[cryptography] Better Crypto

Not sure if it has been mentioned here. The Better Crypto group at bettercrypto.org have written a (draft) paper for many of those likely configurations for net tools. The PDF is here: https://bettercrypto.org/static/applied-crypto-hardening.pdf If you're a busy sysadm with dozens of tools

Re: [cryptography] Better Crypto

On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 11:59 PM, ianG i...@iang.org wrote: Not sure if it has been mentioned here. The Better Crypto group at bettercrypto.org have written a (draft) paper for many of those likely configurations for net tools. The PDF is here:

[cryptography] ECC patent FUD revisited

NSA's Kevin Igoe writes, on the semi-moderated c...@irtf.org list: Certicom has granted permission to the IETF to use the NIST curves, and at least two of these, P256 and P384, have p = 3 mod 4. Not being a patent lawyer, I have no idea what impact the Certicom patents have on the use of

[cryptography] Preventing Timing Correlation Attacks on XMPP chats?

Hi, XMPP networks are now going to be default secured with TLS in their client-to-server and server-to-server communications by 22th Feb. Most IM client support end-to-end encryption with OTR by default. The Federated Architecture make it very scalable and distributed. With all that goods of

Re: [cryptography] Preventing Timing Correlation Attacks on XMPP chats?

Hi - a scrambler could send out from time to time fake messages. - an impersonator could record your own chat behaviour and generate random time and lenght and content data, so it looks like your own chat - the main problem remains that from an external analysis you can always see, that User A is

Re: [cryptography] Preventing Timing Correlation Attacks on XMPP chats?

Den 5 jan 2014 13:23 skrev Randolph rdohm...@gmail.com: Hi - a scrambler could send out from time to time fake messages. - an impersonator could record your own chat behaviour and generate random time and lenght and content data, so it looks like your own chat - the main problem remains that

Re: [cryptography] Better Crypto

ianG i...@iang.org writes: Not sure if it has been mentioned here. The Better Crypto group at bettercrypto.org have written a (draft) paper for many of those likely configurations for net tools. The PDF is here: https://bettercrypto.org/static/applied-crypto-hardening.pdf If you're a busy

Re: [cryptography] Preventing Timing Correlation Attacks on XMPP chats?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 01/05/2014 04:28 AM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote: Hi, XMPP networks are now going to be default secured with TLS in their client-to-server and server-to-server communications by 22th Feb. Actually May 19th:

Re: [cryptography] ECC patent FUD revisited

On Jan 5, 2014, at 1:36 AM, D. J. Bernstein d...@cr.yp.to wrote: NSA's Kevin Igoe writes, on the semi-moderated c...@irtf.org list: Certicom has granted permission to the IETF to use the NIST curves, and at least two of these, P256 and P384, have p = 3 mod 4. Not being a patent lawyer, I

Re: [cryptography] To Protect and Infect Slides

Hi Jacob, I just watched your 30c3 presentation on Youtube. About halfway through you described an exploit on Dell servers that uses the JTAG, and then asked; Why did Dell leave a JTAG debugging interface on these servers?” There is nothing nefarious or uncommon about an active JTAG

Re: [cryptography] To Protect and Infect Slides

On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 3:13 PM, Jacob Appelbaum ja...@appelbaum.netwrote: Kevin W. Wall: On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 3:10 PM, John Young j...@pipeline.com wrote: 30c3 slides from Jacob Appelbaum: http://cryptome.org/2013/12/appelbaum-30c3.pdf (3.8MB) And you can find his actual prez

[cryptography] NSA Molecular Nanotechnology hardware trojan

I know that this is going to sound nearly impossible and I cannot fully explain how it works but after witnessing the evidence left behind by this technology I feel that it is necessary to inform the more intelligent out there of the reality of how the NSA is bridging the air gap on secure