinking when
> > > > you were young. That thought is a fluid in motion. Over
> the course
> > > > of your life you revisit certain ideas and revise certain
> > > > opinions. The motion continues for decades. The way you
> think is
> > > > like an information processing system which evolves over the
> > > > course of your life, and it's true enough to call that
> software,
> > > > not hardware, but the flow of data through that system
> is entirely
> > > > organic, and creating an exact copy of a given flow in
> nonlinear
> > > > fluid dynamics is impossible. The structure of your mode of
> > > > thinking -- your "software" -- is shaped tremendously by the
> > > > things that you think about; therefore replicating the
> processor
> > > > without replicating the data can only be of partial
> usefulness, if
> > > > the processor is shaped by and for the data. It's like
> copying a
> > > > river by duplicating exactly every last rock and pebble, but
> > > > leaving out the water.
> > > >
> > > > On 7/10/06, Frank Wimberly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > > > Back in the 1980's Hans and I had offices next to
> each other in
> > > > > the Robotics Institute at Carnegie Mellon. Over a
> period of a
> > > > > couple of years we had numerous arguments about
> whether machines
> > > > > could realize consciousness; whether a human mind could be
> > > > > transferred to a machine, etc. I remember saying that if
> > > > > somehow my "mind" were transferred
> > from
> > > > > my body to some robot--which I felt was
> impossible--it might be
> > > > > that everyone else would agree that it was a
> remarkable likeness
> > > > > but that I would be gone. Hans replied that I undervalued
> > > > > myself--that I am software not hardware. After many
> arguments
> > > > > along these lines I said, "Hans, I now understand why
> you don't
> > > > > understand what I am saying
> > about
> > > > > consciousness--you don't have it." This was all in
> good humor
> > > > > and
> > later
> > > > > when I was teaching a course in AI to MBA students I invited
> > > > > Hans to continue our debate in class. A good time was had by
> > > > > all, I hope.
> > > > >
> > > > > Frank
> > > > >
> > > > > ---
> > > > > Frank C. Wimberly
> > > > > 140 Calle Ojo Feliz (505) 995-8715 or
> (505) 670-9918
> > (cell)
> > > > > Santa Fe, NM 87505 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > > >
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > > > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
> Martin C. Martin
> > > > > Sent: Saturday, July 08, 2006 7:16 PM
> > > > > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> > > > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] 100 billion neurons
> > > > >
> > > > > I suspect you'd like Hans Moravec's books:
> > > > >
> > > > > http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0674576187
> > > > > http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0195136306
> > > > >
> > > > > He uses Moore's law and estimates of the brain's
> computing power
> > > > > to calculate when we'll have human equivalence in "a
> computer."
> > > > > I forget the date, but it's not far. He also talks about a
> > > > > number of very interesting consequences of this.
> > > > >
> > > > > - Martin
> > > > >
> > > > > ============================================================
> > > > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> > > > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures,
> > > > > archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > ============================================================
> > > > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> > > > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures,
> > > > > archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > Giles Bowkett
> > > > http://www.gilesgoatboy.org
> > > >
> > > > ============================================================
> > > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> > > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures,
> > > > archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > George T. Duncan
> > > Professor of Statistics
> > > Heinz School of Public Policy and Management
> > > Carnegie Mellon University
> > > Pittsburgh, PA 15213
> > > (412) 268-2172
> > > -------------- next part --------------
> > > An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> > > URL:
> >
> /pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20060713/bcb8105c/attachment-
> > 0001.h
> > tml
> > >
> > > ------------------------------
> > >
> > > Message: 2
> > > Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2006 16:57:49 -0600
> > > From: Jim Rutt <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] 100 billion neurons
> > > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> > > <friam@redfish.com>
> > > Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
> > >
> > > as an interesting argument that the old hardware/software
> argument
> > > about
> > > consciousness is often malformed, take a look see at:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Damasio, Antonio: _The Feeling of What Happens: Body and
> Emotion in
> > > the
> > > Making of
> > > Consciousness_
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > At 07:30 AM 7/10/2006, you wrote:
> > > >Back in the 1980's Hans and I had offices next to each
> other in the
> > > >Robotics Institute at Carnegie Mellon. Over a period of
> a couple
> > > >of years we had numerous arguments about whether machines could
> > > >realize consciousness; whether a human mind could be
> transferred to
> > > >a machine, etc. I remember saying that if somehow my
> "mind" were
> > > >transferred from my body to some robot--which I felt was
> > > >impossible--it might be that everyone else would agree
> that it was
> > > >a remarkable likeness but that I would be gone. Hans
> replied that
> > > >I undervalued myself--that I am software not hardware.
> After many
> > > >arguments along these lines I said, "Hans, I now
> understand why you
> > > >don't understand what I am saying about consciousness--you don't
> > > >have it." This was all in good humor and later when I
> was teaching
> > > >a course in AI to MBA students I invited Hans to continue our
> > > >debate in class. A good time was had by all, I hope.
> > > >
> > > >Frank
> > > >
> > > >---
> > > >Frank C. Wimberly
> > > >140 Calle Ojo Feliz (505) 995-8715 or (505)
> 670-9918 (cell)
> > > >Santa Fe, NM 87505 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > >
> > > >-----Original Message-----
> > > >From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > >On Behalf Of Martin C. Martin
> > > >Sent: Saturday, July 08, 2006 7:16 PM
> > > >To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> > > >Subject: Re: [FRIAM] 100 billion neurons
> > > >
> > > >I suspect you'd like Hans Moravec's books:
> > > >
> > > >http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0674576187
> > > >http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0195136306
> > > >
> > > >He uses Moore's law and estimates of the brain's
> computing power to
> > > >calculate when we'll have human equivalence in "a computer." I
> > > >forget the date, but it's not far. He also talks about
> a number of
> > > >very interesting consequences of this.
> > > >
> > > >- Martin
> > > >
> > > >============================================================
> > > >FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> > > >Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures,
> > > >archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >============================================================
> > > >FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> > > >Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures,
> > > >archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
> > >
> > > ===================================
> > > Jim Rutt
> > > voice: 505-989-1115
> > >
> > > -------------- next part --------------
> > > An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> > > URL:
> >
> /pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20060713/3f05e21d/attachment-
> > 0001.h
> > tml
> > >
> > > ------------------------------
> > >
> > > Message: 3
> > > Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2006 18:59:23 -0600
> > > From: "Frank Wimberly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] 100 billion neurons
> > > To: "'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'"
> > > <friam@redfish.com>
> > > Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> > >
> > > At the risk of being neurotic, here is link to a review
> of Damasio's
> > > book:
> > >
> > >
> http://dir.salon.com/story/books/review/1999/09/21/damasio/index.htm
> > > l
> > >
> > >
> > > Frank
> > >
> > > ---
> > > Frank C. Wimberly
> > > 140 Calle Ojo Feliz??????????????(505) 995-8715 or (505) 670-9918
> > > (cell) Santa Fe, NM [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > On Behalf Of Jim Rutt
> > > Sent: Thursday, July 13, 2006 4:58 PM
> > > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] 100 billion neurons
> > >
> > > as an interesting argument that the old hardware/software
> argument
> > > about consciousness is often malformed, take a look see at:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Damasio, Antonio: _The Feeling of What Happens: Body and
> Emotion in
> > > the Making of Consciousness_
> > >
> > > ?
> > >
> > >
> > > At 07:30 AM 7/10/2006, you wrote:
> > >
> > > Back in the 1980's Hans and I had offices next to each
> other in the
> > > Robotics Institute at Carnegie Mellon.? Over a period of
> a couple of
> > > years we had numerous arguments about whether machines
> could realize
> > > consciousness; whether a human mind could be transferred to a
> > > machine, etc.? I remember saying that if somehow my "mind" were
> > > transferred from my body to some robot--which I felt was
> > > impossible--it might be that everyone else would agree
> that it was a
> > > remarkable likeness but that I would be gone.? Hans
> replied that I
> > > undervalued myself--that I am software not hardware.? After many
> > > arguments along these lines I said, "Hans, I now
> understand why you
> > > don't understand what I am saying about consciousness--you don't
> > > have it."? This was all in good humor and later when I
> was teaching
> > > a course in AI to MBA students I invited Hans to continue
> our debate
> > > in class.? A good time was had by all, I hope.
> > >
> > > Frank
> > >
> > > ---
> > > Frank C. Wimberly
> > > 140 Calle Ojo Feliz????????????? (505) 995-8715 or (505) 670-9918
> > > (cell) Santa Fe, NM 87505?????????? [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [
> mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > On Behalf Of Martin C. Martin
> > > Sent: Saturday, July 08, 2006 7:16 PM
> > > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] 100 billion neurons
> > >
> > > I suspect you'd like Hans Moravec's books:
> > >
> > > http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0674576187
> > > http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0195136306
> > >
> > > He uses Moore's law and estimates of the brain's
> computing power to
> > > calculate when we'll have human equivalence in "a
> computer."? I forget
> > > the date, but it's not far.? He also talks about a number of very
> > > interesting consequences of this.
> > >
> > > - Martin
> > >
> > > ============================================================
> > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures,
> > > archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
> > >
> > >
> > > ============================================================
> > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures,
> > > archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
> > > ===================================
> > > Jim Rutt
> > > voice:? 505-989-1115??
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ------------------------------
> > >
> > > Message: 4
> > > Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2006 09:42:14 +0200
> > > From: "Jochen Fromm" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > Subject: [FRIAM] Intentionality - the mark of the vital
> > > To: "'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'"
> > > <friam@redfish.com>
> > > Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
> > >
> > >
> > > I have finally read the article "Intentionality is
> > > the mark of the vital". It contains interesting
> > > remarks about the mind/body problem, about the
> > > relationship between mental and material "substance",
> > > and nice illustrations (for example about lions and gnus).
> > > Well written.
> > >
> > > If "intentionality is the mark of the vital",
> > > are artificial agents with intentions the first
> > > step towards vital, living systems ? Agents are
> > > of course used in artificial life, but in the
> > > context of the article the question seems to
> > > gain new importance.
> > >
> > > -J.
> > > ________________________________
> > >
> > > From: Nicholas Thompson
> > > Sent: Monday, June 26, 2006 3:20 AM
> > > To: friam@redfish.com
> > > Subject: [FRIAM] self-consciousness
> > >
> > > For those rare few of you that are INTENSELY interested by the
> > > recent discussion on self consciousness, here is a paper on the
> > > subject which asserts that every organism must have a
> point of view.
> > >
> > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/id14.html
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ------------------------------
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Friam mailing list
> > > Friam@redfish.com
> > > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> > >
> > >
> > > End of Friam Digest, Vol 37, Issue 17
> > > *************************************
> >
> >
> >
> > ============================================================
> > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures,
> > archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
> --
> *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my
> email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't
> worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that
> may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP
> or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment.
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> --------------
> A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
> Mathematics 0425 253119 (")
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> Australia
> http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> International
> prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> --------------
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
