[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
and the SocraticTradition in Philosophy", Proceedings of the Peirce Society, 2000)http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/socratic.htm Peirce could take this for granted not because of some well known psychological laws but because of the adoption (in a modified form) of the basic dialectical principle by Hegel and others, following upon the use of it in the Kantian philosophy in the transcendental dialectic of pure reason in the First Critique. I do not say that this should also satisfy us today as sufficient to persuade us to the acceptance of the thesis that inquiry is driven by doubt, construed as a "dissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions". But it is possible that Peirce did, at the time of composition of the Fixation article, think that this would be regarded as being something no one would be likely to dispute, or at least as something which no reader of the Popular Science Monthly would be likely to dispute. (That Journal was, as I understand it, a rough equivalent of the present day Nature as regards its targeted audience, whereas the Scientific American at that time was oriented more towards applications and inventions than theoretical science.) It is not obvious that logic should be based in a theory of inquiry, but it is not clear to me that Peirce regarded that as something which had to be argued for. In any case, none of this affects your thesis about Peirce not regarding the Fixation as suffering from psychologism.I have a couple of other comments to make, Jeff, but I will put them in another message which I probably won't write before tomorrow. Joe Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED]- Original Message From: Jeff Kasser [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Sunday, October 1, 2006 3:04:13 PMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? Joe and other listers, Thanks, Joe, for your kind words about my paper. I fear that you make the paper sound a bit more interesting than it is, and you certainly do a better job of establishing its importance than I did. It's something of a cut-and paste job from my dissertation, and I'm afraid the prose is sometimes rather "dissertationy," which is almost never a good thing. First, as to the question in the heading of your initial message, it seems to me that Peirce can only be referring to the antecedents of the two conditional statements that motivate the method of tenacity in the first place. These are stated in the first sentence of Section V of "Fixation." "If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if belief is of the nature of a habit, why should we not attain the desired end, by taking any answer to a question which we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything which might disturb it." In the context of the paper, this would seem to make fairly straightforward sense of the idea that tenacity rests on "two fundamental psychological laws." Peirce sure seems to think that it should be apparent to the reader on which "laws" tenacity rests, and so I don't think we're to wander too far afield from the paper itself in determining which the laws are. This interpretation does have two disadvantages, however. If my paper is at all close to right, then Peirce considered these laws "psychical" rather than "psychological," in the 1870's as well as in the 1860's and in the latter half of his career (I don't mean that he had the term "psychical" available in 1877, however). But this is one of those places where the fact that Peirce was writing for *Popular Science Monthly* can perhaps be invoked to account for some terminological sloppiness. A second consideration is a bit more troublesome, however. It's not easy to see how Peirce could have considered "the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry" a psychical or a psychological law. It seems charitable here to see Peirce as writing a bit casually once again and to construe him as meaning that the statement in question is a normative truth more or less forced on us by psychological (i.e. psychical) facts. But, as the following quote from another of your messages indicates, Peirce was pretty quick to close the is/ought gap with respect to this issue:The following axiom requires no comment, beyond the remark that it seems often to be forgotten. Where there is no real doubt or disagreement there is no question and can be no real investigation. So perhaps he really meant that a statement about the aim of iqnuiry could be a (coenscopic) psychological law. This raises an issue you mention in yet another message, viz. what exactly makes doubts "paper" or otherwise inappropriate. There's been some good work done on t
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Response to J Kasser (resend) -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Mon, 2 Oct 2006 11:49 AM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? J Kasser says, "It's not easy to see how Peirce could have considered "the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry" a psychical or a psychological law. It seems charitable here to see Peirce as writing a bit casually once again and to construe him as meaning that the statement in question is a normative truth more or less forced on us by psychological (i.e. psychical) facts. But, as the following quote from another of your messages indicates, Peirce was pretty quick to close the is/ought gap with respect to this issue: The following axiom requires no comment, beyond the remark that it seems often to be forgotten. Where there is no real doubt or disagreement there is no question and can be no real investigation. So perhaps he really meant that a statement about the aim of iqnuiry could be a (coenscopic) psychological law." (end) The question is whether"the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry" is a normative truth or a psychological law. The fact that doubt is a necessary condition for inquiry does not settle this question. It merely suggests what is required for any inquiry to begin. Peirce does not say "the settlement of inquiry ought to be the sole object of inquiry." Thus, the statement is a generalization about what all (some?) men desire when they inquire. It is the major premise in a practical syllogism. The conclusion isthenormative claim that we ought to pursue the scientific method. Maybe there is an implicit premise that we ought to pursue the best method for settling opinion. This might satisfy those concerned with the "naturalistic fallacy." Peirce overstates his case about his own psychologism. His statement about the "origin of truth" is unfortunate. He should have spoken of either a "desire for truth" originating inthe impulse to self-consistency or of "belief."In the latter case,it makes perfectly good sense to talk about psychological concepts such as self-control, satisfaction, conviction, habit etc. The interesting question is whether we can make sense of practical reason andtalk of ends and actions without the introduction of psychological concepts. The problem here has less to do with replacing psychologizing tendencies with phenomenological observations than with using the "intentional idom" to assess practical reason. I have always thought of FOB as an "ethics of inquiry." And unless one wants to try and eliminate the concepts involved in moral psychology,they are always there as a conceptual resource for articulating the normative basis of methodology in the sciences. It appears then, that logical methodology is based on ethics. Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Sun, 1 Oct 2006 3:04 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? Joe and other listers, Thanks, Joe, for your kind words about my paper. I fear that you make the paper sound a bit more interesting than it is, and you certainly do a better job of establishing its importance than I did. It's something of a cut-and paste job from my dissertation, and I'm afraid the prose is sometimes rather "dissertationy," which is almost never a good thing. First, as to the question in the heading of your initial message, it seems to me that Peirce can only be referring to the antecedents of the two conditional statements that motivate the method of tenacity in the first place. These are stated in the first sentence of Section V of "Fixation." "If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if belief is of the nature of a habit, why should we not attain the desired end, by taking any answer to a question which we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything which might disturb it." In the context of the paper, this would seem to make fairly straightforward sense of the idea that tenacity rests on "two fundamental psychological laws." Peirce sure seems to think that it should be apparent to the reader on which "laws" tenacity rests, and so I don't think we're to wander too far afield from the paper itself in determining which the laws are. This interpretation does have two disadvantages, however. If my paper is at all close to right, then Peirce considered these laws "psychical" rather than "psychological," in the 1870's as well as in the 1860's and in the latter half of his career (I don't mean that he had the
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
hich all the physical sciences repose, when defined in the strict way in which its founders understood it, and not as embracing the law of the conservation of energy, neither is nor ever was one of the special sciences that aim at the discovery of novel phenomena, but merely consists in the analysis of truths which universal experience has compelled every man of us to acknowledge. Thus, the proof by Archimedes of the principle of the lever, upon which Lagrange substantially bases the whole statical branch of the science, consists in showing that that principle is virtually assumed in our ordinary conception of two bodies of equal weight. Such universal experiences may not be true to microscopical exactitude, but that they are true in the main is assumed by everybody who devises an experiment, and is therefore more certain than any result of a laboratory experiment. (CP 8.198, CN3 230 [1905]) end quote=== In other words, Peirce is identifying there the point at which the coenoscopic and the idioscopic meet, in physical conceptions that appear in the context of idioscopic (special scientific) research, and I suggest that the two "psychological laws" which he is referring to in the passage in the Fixation article which I quoted in my first post on this topic must be the coenoscopic analogues of those in the case of the psychological sciences, In other words, those particular psychological laws must be psychological in the commonsense psychology of everyday life, though they will appear as fundamental conceptions in scientific psychology.and thus seem at first to be idioscopic in type. Now Jeff's claim in that paper (among other things) is that "The Fixation of Belief" is concerned with psychology only in the sense of commonsense psychology, not scientific psychology, and Peirce's anti-psychologism is as characteristically present in that paper as it is in any of his more technical papers on logic. Thus the fact that the Fixation paper relies as heavily as it does on doubt and belief neither shows that Peirce lapsed into psychologism there nor that Peirce ever thought that this was so, but rather -- and I think this is what Jeff is saying -- it is rather that where Peirce may seem to be admitting to psychologism in that paper he is in fact admitting to something rather different, namely, a rhetorical failure in composing it that mistakenly made it appear to people who do not understand what the objection to psychologism actually is that he was making his claims in that paper rest on psychology in the special or idioscopic sense. when in fact he was not. (I may be putting words in Jeff's mouth there but I think that is what he is getting at.) Well, that will have to do for this post. Sorry for being so long-winded on that. Joe [EMAIL PROTECTED] . . - Original Message From: Bill Bailey [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Saturday, September 23, 2006 1:21:48 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? Joe, thanks for your response. I "get it" now. Festinger came to mind because "selective exposure" as amode of dissonance avoidance was a major topic in communication research. I haven't read that literature in years--and I didn't particularly buy into it then--so don't trust me now. As I recall, one mode of dissonance reduction wassimilar tothe pre-dissonance mode:"selective perception," or "cherry picking"--selecting only the data consonant with the threatened belief or behavior. "Rationalization"was a dissonance reduction means, I think, though it seems nearly tautological.In terms of Festinger's smoking-health dissonance I remember itin this form: "We're all going to die of something." There is also the heroic, the transcendent "We all owe a death." Simple denial is a common means: "If smoking causes cancer, most smokers would get it, but in fact most don't." Researchers turned up so many techniques of dissonance reduction I no longer remember which were originallyproposed by Festinger and which came later. Some, by the way (I think Eliot Aronson among them), argued cognitive dissonance was nota logical but a psychological phenomena, and that humans were not rational but rationalizers. And, relevant to your remarks below, some argued that the need to reduce the dissonance resulted not from logical tensions, but from the social concept of the self. For example, the argument goes, if it were only a logical tension operating, there'd be no tension experienced from telling a lie for money. It would make logical sense to say anything asked of you for either a few or many bucks. The tension arisesonly as a result of social norms:"What kind of person am I to tell a lie for a lousy couple of bucks." In my personal experience with smoking, I c
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
I think you're right, Gary, that Peirce doesn't really need to be saved
from the circularity you (very astutely) pointed out in your earlier
message. And I think that you make a good start of showing why he
doesn't need saving. But I would add that Peirce is very concerned
about avoiding what he takes to be vicious circularities in philosophy,
and that he does think of psychologism as involving a vicious
circularity. As some of Peirce's writings on the classification of
sciences make apparent and as Christopher Hookway has emphasized in a
couple of papers, Peirce maintained that we claim a kind of autonomy or
rational self-control when we undertake inquiry. He seemed to think
that some facts are not subject to logical criticism. These give shape
to the project of inquiry and we don't give troubling hostages to
fortune in relying on them to formulate the goals and methods of
inqury. But Peirce was very concerned about building claims that
couldn't be established by the coenscopic sciences into the goals and
methods of inquiry, because he feared that they would then be placed
beyond the possibility of falsification through inquiry. It's an open
question whether the coenscopic/idioscopic distinction can bear the
weight that Peirce asks it to bear, but I do think that Peirce is very
troubled by some apparent circularities and not at all troubled by (what
some would see as) other circularities.
Best to all, and with warm admiration for the departed Arnold Shepperson,
Jeff
gnusystems wrote:
Joe, Kirsti, list,
[[ Well, Gary, it looks like some fancy footwork with the term is
rooted in might have to be resorted to if we are to save Peirce on this
one! You've caught him with a flat contradiction there! ]]
Personally i think the contradiction is more apparent than flat. As i
said (and i think Kirsti said the same), this is not circulum vitiosum
but a pattern which underlies inquiry and therefore can only be itself
investigated via a cyclical process.
The social principle is implicit in explicit (formal) logic, *and*
logic/semeiotic is implicit in the social principle. (Though Peirce
would not have put it that way in 1869 or 1878.) The social
principle is intrinsically rooted in logic (1869) because recognition
of others as experiencing beings is a special case of seeing a
difference between phenomenon and reality, or between sign and object --
or between soul and world, to use the terms Peirce uses in both of
these passages. Logic begins with the revelation of a real world out
there beyond phenomenal consciousness. Logic is rooted in the social
principle (1878) in that it explicates the relationship between
experience and reality, which it cannot do prior to the developmental
stage at which the difference between the two is recognized -- a stage
accessible only to *social* animals who can handle symbolic signs. (The
method of tenacity is, in a sense, a reversion to an earlier stage of
development even though it is also a social stance.)
So i don't think Peirce needs to be saved; or if he does, it's only
because (like a bodhisattva) he has sacrificed his own soul to save the
whole world.
gary F.
}To seek Buddhahood apart from living beings is like seeking echoes by
silencing sounds. [Layman Hsiang]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/gnoxic.htm }{
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[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Gary, Joe, et al.
With circularity, I think you'll have to consider, what Peirce wrote of taking up the same premisses again and again in cyclical systems, e.g. cyclical algebra. That is not circulum vitiosum. The same premisses take on new meanings, with a new context, that's how I've interpreted the idea.
To Peice, meaning IS contextual.
Kirsti Määttänen
[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
25.9.2006 kello 20:55, gnusystems kirjoitti:
Joe, thanks for that pointer to Jeff Kasser's paper; it clears up many
of the questions i've had lately about what Peirce meant by
psychologism (and psychology).
However i'm inclined to question Jeff's emphasis (in the middle of the
paper) on the circularity of psychologistic approaches to logic as a
crucial component of Peirce's antipsychologism. I think there's an
important sense in which the logic of science -- the logic that Peirce
was mainly interested in -- *has* to be circular, or rather cyclical. I
won't go into that here, but i will point out a circularity in Peirce
which i think would be rather damning if all circles were vicious.
Jeff quotes W2 270-1, CP 5.354, EP1 81 [1869]:
[[[ [L]ogic rigidly requires, before all else, that no determinate fact,
nothing which can happen to a man's self, should be of more consequence
to him than everything else. He who would not sacrifice his own soul to
save the whole world, is illogical in all his inferences, collectively.
So the social principle is intrinsically rooted in logic. ]]]
Now, compare this with a clearly recycled version from 1878 (EP1, 149;
CP 2.654):
[[[ It seems to me that we are driven to this, that logicality
inexorably requires that our interests shall not be limited. They must
not stop at our own fate, but must embrace the whole community. This
community, again, must not be limited, but must extend to all races of
beings with whom we can come into immediate or mediate intellectual
relation. It must reach, however vaguely, beyond this geological epoch,
beyond all bounds. He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the
whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences,
collectively. Logic is rooted in the social principle. ]]]
The social principle is rooted in logic, and logic is rooted in the
social principle. If that ain't circular, what is?
gary
}Who guides those whom God has led astray? [Qur'an 30:29 (Cleary)]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
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[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Coming out of hibernation this is one hell of an interesting thread, but I've not had time to put in my contribution because my time is consumed with various projects. So I'll put in my 0.02 cents worth now. What more compelling factor in fixation of belief is there than the mind-body unity of all the mind-bodies (of our body-cells) that come together in the one mind-body that is self? What about all the little animals (neurons) that are having to contend with their own habits? Surely the group-habits of the cells of which we are composed will establish an attractor (chaos theory) that will lock us into fixed ideas until we can get the whole team (of cells) to agree to a new set of habits? People can incorporate new ideas swiftly, so long as these new ideas are not in fact new, but expressions of an EXISTING logic-set. It's easy to change political opinions, for example, if we know what the different political parties are about - but this understanding of political parties emerges over a long period of time. But step outside of what we know, and the fixation of belief, courtesy of the habits of the critters of which we are comprised, will have a lot of momentum that is not changed easily. A truly new idea will take some considerable time to emerge, especially within a new logical framework that is establishing itself. In other words, we are dealing more with the momentum of tornadoes and hurricanes rather than logic-switching of circuits. That's my 0.02 cents worth. Back to my projects... __ Newton's Laws of Emotion: http://members.iinet.net.au/~tramont/biosem.html There can be no complexity without simplicity. Stephen Springette __ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Title: [peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Pei Kristi, Yes indeed, I'm thinking of growth logically. This is why I don't think (at least am not convinced by any argument I've seen) that there is much to be gained by looking at the order of different methods of fixation chiefly in psychic or psychological terms. We can certainly conceive the logical possibility of a monadic mind, however we need to remember that for Peirce mind (human or not) is Third since the Law of Mind is the law of habit-taking. A monadic mind would therefore be a mind in an entirely different sense, it would be a mind that cannot grow, that cannot form habits; it would be the mere possibility of a mind, one where the law of mind would be a mere incohate possibility. cheers, Martin Lefebvre Martin, Joe, et al., 25.9.2006 kello 19:40, martin lefebvre kirjoitti: I consider the Fixation essay to be organized around a sort of development/growth principle that leads to the scientific method as the method of choice of reason. I believe that growth here can be thought of categorially. Yes, I agree, absolutely. But still, the principle of growth can be viewed as predominantly a logical order, or predominantly as a metaphysical order, or as a psychic order ( the term 'psychic' to be understood here in contradistinction to 'psychological' - which is a distinction Peirce at least once made - a distinction I've interpreted as: the former referring to philosophy of mind, and the latter referring to the empirical science called 'psychology'.) From the following, it seems to me you are considering the logical order: The method of tenacity works as long as the individual is considered monadically (the social impulse must be held in check) and as long as there is no attempt to examine a belief against experience. A monadic mind (what could that be???)... A monadic mind is something we can think of, so it's a logical possibility, it is conceivable, irrespective of whether any such (human) mind would exist. Kirsti Määttänen [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Joe, Kirsti, list,
[[ Well, Gary, it looks like some fancy footwork with the term is
rooted in might have to be resorted to if we are to save Peirce on this
one! You've caught him with a flat contradiction there! ]]
Personally i think the contradiction is more apparent than flat. As i
said (and i think Kirsti said the same), this is not circulum vitiosum
but a pattern which underlies inquiry and therefore can only be itself
investigated via a cyclical process.
The social principle is implicit in explicit (formal) logic, *and*
logic/semeiotic is implicit in the social principle. (Though Peirce
would not have put it that way in 1869 or 1878.) The social
principle is intrinsically rooted in logic (1869) because recognition
of others as experiencing beings is a special case of seeing a
difference between phenomenon and reality, or between sign and object --
or between soul and world, to use the terms Peirce uses in both of
these passages. Logic begins with the revelation of a real world out
there beyond phenomenal consciousness. Logic is rooted in the social
principle (1878) in that it explicates the relationship between
experience and reality, which it cannot do prior to the developmental
stage at which the difference between the two is recognized -- a stage
accessible only to *social* animals who can handle symbolic signs. (The
method of tenacity is, in a sense, a reversion to an earlier stage of
development even though it is also a social stance.)
So i don't think Peirce needs to be saved; or if he does, it's only
because (like a bodhisattva) he has sacrificed his own soul to save the
whole world.
gary F.
}To seek Buddhahood apart from living beings is like seeking echoes by
silencing sounds. [Layman Hsiang]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/gnoxic.htm }{
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[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Gary, Joe, Kirsti, list,
Personally i think the contradiction is more apparent than flat. As i
said (and i think Kirsti said the same), this is not circulum vitiosum
but a pattern which underlies inquiry and therefore can only be itself
investigated via a cyclical process.
I have to agree. The more I read of Peirce, the more I see loops of reasoning -
loops, networks, call it what you will. In fact it only seems to jive with his
thinking, especially showing itself when he gets knee-deep in relative logic.
The circle has less to do with circular reasoning than with being able to
define even the simplest conceptions via the logic of relations (5.207).
A bit like the hermeneutic circle of Heidegger - the structure of meaning, and
of Dasein itself, looping back on itself and forming a system (H. 153 of Being
and Time). So far as I know, Heidegger never read Peirce, but they seem to be
touching on the same thing.
Circles in reasoning must be demonstrated to be truly vicious; I'm not
convinced that this one is.
best,
jacob
Original-Nachricht
Datum: Wed, 27 Sep 2006 09:35:29 -0400
Von: gnusystems [EMAIL PROTECTED]
An: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Betreff: [peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce
referring to?
Joe, Kirsti, list,
[[ Well, Gary, it looks like some fancy footwork with the term is
rooted in might have to be resorted to if we are to save Peirce on this
one! You've caught him with a flat contradiction there! ]]
Personally i think the contradiction is more apparent than flat. As i
said (and i think Kirsti said the same), this is not circulum vitiosum
but a pattern which underlies inquiry and therefore can only be itself
investigated via a cyclical process.
The social principle is implicit in explicit (formal) logic, *and*
logic/semeiotic is implicit in the social principle. (Though Peirce
would not have put it that way in 1869 or 1878.) The social
principle is intrinsically rooted in logic (1869) because recognition
of others as experiencing beings is a special case of seeing a
difference between phenomenon and reality, or between sign and object --
or between soul and world, to use the terms Peirce uses in both of
these passages. Logic begins with the revelation of a real world out
there beyond phenomenal consciousness. Logic is rooted in the social
principle (1878) in that it explicates the relationship between
experience and reality, which it cannot do prior to the developmental
stage at which the difference between the two is recognized -- a stage
accessible only to *social* animals who can handle symbolic signs. (The
method of tenacity is, in a sense, a reversion to an earlier stage of
development even though it is also a social stance.)
So i don't think Peirce needs to be saved; or if he does, it's only
because (like a bodhisattva) he has sacrificed his own soul to save the
whole world.
gary F.
}To seek Buddhahood apart from living beings is like seeking echoes by
silencing sounds. [Layman Hsiang]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/gnoxic.htm }{
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[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Bill, Joe, list, Well, the Pluto example is an intriguing one. BB: The experiential evolution in the conception of Pluto as a planet can be described as the new information that surprised even the scientists. This scenario seems to me to fit pretty well Peirce's sketch of the way things necessarily happen in social groups. But it also involves features I wonder how Peirce would work out in the terms of his sketch, In some news source, I saw the vote of the astronomers hailed as a triumph of science over romance. And so it appears at first glance. But what we have an instance of tenacity (This is how we have always defined a planet,) propped up by the authority of science, the community of investigators. We can certainly say there has been an advance in information. But has there been an evolutionary advance in the mode of conception, or just a shift in whose conceptions are valued? Has there been an evolutionary advance in the mode of conception? A good question. To my mind Peirce would certainly not had applauded at a decision by vote. What is at stake here, is a possible change (or need for a change) in more fundamental issues, those of nominalistic or realistic stance. In other words, is the basic issue about definitions? Or is it about something, which shows that definitions do not play the part they are commonly thought to play in nominalistic way of thinking. Which brings to mind how Peirce criticized the common modern view of geometry as based on definitions, not on what is undoubtedly hold to be true of things ( somewhere in vol.3 of CP). So to me it seems. on the basis of the information provided by you, that this case was just a shift in whose conceptions are valued, decided in the way constitutive to modern gallup-democracy (which I view as a twisted and peculiar mode of the method of authority). Kirsti Määttänen [EMAIL PROTECTED]>
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Dear Joe, Thanks for your response and the quote. On second thoughts, informed with the quote you provided, some kind of evolution seems to be involved. But, being evolution of a conception, it must be of logical nature. I can't see how it could hold as a hypothesis of evolution of either individual or social development. Social comes first, no question about it. But it might be fruitful to think of the principle of ordering the methods this way in terms of critical thought involved. The method of tenacity, by definition, involves none. The method of authority may involve some, though not necessarily by the believer, but by the authority. It is not excluded, by definition, that the authority in question may have arrived at the belief by a process involving critical thought, as well as having gained the authority for a reason. Well, I don't know. Don't remember Peirce ever writing along these lines. But it is an ordering of intellectual enditions. So the method of tenacity would imply a conscious belief, in contrast to all the beliefs forced upon us by experience which we are not aware we are holding. CP 5.524 ...For belief, while it lasts, is a strong habit, and, as such forces the man to believe until some surprise breaks the habit. Kirsti Määttänen [EMAIL PROTECTED]> 25.9.2006 kello 02:02, Joseph Ransdell kirjoitti: Dear Kirsti:: I'm short on time today and can't really answer you until tomorrow, but I ran across a llater passage in Peirce in wihch he describes what he was doing earlier, in the Fixation article, as follows. (I'm just quotting it, for what \it's worth , at the moment and will get back with you tomorrow, when I have some free time again. In a manuscript c. 1906 which was printed in the Collected Papers at 5.564, Peirce describes The Fixation of Bellief (1877) as starting out from the proposition that the agitation of a question ceases only when satisfaction is attaned with the settlement of belief, and then goes on to consider how: ...the conception of truth gradually develops from that principle under the action of experience; beginning with willful belief, or self-mendacity [i.e. the method of tenacity], the most degraded of all intellectual cnditions; thence rising to the imposition of beliefs by the authority of organized society [the method of authority]; then to the idea of a settlement of opinion as the result of a fermentation of ideas [the a priori method]; and finally reaching the idea of truth as overwelmingly forced upon the mind in experience as the effect of an independent reality [the method of reason or science, or, as he also calls it,in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, the method of experience]. My words are in brackets Joe Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Original Message From: Kirsti Määttänen [EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu> Sent: Sunday, September 24, 2006 8:50:46 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to? Joe Bill, Joe, I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the order of the methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed. But that wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing this response :). It was the two fundamental psychological laws on the title you gave, which caught my attention. Anyway, you wrote: > JR: ...exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the > second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have > the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be > authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried > to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't > recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory > on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much > interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of > something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I > believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible? And later in the discussion you wrote: JR: Well, I was thinking of the argument one might make that social consciousness is prior to consciousness of self, and the method of tenacity seems to me to be motivated by the value of self-integrity, the instinctive tendency not to give up on any part of oneself, and one's beliefs are an important aspect of what one tends to think of when one thinks of one's identity. To my mind the logic in the order Peirce is here following is based on the degree of 'goodness' of methods, not on motives, or order in evolution, or any other kind of (logical) order. And the goodness has to do with 'summum bonum, the ultimate aim and purpose, which is not necessarily an aim or a purpose held by any (one) individual person. So, the method of tenacity, in spite of being the lowest in degree of goodness, IS STILL A CONSISTENT METHOD. Which,
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Kristi, Joe, list:
The human is a social animal, born into a social group
which typically has a full array of habits, customs in place. That strikes
me as a given. "We've always done it that way, and that's the way it will
be done" seems to me what Peirce is talking about as tenacity propped up by
authority. And that too strikes me as a given, even in this empirical,
secular society where tenacity and authority are currently clashing over
Pluto.Peirces "community of investigators"(is that his term?),
the astronomers, settled it with a vote. The experiential evolution in the
conception of Pluto as a planet can be described as the new information that
surprised even the scientists. This scenario seems to me to fit pretty
well Peirce's sketch of the way things necessarily happen in social
groups. But it also involves features I wonder how Peirce wouldwork
outin the terms of his sketch, In some news source, I saw the vote
of the astronomers hailed as a triumph of science over romance. And so it
appears at first glance. But what we have an instance of tenacity ("This
is how we have always defined a planet,") propped up by the authority of
science, the community of investigators.We can certainly say there has
been an advance in information. But has there been an evolutionary advance
in the mode of conception, or just a shift in whose conceptions are
valued?
Dear Joe,Thanks for your response and the quote. On second
thoughts, informed with the quote you provided, some kind of evolution seems to
be involved. But, being evolution of a conception, it must be of logical nature.
I can't see how it could hold as a hypothesis of evolution of either individual
or social development. Social comes first, no question about it.But it
might be fruitful to think of the principle of ordering the methods this way in
terms of critical thought involved. The method of tenacity, by definition,
involves none. The method of authority may involve some, though not necessarily
by the believer, but by the authority. It is not excluded, by definition, that
the authority in question may have arrived at the belief by a process involving
critical thought, as well as having gained the authority for a reason.
Well, I don't know. Don't remember Peirce ever writing along these
lines. But it is an ordering of "intellectual enditions". So the method of
tenacity would imply a conscious belief, in contrast to all the beliefs forced
upon us by experience which we are not aware we are holding. CP 5.524
""...For belief, while it lasts, is a strong habit, and, as such forces the man
to believe until some surprise breaks the habit."
Kirsti
Määttänen[EMAIL PROTECTED]25.9.2006
kello 02:02, Joseph Ransdell kirjoitti:Dear
Kirsti::
I'm
short on time today and can't really answer you until tomorrow, but I
ran across a llater passage in Peirce in wihch he describes what he
was doing earlier, in the Fixation article, as follows. (I'm
just quotting it, for what \it's worth , at the moment and will get back
with you tomorrow, when I have some free time again.In
a manuscript c. 1906 which was printed in the Collected Papers at 5.564,
Peirce describes "The Fixation of Bellief" (1877) as starting out from the
proposition that "the agitation of a question" ceases only when satisfaction
is attaned with the settlement of belief, and then goes on to consider how: "...the
conception of truth gradually develops from that principle under the
action of experience; beginning with willful belief, or self-mendacity [i.e.
the method of tenacity], the most degraded of all intellectual cnditions;
thence rising to the imposition of beliefs by the authority of organized
society [the method of authority]; then to the idea of a settlement of
opinion as the result of a fermentation of ideas [the a priori method]; and
finally reaching the idea of truth as overwelmingly forced upon the mind in
experience as the effect of an independent reality [the method of reason or
science, or, as he also calls it,in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, the method
of experience]."My
words are in bracketsJoe
Ransdell[EMAIL PROTECTED]-
Original Message From:
Kirsti Määttänen [EMAIL PROTECTED]To:
Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent:
Sunday, September 24, 2006 8:50:46 AMSubject:
[peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?Joe
Bill,Joe,
I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the order of the
methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed. But that
wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing this response :).
It was "the two fundamental psychological laws" on the title you gave,
which caught my attention. An
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
to it
and to it alone, and which has nothing mysterious or vague about it. In
like manner, it may be admitted that a genuine investigation is
undertaken to resolve the doubts of the investigator. But observe this:
no sensible man will be void of doubt as long as persons as competent
to judge as himself differ from him. Hence to resolve his own doubts is
to ascertain to what position sufficient research would carry all men.
For attaining this unanimous accord,--this catholic confession,--two plans have been pursued.
The first, simplest, and most usual is to adhere pertinaciously to some
opinion and endeavour to unite all men upon it. The means of bringing
men to agree to such a fixed opinion are an efficient organization of
men who will devote themselves to propagating it, working upon the
passions of mankind, and gaining an ascendency over them by keeping
them in ignorance. In order to guard against all temptation to abandon
his opinion, a man must be careful what he reads and must learn to
regard his belief as holy, to be indignant at any questioning of it,
and especially to consider the senses as the chief means whereby Satan
gains access to the soul and as organs constantly to be mortified,
distrusted, and despised. With an unwavering determination thus to shut
himself off from all influences external to the society of those who
think with him, a man may root //opinions/faith// in himself
ineradicably; and a considerable body of such men, devoting all their
energies to the spread of their doctrines, may produce a great effect
under favourable circumstances. They and their followers may truly be
said to be not of this world. Their actions will often be inexplicable
to the rest of mankind, since they live in a world, which they will
call spiritual and others will call imaginary, with reference to which
their opinions are certainly perfectly true. The belief of one of these
men, though perhaps resulting in large measure from the force of
circumstances, will also be strengthened by a direct effort of the
will, and he should therefore consistently regard it as wrong-willed
and wicked to allow one's opinion to be formed, independently of what
one wishes to believe, by that play of Sense which the Devil puts in
one's way.
This method (which we may term the Divine, Spiritual, or Heavenly
method) will not serve the purpose of the Children of This World, since
the world in which they are interested has this peculiarity: that
things are not just as we choose to think them. Consequently, the
accord of those whose belief is determined by a direct effort of the
will, is not the unanimity which these persons seek.
===end Peirce quote==
I'll close this message and comment in a separate one/.
Joe
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
(Note new email address; old address at cox.net now defunct)
- Original Message From: Bill Bailey [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Monday, September 25, 2006 9:46:14 AMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
Kristi, Joe, list:
The human is a social animal, born into a social group
which typically has a full array of habits, customs in place. That strikes
me as a given. "We've always done it that way, and that's the way it will
be done" seems to me what Peirce is talking about as tenacity propped up by
authority. And that too strikes me as a given, even in this empirical,
secular society where tenacity and authority are currently clashing over
Pluto.Peirces "community of investigators"(is that his term?),
the astronomers, settled it with a vote. The experiential evolution in the
conception of Pluto as a planet can be described as the new information that
surprised even the scientists. This scenario seems to me to fit pretty
well Peirce's sketch of the way things necessarily happen in social
groups. But it also involves features I wonder how Peirce wouldwork
outin the terms of his sketch, In some news source, I saw the vote
of the astronomers hailed as a triumph of science over romance. And so it
appears at first glance. But what we have an instance of tenacity ("This
is how we have always defined a planet,") propped up by the authority of
science, the community of investigators.We can certainly say there has
been an advance in information. But has there been an evolutionary advance
in the mode of conception, or just a shift in whose conceptions are
valued?
Dear Joe,Thanks for your response and the quote. On second
thoughts, informed with the quote you provided, some kind of evolution seems to
be involved. But, being evolution of a conception, it must be of logical nature.
I can't see how it could hold as a hypothesis of evolution of either individual
or social development. Social comes first, no question about it.But it
might be fruitful to think of the principle of ordering the methods this way in
terms of
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
thought, as well as having gained the authority for a reason. Well, I don't know. Don't remember Peirce ever writing along these lines. But it is an ordering of intellectual enditions. So the method of tenacity would imply a conscious belief, in contrast to all the beliefs forced upon us by experience which we are not aware we are holding. CP 5.524 ...For belief, while it lasts, is a strong habit, and, as such forces the man to believe until some surprise breaks the habit. Kirsti Määttänen [EMAIL PROTECTED] 25.9.2006 kello 02:02, Joseph Ransdell kirjoitti: Dear Kirsti:: I'm short on time today and can't really answer you until tomorrow, but I ran across a llater passage in Peirce in wihch he describes what he was doing earlier, in the Fixation article, as follows. (I'm just quotting it, for what \it's worth , at the moment and will get back with you tomorrow, when I have some free time again. In a manuscript c. 1906 which was printed in the Collected Papers at 5.564, Peirce describes The Fixation of Bellief (1877) as starting out from the proposition that the agitation of a question ceases only when satisfaction is attaned with the settlement of belief, and then goes on to consider how: ...the conception of truth gradually develops from that principle under the action of experience; beginning with willful belief, or self-mendacity [i.e. the method of tenacity], the most degraded of all intellectual cnditions; thence rising to the imposition of beliefs by the authority of organized society [the method of authority]; then to the idea of a settlement of opinion as the result of a fermentation of ideas [the a priori method]; and finally reaching the idea of truth as overwelmingly forced upon the mind in experience as the effect of an independent reality [the method of reason or science, or, as he also calls it,in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, the method of experience]. My words are in brackets Joe Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Original Message From: Kirsti Määttänen [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Sunday, September 24, 2006 8:50:46 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to? Joe Bill, Joe, I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the order of the methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed. But that wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing this response :). It was the two fundamental psychological laws on the title you gave, which caught my attention. Anyway, you wrote: JR: ...exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible? And later in the discussion you wrote: JR: Well, I was thinking of the argument one might make that social consciousness is prior to consciousness of self, and the method of tenacity seems to me to be motivated by the value of self-integrity, the instinctive tendency not to give up on any part of oneself, and one's beliefs are an important aspect of what one tends to think of when one thinks of one's identity. To my mind the logic in the order Peirce is here following is based on the degree of 'goodness' of methods, not on motives, or order in evolution, or any other kind of (logical) order. And the goodness has to do with 'summum bonum, the ultimate aim and purpose, which is not necessarily an aim or a purpose held by any (one) individual person. So, the method of tenacity, in spite of being the lowest in degree of goodness, IS STILL A CONSISTENT METHOD. Which, if persisted in, will, in the long run (if the person persisting will live long enough), show to the person its truth or falsity. If false, it will be some kind of a nasty surprise to the person. If still persisted in, more nasty surprised are to follow. - Well, it might as well be a pleasant surprise. For example with the (common) belief that humans beings are by nature evil and egoistic. Being surprised in this way, according to my somewhat systematic observations, follows a different course. But Peirce does not give examples of this kind. But I do not see any justification given in this particular paper to: CSP: In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called the method of authority, we must, in the first place, allow its immeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity. It can only be the 'summum bonum', which could act
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Joe and list, It is difficult to tell exactly what those two psychological laws are from the text. (preceding the quote below) It is also difficult to frame them universally. Either we talk of all men at all times or some men at all times or all men at some time or another. I think we could talk of all men at some time or another"systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change in his opinions." That is what needs explaining. The explanation is teleological. What causes people to avoid changing their opinions? Why do people avoid changing their opinions? Peirce says, 1. an instinctive dislike of an undecided state of mind makes men cling spasmodically to the views they already take. 2. a steady and immovable faith yields great peace of mind. (sec. 5 FOB) Pyrryo, of course,claimed that 'suspension' yields peace of mind. But this was only after the method of science or experiencewas brought to bear.Furthermore, an undecided state of mind motivates inquiry as much as it closes it down. Effectively, this reflects the problem of framing a law universally. How about "The truth is too painful." If the man following the "method of ostriches" knew this about himself, however,it is difficult to see how it could yield peace of mind. Can s/he coherently say "I am impervious to the truth and I am happy." What can be said here? In any case, I am not sure what the two psychological laws are. #1 looks like a candidate. Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Fri, 22 Sep 2006 6:21 PM Subject: [peirce-l] What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? In "The Fixation of Belief" Peirce says that "a man may go through life,systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change n his opinions, and if he only succeeds -- basing his method, as he does, on two fundamental psychologicl laws -- I do not see what can be said against his doing so". This is in Part V, where he is explaining the method of tenacity, where he then goes on to say that "the social impulse" will nevertheless somehow cause him, at times, to face up to some contradiction which impels recourse to adopting the second method, which is the method of authority. His explanation of this is very unsatisfactory, far too sketchy to be very informative, and I wonder if anyone has run across any place where he says anything that might flesh that out or, regardless of that, whether anyone has any plausible explanation themselves of exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible? Joe Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Bill, Kirsti, et al: In my earlier message I mischaracterized the method he describes in MS 165. And of course what later becomes the fourth method or method of reason is only alluded to rather than described except in the last paragraph of this MS where he talks about "the Children of This World" in contrast with the "Divine, Spiritual, or Heavenly" world of the fundamentalists, the "Children of this world" being those who realize that "things are not just as we choose to think them", which is nearly equivalent to saying that they recognize that there is such a thing as reality, the recognition of which is of the essence of the fourth method, which Peirce defines in terms of that which is so regardless of what anyone thinks it to be. I was thinking of this simplistically as the method of tenacity, but in fact what he is describing includes both the tenacity component and the authority component and I would say that it also includes the a priori component as well, though what he means by the latter, in the Fixation article, is not easy to get completely clear on. Anyway, I think we can see how, after writing this, further rewrites by Peirce will show him recognizing that he needs to draw some further distinctions, which ends up finally as the four methods of the Fixation paper -- and there are many, many rewrites of this in the MS material, some of which is available in Writings 2 and 3 and some of which is available in Volume 7 of the Collected Papers (in the part called "The Logic of 1873"), which is somewhat misleadingly titled since Peirce was working on this text from the time of the MS presently in question from 1869-1870. If you go to the ARISBE website, you will see that on the page for the primary Peirce writings as made available there http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/bycsp.htm I have arranged the material which the Peirce Edition Project has made available from Volume 2 of the Writings from that period (a few years earlier than the publication of the Fixation paper in l877) in a fairly perspicuous way and the development of his thinking on this can be traced through to some extent there in addition to what can be learned from what is available in the Collected Papers in Volume 7. But there is much MS material still available only in the unpublished manuscripts. Perhaps we can get copies of some of that transcribed and distributed in the next few weeks. (If anybody has an digitized transcriptions of that particular MS material, let me know and I will put it up on-line.) Joe Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Original Message From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Monday, September 25, 2006 11:10:36 AMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?Bill, Kirsti, and list generally: Let's go back to a short MS from 1869-70 (available on-line, from Vol 2 of the Writings), which is the earliest MS I am aware of -- but not necessarily the earliest one there is -- in which we find Peirce explicitly approaching logic, in what is clearly a projected introductory logic text, from the perspective of logic as inquiry. In German "inquiry" would be "Forschung", as in Karl Popper's Logik der Forschung of 1914, which was disastrously -- for the course of logic in the 20th Century -- mistranslated as "Logic of Scientific Discovery". (More on that later.) The immediate point of interest is that in it we find Peirce working initially with only two methods, tenacy and what will later be called the "method of reason" or "method of science" or, in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, "the experiential method". It is short and I include the whole of it here and wll as follows: =quote Peirce http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_37/v2_37.htm Practical Logic (MS 165: 1869-70) Chapter I "All men naturally desire knowledge." This book is meant to minister to this passion primarily and secondarily to all interests that knowledge subserves. Here will be found maxims for estimating the validity and strength of arguments, and for deciding what facts ought to be examined in the investigation of a question. That the student may attain a real mastery of the art of thinking, it is necessary that the reasons for these maxims should be made clear to him, and that the maxims themselves should be woven into a harmonious code so as to be readily grasped by the mind. Logic or dialectic is the name of the science from which such rules are drawn. For right reasoning has evidently been the object of inquiry for Aristotle in all the books of the Organon except perhaps the first, as it was also that of the Stoics, of the Lawyers, of the medieval Summulists, and of modern students of Induction, in the additions which they have made to the doctrines of the Stagy
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Title: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Pei Martin -- and Bill: Martin, I find what you are saying both plausible and resulting in a gemerally consistent view. Something can be done, too, to put a more positive face on the first two methods, which need not be construed as negatively as Peirce does, e.g. by pointing out that tenacity, in spite of there being nothing that one can cite at a given time that supports one's viewand the evidence seems actually to be against it, this sort of stubborness seems to be a pretty important factor at times in winning through to a better view. Of course everything really depends on good judgment and being willing, finally, to give up on something. But there is a positive element in tenacity that needs to be identified and salvaged finally as part of the fourth method. And so also for authority, which is, in some cases, simply the overwhelming forcefulness of well-deserved good reputations. Peirce is definitely aware of this sort of thing. I ran across a passage within the past day or so that illustrates this and I'll see if I can find it again. Peirce is expressing a kind of scorn, as I recall, about scientists who are overly impressed by the recognition given in official commendations and awards and the like and says that the individual scientist has to be the best judge of his or her own competence. In other words, competence actually requires one's own ability to be the best judge of one's own competence, that is, one ought to regard the matter that way. I think though that you are probably right that it is only in the case of the third method that it even appears that we can reasonably talk about it as being a rational method, that being highly qualified, of course, by noting it as a "degenerate" form, as you suggest. That goes back to what Bill Bailey was saying about the decision about the planet Pluto being a committee decision. I think myself that it is not correct to say that they really did settle anything by making that decision. I mean their vote may well have the effect of bringing that change about, but this is simply a causal result, not a logical consequence, i.e. they didn't really decide to do anything other than to lend persuasional weight to what will turn out de facto to be accepted about Pluto from now on. I would argue myself -- have argued elsewhere -- that acceptance in science can mean only one thing, namely. the fact that future inquirers do in fact make use of the proposition in question as a premise or presupposition in their own futuire inquiry, essentially including that part of it which consists in making a public claim to a research conclusion which is put forward as based on the propositon in quesion in that way. Otherwise it makes no difference what any scientists say about Pluto's status. It is up to the future to determine whether the resolution to actually use the proposition in that way or not has the effect of actual such use of it. And of course the last word on that is never in. As it stands, the confusion about what is meant by "acceptance" in science -= and inhumanistic scholaraship, too -- is massive and sometimes grotesque, as when it is confused with gettting a paper accepted by a prestigious journal! Joe [EMAIL PROTECTED] From Martin Lefebvre To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Monday, September 25, 2006 11:40:01 AMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? Joe, Kristi, list, At the risk of offering a post hoc, ergo propter hoc argument, I'll try looking at the issue from the prespective of Peirce's more mature views. I consider the "Fixation" essay to be organized around a sort of development/growth principle that leads to the scientific method as the method of choice of reason. I believe that growth here can be thought of categorially. The method of tenacity "works" as long as the individual is considered monadically (the social impulse must be held in check) and as long as there is no attempt to examine a belief against experience. A "monadic" mind (what could that be???) would think what it thinks, irrespective of anything else. Of course, the individual (the self) is not a monad (see Colapietro's work on this) and the social impulse cannot be held in check forever. With the method of authority belief is achieved in relation to the belief of others (those in authority) -- not in relation to experience. There is a growing sense of dualism here with the introduction of "others". With the third, a priori, method we find something interesting. This third method is "far more intellectual and respectable from the point of view of reason than either of the others which we have noticed", says Peirce (italics mine). He adds, however: "It makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste". Now, as you know, Peirce (m
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Joe Bill, Joe, I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the order of the methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed. But that wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing this response :). It was the two fundamental psychological laws on the title you gave, which caught my attention. Anyway, you wrote: JR: ...exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible? And later in the discussion you wrote: JR: Well, I was thinking of the argument one might make that social consciousness is prior to consciousness of self, and the method of tenacity seems to me to be motivated by the value of self-integrity, the instinctive tendency not to give up on any part of oneself, and one's beliefs are an important aspect of what one tends to think of when one thinks of one's identity. To my mind the logic in the order Peirce is here following is based on the degree of 'goodness' of methods, not on motives, or order in evolution, or any other kind of (logical) order. And the goodness has to do with 'summum bonum, the ultimate aim and purpose, which is not necessarily an aim or a purpose held by any (one) individual person. So, the method of tenacity, in spite of being the lowest in degree of goodness, IS STILL A CONSISTENT METHOD. Which, if persisted in, will, in the long run (if the person persisting will live long enough), show to the person its truth or falsity. If false, it will be some kind of a nasty surprise to the person. If still persisted in, more nasty surprised are to follow. - Well, it might as well be a pleasant surprise. For example with the (common) belief that humans beings are by nature evil and egoistic. Being surprised in this way, according to my somewhat systematic observations, follows a different course. But Peirce does not give examples of this kind. But I do not see any justification given in this particular paper to: CSP: In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called the method of authority, we must, in the first place, allow its immeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity. It can only be the 'summum bonum', which could act as an (ultimate) justification in considering the method of authority as far superior to the method of tenacity. But Peirce does not take that up here. Anyway, the IF's in the following may be worth considering: CSP: If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if belief is of the nature of a habit How I find, is, that these are the premisses from which Peirce proceeds in this chapter. So these give the perspective Peirce is here taking in view of the answers he offers, pertaining as well to the logic of the order of the methods in presenting them. As to the two fundamental psychological laws, I assume Peirce is referring to the laws he himself had arrived at stated. A relevant quote on this might be the following, where Peirce puts the question: How do we know that a belief is nothing but CP 5.28 ”... the deliberate preparedness to act according to the formula believed? My original article carried this back to a psychological principle. The conception of truth, according to me, was developed out of an original impulse to act consistently, to have a definite intention.” Which, by the time of writing, Peirce does not find satisfactory. For the reasons you stated in your later post, with which I agree. Best, Kirsti – Kirsti Määttänen [EMAIL PROTECTED]>
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Dear Kirsti:: I'm short on time today and can't really answer you until tomorrow, but I ran across a llater passage in Peirce in wihch he describes what he was doing earlier, in the Fixation article, as follows. (I'm just quotting it, for what \it's worth , at the moment and will get back with you tomorrow, when I have some free time again. In a manuscript c. 1906 which was printed in the Collected Papers at 5.564, Peirce describes "The Fixation of Bellief" (1877) as starting out from the proposition that "the agitation of a question" ceases only when satisfaction is attaned with the settlement of belief, and then goes on to consider how: "...the conception of truth gradually develops from that principle under the action of experience; beginning with willful belief, or self-mendacity [i.e. the method of tenacity], the most degraded of all intellectual cnditions; thence rising to the imposition of beliefs by the authority of organized society [the method of authority]; then to the idea of a settlement of opinion as the result of a fermentation of ideas [the a priori method]; and finally reaching the idea of truth as overwelmingly forced upon the mind in experience as the effect of an independent reality [the method of reason or science, or, as he also calls it,in How to Make Our Ideas Clear, the method of experience]." My words are in brackets Joe Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Original Message From: Kirsti Määttänen [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Sunday, September 24, 2006 8:50:46 AMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?Joe Bill,Joe, I agree with Bill in that I do not see any reason why the order of the methods of tenacity and that of authority should be reversed. But that wasn't the impulse which caused me to start writing this response :). It was "the two fundamental psychological laws" on the title you gave, which caught my attention. Anyway, you wrote: JR: "...exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible?And later in the discussion you wrote:JR:Well, I was thinking of the argument one might make that social consciousness is prior to consciousness of self, and the method of tenacity seems to me to be motivated by the value of self-integrity, the instinctive tendency not to give up on any part of oneself, and one's beliefs are an important aspect of what one tends to think of when one thinks of one's identity.To my mind the logic in the order Peirce is here following is based on the degree of 'goodness' of methods, not on motives, or order in evolution, or any other kind of (logical) order. And the goodness has to do with 'summum bonum", the ultimate aim and purpose, which is not necessarily an aim or a purpose held by any (one) individual person.So, the method of tenacity, in spite of being the lowest in degree of goodness,IS STILL A CONSISTENT METHOD. Which, if persisted in, will, in the long run (if the person persisting will live long enough), show to the person its truth or falsity.If false, it will be some kind of a nasty surprise to the person. If still persisted in, more nasty surprised are to follow.- Well, it might as well be a pleasant surprise. For example with the (common) belief that humans beings are by nature evil and egoistic. Being surprised in this way, according to my somewhat systematic observations, follows a different course. But Peirce does not give examples of this kind.But I do not see any justification given in this particular paper to:CSP: In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called the method of authority, we must, in the first place, allow its immeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity.It can only be the 'summum bonum', which could act as an (ultimate) justification in considering the method of authority as far superior to the method of tenacity. But Peirce does not take that up here.Anyway, the IF's in the following may be worth considering:CSP: "If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if belief is of the nature of a habit"How I find, is, that these are the premisses from which Peirce proceeds in this chapter. So these give the perspective Peirce is here taking in view of the answers he offers, pertaining as well to t
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
ing some beliefs e.g. in religion, in one's parents, in the worthiness of one's country, etc., can be experienced as a kind of self-destruction and people often seem to demonstrate great fear of that happening to them. But this sense of self-identity could be argued to be a later construct than one's idea of the social entity of which one is a part. I always liked to use it in teaching intro to philosophy classes because it is the only paper on logic I know of where it is made clear that there is no obvious or self-evident basis for supposing that it is better to be reasonable than unreasonable: indeed, irrationality is frequently respected more highly than rationality by people with a literary orientation, for example. Anyway, what I want to say is that I interpret Peirce as appealing to four distinct things of value to which appeal can be made -- which may be existentially at odds with one another as values -- in a process of belief-fixing: self-integrity, social unity, coherence or unity of ideas (construable objectively as the idea that there is a universe), and the idea of the independently real that is always there, the one thing you can always rely upon. I think of the fourth method as presupposing the values of the first three but as introducing a fourth as well, which could be the first three considered AS ordered, I suppose. (But I am not arguing that.) What are the other possible kinds of dissonance reduction that Festinger identifies, by the way?Joe ----- Original Message From: Bill Bailey [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Friday, September 22, 2006 11:34:25 PMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? Joe, I don't understand why you think the order might be reversed. To resort to authority is essentially to cease thinking and to unquestioningly accept. There's no cognitive dissonanceavoidance necessary. But if we begin with trying to avoid dissonance, and society forces us to confront it, then authority is one possible resort. (Leon Festinger's school ofresearch would suggeststill other possibilities of dissonance reduction.) Bill Bailey In "The Fixation of Belief" Peirce says that "a man may go through life, systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change n his opinions, and if he only succeeds -- basing his method, as he does, on two fundamental psychologicl laws -- I do not see what can be said against his doing so". This is in Part V, where he is explaining the method of tenacity, where he then goes on to say that "the social impulse" will nevertheless somehow cause him, at times, to face up to some contradiction which impels recourse to adopting the second method, which is the method of authority. His explanation of this is very unsatisfactory, far too sketchy to be very informative, and I wonder if anyone has run across any place where he says anything that might flesh that out or, regardless of that, whether anyone has any plausible explanation themselves of exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible? Joe Ransdell[EMAIL PROTECTED]---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] No virus found in this incoming message.Checked by AVG Free Edition.Version: 7.1.405 / Virus Database: 268.12.6/453 - Release Date: 9/20/2006---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] No virus found in this incoming message.Checked by AVG Free Edition.Version: 7.1.405 / Virus Database: 268.12.6/453 - Release Date: 9/20/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
en defined in the strict way in which its founders understood it, and not as embracing the law of the conservation of energy, neither is nor ever was one of the special sciences that aim at the discovery of novel phenomena, but merely consists in the analysis of truths which universal experience has compelled every man of us to acknowledge. Thus, the proof by Archimedes of the principle of the lever, upon which Lagrange substantially bases the whole statical branch of the science, consists in showing that that principle is virtually assumed in our ordinary conception of two bodies of equal weight. Such universal experiences may not be true to microscopical exactitude, but that they are true in the main is assumed by everybody who devises an experiment, and is therefore more certain than any result of a laboratory experiment. (CP 8.198, CN3 230 [1905]) end quote=== In other words, Peirce is identifying there the point at which the coenoscopic and the idioscopic meet, in physical conceptions that appear in the context of idioscopic (special scientific) research, and I suggest that the two "psychological laws" which he is referring to in the passage in the Fixation article which I quoted in my first post on this topic must be the coenoscopic analogues of those in the case of the psychological sciences, In other words, those particular psychological laws must be psychological in the commonsense psychology of everyday life, though they will appear as fundamental conceptions in scientific psychology.and thus seem at first to be idioscopic in type.Now Jeff's claim in that paper (among other things) is that "The Fixation of Belief" is concerned with psychology only in the sense of commonsense psychology, not scientific psychology, and Peirce's anti-psychologism is as characteristically present in that paper as it is in any of his more technical papers on logic. Thus the fact that the Fixation paper relies as heavily as it does on doubt and belief neither shows that Peirce lapsed into psychologism there nor that Peirce ever thought that this was so, but rather -- and I think this is what Jeff is saying -- it is rather that where Peirce may seem to be admitting to psychologism in that paper he is in fact admitting to something rather different, namely, a rhetorical failure in composing it that mistakenly made it appear to people who do not understand what the objection to psychologism actually is that he was making his claims in that paper rest on psychology in the special or idioscopic sense. when in fact he was not. (I may be putting words in Jeff's mouth there but I think that is what he is getting at.) Well, that will have to do for this post. Sorry for being so long-winded on that.Joe[EMAIL PROTECTED] . . - Original Message ----From: Bill Bailey [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Saturday, September 23, 2006 1:21:48 PMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? Joe, thanks for your response. I "get it" now.Festinger came to mind because "selective exposure" as amode of dissonance avoidance was a major topic in communication research. I haven't read that literature in years--and I didn't particularly buy into it then--so don't trust me now. As I recall, one mode of dissonance reduction wassimilar tothe pre-dissonance mode:"selective perception," or "cherry picking"--selecting only the data consonant with the threatened belief or behavior. "Rationalization"was a dissonance reduction means, I think, though it seems nearly tautological.In terms of Festinger's smoking-health dissonance I remember itin this form: "We're all going to die of something." There is also the heroic, the transcendent "We all owe a death." Simple denial is a common means: "If smoking causes cancer, most smokers would get it, but in fact most don't." Researchers turned up so many techniques of dissonance reduction I no longer remember which were originallyproposed by Festinger and which came later. Some, by the way (I think Eliot Aronson among them), argued cognitive dissonance was nota logical but a psychological phenomena, and that humans were not rational but rationalizers. And, relevant to your remarks below, some argued that the need to reduce the dissonance resulted not from logical tensions, but from the social concept of the self. For example, the argument goes, if it were only a logical tension operating, there'd be no tension experienced from telling a lie for money. It would make logical sense to say anything asked of you for either a few or many bucks. The tension arisesonly as a result of social norms:"What kind of person am I to tell a lie for a lousy couple of bucks." In my personal experience with smoking, I could have cared less about the dissonance between my smokin
[peirce-l] Re: What fundamenal psychological laws is Peirce referring to?
Joe, I don't understand why you think the order might be reversed. To resort to authority is essentially to cease thinking and to unquestioningly accept. There's no cognitive dissonanceavoidance necessary. But if we begin with trying to avoid dissonance, and society forces us to confront it, then authority is one possible resort. (Leon Festinger's school ofresearch would suggeststill other possibilities of dissonance reduction.) Bill Bailey In "The Fixation of Belief" Peirce says that "a man may go through life, systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change n his opinions, and if he only succeeds -- basing his method, as he does, on two fundamental psychologicl laws -- I do not see what can be said against his doing so". This is in Part V, where he is explaining the method of tenacity, where he then goes on to say that "the social impulse" will nevertheless somehow cause him, at times, to face up to some contradiction which impels recourse to adopting the second method, which is the method of authority. His explanation of this is very unsatisfactory, far too sketchy to be very informative, and I wonder if anyone has run across any place where he says anything that might flesh that out or, regardless of that, whether anyone has any plausible explanation themselves of exactly what accounts for the transition from the first to the second method. One might wonder, too,whether Peirce might not have the order wrong: might it not be argued that method #1 should be authority and method #2 tenacity? I wonder if anyone has ever tried to justify his ordering of the methods in the way he does? I don't recall anyone ever trying to do that, but then I don't trust my memory on this since it has not always been a topic in which I had much interest until fairly recently. That he has somehow got hold of something right in distinguishing the methods can be argued, I believe, but can the ordering really be argued for as plausible? Joe Ransdell[EMAIL PROTECTED]---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] No virus found in this incoming message.Checked by AVG Free Edition.Version: 7.1.405 / Virus Database: 268.12.6/453 - Release Date: 9/20/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
