Eugene:  Can you offer more details about who gets the EITC and when?

In any event, given that it's a tax credit (and for individuals, at that),
I assume that it does not entail the government sending a check to a
church.  Rightly or wrongly, the Court has always treated tax benefits
different from direct funding for purposes of the EC.  See Walz, Mueller,
etc.  Moreover, it's not only the Court that has drawn that distinction;
history has, too:  Whereas more than half the states have constitutional
provisions prohibiting the expenditure of appropriated funds to churches,
I'm not aware of any such tradition prohibiting tax benefits to religion,
and it wouldn't surprise me if many states have provided such
credits/deductions/etc., even while prohibiting direct funding.

Even if the EC would not prohibit the particular grant to a church at issue
in TLC--say, because of an unusual set of conditions applicable to that
grant program--the principal question in the case would remain, namely,
whether the longstanding, bright-line state constitutional provisions in
question are unconstitutional, either on facially or "as applied" to any
cases in which the EC would not itself prohibit the funding to churches.

On Sun, May 8, 2016 at 9:24 PM, Volokh, Eugene <vol...@law.ucla.edu> wrote:

>                Well, let’s test that principle against paying the salaries
> of clergy in private faith communities, when it comes to an equal-treatment
> system.  I posted about this in January, but I don’t think there were any
> reactions to it:
>
>
>
> It turns out that the government actually does offer salary supplements
> for ministers, alongside other employees who earn under a threshold amount,
> via the Earned Income Tax Credit.  For instance, if a minister is a head of
> household, has two children, and earns $20,000 (think some assistant
> pastor, perhaps part-time, at some poor church), he will get a substantial
> net payment from the government.  That's taxpayer money going to subsidize
> ministers (again, alongside the other earners in the same boat).  Does this
> violate the Establishment Clause, on the grounds that the government is
> paying part of a clergy member’s salary?
>
>                Note that this isn't a program that's available to
> everyone, the way police or fire protection is: it's only available to a
> minority of taxpayers.  Unconstitutional?
>
>
>
>                As to the possibility of sect discrimination in Trinity
> Lutheran, it seems extremely remote to me – as we’ve discussed on the list,
> the program there (like the Earned Income Tax Credit) relies on objective
> factors.
>
>
>
>                Eugene
>
>
>
> Chip Lupu writes:
>
>
>
> Equality cannot be the only prism for measuring Religion Clause norms.
> Non-establishment does at times mandate different treatment -- favorable to
> religion in the context of the ministerial exception, and unfavorable in
> the context of public school sponsored speech.  A public school may sponsor
> a morning recitation of "Ode on a Grecian Urn," but not the NY Regents
> Prayer, the Lord's Prayer, etc.
>
>
>
> Whether government funding should be seen the same way as state sponsored
> speech is a question, and "equal treatment is not establishment" cannot be
> the simple answer.  We have a deep and abiding constitutional principle
> that the government may not pay to build houses of worship or to pay the
> salaries of clergy in private faith communities.  So if a state sets up a
> direct funding program to help build structures for valuable community
> institutions, longstanding principles would say the program can help pay to
> build an art museum or musical venue, but cannot offer money to build a
> church, mosque, or synagogue.
>
>
>
> I understand that we can always debate whether to maintain that
> settlement.  And the Trinity Lutheran Church case, involving grants for
> safe surfaces in playgrounds, hardly tests the core of it -- rather, it
> tests whether the states can expand the periphery of that no funding
> principle.  The rationale for the principle -- fear of sect discrimination;
> fear of government control over the subsidized church; fear over
> politicization of the church's teachings so as to curry favor with
> appropriators; fear of rivalry among sects for public resources -- may or
> may not be implicated in a given case.  The grant system for safe surfaces
> in playgrounds in Missouri at least touches on the possibility of sect
> discrimination -- would mosques be treated equally with popular Protestant
> denominations?  If we fear otherwise, should we have a prophylactic
> anti-funding rule, or just closely monitor for sect discrimination? These
> are subtle questions, not answered adequately by claims for formal
> equality.
>
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