John says:
Wireless is a horse of a different color. IANAL but
the last time I looked, there was no federal law
against intercepting most wireless signals, but you
were (generally) not allowed to disclose the contents
to anyone else.
No longer, if it ever was. It's a crime, as evidenced by the
I'm looking for a list or lists of sensibly sized proven primes - all
the lists I can find are more interested in records, which are _way_ too
big for cryptographic purposes.
By sensibly sized I mean in the range 512-8192 bits. I'm particularly
after Sophie Germain primes right now, but I
Ian Brown[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ed Gerck wrote:
Printing a paper receipt that the voter can see is a proposal
that addresses one of the major weaknesses of electronic
voting. However, it creates problems that are even harder to
solve than the silent subversion of
-Mensagem original-
De: Ben Laurie [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Enviada em: quinta-feira, 6 de março de 2003 08:47
Para: Cryptography
Assunto: Proven Primes
I'm looking for a list or lists of sensibly sized proven primes - all
the lists I can find are more interested in records,
- Original Message -
From: Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Cryptography [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2003 6:47 AM
Subject: Proven Primes
I'm looking for a list or lists of sensibly sized proven primes - all
the lists I can find are more interested in records, which are
I believe the IPSec primes had been proven. All are SG primes with a g=2
Check RFC 2412, draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-05.txt, and
draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-modp-groups-05.txt
However, I don't seen any primality proof certificates included in the
texts.
On Thu, 6 Mar 2003, Ben Laurie wrote:
I'm looking
Peter Trei wrote:
I'd prefer that the printed receipt be retained at the
polling station, after the voter has had an opportunity to
examine it. This serves two purposes: First, it prevents the
vote selling described above, and second, if a recount is
required, it allows the recount to be
Will Rodger wrote:
John says:
Wireless is a horse of a different color. IANAL but
the last time I looked, there was no federal law
against intercepting most wireless signals, but you
were (generally) not allowed to disclose the contents
to anyone else.
No longer, if it ever was. It's a
- Original Message -
From: Bill Frantz [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2003 2:14 AM
Subject: Re: Scientists question electronic voting
[..]
The best counter to this problem is widely available systems to produce
fake photos
On Wed, 5 Mar 2003, Bill Frantz wrote:
The best counter to this problem is widely available systems to produce
fake photos of the vote, so the vote buyer can't know whether the votes he
sees in the photo are the real votes, or fake ones.
blink, blink.
you mean *MORE* widely available than
- Original Message -
From: Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[...]
This is not possible for current paper ballots, for several reasons. For
example, if you take a picture of your punch card as a proof of how you
voted, what is to prevent you -- after the picture is taken -- to punch
another
Tal Garfinkel wrote:
The value of these type of controls that they help users you basically
trust who might be careless, stupid, lazy or confused to do the right
thing (however the right thing is defined, according to your company
security policy).
It beats me that users you basically
Anton Stiglic wrote:
-Well the whole process can be filmed, not necessarily photographed...
It's difficult to counter the attack. In you screen example, you can
photograph
the vote and then immediately photograph the thank you, if the photographs
include the time in milliseconds, and the
- Original Message -
From: Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Anton Stiglic [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[Talking about the ECPP package...]
I'm not convinced any of those binaries are going to run on my system
(which is FreeBSD), and anyway, if I'm going to use a binary to do ECPP
I may as well
Peter Trei wrote:
I'd prefer that the printed receipt be retained at the polling
station, after the voter has had an opportunity to examine it.
This serves two purposes: First, it prevents the vote selling
described above, and second, if a recount is required, it allows
the recount to be
Francois Grieu[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Peter Trei wrote:
I'd prefer that the printed receipt be retained at the polling
station, after the voter has had an opportunity to examine it.
This serves two purposes: First, it prevents the vote selling
described above, and second, if a
At 4:57 PM -0500 3/5/03, John S. Denker wrote:
Tim Dierks wrote:
In order to avoid overreaction to a nth-hand story, I've attempted to
locate some primary sources.
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines:
http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/getcase/9th/case/9955106pexact=1
[US v Councilman:]
John says:
Next time, before disagreeing with someone:
a) Please read what he actually wrote, and
b) Don't quote snippets out of context.
Three sentences later, at the end of the paragraph that
began as quoted above, I explicitly pointed out that
cellphone transmissions are a more-protected
John,
John Gilmore [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
And, besides identifying what cities they're doing this in, we should
also start examining a collection of these boarding passes, looking
for the encrypted let me through without searching me information.
Or the Don't let me fly information. Then
bear wrote:
Let's face it, if somebody can *see* their vote, they can record it.
Not necessarily. Current paper ballots do not offer you a way to record
*your* vote. You may even photograph your ballot but there is no way to
prove that *that* was the ballot you did cast. In the past, we had
On Thu, Mar 06, 2003 at 01:50:44PM -0500, Derek Atkins wrote:
[...]
When I flew on US-Airways out of BAL last year, they had a marking on
the boarding pass that signified search this person. If your
boarding pass had the mark, you were searched as you tried to board.
If it did not, then
John Ioannidis [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Are you referring to the string on the boarding pass? That
indicated that you were going to be searched by the boarding gate TSA
people whether they were going to decide to search you or not (they
still picked up random people without the search
http://www.yaledailynews.com/articlefunctions/Printerfriendly.asp?AID=22111
yaledailynews.com -
Changes may follow hoax e-mail
Published Wednesday, March 5, 2003
Changes may follow hoax e-mail
BY JESSAMYN BLAU
Staff Reporter
The Feb. 17 hoax e-mail that caused some students to miss
Ben Laurie writes:
I'm looking for a list or lists of sensibly sized proven primes - all
the lists I can find are more interested in records, which are _way_ too
big for cryptographic purposes.
Directory
ftp://ftp.ssh.com/pub/ietf/ecpp-certificates
contains ecpp certificates for IKE primes
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
This is not possible for current paper ballots, for several reasons. For
example, if you take a picture of your punch card as a proof of how you
voted, what is to prevent you -- after the picture is taken -- to punch
another hole for the same race and
At 3:47 AM -0800 3/6/03, Ben Laurie wrote:
I'm looking for a list or lists of sensibly sized proven primes - all
the lists I can find are more interested in records, which are _way_ too
big for cryptographic purposes.
By sensibly sized I mean in the range 512-8192 bits. I'm particularly
after
At 9:17 AM -0800 3/6/03, Daniel Garcia wrote:
On Thu, 6 Mar 2003, Don Davis wrote:
http://cgi.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewItemitem=2162414185
i saw this on the boing-boing blog.
Interesting, when i try to look at this from work (over in brighton,
actually), i get:
Dear User:
Dan Riley wrote:
The vote can't be final until the voter confirms the paper receipt.
It's inevitable that some voters won't realize they voted the wrong
way until seeing the printed receipt, so that has to be allowed for.
Elementary human factors.
This brings in two other factors I have
On Thu, Mar 06, 2003 at 08:38:42PM -0500, Dan Riley wrote:
But this whole discussion is terribly last century--still pictures are
passe. What's the defense of any of these systems against cell phones
that transmit live video?
A Faraday cage.
Seriously, what current or historic voting
Lotus Notes/Domino already has something similar to what Microsoft is
proposing.
You can designate an outgoing message as read-only.
The end-user (if they are using a Notes Client) can only view the message,
menu choices for printing and cutting/copy text are disabled. Forwarding the
message
At 02:39 AM 3/6/03 +, Ian Brown wrote:
Ed Gerck wrote:
...
For example, using the proposed system a voter can easily, by
using a small concealed camera or a cell phone with a camera,
obtain a copy of that receipt and use it to get money for the
vote, or keep the job. And no one would know
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