Howard wrote:
Question to Kristofer
do you see the issues that you start off with as orthogonal?
i.e. do you see this only working in a world where the issues polled are
independent.
The simulation I wrote assumes this, since it picks the proportion in
favor on each issue independently. The
Steve Eppley wrote:
Hi,
I prefer a definition of representativeness that differs from
Kristofer's. To me, the more similar the *decisions* of a legislature
are to the decisions the people themselves would make collectively in a
well-functioning direct democracy, the more representative is
Terry Bouricius wrote:
That brings me to an interesting issue, which may be off-topic for this
list...sortition...the selection of a legislative body by means of
modern sampling methods that assure a fully representative body. There is
an interesting history of the tension between sortition on
That could be one big poster where the candidates are listed on the
right hand side and the left hand side is used for representing the tree
structure (and the names of the parties and the subgroups).
That could work, at least in cases where there's only one district and
the party limits the
I thought I could ask a few questions while otherwise being busy making
my next simulator version :-) So here goes..
First, when a group elects a smaller group (as a parliament might do
with a government, although real parliaments don't do it this way),
should the method used to elect the
James Gilmour wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm Sent: Sunday, July 06, 2008 12:10 AM
Second, I've been reading about the decoy list problem in mixed member
proportionality. The strategy exists because the method can't do
anything when a party doesn't have any list votes to compensate
Rob LeGrand wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
(On a related note, has anyone tried to use Range with LeGrand's
Equilibrium Average instead of plain average?)
I don't recommend using Equilibrium Average (which I usually call AAR
DSV, for Average-Approval-Rating DSV) to elect winner(s) from
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Again, why NOT Condorcet?
Its' ballot is ranking, essentially the same as IRV, except the
directions better be more intelligent:
Rank as many as you choose - ranking all is acceptable IF you choose.
Rank as few as you choose - bullet voting is acceptable if that
I don't see how IRV's failure to elect the Condorcet candidate is
necessarily linked to its non-monotonicity.
There are monotonic (meets mono-raise) methods that fail Condorcet, and
some Condorcet methods that fail mono-raise.
(For information: I think Bucklin would be an example of the
Juho wrote:
I think already the basic open list provides a quite strong link between
candidates and voters. Voters will decide which candidates will be
elected, not the party (this is an important detail). (Extensions are
needed to provide proportionality between different subgroups of the
Hello all,
I've rewritten my program that tests the proportionality of PR methods
by assigning binary issue profiles to voters and candidates and
comparing the council's proportion of candidates in favor of each issue
with the proportions of the people.
There were some bugs in my previous
Chris Benham wrote:
At one stage Woodall was looking for the method/s that meet as many of
his monotonicty properties as possible while keeping Majority
(equivalent to Majority for Solid Coalitions). That is what led him to
Quota-Limited Trickle Down (QLTD) and then Descending Acquiescing
If QLTD isn't cloneproof (and it isn't), then the result won't be
either, hence we could just as well go with first preference Copeland
(unless that has a flaw I'm not seeing).
What is supposed to be the attraction of first preference Copeland?
And how do you define it exactly?
The
Juho wrote:
On Jul 22, 2008, at 14:26 , Michael Allan wrote:
I'm grateful I was directed to this list. You're clearly experts. I
wish I could reply more completely right away (I should know better
than to start 2 separate threads). I'll just reply to Juho's
questions today, and tomorrow
(Oops, seems I sent this only to James Gilmour. Let's try again. )
James Gilmour wrote:
it would have to look at the entire ballot.
That is a consequence of your interpretation of how the voting system
is supposed to work and what the voting system is supposed to
be doing. But that's not
Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Hello all,
although I did not follow all of the discussion so far, the following
question strikes me:
Why the hell do you care about proportional representation of minorities
when the representative body itself does not decide with a method that
ensures a proportional
Kathy Dopp wrote:
Well, any election method can be parallelized (in quote marks) with a
superpolynomial amount of information when there are as many choices as
candidates.
I am not certain what you mean. Precisely, any Ranked Choice ballot
has a number of possible permutations of all the
Warren Smith wrote:
--see this:
http://RangeVoting.org/ConitzerSmanipEasy.pdf
Oops, disregard the point I said about not being familiar of IRV
manipulation. I cited the paper myself!
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Warren Smith wrote:
1. Dopp wanted simple nonmonotone IRV elections examples.
See
http://rangevoting.org/Monotone.html
and here is another:
#voters Their Vote
8BAC
5CBA
4ACB
If two of the BAC voters change their vote to ABC, that causes
their true-favorite B to win
Kathy Dopp wrote:
From: rob brown [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Can someone point me at an example of the
nonmonotonicity of IRV?
Are you aware that in going to a doctor to treat an injury, you can get in a
car accident and get injured some more? Why would anyone go to a doctor
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Or do we want the voter to be able to cancel the ballot and let
the poll workers know that he needs a paper ballot instead that
he can mark himself?
I'm fine with the latter. Actually that seems like a reasonable
thing to do.
I agree,
Chris Benham wrote:
*Kristofer Munsterhjelm* wrote (Sun. Aug.10):
There's also the it smells fishy that nonmonotonicity - of any kind or
frequency - evokes. I think that's stronger for nonmonotonicity than for
things like strategy vulnerability because it's an error that appears in
the method
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Jobst Heitzig said:
It is of no help for a minority to be represented proportionally when
still a mere 51% majority can make all decisions!
I disagree. The advantage is that it allows 'on the fly' coalition
re-organisation.
If all the legislators are
Also, such a scheme would be, I think, highly susceptible to agenda
manipulation: who decides which issue is to be effectively on the
ballot, and who decides that the candidates associated with X and
not-X are sincere?
Citizens are free to form such lists. Each list may support and oppose
I could see a kind of proxy front end to STV elections. I'm not sure I'm
convinced it would be a good idea, or even practical to implement, but
suppose that any person or group (including parties) could register an
STV ranking, and a voter could select that ranking instead of ranking
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 16, 2008, at 12:54 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I am for a record on disk of each ballot, but done in a maner to
not destroy secrecy.
You have to be very careful when doing so, because there are many
channels to secure. A vote-buyer might tell you
Dave Ketchum wrote:
So you're saying that computers are better than specialized machines?
I'm not sure that's what you say (rather than that machines are better
than paper ballots), but I'll assume that.
Your specialized machines can each do a fragment of the task. However,
dependably
But murderers get away with murder, police are being bought
off by criminals, government employees steal office supplies. No one knows
exactly how much any of things happen. We try to limit them (balancing the
degree of the problem and the cost of addressing it), and we go on with our
lives.
Predictions based on that idea would consider the ideal to be direct
democracy. Next to that would be continuous update of representative
power (continuous elections). While both of these might work if we
were machines, the former scales badly and the latter would put an
undue load on the
Juho wrote:
This is a very interesting real life example on how such horizontal
preference orders may impact the elections and strategies in them.
Do you have a list of the strategies/tricks that are used?
One trick that appears, as has been mentioned in other posts here, is
vote
Raph Frank wrote:
I had a similar though previously.
It was based on a legislature rather than individual voters.
I called it 'consumable votes'.
Here is one example, though there was a fair few versions.
Juho wrote:
On Aug 18, 2008, at 12:10 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
The extreme would be a voting system where people just say how much
they agree with an opinion, for all relevant opinions, and then the
system picks the maximally representative assembly. Such a method is
not desirable, I
Dave Ketchum wrote:
You claim that many fragments can be done by specialized machines.
AGREED, though I do not agree that they can do it any better than a
normal computer - which has equivalent capability.
In a technical capacity, of course not. Since a computer is
Turing-complete, it can do
Juho wrote:
I could accept also methods where the voting power of each
representative is different. The good part is that such a parliament
would reflect the wishes of the voters more accurately than a parliament
where all the representatives have the same voting power. Maybe one
could force
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 10:00 PM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
First, this is not intended to be used in a zillion precincts - just to
validate the programs.
OK. Well if you don't care about validating the election outcome
accuracy, and just want to verify the
Raph Frank wrote:
On 8/22/08, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In Finland where the number of candidates is relatively high some less
obvious candidates may have some trouble getting in to the lists but on the
other hand some well known figures (that have become popular (and respected)
in other
Raph Frank wrote:
On 8/22/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What I had in mind was something like this: Say there's a single-winner
election where the plurality winner has 35% support. Then those voters
effectively got 0.5 (+1) worth of the vote with only 0.35 mass. The total
Raph Frank wrote:
On 8/22/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If I understand Schulze's STV method correctly, it calculates vote
management strengths and so does vote management on behalf of the voter and
on all candidates. I may be wrong, though, and Schulze STV uses a very
Raph Frank wrote:
On Sun, Aug 24, 2008 at 8:03 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
As for fairness, consider the case where more than just enough voters
voted for candidate X. With your you either get full strength or no
strength scheme, some voters are going to look
Juho wrote:
On Aug 24, 2008, at 1:34 , James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Sent: Saturday, August 23, 2008 9:56 PM
Trying to guarantee proportionality for women at national level may
be tricky if there is no woman party that the candidates and voters
could name (well, the sex of a candidate is
Juho wrote:
On Aug 22, 2008, at 12:36 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
On Aug 18, 2008, at 12:10 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
If we are taking about methods that rank the candidates the idea is to
define a grammar and terminology so that the most common voter opinions
Juho wrote:
On Aug 26, 2008, at 1:20 , Raph Frank wrote:
Each candidate can register in any number of polling stations covering
at most N seat's worth of population. (N=5 might be reasonable).
You might want to keep the sizes of the registered areas of each
candidate about equal (or to
As the subject says, this is a very simple multiwinner method that's
based on Bucklin. I referred to it in another post, and so I think I
should explain how it works:
Inputs are ranked ballots. Each voter starts with a weight of one. The
quota is Droop (Hare does much worse).
As in Bucklin,
Raph Frank wrote:
That's fine. In fact, if you had 50% local and 50% national seats,
then it can be made to work perfectly.
Just say that an independent must get at least 50% of the constituency
to be elected and if he does, each of his voters have their weights
reduced to
(VA-50%)/100% where
Raph Frank wrote:
On 8/26/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
No, it uses logarithmic and exponential functions to find the divisor
that corrects the bias that arises with certain assumptions about the
distribution of voters. See
http://rangevoting.org/NewAppo.html . Warren
Raph Frank wrote:
On 8/26/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Inputs are ranked ballots. Each voter starts with a weight of one. The
quota is Droop (Hare does much worse).
Can a voter skip ranks and also is there a limited number of ranks?
If you allow rank skipping
Juho wrote:
Yes, security might force us to use simpler solutions like ballots to be
similar, votes to be shorter (e.g. only two or three rankings allowed),
and even to reduce the number of candidates. The latter two
simplifications are already vote buying / coercion oriented.
Security might
Juho wrote:
The idea of an appropriate size circle around candidates home (or home
district) sounds like a pretty safe and simple approach. That gives also
the voters a natural explanation to why some of the familiar candidates
are on the list and some not.
Dynamic districts may also be seen
Juho wrote:
On Aug 28, 2008, at 11:36 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
One more approach to semi-computerized voting. A computer displays
the personal alternatives and then prints a ballot. This solution
hides the personalized nature of the ballot and still avoids the
problem of voter voting
Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Aug 27, 2008 at 7:59 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
True. I just gave it as an option for the perfectionists who aren't
satisfied with Webster, or for the case where the election system is so
complex that adding the calculation wouldn't be noticed
Michael Rouse wrote:
There was a discussion of district-drawing algorithms on the
election-methods list a few years back. I've always thought that taking
centroidal Voronoi cells with equal populations was an elegant way to do
it. Here's an example of standard Voronoi cells and the
rob brown wrote:
On Mon, Sep 1, 2008 at 3:20 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Consider Condorcet. One of the greater problems with plurality is
vote-splitting, which favors minorities since it destroys a center
that many think is good
Juho wrote:
On Aug 29, 2008, at 15:51 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
One more approach to semi-computerized voting. A computer displays
the personal alternatives and then prints a ballot. This solution
hides the personalized nature of the ballot and still avoids the
problem of voter voting
Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, Sep 2, 2008 at 11:00 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The reasonable thing to use would be Euclidean distance, since that makes
sense, given the geometric nature of the districting problem. If you want to
be even more accurate, you can use great
Raph Frank wrote:
1) Every odd year, an 'election' is held but voters vote for parties
2) based 1), seats are distributed using d'Hondt between the parties
If you're going to have D'Hondt, or PR in general, why bother with the
districting? Just use open list or a party-neutral proportional
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Sep 3, 2008, at 12:28 AM, Juho wrote:
I hope this speculation provided something useful. And I hope I got
the Meek's method dynamics right.
Meek completely fixes Woodall free riding. That strategy takes advantage
of the fact that most STV methods (to the extent
Brian Olson wrote:
I guess my time in Computer Science land has left me pretty comfortable
with the idea that there are lots of problems that are too hard to ever
reliably get the best solution. I don't know if there's a short-short
popularizing explanation of how finding a good solution is
Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Sep 3, 2008 at 10:51 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In general then, any method that acts like Z had never run (when Z is
eliminated) would be resistant to Woodall free-riding.
Right, you can get that benefit from alot of methods. For example
Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Afternoon, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Thank you for your thoughtful comments. I understand and agree with you
on plurality and two-party dominion, and their off-shoots,
gerrymandering and the various forms of corruption. The difference
between our views seems
Juho wrote:
On Sep 4, 2008, at 0:59 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I think puzzles and games make good examples of NP-hard problems.
Sokoban is PSPACE-complete, and it's not that difficult to show people
that there are puzzles (like ciphers) where you know if a solution is
right
Raph Frank wrote:
On Fri, Sep 5, 2008 at 2:00 AM, Stéphane Rouillon
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hello Juho,
using age, gender or other virtual dimension to build virtual districts
replaces geographic antagonism by generation antagonism.
The idea is to get equivalent sample that are not opposed by
Raph Frank wrote:
I think there is a slight issue. In PAV, the satisfaction of each
voter is determined by
S(N) = sum(1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + 1/4 + + 1/N )
Where N is equal to the number of candidates elected.
An approx function could be created that gives S(N) for non-integer N.
The easiest
James Gilmour wrote:
Raph Frank Sent: Friday, September 05, 2008 12:35 PM
Also, what is optimal for Should we use subsidiarity to make
decisions?.
I don't think this question can be answered as you have asked it.
Perhaps it would be more appropriate to ask Do we want our
decision-making
Michael Allan wrote:
What about an alternative electoral system, in parallel? If voters
really want to see change - if they really want to choose the 'who'
and the 'what' - a parallel system would give them an opportunity to
vote with their feet. If nothing else, they might be curious to learn
Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Afternoon, Kristofer
re: This sounds a lot like what I've previously referred to as
'council democracy'.
I hadn't heard that term before or seen the proposal. I wonder if the
concepts can be merged, perhaps by an analytical critique of the processes.
I first
Raph Frank wrote:
Sorry, pressed reply instead of reply to all
On 9/11/08, Aaron Armitage [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It doesn't follow from the fact we choose representatives for ourselves
that we would lose nothing by being stripped of the means of political
action. We would lose our
Juho wrote:
The traditional algorithm complexity research covers usually only
finding perfect/optimal result. I'm particularly interested in how the
value of the result increases as a function of time. It is possible that
even if it would take 100 years to guarantee that one has found the best
Michael Allan wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
If you take the parallel system strategy to its extreme, you'd get a
parallel organization where (as an example), a group elects a double
mayor and support him over the real mayor, essentially building a state
inside the state. I don't think
Raph Frank wrote:
On Sun, Sep 14, 2008 at 8:56 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
A random assembly also resists the attack where one corrupts
candidates, simply because it's not clear who the candidates are
going to be.
There is also the effect that a person who wants
Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Kristofer
Thanks for the link. I'll check it as soon as I can.
re: If the council is of size 7, no opinion that holds less than
1/7 of the voters can be represented, so if the opinion is
spread too thin, it'll be removed from the system; but if
Michael Allan wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
That is interesting. Perhaps one could have, for example, a Condorcet
party that pledges to run the Condorcet winner of an earlier internal
election for president. Then various small parties could nominally join up
with the Condorcet party
Chris Benham wrote:
I have an idea for a FBC complying method that I think is clearly
better than the version of Range Voting (aka Average Rating or
Cardinal Ratings) defined and promoted by CRV.
http://rangevoting.org/
I suggest that voters use multi-slot ratings ballots that
For some reason, I didn't receive Dave Ketchum's reply to my post about
the Condorcet party. So let's try this again, indeed.
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Mon, 29 Sep 2008 00:05:28 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
My goal is using Condorcet, but recognizing that everything
Chris Benham wrote:
Yes. I suggest that those not rated should be interpreted as
disapproved and bottom-most rated. Those candidates rated zero
should be considered to be half-approved. Candidate X's approval
opposition to Y should be X's approval score (including of course the
half-approvals)
Stéphane Rouillon wrote:
Hi,
for an anti-fraud purpose, the capacity to repeat the counting operation
is a must.
Hence I recommand to use a reproductible random procedure to break ties.
This allows the use of different computers to reproduce the counting
operation, while always obtaining the
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Sat, Oct 4, 2008 at 3:51 PM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In fact some computer scientists just recently mathematically PROVED
that it is impossible to even verify that the certified software is
actually running on a voting machine.
Tell us more, a bit more
Mike Frank wrote:
Hello, I was thinking of building a free public web service, perhaps
operated by a charitable NPO, that would allow organizations (including
perhaps small governments) to operate online elections in a way that
offers some sophisticated modern security features.
In addition
Scott Ritchie wrote:
I'm writing a ranked pairs counter as practice for learning python, and
I realized I don't know the answer to this question.
Suppose I want to know who comes in second in a ranked pairs election.
Is it:
1) Run ranked pairs algorithm on the ballots, find that candidate A
Greg Nisbet wrote:
Reasons why Range is better and always will be.
I would like to end the truce.
I'll be generous to the Condorcet camp and assume they suggest something
reasonable like RP, Schulze or River.
Property Related:
favorite betrayal, participation and consistency.
Implications:
Greg Nisbet wrote:
Proportional Approval Voting
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Proportional-approval-voting
Brief summary of this method:
there are O(c!) (candidates factorial) many pseudocandidates
consisting of all the possible combinations of candidates.
Let's say we have a voter
Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Jonathan Lundell,
I wrote (7 Oct 2008):
Well, the second paper is more general. Here they use
Arrow's Theorem to argue why monotonicity has to be
sacrificed.
You wrote (7 Oct 2008):
Or at least that something has to be sacrificed. Do
you see that as a problem?
Dave Ketchum wrote:
I suggest a two-step resolution:
Agree to a truce between Condorcet and Range, while they dispose of
IRV as being less capable than Condorcet.
Then go back to the war between Condorcet and Range.
I think the problem, or at least a part of it, is that if we (the
Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Kristofer,
you wrote:
This is really a question of whether a candidate loved by 49% and
considered kinda okay by 51% should win when compared to a candidate
hated by the 49% and considered slightly better than the first by the
51%. A strict interpretation of the
Warren Smith wrote:
1. the right way to compare election methods is Bayesian Regret
(BR). http://rangevoting.org/BayRegDum.html
For a long time I thought this was only applicable for single-winner
voting methods. However, I eventually saw how to do it for
multiwinner methods also:
Greg Nisbet wrote:
Instant Range-off Voting is an interesting idea. I thought about it once
a while ago too. I didn't renormalize the ballots though, I just set the
co-highest to 100 and the co-lowest to 0 for each ballot as a sanitation
measure. I eventually abadoned it due to
Greg Nisbet wrote:
On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 3:09 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If you like Range, this may be to your advantage, since you could
say that instead of there being only one Condorcet method that
satisfies FBC
Raph Frank wrote:
On Fri, Oct 17, 2008 at 12:44 AM, Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think what we need to see, are IRV elections to a chamber that is
not parliamentary (i.e. there is no particular prize for one party getting
the most seats). Perhaps in that situation IRV could support
Greg Nisbet wrote:
So far the following multiwinner methods have been suggested or I know of:
CPOSTV
Schulze STV
QBS (this is what I meant by Proportional Borda, sorry!)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quota_Borda_system
QanythingS (look at the description of QBS, it effectively allows a
black
Paul Kislanko wrote:
There are several ways to make ballots-counted public record without
compromising the anonymity of ballots-cast. The trick is to assign a unique
key to each POTENTIAL ballot-cast, and expose said key only to the voter who
casts an actual ballot.
The collecting authority
Raph Frank wrote:
Another option is to use the original ballots. In Australia, for
their PR-STV seats, the ballots are reexamined after a vacancy and the
results calculated a second time. However, no candidate who is still
sitting in the parliament can be eliminated (i.e. you can't lose your
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Mon, 20 Oct 2008 19:51:55 -0700 Bob Richard wrote:
Some states may not be up to Condorcet instantly. Let them
stay with FPTP
until they are ready to move up. Just as a Condorcet voter
can choose to rank
only a single candidate, for a state full of
Bob Richard wrote:
I'm obviously missing something really, really basic here. Can someone
explain to me what it is?
Take it from the FPTP count and recount it
into the N*N array by Condorcet rules ...
I still have no idea what this means. Here's an example:
Plurality result:
Able: 45
Greg Nisbet wrote:
For the record, I am against nondeterminism in single winner methods,
but that is another ball of wax that I want to keep separate.
Anyway, the single winner methods can be divided into a few basic types:
1) slow (these take O(candidates!) time. They are non-iterative)
2)
Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Evening, Kristofer
Before responding to your most recent letter, I'd like to revisit a
topic mentioned in your letter of Fri, 26 Sep. In discussing the way a
group of three people might resolve a traffic question involving three
alternatives, each championed by a
Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Kristofer
There is so much good material in your message that, instead of
responding to all of it, I'm going to select bits and pieces and comment
on them, one at a time, until I've responded to all of them. I hope
this will help us focus on specific parts
Dave Ketchum wrote:
A few thoughts:
Plurality or Approval cannot fill need.
IRV uses about the same ballot as Condorcet - but deserves
rejection for its method of counting.
Condorcet can - but I am trying to word this to also accept other
methods that satisfy need.
Range
Fred Gohlke wrote:
The proposed electoral method uses computers to maintain a database of
the electorate, generate random groupings, and record the selections
made at each level, This makes the process inherently bi-directional.
Each elected official sits atop a pyramid of known electors, so
Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Kristofer
re: So, in essence, the pyramid structure remains even after
selection?
Yes. We have the capability of retaining the information and it should
be used to enhance the role of those elected to act as spokesperson for
a segment of the electorate.
Dave Ketchum wrote:
With the EC it seems standard to do Plurality - a method with weaknesses
most of us in EM recognize.
Let's do a Constitutional amendment to move up.
I propose Condorcet. One advantage is that states could move up to use
it as soon as ready. States, and even districts
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Fri, 07 Nov 2008 09:58:30 +0100 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I think an NPV-style gradual change would have a greater chance of
succeeding than would a constitutional amendment. The constitutional
amendment requires a supermajority, and would thus be blocked
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