Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Russell Standish]

On Sat, May 27, 2017 at 09:24:31PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> 
> Regarding special relatively and collapse, I think the point is that two
> observers in different reference frames can have different presents. Two
> humans walking past each other on the sidewalk may have presents that
> include the Andromeda Galaxy hours apart in time. (See "Andromeda
> Paradox"). So if something on Earth collspses the wave everywhere and
> instantly (in the present) which present is it collapsed in?
> 
> I think this even more clearly shows the incompatibility between collapse
> theories and special relatively, beyond just pointing to the FTL influences
> as violations; this shows now we have to somehow use an objective reference
> frame which relatively tells us does not exist. And this leads to collapse
> events happening in different times/places for different observers, even
> ones walking past each other on a sidewalk.
> 

Forgetting about JC's peepee for the minute, ISTM that relativity is
exclusively a 3p theory, whereas QM is both a 1pm and 3p theory. The
1p version of QM looks rather like Copenhagen, with wavefunction
collapses, and the 3p looks more like Everett, with deterministic wave
functions and many worlds.

The incompatibility between relativity and wave function collapse can
be seen as a manifestation of the incommensurate nature of the 1p/3p
distinction.

Cheers

-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Jason Resch]

On Saturday, May 27, 2017, Russell Standish  wrote:

> On Thu, May 25, 2017 at 06:30:07PM -0700, Pierz wrote:
> > Recently I've been studying a lot of history, and I've often thought
> about
> > how, according to special relativity, you can translate time into space
> and
> > vice versa, and therefore how from a different perspective we can think
> of
> > the past as distant in space rather than time: my childhood being 40
> light
> > years away, rather than 40 years for instance. I can visualise my own
> body
> > as a sort of long, four dimensional tendril through spacetime, of which I
> > only ever see a three-dimensional cross-section. This is the block
> universe
> > idea of course. What occurred to me recently was that the past, in any
> > physical theory I know of, is "locked down". There is only a single
> history
> > consistent with the present (ignoring the microscopic ambiguities of
> > quantum interference effects), but the present is consistent with
> multiple
> > futures.
>
> This assumption is wrong. There are many histories (pasts) consistent
> with our present. If we don't know some fact about the past (eg
> T. Rex's colour), then pasts with different colours of T.Rexes are all
> compatible with our present. Only when we make a measurement that
> distinguishes between different facts about the past, do we eliminate
> some of those pasts from the compatibility list.
>
> There are, however, arrows of time - past and future are asymmetric,
> the future is more uncertain than the past. But I don't see how you
> can leverage that into support for the MWI.
>
>
>

I agree, there are multiple pasts compatible with our future. Some if these
can't be ruled out with any possible measurements, like in the case if the
quantum erasure.

That entropy increases does mean there are more futures than pasts.

Regarding special relatively and collapse, I think the point is that two
observers in different reference frames can have different presents. Two
humans walking past each other on the sidewalk may have presents that
include the Andromeda Galaxy hours apart in time. (See "Andromeda
Paradox"). So if something on Earth collspses the wave everywhere and
instantly (in the present) which present is it collapsed in?

I think this even more clearly shows the incompatibility between collapse
theories and special relatively, beyond just pointing to the FTL influences
as violations; this shows now we have to somehow use an objective reference
frame which relatively tells us does not exist. And this leads to collapse
events happening in different times/places for different observers, even
ones walking past each other on a sidewalk.

Jason




>
> --
>
> 
> 
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> 
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> 
> 
>
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Re: Peepee

[John Clark]

On Sat, May 27, 2017  David Nyman  wrote:

​>
>> ​>​
>> ​
>> Data feels something?
>>
>
> ​
> ​> ​
> Yes.​
>
>
>
>> ​
>> ​>
>> ​>>​
>> ​
>> Data feels something in a way?​
>>
>
> ​
> ​> ​
> Yes.​
>
>
> Ah, now I see what you mean. Proof by repetitive assertion.
>

​I'm glad you see what I mean, but unfortunately I don't see what you mean.
​You asked questions and I answered them without equivocation to the best
of my ability.


> ​>
>> ​>>​
>> ​
>> When 'it' is being processed?
>>
>
> ​>> ​
> Yes, but I don't understand why that pronoun is hiding inside quotation
> marks, the referent is clear. ​
>
>
> ​> ​
> It can't be clear unless you can distinguish data from the particular
> physical relations
>

​I point to a tree and then point to the word "tree" written in ​ink on
paper, and it you are watching this and you are a intelligent person or
computer you get the idea that one is a symbol for the other.



> ​> ​
> there simply is no canonical way of achieving this without the implicit
> assumption of a privileged interpretation from outside the system in
> question.
>

​Well yes, but we can go outside the system and so can a computer, we do
have access to information that is not innate to our brain, that's what our
senses are for. If you were as ignorant of the outside world as you were on
the day you were born you wouldn't know anything except pleasure and pain.


> ​>> ​
> Processed by matter that obeys the laws of physics obviously.​
>
>
> ​> ​
> And how then is that supposed to produce a distinguishable outcome from
> the straightforward transition from one physical state to another?
>

​That not hard to produce because not all physical transformations are
identical just as not all ideas are identical; so they can match up. When
the electrical contacts under the "7" and the "+" and the "2" key closes a
current forms that lights up a LED next to the "9" symbol, but when the 3,
+.and 5 key is depressed a different physical current forms and a different
light goes on, this time next to a 8; and we note that when we add 7+ 2 and
3+ 5 in our head we also get 9 and 8, and being intelligent creatures we
recognize the connection between what going on in our head and what's going
on in the computer. And it works both ways, if the computer is smart enough
it will recognize that what's going on in it's microprocessor can be mapped
with  what's going on in your brain.   ​
 ​

> ​> ​
> The implication of the terms you use IMO rather too loosely
> ​
> above
>

​I ask again, which word didn't you understand?​


​John K Clark​

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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, May 25, 2017 at 06:30:07PM -0700, Pierz wrote:
> Recently I've been studying a lot of history, and I've often thought about 
> how, according to special relativity, you can translate time into space and 
> vice versa, and therefore how from a different perspective we can think of 
> the past as distant in space rather than time: my childhood being 40 light 
> years away, rather than 40 years for instance. I can visualise my own body 
> as a sort of long, four dimensional tendril through spacetime, of which I 
> only ever see a three-dimensional cross-section. This is the block universe 
> idea of course. What occurred to me recently was that the past, in any 
> physical theory I know of, is "locked down". There is only a single history 
> consistent with the present (ignoring the microscopic ambiguities of 
> quantum interference effects), but the present is consistent with multiple 
> futures. 

This assumption is wrong. There are many histories (pasts) consistent
with our present. If we don't know some fact about the past (eg
T. Rex's colour), then pasts with different colours of T.Rexes are all
compatible with our present. Only when we make a measurement that
distinguishes between different facts about the past, do we eliminate
some of those pasts from the compatibility list.

There are, however, arrows of time - past and future are asymmetric,
the future is more uncertain than the past. But I don't see how you
can leverage that into support for the MWI.



-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Peepee

[David Nyman]

On 28 May 2017 12:36 a.m., "John Clark"  wrote:

On Sat, May 27, 2017 at 6:18 PM, David Nyman  wrote:

​​> >
>> What is
>> ​actually ​
>> being claimed is that consciousness is the way data feels when it is
>> being processed
>> ​.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Data feels something?
>

​Yes.​



> ​
> ​> ​
> Data feels something in a way?​
>

​Yes.​


Ah, now I see what you mean. Proof by repetitive assertion.



> ​> ​
> When 'it' is being processed?
>

Yes, but I don't understand why that pronoun is hiding inside quotation
marks, the referent is clear. ​


It can't be clear unless you can distinguish data from the particular
physical relations that putatively instantiate it. And there simply is no
canonical way of achieving this without the implicit assumption of a
privileged interpretation from outside the system in question.



> ​> ​
> By what?
>

Processed by matter that obeys the laws of physics obviously.​


And how then is that supposed to produce a distinguishable outcome from the
straightforward transition from one physical state to another?



> ​>​
> I could continue.
>

​Please do.​


The implication of the terms you use IMO rather too loosely above is a
frequent focus of discussion in this list, if you are so inclined.

David



> ​>> ​
>> ​You can argue if that is true or not but I think the claim itself is
>> pretty clear, or at least as clear as things get when consciousness is
>> involved.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Frankly
> ​ ​
> ​i
> t's about as clear as mud.
> ​
>

​Which word didn't you understand?

John K Clark
​


>
>
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Re: Peepee

[John Clark]

On Sat, May 27, 2017 at 6:18 PM, David Nyman  wrote:

​​> >
>> What is
>> ​actually ​
>> being claimed is that consciousness is the way data feels when it is
>> being processed
>> ​.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Data feels something?
>

​Yes.​



> ​
> ​> ​
> Data feels something in a way?​
>

​Yes.​


> ​> ​
> When 'it' is being processed?
>

Yes, but I don't understand why that pronoun is hiding inside quotation
marks, the referent is clear. ​


> ​> ​
> By what?
>

Processed by matter that obeys the laws of physics obviously.​


> ​>​
> I could continue.
>

​Please do.​


> ​>> ​
>> ​You can argue if that is true or not but I think the claim itself is
>> pretty clear, or at least as clear as things get when consciousness is
>> involved.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Frankly
> ​ ​
> ​i
> t's about as clear as mud.
> ​
>

​Which word didn't you understand?

John K Clark
​


>
>

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Fwd: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

-- Forwarded message --
From: David Nyman 
Date: 27 May 2017 at 22:43
Subject: Re: Answers to David 4
To: meekerdb 


On 27 May 2017 9:19 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:



On 5/27/2017 5:36 AM, David Nyman wrote:

> ​It might. But ISTM that the entire project of explanation itself entails
> at least a hesitation before assigning anything to the category of 'brute
> fact'.​ Bruno sometimes likes to metaphorise whatever we accept without
> explanation as God, or at least as an aspect of a generalised notion of
> theology (as indeed did Einstein, leading to not dissimilar
> misunderstandings in his case). So on that basis you are suggesting that we
> accept a physical universe (assuming that this is what you mean by reality
> being what it is) exclusively in that role. Trouble is, computationalism as
> a theory of mind closes that option.
>

That's not true.  It hides a lot of assumptions about the reification of
arithmetic and the UD and modal logic.


Well, I have to say from my perspective this debate over reification is
getting a mite tedious. I really don't understand why you think that the
assumption of arithmetic as an explanatory ontology is any more a
'reification' than that of any other mathematical schema. They're all
essentially inferences to an explanation of the observables. I'd hoped my
recent posts might possibly take the conversation in a more interesting
direction.


  Part of the problem in these discussions is that they started with a
definition of computationalism = "consciousness arises when some class of
computations is implemented"


I think part of your difficulty is encapsulated by the vocabulary you adopt
here. ISTM you have a tendency to talk about consciousness in implicitly
ontological terms, for example as something that "arises". For me what's
interesting is the relinquishing of such ineffectual notions in exchange
for the analysis of the characteristic modes of a reflexive epistemology.
It opens up a quite novel conceptual space for thinking about perception.
Instead of worrying about what sort of thing or process it might be, we can
think rather in terms of what is perceptible and what isn't, what is
doubtable and what isn't, what is communicable and what isn't and so forth.
Then we may begin to discern how such aspects might represent effective
points of contact with the specifics of what we ordinarily call
consciousness and consequently also what the natural limits of any such
representation might be. By conceiving the thing in this way we also
'vaccinate' it against any reduction in ontological terms.

but then it starts to be used to encompass Bruno's whole theology as though
we accept not only the premise but also his whole argument.


We're not required to accept it, only to adopt it provisionally. But
seriously. In point of fact though, speculative though it may be, in the
last analysis it's a theory of everything or else a theory of nothing (pace
Dr Standish). Sometimes you have to push a thing to the limit to see what
it's really about.

David



Brent

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Fwd: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

-- Forwarded message --
From: David Nyman 
Date: 27 May 2017 at 23:12
Subject: Re: Answers to David 4
To: meekerdb 


​Brent, why are y
ou still PM'ing me
​?​

​Please let me know if you have read this.

On 27 May 2017 21:36, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:

>
>
> On 5/27/2017 6:24 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 27 May 2017 at 01:07, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On 26/05/2017 6:53 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 26 May 2017, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:
>>
>>
>> I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.  "Invoke" is
>> a pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is an *inference *to
>> explain appearances (and a very successful one at that).
>>
>>
>> Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if
>> you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a
>> particular *selection* of computations from the computational plenitude.
>> And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances. But do they
>> really? Are those computations - in and of themselves - really capable of
>> 'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected
>> for our delectation? Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how
>> those selfsame appearances come to be present to us?
>>
>>
>> I think you and Brent are using different notions of "explanation". As I
>> understand your (David's) position, it is a notion of "explanation"
>> originating with Plato: Plato's theory of Forms offered at the same time
>> both a systematic explanation of things and also a connected epistemology
>> of explanation. (Summaries from Jonathan Cohen in the Oxford Companion to
>> Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic ideal is that "Ontology precedes
>> epistemology", to vary Brent's slogan. In the case of mechanism, the
>> ontology is the natural numbers (plus arithmetic) and for an explanation to
>> be acceptable, everything has to follow with the force of logical necessity
>> from this ontology.
>>
>> As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same as my
>> position), his concept of "explanation" follows the tradition of British
>> empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon, through Hume, to Russell and
>> others. In this tradition, to explain an observed characteristic is to show
>> its relationship to a law in accordance with which the characteristic
>> occurs or can be made to occur, and there is a hierarchy of such laws --
>> the more comprehensive laws are deemed more probable. This leads to the
>> dominant model for explanation in the natural sciences, which requires the
>> citation of one or more laws which, when conjoined with the statement of
>> relevant facts, entail the occurrence of the phenomenon or uniformity that
>> is to be explained. This does not rely on any assumed ontology; hence,
>> "Epistemology precedes ontology".
>>
>> Wherever we want to derive a technology from scientific knowledge, we
>> shall need to know what causes a desired effect. So we need to distinguish
>> between different levels of explanation, in that while, for example, the
>> disappearance of a patient's infection may be causally explained by his
>> antibiotic injection, the operation of that causal process is in its turn
>> to be explained by correlational laws of biochemistry. Hence, the
>> understanding of consciousness in any effective way will be linked to the
>> creation of effective AI.
>>
>> This is the paradigm of current scientific practice. Sure, as Bruno says,
>> this stems ultimately from an Aristotelian approach to science rather than
>> the Platonic approach. But the history of Western thought has shown the
>> scientific, or Aristotelian, approach to have been overwhelmingly more
>> successful, both in developing technology and in reaching understanding of
>> the nature of reality.
>>
>>
>> Aristotle's Matter was a good simplifying hypothesis. I agree that it has
>> led to some success. But that does not make it true,
>>
>>
>> For the pragmatic instrumentalist, "truth" is not of primary concern.
>> What is relevant is explanation in terms of predictive success. The
>> scientific realist might reject instrumentalism, but suggestions about the
>> underlying ontology have always been shown inadequate in the past -- this
>> being the famous 'negative induction' against scientific realism.
>>
>> and the price of it has been the burying of many interesting problem
>> (given away to the clergy). Physicalism simply fail to explain the apparent
>> existence of the physical reality,
>>
>>
>> Why should there be an explanation for this? It might, after all, be just
>> a brute fact that reality is what it is, so the best we can do is explore
>> and attempt to understand how it works.
>>
>> and why it hurts. Computationalism does, but 

Re: Peepee

[David Nyman]

On 27 May 2017 at 21:20, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sat, May 27, 2017  David Nyman  wrote:
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> it is unscientific to ignore alternative modes of explanation when
>> progress seems to be blocked
>>
>
> ​Those ​
> alternative modes of explanation
> ​ are not only ​
> unscientific
> ​ there are a complete waste of time because there is no way, even with
> unlimited experimental capacity, such explanations can ever be proved or
> disproved. And as if that isn't bad enough the "explanations" can't even be
> stated without numerous personal pronouns with no unique referent due to
> the fact that personal pronoun duplicating machines have been invented.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> Of course any theory offered in replacement must subsume what has
>> succeeded up to that point. This is the sort of thing that happens quite
>> normally when one theory replaces another in the same domain, as for
>> example Einsteins's did with Newton's.
>>
>
> ​Einstein gave many very clear examples of his theory making different
> predictions than Newton did, the precession of Mercury's orbit is only one
> example.  If even one of Einstein's prediction had failed his entire theory
> would be forgotten today, but none of them failed. Where is the equivalent
> for Bruno's theory or any other consciousness theory? ​Show me the
> precession
> ​!​
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> A different mode of enquiry may well allow us to take a quite different
>> view of its 'brute facts'.
>>
>
> ​Maybe. Maybe​
>
> ​the chain of "what caused that?" questions goes on forever in which case
> there will always be unanswered question. So either unanswered question or
> brute facts​ must exist, you can't get rid of both.
>
>
>>> ​>>​
>>> There is every indication that "consciousness is the way data feels when
>>> it is being processed" is a brute fact and it's pointless to ask how did
>>> that happen.
>>>
>>
>> ​
>> ​> ​
>> Oh dear. Alas, there are far too many unacknowledged assumptions in that
>> slogan to gain any understanding of what is actually being claimed.
>>
>
> ​​
> What is
> ​actually ​
> being claimed is that consciousness is the way data feels when it is being
> processed
> ​.
>

Data feels something?
​ Data feels something in a way?​ When 'it' is being processed? By what? I
could continue.



> ​You can argue if that is true or not but I think the claim itself is
> pretty clear, or at least as clear as things get when consciousness is
> involved.
>

Frankly
​ ​
​i
t's about as clear as mud.
​ I think we can be a little clearer.

David​

>
> ​John K Clark​
>
>
>
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Re: Peepee

[John Clark]

On Sat, May 27, 2017  David Nyman  wrote:


> ​> ​
> it is unscientific to ignore alternative modes of explanation when
> progress seems to be blocked
>

​Those ​
alternative modes of explanation
​ are not only ​
unscientific
​ there are a complete waste of time because there is no way, even with
unlimited experimental capacity, such explanations can ever be proved or
disproved. And as if that isn't bad enough the "explanations" can't even be
stated without numerous personal pronouns with no unique referent due to
the fact that personal pronoun duplicating machines have been invented.


> ​> ​
> Of course any theory offered in replacement must subsume what has
> succeeded up to that point. This is the sort of thing that happens quite
> normally when one theory replaces another in the same domain, as for
> example Einsteins's did with Newton's.
>

​Einstein gave many very clear examples of his theory making different
predictions than Newton did, the precession of Mercury's orbit is only one
example.  If even one of Einstein's prediction had failed his entire theory
would be forgotten today, but none of them failed. Where is the equivalent
for Bruno's theory or any other consciousness theory? ​Show me the
precession
​!​


> ​> ​
> A different mode of enquiry may well allow us to take a quite different
> view of its 'brute facts'.
>

​Maybe. Maybe​

​the chain of "what caused that?" questions goes on forever in which case
there will always be unanswered question. So either unanswered question or
brute facts​ must exist, you can't get rid of both.


>> ​>>​
>> There is every indication that "consciousness is the way data feels when
>> it is being processed" is a brute fact and it's pointless to ask how did
>> that happen.
>>
>
> ​
> ​> ​
> Oh dear. Alas, there are far too many unacknowledged assumptions in that
> slogan to gain any understanding of what is actually being claimed.
>

​​
What is
​actually ​
being claimed is that consciousness is the way data feels when it is being
processed
​. ​You can argue if that is true or not but I think the claim itself is
pretty clear, or at least as clear as things get when consciousness is
involved.

​John K Clark​

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Re: Peepee

[David Nyman]

On 27 May 2017 at 16:02, John Clark  wrote:

> Due to the impenetrable tangle of quotes of quotes of quotes of quotes
> ​of quotes ​
> that is epidemic on
> ​ ​
> this list there is no way to tell who but
> ​ ​
> somebody wrote:
>
> *​"​The point is to recognise that at a certain stage it is no longer
>> scientific to ignore what is incapable of further explanation even with a
>> heretofore supremely adequate intellectual toolkit. That's Bruno's whole
>> point really.​"​*
>
>
> ​Yes that is Bruno's whole point, and that's why he's wrong. ​
> I
> ​ ​
> would maintain it is supremely scientific to ignore what is incapable of
> further explanation even
> ​ ​
> with a supremely adequate intellectual toolkit
> ​. I would insist there is nothing else a logical person could do.​
>

​That was me actually. I'm afraid this has happened only recently because
Bruno had lost his ability to post directly. Hopefully that will sort
itself out and posting can return to some sort of normalcy.​ Anyway, your
excerption fails to give sufficient weight to the burden of my point. Which
was that it is unscientific to ignore alternative modes of explanation when
progress seems to be blocked for what appear to be fundamental explanatory
reasons. Of course any theory offered in replacement must subsume what has
succeeded up to that point. This is the sort of thing that happens quite
normally when one theory replaces another in the same domain, as for
example Einsteins's did with Newton's. In the present case we're not
contemplating anything quite so completed as that. What is nevertheless
worth taking seriously is the possibility of shedding light on areas that
have so far been opaque to the explanatory tools of the physical sciences.


>
>
>>
>> *​" ​Statements, or in effect dogmas, such as the position you reiterate
>> above to the effect that there is an absolute limit to understanding​"​*
>
>
> ​Turing, Godel, Chaitin, and quantum physicists have already told us
> there is a absolute limit to understanding, but even without them we would
> still have to face one very important question, does the chain of "how did
> that happen?" questions come to a end or does it not? If is doesn't end
> then there can never be complete understanding because there will always be
> more unanswered questions, if it does end then eventually you'll come to a
> brute fact.
>

​Certainly, but again you omitted an important part of what I said. Which
is that it is illegitimate to set an absolute​ limit to understanding
purely on the basis of what is considered an allowable mode of enquiry. A
different mode of enquiry may well allow us to take a quite different view
of its 'brute facts'.

  There is every indication that "consciousness is the way data feels when
> it is being processed" is a brute fact and it's pointless to ask how did
> that happen.
>

​Oh dear. Alas, there are far too many unacknowledged assumptions in that
slogan to gain any understanding of what is actually being claimed.

David
​

> And that's why armchair philosophers love to spin consciousness theories
> on the internet, it's easy because no theory can be proved or disproved;
> and that's why armchair philosophers never spin intelligence theories,
> that's hard. Successful intelligence theorists aren't in armchairs, they're
> in Silicon Valley.
>
> ​I was able to figure out it was ​
> Bruno Marchal
> ​ who said the following:​
>
> *​> ​Yes. John Clark proceeds like that too. Saying "peepee" when we
>> introduce the needed pov distinctions.*
>
>
> And John Clark will continue to say "peepee" when Bruno Marchal
> ​ insists that idiotic questions like "what one and only one thing will
> happen to *YOU* after *YOU *walk into a *YOU* duplicating machine and
> *YOU* becomes 2 *YOUS*?" are areas for legitimate scientific research​.
>
>
>> *​> ​It is a theorem​ ​of machine theology*
>
>
> ​And John Clark will continue to say:​
>
>
> ​"​
> Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard
> that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.
> ​"​
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
> --
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Peepee

[John Clark]

Due to the impenetrable tangle of quotes of quotes of quotes of quotes
​of quotes ​
that is epidemic on
​ ​
this list there is no way to tell who but
​ ​
somebody wrote:

*​"​The point is to recognise that at a certain stage it is no longer
> scientific to ignore what is incapable of further explanation even with a
> heretofore supremely adequate intellectual toolkit. That's Bruno's whole
> point really.​"​*


​Yes that is Bruno's whole point, and that's why he's wrong. ​
I
​ ​
would maintain it is supremely scientific to ignore what is incapable of
further explanation even
​ ​
with a supremely adequate intellectual toolkit
​. I would insist there is nothing else a logical person could do.​



>
> *​" ​Statements, or in effect dogmas, such as the position you reiterate
> above to the effect that there is an absolute limit to understanding​"​*


​Turing, Godel, Chaitin, and quantum physicists have already told us there
is a absolute limit to understanding, but even without them we would still
have to face one very important question, does the chain of "how did that
happen?" questions come to a end or does it not? If is doesn't end then
there can never be complete understanding because there will always be more
unanswered questions, if it does end then eventually you'll come to a brute
fact.  There is every indication that "consciousness is the way data feels
when it is being processed" is a brute fact and it's pointless to ask how
did that happen. And that's why armchair philosophers love to spin
consciousness theories on the internet, it's easy because no theory can be
proved or disproved; and that's why armchair philosophers never spin
intelligence theories, that's hard. Successful intelligence theorists
aren't in armchairs, they're in Silicon Valley.

​I was able to figure out it was ​
Bruno Marchal
​ who said the following:​

*​> ​Yes. John Clark proceeds like that too. Saying "peepee" when we
> introduce the needed pov distinctions.*


And John Clark will continue to say "peepee" when Bruno Marchal
​ insists that idiotic questions like "what one and only one thing will
happen to *YOU* after *YOU *walk into a *YOU* duplicating machine and *YOU*
becomes 2 *YOUS*?" are areas for legitimate scientific research​.


> *​> ​It is a theorem​ ​of machine theology*


​And John Clark will continue to say:​


​"​
Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.
​"​

 John K Clark

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Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 27 May 2017 at 01:07, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 26/05/2017 6:53 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 26 May 2017, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker" < 
> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
> I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.  "Invoke" is
> a pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is an *inference *to
> explain appearances (and a very successful one at that).
>
>
> Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if
> you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a
> particular *selection* of computations from the computational plenitude.
> And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances. But do they
> really? Are those computations - in and of themselves - really capable of
> 'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected
> for our delectation? Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how
> those selfsame appearances come to be present to us?
>
>
> I think you and Brent are using different notions of "explanation". As I
> understand your (David's) position, it is a notion of "explanation"
> originating with Plato: Plato's theory of Forms offered at the same time
> both a systematic explanation of things and also a connected epistemology
> of explanation. (Summaries from Jonathan Cohen in the Oxford Companion to
> Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic ideal is that "Ontology precedes
> epistemology", to vary Brent's slogan. In the case of mechanism, the
> ontology is the natural numbers (plus arithmetic) and for an explanation to
> be acceptable, everything has to follow with the force of logical necessity
> from this ontology.
>
> As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same as my
> position), his concept of "explanation" follows the tradition of British
> empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon, through Hume, to Russell and
> others. In this tradition, to explain an observed characteristic is to show
> its relationship to a law in accordance with which the characteristic
> occurs or can be made to occur, and there is a hierarchy of such laws --
> the more comprehensive laws are deemed more probable. This leads to the
> dominant model for explanation in the natural sciences, which requires the
> citation of one or more laws which, when conjoined with the statement of
> relevant facts, entail the occurrence of the phenomenon or uniformity that
> is to be explained. This does not rely on any assumed ontology; hence,
> "Epistemology precedes ontology".
>
> Wherever we want to derive a technology from scientific knowledge, we
> shall need to know what causes a desired effect. So we need to distinguish
> between different levels of explanation, in that while, for example, the
> disappearance of a patient's infection may be causally explained by his
> antibiotic injection, the operation of that causal process is in its turn
> to be explained by correlational laws of biochemistry. Hence, the
> understanding of consciousness in any effective way will be linked to the
> creation of effective AI.
>
> This is the paradigm of current scientific practice. Sure, as Bruno says,
> this stems ultimately from an Aristotelian approach to science rather than
> the Platonic approach. But the history of Western thought has shown the
> scientific, or Aristotelian, approach to have been overwhelmingly more
> successful, both in developing technology and in reaching understanding of
> the nature of reality.
>
>
> Aristotle's Matter was a good simplifying hypothesis. I agree that it has
> led to some success. But that does not make it true,
>
>
> For the pragmatic instrumentalist, "truth" is not of primary concern. What
> is relevant is explanation in terms of predictive success. The scientific
> realist might reject instrumentalism, but suggestions about the underlying
> ontology have always been shown inadequate in the past -- this being the
> famous 'negative induction' against scientific realism.
>
> and the price of it has been the burying of many interesting problem
> (given away to the clergy). Physicalism simply fail to explain the apparent
> existence of the physical reality,
>
>
> Why should there be an explanation for this? It might, after all, be just
> a brute fact that reality is what it is, so the best we can do is explore
> and attempt to understand how it works.
>
> and why it hurts. Computationalism does, but with the price that a lot of
> work remains for all details. We are at the beginning of the "reversal"
> only.
>
>
> I think there is reason to think that the "reversal" cannot succeed.
>

​Forgive me for the flurry of posting today, but I feel it may again be
useful to rearticulate a view of the 'reversal' at this ​point, since it
seems to lead to endless miscommunication. I'm afraid it's going to lean on
an explanatory style deriving from 

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 27 May 2017 at 01:07, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 26/05/2017 6:53 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 26 May 2017, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker" < 
> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
> I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.  "Invoke" is
> a pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is an *inference *to
> explain appearances (and a very successful one at that).
>
>
> Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if
> you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a
> particular *selection* of computations from the computational plenitude.
> And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances. But do they
> really? Are those computations - in and of themselves - really capable of
> 'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected
> for our delectation? Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how
> those selfsame appearances come to be present to us?
>
>
> I think you and Brent are using different notions of "explanation". As I
> understand your (David's) position, it is a notion of "explanation"
> originating with Plato: Plato's theory of Forms offered at the same time
> both a systematic explanation of things and also a connected epistemology
> of explanation. (Summaries from Jonathan Cohen in the Oxford Companion to
> Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic ideal is that "Ontology precedes
> epistemology", to vary Brent's slogan. In the case of mechanism, the
> ontology is the natural numbers (plus arithmetic) and for an explanation to
> be acceptable, everything has to follow with the force of logical necessity
> from this ontology.
>
> As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same as my
> position), his concept of "explanation" follows the tradition of British
> empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon, through Hume, to Russell and
> others. In this tradition, to explain an observed characteristic is to show
> its relationship to a law in accordance with which the characteristic
> occurs or can be made to occur, and there is a hierarchy of such laws --
> the more comprehensive laws are deemed more probable. This leads to the
> dominant model for explanation in the natural sciences, which requires the
> citation of one or more laws which, when conjoined with the statement of
> relevant facts, entail the occurrence of the phenomenon or uniformity that
> is to be explained. This does not rely on any assumed ontology; hence,
> "Epistemology precedes ontology".
>
> Wherever we want to derive a technology from scientific knowledge, we
> shall need to know what causes a desired effect. So we need to distinguish
> between different levels of explanation, in that while, for example, the
> disappearance of a patient's infection may be causally explained by his
> antibiotic injection, the operation of that causal process is in its turn
> to be explained by correlational laws of biochemistry. Hence, the
> understanding of consciousness in any effective way will be linked to the
> creation of effective AI.
>
> This is the paradigm of current scientific practice. Sure, as Bruno says,
> this stems ultimately from an Aristotelian approach to science rather than
> the Platonic approach. But the history of Western thought has shown the
> scientific, or Aristotelian, approach to have been overwhelmingly more
> successful, both in developing technology and in reaching understanding of
> the nature of reality.
>
>
> Aristotle's Matter was a good simplifying hypothesis. I agree that it has
> led to some success. But that does not make it true,
>
>
> For the pragmatic instrumentalist, "truth" is not of primary concern.
>

​Assuming that you're describing your own stance in this way, it would
hardly be surprising that you can then find little sympathy for 'digging'
on fundamental issues, as Bruno likes to put it. Trouble is, that tends to
mire these conversations in procedural preliminaries rather than
substantial argument.

What is relevant is explanation in terms of predictive success. The
> scientific realist might reject instrumentalism, but suggestions about the
> underlying ontology have always been shown inadequate in the past -- this
> being the famous 'negative induction' against scientific realism.
>

​But it is quite unnecessary to interpret 'realism' in this way. ​Realism
need entail only taking a provisional (or assumptive) ontological
commitment sufficiently seriously to discover what can be inferred from it.
How else could any explanatory schema be refuted or corrected if
inadequate? And if that incorrectness is a function of the inadequacy of
the assumptive ontology, then that too would have to be corrected. As
indeed has occurred many times in the history of science. ISTM that the
supposed necessity of a dichotomy between instrumentalism and so-called

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 27 May 2017 3:30 a.m., "Bruce Kellett"  wrote:

On 27/05/2017 11:46 am, David Nyman wrote:

On 27 May 2017 at 01:44, Bruce Kellett < 
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

>
> I think it is the interpretation of the data that is theory-dependent.
>

​Not at all. Data don't just sit there staring you in the face. What is
data in terms of one theory is mere background noise in terms of another.


That is what it means for the *interpretation* to be theory-dependent.


Sure, that too, but prior to that you wouldn't necessarily be looking in
that particular direction or with that particular interpretative mindset
without having at least an implicit theory in the background.



This insight led Popper to reject the notion of induction. As he (I believe
correctly) pointed out, the very notion of the data on which induction
putatively relies is theory-dependent and hence primarily deductive.
Conjecture and refutation is a better account of how science (or any
consistent reasoning) actually proceeds.


I don't think that is an accurate account of Popper. It was the asymmetry
between falsification and confirmation that lay at the heart of his
rejection of induction. His account of scientific practice as "conjecture
and refutation" was rather naive, and philosophy of science has long moved
beyond this.


In my view the dismissal of Popper is often based on a somewhat naive
misreading. The process he described is rarely explicit, especially in the
case of 'normal' science as distinct from attempts at a theoretical
breakthrough. The asymmetry between falsification and confirmation is
likewise frequently implicit rather than stated, but that doesn't mean that
theories are ever more than provisional, even if our confidence in them
grows the more they resist refutation. I need hardly quote you chapter and
verse from the history of science.



​

> But then you have a hierarchy of theories -- what is a new cutting-edge
> theory today is tomorrow's instrument for data taking.
>

​

>
> ​ ​
> And the reductive aspect of theory is itself an implicitly ontological
> commitment.
>

Not for the pragmatic instrumentalist. Even committed scientific realists
> would only claim that it is only for our best, well-established, theories
> that there is any suggestion that the suggested entities actually exist.
>

​But we're not interested in "reifying" the ontology. It merely represents
the unexplained part of an explanatory hierarchy.


That is an unconventional definition of ontology. Perhaps one can say that
ontology is theory-dependent in that any mature theory carries an implied
ontology -- statistical mechanics implies an ontology in which
atoms/molecules exist, the standard model of particle physics implies an
ontology in which quarks and gluons exist -- but the theory itself does not
rely on such an ontology. The elements of the theory may be nothing more
than convenient fictions, as was for many years the status of quarks in the
Gell-Mann quark model -- the predictive power of the theory would be in no
way impaired.


That's the sense in which it exists. It's the part that's "independent of
us" simply because, although the basis of any explanation that follows, it
doesn't itself rely on our explaining it.


Quite. Atoms, quarks, and gluons, require no explanation in terms of the
theory. They are just terms in the equations that the theory uses -- their
existence or otherwise is not an issue for the success of the theory.


So if a hierarchy of laws were to imply mutually inconsistent ontological
commitments it would be to that extent incomplete and unsatisfactory.
Indeed the holy grail of (Aristotelian?) science is a hierarchical "Theory
of Everything" that is, in precisely this sense, ontologically consistent
"bottom up all the way down", if you'll permit me a slogan of my own.


The search for such a TOE has a chequered record in the history of science.
Some still hope that such a theory is possible, but the negative induction
from the past record would not lead one to be optimistic that any such
theory exists or is possible.

For these reasons I can't accept that your distinction between Platonic and
Aristotelian modes of explanation has much real force. In practice, *any*
effective mode of explanation must inexorably be constrained by its
fundamental ontological commitments,


That is the case only on your account of "explanation". If explanation does
not rely on an underlying ontology, then it is not constrained by any such
assumed ontology. Not all explanations need be reducible to your model of
explanation.

That's true of course Bruce, but I would think then that any such
heterogeneous account of explanation is in serious danger of falling into
inconsistency.


Why?


Because their respective ontological commitments may turn out to be in
conflict. This crops up all the time in the attempt to unify knowledge over
time. So long as the respective fields