On Fri, Sep 09, 2011 at 04:57:55PM +0200, Aristotle Pagaltzis wrote:
> * Arthur Corliss <corl...@digitalmages.com> [2011-08-28 21:40]:
> > My humor was perhaps too subtle, since you didn't get the
> > relevance of my reply. Google switching to SSL by default is as
> > pointless as metacpan. In the former case it's the "protection"
> > of delivery to/from an entity that not only doesn't have your
> > best interest at heart, but has a business built on exploiting
> > *your* information for *its* benefit. Utterly pointless.
> 
> Protecting your communication with another party from third
> parties needs no justification whatever. It should be the assumed
> default that exceptions are made from, not the exception from the
> rule requiring proof.
> 
> If I’m having a massive argument with my personal foe #1, the
> fact that I distrust this person on all conceivable levels does
> not make you welcome to eavesdrop on the conversation.
> 
> It does not matter the very least bit how trustworthy the other
> party is: uninvited third parties have no business knowing what
> you do or do not say to the other party.
[snip the rest of an e-mail with more excellent arguments]

I also wonder why is it that nobody has so far brought up another
important consequence of using SSL, at least with a trusted certificate
at the other end - protection from not just eavesdropping, but also
man-in-the-middle attacks.  Yes, it seems kind of... weird... to think
of MITM attacks against MetaCPAN, but with just a little bit of further
thinking, it's not all *that* weird - and now you've all started me
wondering how difficult it would be to "catch" an HTTP file transfer of
a previously unknown Perl module out of the air, hijack it, unpack
the tarball, add a couple of lines to Build.PL (or Makefile.PL or
whatever), repack it and pass it on down the line :)

No, of course I'm not going to seriously sit down and write code
doing that.  Still... I really wonder why no one brought MITM attacks
up yet :)

G'luck,
Peter

-- 
Peter Pentchev  r...@ringlet.net r...@freebsd.org pe...@packetscale.com
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This sentence every third, but it still comprehensible.

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