Re: UK case
This is governed in all of Europe by the EC Working Time Directive which (in general, but there are opt outs) provides for a max. 13 hour day and two days off in a 14 day reference period (base on principle on one day in seven). Although if an employer structured his shifts carefully it would be possible to work an employee for the best part of the month. Further no days (Sundays) are special, so the employer selects the day off. Although with our trade unions, this is the minimum. In the Copsey case, the employer gave the employees two days off a week, but he determined the work pattern and wanted Sunday working. Poor Mr. Copsey would have been given a Thurday and Saturday off, but he wanted the Lord's Day. Does this help? Paul - Original Message - From: Stephen C. Carlson [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Cc: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2005 9:44 PM Subject: Re: UK case At 10:10 PM 8/2/2005 +0100, Paul Diamond wrote: It works! A seven day shift is simply a seven day working pattern; we have working hour limitation legislation, but the employercan set the days to be worked and days off. So on a seven day shift pattern, the employer required Sunday work and gave Thursday instead. That helps some, but it's still not fully clear to me. On a 7-day shift pattern, is it permissible in the UK to set *no* days off and require the employee to work all seven days of the week (e.g. only 4 or 5 hours a day)? Stephen Carlson -- Stephen C. Carlson mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Weblog: http://www.hypotyposeis.org/weblog/ Author of: The Gospel Hoax, http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1932792481 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. Version: 7.0.338 / Virus Database: 267.9.9/62 - Release Date: 02/08/2005 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: UK case
Thanks for this reply; I am interest by the US principle that 'no rule' is established in circumstances in which the conlcusion is similar. Mummery LJ held himself bound, unless over-ruled by the Hof Lords and Rix LJ says Article 9 is engaged but can't interfere (even though this means the lower courts asked the wrong questions). I am interested on what basis a US court would feel free to challenge lower court fact finding; as noted the lower courts did not ask the correct questions on religious rights or accommodation, but use a 'reasonableness' test and since the employer has a need he is reasonable! Paul Diamond - Original Message - From: Vance R. Koven To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2005 2:56 PM Subject: Re: UK case I find it difficult to figure out what principle to adduce from this case. If it were a panel opinion of a US Court of Appeals, there would be no rule established, since there were three opinions, all concurring in the result, but diverging significantly on the law. While Mummery and Rix, LJJ, would agree that the European Court of Human Rights has something to say that affects how UK employment law cases should be decided, only Lord Justice Mummery would give the ECHR case law binding effect to defeat the employee's claim. The case thus does not turn on a point of European law, but on the prosaic basis that an appellate court should not upset the trial court's finding of fact that the employer offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee's request not to work on Sundays. I'm not sure a US court would reach the same result on the facts of the case, but I think the principle of reasonable accommodation is consistent with our jurisprudence.It is noteworthy that all three justices agreed that the ECHR case law on the subject of taking days off for sabbath observance is, as they were too polite to put it, bizarre and in apparent contradiction to the intent of Article 9 of the Human Rights Convention. Lord Justice Rix probably put the best face on what the ECHR has ruled by focusing on the question of whether it was the employer or employee who sought a change in pre-existing terms of employment; but even he couldn't abide the Stedman case, and discreetly chose to write it off as an aberration (a judicial sleight-of-hand that I'm sure we're all familiar with). By contrast, Lord Justice Mummery was prepared to accept the proposition (paraphrasing Justice Stewart's dissent in Von's Groceries) that the only consistency in the law is that the employer always wins. On 8/2/05, Paul Diamond [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear All, Not sure how this works; can you confirm if you have received this? I am Paul Diamond from the real Cambridge (UK, not MA)! This was a recent case in our Court of Appeal Copsey v WBB; you may find it interesting and ignore the Euro jargan; would be interest in your views.www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2005/932.html Paul ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. No virus found in this incoming message.Checked by AVG Anti-Virus.Version: 7.0.338 / Virus Database: 267.9.7/60 - Release Date: 28/07/2005 ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.-- Vance R. KovenBoston, MA USA[EMAIL PROTECTED] ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. No virus
Re: religiously-motivated political strife
In a message dated 8/3/2005 11:01:19 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Of course, in recent times much religious strife is caused by excluding religious people from equal access to the public square and from equal participation in the benefits of the welfare state. I think this is an unfortunately skewed view of religious tensions and the pain and anger caused bysome "religious" peopleregarding other religions. I have in mind the position of some Christians that unless Jews renounce their faith, theyare (and should be) damned to Hell. Or the alleged view of such individuals as Roy Moore that this is (and should be) a Christian country, and that Jews and others should be tolerated out of the goodness of Christianity. That strikes me as paradigmatic of religious motivated strife. Bobby Robert Justin LipkinProfessor of LawWidener University School of LawDelaware ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: UK case
I don't think that Rix LJ proposed that just because the employer has a need its actions are inherently reasonable. I think what he said was that because the employer had a need, the justification provisions of Article 9 were engaged and required an offer of reasonable accommodation (he also said, alternatively, that offering a reasonable accommodation meant that there was no material interference with religion to which Article 9 attaches, but this comes to the same thing). The lower court found that the employer had made reasonable attempts to accommodate based on offering Copsey a different job at the same location (albeit with less pay, which I don't think would pass muster in US litigation) or a similar job at another location (which would be reasonable or not in the US based probably on how far away it was from Copsey's home, etc.). Since I don't do any litigation of employment matters, I'm not familiar enough with our statutory scheme to say whether a lower court or administrative finding of reasonableness on a record such as appeared in Copsey would be treated as a fact finding (normally, reasonableness is considered a jury--therefore fact--matter), but if it were, the appeals court could only overrule it if it were manifestly contrary to the evidence. It was unclear to me from reading the Copsey opinions whether the same standard applies in England, but I can envision a court here coming out (that is, finding for the employer) just as it did in Copsey, for the same technical reason--that the lower court could have found, on the record, that the employer's accommodation offers were reasonable, and that, to say the least, nothing in the ECHR rulings demanded a higher standard. On 8/4/05, Paul Diamond [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Thanks for this reply; I am interest by the US principle that 'no rule' is established in circumstances in which the conlcusion is similar. Mummery LJ held himself bound, unless over-ruled by the Hof Lords and Rix LJ says Article 9 is engaged but can't interfere (even though this means the lower courts asked the wrong questions). I am interested on what basis a US court would feel free to challenge lower court fact finding; as noted the lower courts did not ask the correct questions on religious rights or accommodation, but use a 'reasonableness' test and since the employer has a need he is reasonable! Paul Diamond - Original Message - From: Vance R. Koven To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2005 2:56 PM Subject: Re: UK case I find it difficult to figure out what principle to adduce from this case. If it were a panel opinion of a US Court of Appeals, there would be no rule established, since there were three opinions, all concurring in the result, but diverging significantly on the law. While Mummery and Rix, LJJ, would agree that the European Court of Human Rights has something to say that affects how UK employment law cases should be decided, only Lord Justice Mummery would give the ECHR case law binding effect to defeat the employee's claim. The case thus does not turn on a point of European law, but on the prosaic basis that an appellate court should not upset the trial court's finding of fact that the employer offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee's request not to work on Sundays. I'm not sure a US court would reach the same result on the facts of the case, but I think the principle of reasonable accommodation is consistent with our jurisprudence.It is noteworthy that all three justices agreed that the ECHR case law on the subject of taking days off for sabbath observance is, as they were too polite to put it, bizarre and in apparent contradiction to the intent of Article 9 of the Human Rights Convention. Lord Justice Rix probably put the best face on what the ECHR has ruled by focusing on the question of whether it was the employer or employee who sought a change in pre-existing terms of employment; but even he couldn't abide the Stedman case, and discreetly chose to write it off as an aberration (a judicial sleight-of-hand that I'm sure we're all familiar with). By contrast, Lord Justice Mummery was prepared to accept the proposition (paraphrasing Justice Stewart's dissent in Von's Groceries) that the only consistency in the law is that the employer always wins. On 8/2/05, Paul Diamond [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear All, Not sure how this works; can you confirm if you have received this? I am Paul Diamond from the real Cambridge (UK, not MA)! This was a recent case in our Court of Appeal Copsey v WBB; you may find it interesting and ignore the Euro jargan; would be interest in your views.www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2005/932.html Paul
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
fwiw here is the South African Constitutional provisions on freedom of religion and freedom of _expression_:15. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions, provided that those observances follow rules made by the appropriate public authorities;they are conducted on an equitable basis; andattendance at them is free and voluntary.(3)This section does not prevent legislation recognising marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law; orsystems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a particular religion.Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this section and the other provisions of the Constitution.Freedom of _expression_16. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of _expression_, which includes freedom of the press and other media;freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;freedom of artistic creativity; andacademic freedom and freedom of scientific research.(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to propaganda for war;incitement of imminent violence; oradvocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.On Aug 4, 2005, at 8:01 AM, Francis Beckwith wrote: Interesting suggestion. It would be a sort of anti-Blaine amendment. But that would imply that those that offered the Blaine amendment were suggesting what was unnecessary. However, if it was necessary, then the EC, and Paul’s Madisonian take on it, does not get us to a Blaine-meaning EC (so to speak). Frank On 8/4/05 6:53 AM, "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In a message dated 8/3/2005 11:47:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Given the regulatory state in which we live—one that requires that parents who send their children to religious private school must pay for both the school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems to me that the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easily dispositive in resolving this dispute. On the assumption that Madison's view, stated by Paul in his earlier post, accurately represents the original meaning of the EC, then shouldn't those who contend it unfairly discriminates against religion regarding governmental benefits advocate amending the First Amendment to explicitly state the EC doesn't apply to these entitlements? Bobby -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/ ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
Sorry -- I hit "send" before I had finished pasting all of the sections I intended to -- here is the more complete version -- you can see the whole bill of rights athttp://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/constitution/saconst02.html?rebookmark=1#31On Aug 4, 2005, at 8:25 AM, Steven Jamar wrote:fwiw here are the South African Constitutional provisions relating to freedom of religion and freedom of _expression_:Equality9. (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.Freedom of religion, belief and opinion15. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions, provided that those observances follow rules made by the appropriate public authorities;they are conducted on an equitable basis; andattendance at them is free and voluntary.(3)This section does not prevent legislation recognising marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law; orsystems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a particular religion.Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this section and the other provisions of the Constitution.Freedom of _expression_16. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of _expression_, which includes freedom of the press and other media;freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;freedom of artistic creativity; andacademic freedom and freedom of scientific research.(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to propaganda for war;incitement of imminent violence; oradvocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.Language and culture30. Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.Cultural, religious and linguistic communities31. (1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; andto form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.Limitation of rights36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including the nature of the right;the importance of the purpose of the limitation;the nature and extent of the limitation;the relation between the limitation and its purpose; andless restrictive means to achieve the purpose.(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.On Aug 4, 2005, at 8:01 AM, Francis Beckwith wrote: Interesting suggestion. It would be a sort of anti-Blaine amendment. But that would imply that those that offered the Blaine amendment were suggesting what was unnecessary. However, if it was necessary, then the EC, and Paul’s Madisonian take on it, does not get us to a Blaine-meaning EC (so to speak). Frank On 8/4/05 6:53 AM, "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In a message dated 8/3/2005 11:47:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Given the regulatory state in which we live—one that requires that parents who send their children to religious private school must pay for both the school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems to me that the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easily dispositive in resolving this dispute. On the assumption that
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
Francis Beckwith wrote: Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation Given the regulatory state in which we liveone that requires that parents who send their children to religious private school must pay for both the school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems to me that the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easily dispositive in resolving this dispute. Suppose, for example, it were discovered that food stamp recipients were using some of them for the purchase of bread and grape juice for Catholic Masses conducted in their homes. Would that violate Madisons principle, since the purchase results from money acquired through taxing non-Catholics? Or would it be consistent with Madisons principle, since the purchase is the result of the free agency of the citizen who received the food stamps rather than a result of a government-directed order (as in the case of religious assessments in early America)? Suppose we change the food stamps to school vouchers and the bread and grape juice to Catholic school admission? I have to agree with Frank here, there has to be a distinction made between direct payments of tax money to churches and ministers (which is what Madison was opposing in Patrick Henry's bill when he wrote the Memorial and Remonstrance) and indirect use of money given for another purpose. Frank gives one example, but there are many others as well. We pay tax dollars to support police and the police protect churches too, so some portion of the taxes I paid might go to protect a church I disagree with, and so forth. Ed Brayton No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. Version: 7.0.338 / Virus Database: 267.10.0/63 - Release Date: 8/3/05 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: religiously-motivated political strife
Perhaps the central point of this dialogue is the silliness of using religious strife when evaluating constitutional provisions on religion. People disagree on school vouchers, the ten commandments, etc. The claim that one side of the disagreement is causing religious strife is implicitly based on claims that the other side is right. Mark A. Graber [EMAIL PROTECTED] 8/4/2005 10:46:32 AM Bobby: I don't carry a brief for Roy Moore. I think this country is a religiously pluralistic country--not a Christian country, but also not a secular country. Thus, I believe that everyone should pay his or her fair share of taxes (including educational taxes) and everyone should receive his or her fair share of benefits (including education benefits). Food stamps should cover Kosher food, educational benefits should be extended to all children regardless of where they go to school, and public fora should be open to all speakers including religious speakers. As far as the doctrine of salvation by faith in Christ goes, I am not ashamed of the Gospel nor do I believe it is intolerant or the cause of justifiable religious strife. You are free to believe or to disbelieve that salvation is through Christ and Christ alone. ButI will notrenounce the central teaching of my faith just to make others feel better about their faith. The doctrine of salvationby grace through faith in Christ is a doctrine of love and forgiveness. It is not an intolerant doctrine. It is open to everyone. Supposeyou fell off a ship at sea and were drowning and I threw you a lifeline. And yousaid, "I don't like this lifeline because it's orange and I prefer yellow ones." And I said "it's the only one I have."And you said "I prefer to drown." You certainly have that choice. And I respect it. But please don't say that I am a strife-causer because I offered you the only lifeline I had. Cheers, Rick[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In a message dated 8/3/2005 11:01:19 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Of course, in recent times much religious strife is caused by excluding religious people from equal access to the public square and from equal participation in the benefits of the welfare state. I think this is an unfortunately skewed view of religious tensions and the pain and anger caused bysome "religious" peopleregarding other religions. I have in mind the position of some Christians that unless Jews renounce their faith, theyare (and should be) damned to Hell. Or the alleged view of such individuals as Roy Moore that this is (and should be) a Christian country, and that Jews and others should be tolerated out of the goodness of Christianity. That strikes me as paradigmatic of religious motivated strife. Bobby Robert Justin LipkinProfessor of LawWidener University School of LawDelaware___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law University of Nebraska College of Law Lincoln, NE 68583-0902"When the Round Table is broken every man must follow either Galahad or Mordred: middle things are gone." C.S.Lewis, Grand Miracle"I will not be pushed, filed, stamped, indexed, ! briefed, debriefed, or numbered." --The Prisoner Start your day with Yahoo! - make it your home page ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: religiously-motivated political strife
In a message dated 8/4/2005 10:47:25 AM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Supposeyou fell off a ship at sea and were drowning and I threw you a lifeline. And yousaid, "I don't like this lifeline because it's orange and I prefer yellow ones." And I said "it's the only one I have."And you said "I prefer to drown." You certainly have that choice. And I respect it. But please don't say that I am a strife-causer because I offered you the only lifeline I had. First. Rick, I'm not callingyou a"strife-causer;" I'm not personalizing this discussion. Second, I have seriousdoubts about the utility of the example. But within the limitations of this example, whileyou, Rick,respect my choice to refuse the only lifeline you have, other Christians do not respect it. By publicly reiterating that Jews are damned to Hell, those Christians are not respecting my choice to "drown."The reiterated message serves not as a lifeline, but as a political act of exclusion, denigration,orinvidious differentiation. Of course, I'm in no way tarring all Christians of invidious differentiation or of anything elsefor that matter. Christians differ among themselves just as other groups do. Indeed, when I asked a dearfriend of mine--a professed Christian--about this issue, her reply was that according to her commitment to (or relationship with, I forget her exact words) Jesus Christ, what matters is leading a moral lifewith or without acknowledging Jesus Christ.When other Christians keep throwing me a lifeline after I repeatedly ask them not to bother, there comes a time when their conduct ceases being ministrations and turns into disrespect at best. Bobby Robert Justin LipkinProfessor of LawWidener University School of LawDelaware ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: religiously-motivated political strife
Steve Jamar wrote on 08/04/2005 10:04:08 AM: On Aug 4, 2005, at 10:46 AM, Rick Duncan wrote: The doctrine of salvationby grace through faith in Christ is a doctrine of love and forgiveness. It is not an intolerant doctrine. It is open to everyone. When people say that theirs is the only way and all others are damned to hell, that is not exactly my idea of tolerance. When a group says we are the only chosen ones, similar problem, though less in-your-face. When a group says this is the one true religion and we have the last word from god and others are infidels, similar problem again. What you are suggesting here, though, is a very slippery slope that could easily have extraordinarily chilling effect on religious freedom. There are alreday those who would advocate stripping away constitutional guarantees of free speech to anything deemed hate speech. When we here some of the racial epithets or similarly vile rants that are far too common in our culture, it's easy to say (as some have), Sure, we should stoof that. I mean, who wouldn't oppose that kind of stuff? How long, though, will it take before Rick's _expression_ above is called hate speech because it was deemed intolerant? The other problem with this is that it misunderstands the motivation that is described intolerance. I'll use an evangelical Christian as an example, since I am one myself. If I express the belief that some people are damned to hell if they reject Christ, I'm no more choosing who will or won't be damned than the weatherman who predicts rainfall is choosing who will or won't get rain. I'm looking at the sources I believe to be authoritative and assessing what they say. I have people dear to me that, as I understand what God has said, are headed to hell. If the choosing was up to me, I'd choose to save them every time. But I'm not God and I don't get to set the criteria. All I can do is try to understand what that criteria is. At the risk of seeming redundant, how long before declaring this to be intolerance leads to a deterioration in religious freedom. A concete example would be Buonanno v. ATT Broadband (313 F. Supp. 2d 1069, if I'm reading the decision on Lexis Nexis correctly). Fortunately, the judge ruled in defense of his supposedly guaranteed religious freedom. One can only wonder, though, if ATT had reached the same result but done more to explore the issue first, would religious freedom still have prevailed? (And is anybody else surprise that this case received little or not press coverage?) Brad Pardee___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: religiously-motivated political strife
Brad,I'm not generally very persuaded by "slippery slope" arguments. We always need to draw lines between what is ok and what is not. I am one who thinks the international norms of hate speech should be followed here and that we can draw the line sufficiently toward the really bad end of the spectrum to avoid the parade of horribles or from going down the slippery slope.I think Bobby Lifkin made the point much more eloquently than I in his post responding to Rick's.I do not misunderstand the motivation of the witnessing evangelical Christian. But from my lights the evangelical Christian ought to understand how some others will perceive his or her witnessing and in a civil pluralistic society ought to show more respect for others than what we often see or hear or get from evangelicals.But regulating this sort of mutual misunderstanding and miscommunication and the dissonance and "strife" that arises from it is not the stuff of law.In any event, I was responding to Rick's post, not setting up a paradigm of best ways of approaching these issues. I believe in responding with a compassionate attitude toward those who say I am damned -- and to assume that they in fact are acting out of love and concern and respect, almost no matter how aggressively or even abusively they present themselves and how closed they are in return. Indeed, it was a curiosity to me one time that I was, in the words of my client, "chosen by God," to represent them (fundamentalist evangelical Christians). I felt obliged to explain how I was an athiest and disagreed with many of their interpretations of the Bible and even much of what they were doing, as a matter of policy. But, as a matter of constitutional law, I thought they were right. Interestingly to me, I showed them a way I thought we could win the case on other grounds, but they said that they were, through that case (or series of cases), "witnessing for Jesus" and required that we present the case only on constitutional religious freedom grounds.People who say others are damned ought to understand that they are going to be perceived (generally legitimately in my view) as intolerant of the beliefs of the person they are saying is damned.Saying this as an interpersonal truth or psychological truth does not transmute it into a legal principle.SteveOn Aug 4, 2005, at 12:14 PM, Brad M Pardee wrote:Steve Jamar wrote on 08/04/2005 10:04:08 AM: On Aug 4, 2005, at 10:46 AM, Rick Duncan wrote: The doctrine of salvation by grace through faith in Christ is adoctrine of love and forgiveness. It is not an intolerant doctrine.It is open to everyone. When people say that theirs is the only way and all others are damned to hell, that is not exactly my idea of tolerance. When a group says we are the only chosen ones, similar problem, though less in-your-face. When a group says this is the one true religion and we have the last word from god and others are infidels, similar problem again. What you are suggesting here, though, is a very slippery slope that could easily have extraordinarily chilling effect on religious freedom. There are alreday those who would advocate stripping away constitutional guarantees of free speech to anything deemed "hate speech". When we here some of the racial epithets or similarly vile rants that are far too common in our culture, it's easy to say (as some have), "Sure, we should stoof that. I mean, who wouldn't oppose that kind of stuff?" How long, though, will it take before Rick's _expression_ above is called "hate speech" because it was deemed intolerant? The other problem with this is that it misunderstands the motivation that is described intolerance. I'll use an evangelical Christian as an example, since I am one myself. If I express the belief that some people are damned to hell if they reject Christ, I'm no more choosing who will or won't be damned than the weatherman who predicts rainfall is choosing who will or won't get rain. I'm looking at the sources I believe to be authoritative and assessing what they say. I have people dear to me that, as I understand what God has said, are headed to hell. If the choosing was up to me, I'd choose to save them every time. But I'm not God and I don't get to set the criteria. All I can do is try to understand what that criteria is. At the risk of seeming redundant, how long before declaring this to be "intolerance" leads to a deterioration in religious freedom. A concete example would be Buonanno v. ATT Broadband (313 F. Supp. 2d 1069, if I'm reading the decision on Lexis Nexis correctly). Fortunately, the judge ruled in defense of his supposedly guaranteed religious freedom. One can only wonder, though, if ATT had reached the same result but done more to explore the issue first, would religious freedom still have prevailed? (And is anybody else surprise that this case received little or not press coverage?) Brad Pardee___To
What causes more religious strife: Government bodies posting the Ten Commandments, or courts ordering their removal?
If religious strife is the touchstone, then I wonder: What causes more religious strife: Government bodies posting the Ten Commandments, or courts ordering their removal? Sure, you can say that even the latter strife is caused by the initial posting -- but this just further illustrates how vague a term causation can be. (In a sense, even outright religious persecution, in the sense of discrimination or even physical attacks based on a target's religion, is caused both by the persecuter and the victim; but for the victim's holding his religious views, he wouldn't even be attacked.) So if one focuses on immediate cause, then it seems to me that the endorsement test might produce more religious strife than it removes. If one focuses on but-for cause, then religious dissent causes religious strife in the same sense as suppression of the dissent does. And if one tries to find an in-between position, I suspect one will quickly recognize that the causation stops being an empirical judgment, and becomes a value judgment: One would be counting what one sees as *improper* causation of religious strife (e.g., government posting of the Ten Commandments empirically causes religious strife, and we count that because the government has no right to do that), but excluding what one sees as *proper* causation of religious strife (e.g., a federal court's order removing the Ten Commandments empirically causes religious strife, but we don't count that because the court is only doing its duty). So lurking behind this supposedly neutral, factual judgment is the very normative question that the religious strife was seeking to answer. It follows, it seems to me, that the religious strife inquiry is misguided (as well as involving empirically difficult and hotly contested predictions, a separate matter from the one I identified above). If we think that posting the Ten Commandments is unconstitutional, then removing the Ten Commandments is obligatory regardless of whatever religious strife observers guess that it might cause, and regardless of how little religious strife the original posting might have caused. If we think that the posting is constitutional, then it's permissible regardless of whatever religious strife people conjecture it might cause. Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: religiously-motivated political strife
Is this a question of speech or a question of behavior? Am I wrong in concluding that each person has a right to express their religious beliefs, even if those beliefs include predictions or convictions that all non-believers are doomed or that a particular individual is destined to some undesirable end? Am I wrong in concluding that the issue becomes thorny when it shifts to behavior? If someone calls Steve 20 times an hour all day and all night trying to persuade him to accept a lifeline, has not the expression of religious belief shifted into a zone of intolerable behavior? Would not government prohibition of that behavior safeguard the afflicted person without impinging on the right of the caller to express beliefs in a way that does not constitute direct harassment? Am I wrong in concluding that the issue becomes thorny when a person attempts to match their behavior to their religious beliefs? When a landlord refuses to rent to someone whose behavior offends or violates the landlord's religious beliefs, is that not where the tough questions reside? Does not religiously-motivated strife (or violence, to be more precise) arise when the application of religious beliefs to behavior clashes? After all, where's the strife in two people calmly telling each other once a week that they are so sad that the other one is doomed? Tiresome, but mutually aggravating. When they turn to fisticuffs because their theologies so require is when the matter becomes challenging. Does it really matter if someone expresses a belief that the listener is doomed? How does that differ from expressions with respect to fashion sense, sports team allegiances, hygiene, or something similar? Short of harassment, talk is, yes, cheap. Jim Maule Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law Villanova PA 19085 [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://vls.law.vill.edu/prof/maule mauledagain.blogspot.com President, TaxJEM Inc (computer assisted tax law instruction) (www.taxjem.com) Publisher, JEMBook Publishing Co. (www.jembook.com) Maule Family Archivist Genealogist (www.maulefamily.com) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: What causes more religious strife: Government bodies posting the Ten Comm...
In a message dated 8/4/05 1:05:00 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: If the court says the majority religion must leave room for the minority to practice, then this can have another set of effects. This sometimes ocurrs when a court treats a defunct (or virtually defunct) religion differently from viable ones, for example, giving more leeway when teachers teach or public school materials discuss or portray Greek and Roman mythology. In my article I discuss the need for distancing language (and was roundly castigated for it by Professor Bradley) so that the instructor is not making faith statements. "The author of Genesis writes that. . . ." rather than "God created the heavens and the earth" or "God wants all human beings to. . . " I've struggled with the nuances of this and address it in my article that the need for distancing language sets a higher bar for instruction about religion than it is does for secular subjects (I gave an example or two in my article). But ultimately it comes back to the fundamental issue of whether religion should be treated the same as everything else (neutrality principle) or whether it is somehow special and different and requires special treatment, special handling--if you will. Frances R. A. Paterson, J.D., Ed.D. Associate Professor Department of Educational Leadership Valdosta State University Valdosta, GA 31698 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
Re Madison's view. Madison clearly expressed his position relating to civil rights and of opposition to use of tax (coerced) money for "teachers of the Christian religion" in his 1785 "Memorial and Remonstrance," which he distributed just prior to passage of the 1786 Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty, in which it is written: "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which is disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; ... our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions, any more than our opinions in physics or geometry; ... no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever." The "Father of the Constitution" was also cochair of the joint Senate-House conference committee which in 1789 drafted the final version of the First Amendment's religion commandments. He is a primary source authority as to their meaning and application. The suggestion that Madison, related facts of history, and unanimous Court decisions (Reynolds and Davis) are irrelevant to an understanding of the wording of the First Amendment's religion commandments is particularly espoused by constitutional revisionists to whom such documentation is objectionable because it conflicts with their idea of religion accommodation. In America there have always been advocates of a connection between religion and government, but their position did not win in Virginia or, ultimately, in any of the colonies or original states, all of which significantly disestablished official religion by 1833. In his two 1811 veto messages of religion bills passed by Congress, President Madison's position remained the same. Feb. 21 veto: "Because the bill exceeds the rightful authority to which governments are limited by the essential distinction between civil and religious functions, and violates in particular the article of the Constitution of the United States which declares that 'Congress shall make no law respecting' Because the bill vests in the said incorporated church [Episcopal] an authority to provide for the support of the poor and the education of poor children of the same, an authority which, ... would be a precedent for giving to religious societies as such a legal agency in carrying into effect a public and civil duty." Feb. 28 veto: "Because the bill in reserving a certain parcel of land of the United States for the use of said Baptist Church comprises a principle and precedent for the appropriation of funds of the United States for the use and support of religious societies, contrary to the article of the Constitution which declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting." In his c.1817 "Detached Memoranda" Madison wrote "Strongly guarded as is the separation between Religion and Government in the Constitution of the United States, the danger of encroachments by Ecclesiastical Bodies may be illustrated by precedents already established in their short history," and he noted one after another example of a "palpable violation of ... constitutional principles." James Madison's "Detached Memoranda," became a part of legal record when cited in Everson v. Board of Education, footnotes 12 and 13. Just because a state, Congress, the Supreme Court, or some other government entity fails to accept and abide by the constitutional principle of "no religious test" and "no law respecting an establishment of religion" does not destroy the Constitution's religion commandments. Actions in violation of the Constitution should be stopped, and Court decisions in conflict with "the supreme law of the land" should be reversed. As one other participant to this list has already suggested, those who object to the wording of Article 6, Section 3., and the First Amendment should push for amendment. Indeed, I recall the day when a contracts professor made it clear "the Constitution means what the Court says it means." That may be sufficient for constitutional revisionists, but it is not the end of the legal argument for those of us who, in a nation composed from its beginning of citizens of many religions and of none, are "original intent," "strict constructionist" separationists and accept the simple wisdom of the Constitution's religion commandments, as written, lest Art. 6., Sec. 3., the Establishment Clause, and government (the essence of coercion) neutrality become a mockery. Gene Garman, M.Div. America's Real Religion www.americasrealreligion.org [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In a message dated 8/3/2005 11:47:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Given the regulatory state in which we live—one that requiresthat parents who send their children to religious private school must pay forboth the school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems tome that the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easilydispositive in resolving this
Re: religiously-motivated political strife
off into semantic land . . . about the term "tolerance" . . . we have been here before . . .I would be delighted to see just the "benign neglect" or unthinking acceptance of others or even better, thoughtful acceptance of others and their beliefs, even if I think they are wrong. I would rather see affirming, thoughtful acceptance of others than mere toleration of them. But I do not hold out a lot of hope for that, so I would be happy with just tolerance of the "I'm write and you are S wrong" version Frank describes. (emphasis mine, for emphasis to make the point sharper) That sort of minimal tolerance is what is required for a bare minimum of respect for the human dignity to which we are all entitled from each other.But Frank, isn't there a bit too much of the fallacious "law of the excluded middle" reasoning in your piece? There is a range of responses and judgments that can be made on which those responses are based.One may think he or she is right about the nonexistence of god, or the exclusivity of the way to god being through Jesus, or whatever and still keep a bit of humility about the possibility that one is wrong and that the billion Muslims or billion Buddhists or billion Hindus just might be onto something -- even if I as an athiest or Christian think I have it right. This humility about having a real lock on the truth -- i.e., rejecting the idea that anyone has a real, perfect lock on the truth -- leads to tolerance of a difference sort than you write about, I think.And I think in today's world we should not just look for neutrality as a guiding principle, not just non-coercion, not any single rule or principle, but rather a set of them, indeed, a shifting set of them -- including requiring official tolerance and fostering civil and civic and personal tolerance.Steve On Aug 4, 2005, at 3:15 PM, Francis Beckwith wrote: Steve: I think the real rub here is over what counts as “tolerance.” It seems to me that tolerance is only a virtue if you think the other guy is wrong, since one is not “tolerant” of what one agrees with or what one is apathetic toward. “Tolerance” without believing the other guy is wrong is like celibacy without genitalia. There’s a sense in which it is no longer a real virtue. I blogged on this several months ago. (see here: http://rightreason.ektopos.com/archives/2005/04/why_tolerance_r.html). I reproduce it below. Take care, Frank --- Why Tolerance Requires Judgment In popular culture--and in columns penned by such liberal luminaries as Maureen Dowd, Frank Rich, and the Daily Kos--one often hears a call for "tolerance" while at the same time offering a condemnation of social and religious conservatives making critical judgments about another's sexual preference or religious beliefs . My sense is that this prescription is a form of intellectual bait and switch, for tolerance, properly understood, requires judgment. Here's why I think this way. First, tolerance presupposes that there is something good about being tolerant, such as being able to learn from others with whom one disagrees or to impart knowledge and wisdom to that person. But that presupposes objective moral values, namely, that knowledge and wisdom are good things. Moreover, tolerance presupposes that someone may be correct about his or her moral or religious perspective. That is to say, it seems that part of the motivation for advocating tolerance is to encourage people to be open to the possibility that one may be able to gain truth and insight (including moral and religious truth and insight) from another who may possess it. If that is the case, then there are objective truths that I can learn. It follows from this that tolerance presupposes a judgment of another's viewpoint. That it to say, I can only be tolerant of those ideas that I think are mistaken. I am not tolerant of that with which I agree; I embrace it. And I am not tolerant of that for which I have no interest (e.g., European professional soccer); I merely have benign neglect for it. (That is, I don't care one way or another). Consider the following example. Suppose I tell a friend that I believe that homosexuality is immoral. And suppose my friend requests that I be tolerant toward homosexuals in my community. If I accept this advice, and choose to be civil, respectful, and gracious to gay men and women with whom I have contact, while at the same time judging their sexual practices as immoral, it seems that I would be truly tolerant. But suppose that someone says that my judging of homosexuality as immoral still makes me "intolerant." At that point, given my understanding of "tolerance," I have no idea what I am supposed to do. For if I change my view of homosexuality, and say either that it is not immoral or that I have no opinion (i.e., I have benign neglect), then I cannot be tolerant, for I can only be tolerant of that which I believe is wrong or mistaken. On the other hand, if judging another's position as wrong or
Re: What causes more religious strife: Government bodies posting the Ten Commandments, or courts ordering their removal?
I'm a few hours behind on these postings, so apologies in advance if this point has been made: Suppose that the inquiry into strife is not a direct touchstone, in the sense that asking whether X causes religious strife is relevant to deciding whether X is constitutional. Rather -- as I think Justice Souter argued in McCreary -- the fact that government interactions (or some other term) with religion historically did cause religious strife should guide our interpretaion of the First Amendment. He then argues that, when one considers the other relevant interpretive material, the best test that emerges is a rule of neutrality, but one could take his first point without thinking that his specific doctrinal conclusion -- drawn, again, from other interpretive material -- is the correct one. begin:vcard n:Tushnet;Mark fn:Mark Tushnet,tushnet tel;fax:202-662-9497 tel;work:202-662-1906 org:Georgetown University Law Center; adr:;;600 New Jersey Ave. NW;Washington;DC;20001; version:2.1 email;internet:[EMAIL PROTECTED] end:vcard ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: What causes more religious strife: Government bodies posting theTen Commandments, or courts ordering their removal?
I much appreciate Mark's point; but I wonder then at what level of generality we accept (if we do accept) Justice Souter's historical claim. For instance, it's not clear to me that genuinely evenhanded aid programs have caused that much strife -- especially not along the lines of the violence that Doug, Paul, and others have pointed to. Likewise, I think, as to most references to religion (especially of the Scalia-described monotheistic God-the-Father variety) in government speech. I suspect that government discrimination against particular denominations in benefit programs or in regulations (as opposed to speech) may have created substantial strife; likewise with government references to religion that exclude huge religious minorities (as opposed to only small ones). But as a general matter, it seems to me that the strife flows from a fairly narrow range of government interactions with religion, much narrower than the range of interactions that the Justices who focus on strife would read the Clause as prohibiting. Eugene Mark Tushnet writes: I'm a few hours behind on these postings, so apologies in advance if this point has been made: Suppose that the inquiry into strife is not a direct touchstone, in the sense that asking whether X causes religious strife is relevant to deciding whether X is constitutional. Rather -- as I think Justice Souter argued in McCreary -- the fact that government interactions (or some other term) with religion historically did cause religious strife should guide our interpretaion of the First Amendment. He then argues that, when one considers the other relevant interpretive material, the best test that emerges is a rule of neutrality, but one could take his first point without thinking that his specific doctrinal conclusion -- drawn, again, from other interpretive material -- is the correct one. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: What causes more religious strife: Government bodies postingtheTen Commandments, or courts ordering their removal?
Well, the central issue in the 19th-century Protestant-Catholic battles was religious instruction in the schools and refusal to fund private schools as an alternative. The Protestants said that Bible reading was neutral and included everybody, just as Scalia says the Ten Commandments are neutral and include nearly everybody. Of course, those who were left out of the allegedly neutral religious observance did not see it as at all neutral, then or now. Religious minorities should not have to put mobs in the streets in order to have their dissent from government sponsored religion respected. One lesson of the Protestant Bible controversy is that government should not try to lead religious observances, even if allegedly neutral. But I think the other lesson cuts the other way in terms of the current culture wars: if government is funding education, it should fund forms that members of all faiths can use in good conscience. Paying for education in both religious and secular environments presents a fundamentally different question from paying for the clergy of all faiths. Madison faced the latter issue; we face the former. Douglas Laycock University of Texas Law School 727 E. Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78705 512-232-1341 (phone) 512-471-6988 (fax) -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2005 4:53 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: What causes more religious strife: Government bodies postingtheTen Commandments, or courts ordering their removal? For instance, it's not clear to me that genuinely evenhanded aid programs have caused that much strife -- especially not along the lines of the violence that Doug, Paul, and others have pointed to. Likewise, I think, as to most references to religion (especially of the Scalia-described monotheistic God-the-Father variety) in government speech. Eugene Mark Tushnet writes: I'm a few hours behind on these postings, so apologies in advance if this point has been made: Suppose that the inquiry into strife is not a direct touchstone, in the sense that asking whether X causes religious strife is relevant to deciding whether X is constitutional. Rather -- as I think Justice Souter argued in McCreary -- the fact that government interactions (or some other term) with religion historically did cause religious strife should guide our interpretaion of the First Amendment. He then argues that, when one considers the other relevant interpretive material, the best test that emerges is a rule of neutrality, but one could take his first point without thinking that his specific doctrinal conclusion -- drawn, again, from other interpretive material -- is the correct one. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
This is not the same as giving money to a synagogue or other religious institution; a Jew can use food stamps for kosher food; and Hindu for vegitarian food; a Moslem for Halal meat; but they should not be allowed to give the stamps to their synagogue, temples, etc. Rick Duncan wrote: Or better yet, change the food stamp hypo to Kosher food. Why should non-Jews be taxed to pay for Kosher observance? The answer, of course, is that they are not being taxed to pay for Kosher observance. They are being taxed to pay for food supplements for the poor, including food stamp recipients who choose to keep a Kosher kitchen. The same with education taxes supporting school choice. No one is being taxed to support religious instruction as such. Everyone is being taxed to pay for education, and everyone gets a free tax supported education up frontin return for paying a lifetime of educational taxes. Both Kosher education(in private religious schools)and non-Kosher education(in all other schools) are equally funded.There should be no strife at all, because everyone pays and everyone receives. Indeed, the battles over the public school curriculum we have been discussing would be less likely to occur (less strife) if dissenting families could exit the public schools without penalty. The real strifeis createdwhen Jews are denied Kosher food in the food stamp program and whenfamilies who choose private schools are denied their fair slice of the K-12 educational benefit pie. I deeply resent being forced to pay taxes to support a system which provides no benefits to my children. I feel like a second class citizen. And many millions more feel the same way. Rick Francis Beckwith [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Given the regulatory state in which we liveone that requires that parents who send their children to religious private school must pay for both the school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems to me that the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easily dispositive in resolving this dispute. Suppose, for example, it were discovered that food stamp recipients were using some of them for the purchase of bread and grape juice for Catholic Masses conducted in their homes. Would that violate Madisons principle, since the purchase results from money acquired through taxing non-Catholics? Or would it be consistent with Madisons principle, since the purchase is the result of the free agency of the citizen who received the food stamps rather than a result of a government-directed order (as in the case of r! eligious assessments in early America)? Suppose we change the food stamps to school vouchers and the bread and grape juice to Catholic school admission? Im not sure Madison is helpful here. Frank On 8/3/05 11:27 PM, "Paul Finkelman" [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would suggest you reread Madison's remonstrance on Religious freedom; one of the clear motivating factors for the establishment clause was to preclude the possibility that people would have to pay for other people's religion. That was what was going on in Va and that, quite frankly, is what the voucher system is all about; when tax money ends up in a religious school, it means that taxpayers of one faith are forced to support the religious schools of someone else. Madison understood how deeply wrong, dangerous, and offensive that was. I am surprised that you and Rick don't see this. Paul Finkelman Pybas, Kevin M wrote: All of the comments are helpful, but let me raise another question that is akin to the one Rick raised. He asked whether, why, and / or how these motivations, or the undesirability of such strife should be used to supply the Establishment Clause's enforceable content. WIth regard to neutral aid programs (as the Court characterizes them), is it really religious strife that worries us? In other words, in the context of the modern administrative state, are the conflicts over the funding of education, for example, whether it be vouchers or the type of aid at issue in Mitchell, really about religion, or religiously-motivated in any sense? In other words, how do we tell the difference between religously-motivated political strife and ordinary political disagreements (I understand that the word "ordinary" may not he all that helpful, but hopefully you see what I mean.) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Paul Finkelman Sent: Wed 8/3/2005 5:08 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: religiously-motivated political strife ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
Title: Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation What if the synagogue, temple, or mosque also distributes and sells religiously-prepared foods as does the local grocery stores, but some of the believers would rather purchase food with their stamps from those they trust to prepare the foods correctly, namely, those at their local house of worship. Frank On 8/4/05 11:04 PM, Paul Finkelman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This is not the same as giving money to a synagogue or other religious institution; a Jew can use food stamps for kosher food; and Hindu for vegitarian food; a Moslem for Halal meat; but they should not be allowed to give the stamps to their synagogue, temples, etc. Rick Duncan wrote: Or better yet, change the food stamp hypo to Kosher food. Why should non-Jews be taxed to pay for Kosher observance? The answer, of course, is that they are not being taxed to pay for Kosher observance. They are being taxed to pay for food supplements for the poor, including food stamp recipients who choose to keep a Kosher kitchen. The same with education taxes supporting school choice. No one is being taxed to support religious instruction as such. Everyone is being taxed to pay for education, and everyone gets a free tax supported education up front in return for paying a lifetime of educational taxes. Both Kosher education (in private religious schools) and non-Kosher education (in all other schools) are equally funded. There should be no strife at all, because everyone pays and everyone receives. Indeed, the battles over the public school curriculum we have been discussing would be less likely to occur (less strife) if dissenting families could exit the public schools without penalty. The real strife is created when Jews are denied Kosher food in the food stamp program and when families who choose private schools are denied their fair slice of the K-12 educational benefit pie. I deeply resent being forced to pay taxes to support a system which provides no benefits to my children. I feel like a second class citizen. And many millions more feel the same way. Rick Francis Beckwith [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Given the regulatory state in which we liveone that requires that parents who send their children to religious private school must pay for both the school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems to me that the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easily dispositive in resolving this dispute. Suppose, for example, it were discovered that food stamp recipients were using some of them for the purchase of bread and grape juice for Catholic Masses conducted in their homes. Would that violate Madisons principle, since the purchase results from money acquired through taxing non-Catholics? Or would it be consistent with Madisons principle, since the purchase is the result of the free agency of the citizen who received the food stamps rather than a result of a government-directed order (as in the case of r! eligious assessments in early America)? Suppose we change the food stamps to school vouchers and the bread and grape juice to Catholic school admission? Im not sure Madison is helpful here. Frank On 8/3/05 11:27 PM, Paul Finkelman [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would suggest you reread Madison's remonstrance on Religious freedom; one of the clear motivating factors for the establishment clause was to preclude the possibility that people would have to pay for other people's religion. That was what was going on in Va and that, quite frankly, is what the voucher system is all about; when tax money ends up in a religious school, it means that taxpayers of one faith are forced to support the religious schools of someone else. Madison understood how deeply wrong, dangerous, and offensive that was. I am surprised that you and Rick don't see this. Paul Finkelman Pybas, Kevin M wrote: All of the comments are helpful, but let me raise another question that is akin to the one Rick raised. He asked whether, why, and / or how these motivations, or the undesirability of such strife should be used to supply the Establishment Clause's enforceable content. WIth regard to neutral aid programs (as the Court characterizes them), is it really religious strife that worries us? In other words, in the context of the modern administrative state, are the conflicts over the funding of education, for example, whether it be vouchers or the type of aid at issue in Mitchell, really about religion, or religiously-motivated in any sense? In other words, how do we tell the difference between religously-motivated political strife and ordinary political disagreements (I understand that the word ordinary may not he all that helpful, but hopefully you see what I mean.) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Paul Finkelman Sent: Wed 8/3/2005 5:08 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject:
