OK, let's turn this around again. I don't follow Eugene's reasoning here. If I do for religious reasons what anyone else could do for secular reasons, why should this be penalized? Seems like a fundamental equal-treatment issue.
On the second paragraph, Eugene is correct that my point went to institutional competence and legitimacy. I have little faith in courts to divine a social or moral consensus that isn't heavily biased in favor of whatever the upper middle class (the category into which most judges fall) thinks it knows. In the absence of an affirmative policy decision by elected representatives, therefore, the rule of decision that imposes the least harm *to the polity* ought to be that tradition carries prima facie probative weight. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the standard of statutory interpretation requires that crimes be clearly specified--none of this "do no harm" generalizing! On Wed, Jul 4, 2012 at 4:24 PM, Volokh, Eugene <vol...@law.ucla.edu> wrote: > Sorry for the delay responding – I was traveling Monday > and Tuesday – but I’m not sure I grasp the argument in the first > paragraph. My view is generally this:**** > > ** ** > > (1) People should generally have the power to make > medical decisions for themselves.**** > > (2) Infants and children can’t make such decisions.**** > > (3) Yet some such medical decisions *must* be made > quickly, before the child becomes mature enough to decide.**** > > (4) We therefore delegate this power to make medical > decisions to the parents.**** > > ** ** > > But this argument hinges on there being medical reasons > for the decision – I don’t see any reason for parents to have this power > when they exercise it for nonmedical reasons. We may defer to a parent’s > decision, even one we doubt, when it involves a tradeoff of one medical > risk for another medical risk. But I don’t see why we should defer to such > a decision when the parent doesn’t even purport to be making a medical > judgment, but is just deciding based on the judgment that “God wants me to > do this” or “I don’t want to give more profits to Big Pharma.” That’s not > weighing religious motivation negatively because it’s religious – that’s > weighing a *nonmedical *motivation negatively compared to a medical > motivation because the only justification for letting me order someone to > alter not my body but my son’s body is the need for *medical* judgment.*** > * > > ** ** > > This leaves two different arguments. One is “letting > people do what they have always done,” which strikes me as weak for the > reasons I gave in part of my response to Paul Finkelman’s post – especially > give the longstanding tradition of allowing not just parental decisions > about surgery for children but also parental decisions about beating > children, a tradition that I do not think ought to be given much legal > weight. The second, which I think is intriguing and might be correct, is > to have such decisions be made by legislatures directly, rather than by > judges interpreting general human rights norms. I’d love to hear more > thoughts on this institutional question.**** > > ** ** > > Eugene**** > > ** ** > > *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto: > religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Vance R. Koven > *Sent:* Monday, July 02, 2012 10:58 AM > *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > *Subject:* Re: German circumcision decision**** > > ** ** > > But isn't saying that you would accept the argument that refusing medical > treatment because it might do more harm than good the same as saying the > medical treatment might not be necessary? And if in any particular > situation you would accept the argument that doing or not doing something > would be valid if you said it was for medical reasons, and oh by the way to > do otherwise would be against my religion (and there is independent > evidence that the medical argument is genuine), then why condemn someone > who neglects to mention the medical rationale? The medical evidence goes to > the question of whether, objectively speaking, there is a likelihood of > harm. If the medical evidence is to the contrary, or if the matter is > subject to substantial debate, the religious motivation shouldn't be > weighted negatively, and doing so is simply a point of religious bias > rather than objective analysis. > > This is why I, like Mark Scarberry, would urge a legal heuristic that > courts should be biased in favor of letting people do what they have always > done, unless a democratically accountable legislature has clearly indicated > the contrary (at which point you could begin analyzing whether the > legislature has infringed someone's fundamental rights). Nobody in post-war > Germany has ever prosecuted a doctor or parent (never mind a religious > official) for performing or permitting a male circumcision, which ought to > be evidence that the generally phrased criminal legislation didn't cover > it. The judge's rather high-handed and arbitrary statements that in Central > Europe there are no medical arguments in favor of circumcision do indicate > a mindset that just wanted to take a slap at traditional religious > communities. It's just more legislating from the bench (or the post office). > > Vance**** > > On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 at 5:22 PM, Volokh, Eugene <vol...@law.ucla.edu> > wrote:**** > > I don’t see why it’s “religio-cultural[ly] insensitiv[e]” > to say that a decision made for medical reasons is permissible but a > decision made for religious reasons is not; or if it is religio-culturally > insensitive, I would be proudly religio-culturally insensitive in many > instances. (This instance I do find hard, for many reasons, but not for > the reasons described below.) For instance, I don’t see why we should > treat (a) a parent’s refusing necessary medical treatment to a child > because there’s a plausible argument that the treatment will do more harm > than good the same as (b) a parent’s refusing such treatment without any > such explanation but simply because he concludes “we should pray instead of > performing the medical procedure, and God will take care of things.” > Perhaps it’s too hard to tease apart such rationales in some situations, > but as a general matter I would think that courts might quite rightly > reject rationale (b) even if they accept rationale (a).**** > > **** > > Now of course here the situation is not identical – > indeed, as I’ve argued before, male circumcision is not identical to pretty > much any other procedure – and perhaps the situation should be different > when we’re not talking about refusal of necessary medical treatment but > rather the performance of a medical procedure for which the practical > effect (with regard to possible loss of sexual sensation) is unknown. But > the point is that the mere fact that a decision might permissibly be made > for plausible medical reasons doesn’t mean that it might permissibly be > made for religious reasons (or other nonmedical reasons).**** > > **** > > Eugene**** > > **** > > *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto: > religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Vance R. Koven > *Sent:* Sunday, July 01, 2012 9:38 AM**** > > > *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics**** > > *Subject:* Re: German circumcision decision**** > > **** > > Isn't there still a substantial body of medical opinion--perhaps not as > prevalent as in decades past--that recommends circumcision as a preventive > health measure? If the issue is the lack of consent from the subject of the > operation, this certainly affects more than just religious observance, and > more than just this particular operation. And if the decision hinges > specifically on the fact that the motivation (if that can ever be clear) is > primarily religious, that certainly smacks of religio-cultural > insensitivity, to put it mildly. > > Vance**** > > _______________________________________________ > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as > private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are > posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or > wrongly) forward the messages to others. > -- Vance R. Koven Boston, MA USA vrko...@world.std.com
_______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
