The Supreme Court of Canada yesterday issued an interesting ruling
addressing the issue of whether a Sikh student may be prohibited from
wearing a kirpan in school. The case came out of Quebec; interestingly,
most Canadian religious freedom cases seem to come from either Quebec or
British
Well, I was using the secular law definition of discrimination,
which (at least insofar as it's relevant here) is pretty much Stevens's
test in Manhart: Does the institution treat[] a person in a manner
which but for that person's sex would be different? If Jesus Christ
deliberately
I'm sure others have expressed this idea more clearly (and authoritatively),
but:
Isn't it possible that when government expenditures are such a large part of
the economy (and taxes take such a large part of personal income), a denial
to a person of an otherwise available subsidy because of the
That's a perfectly sensible position, and if it's limited to
denial of a benefit because of a what person does with his own money,
the answer is that the denial generally is unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
FCC v. LWV.
But if you also apply it to a condition that you may not use the
Via Eschaton: Missouri legislators in Jefferson City considered a bill
that would name Christianity the state's official majority religion.
House Concurrent Resolution 13 has is pending in the state legislature.
Many Missouri residents had not heard about the bill until Thursday.
Karen
Is it that Missouri declares Christianity its official
religion, or just that some legislators have proposed such a resolution?
(Either are worth condemning, I think, but it's important to have a
sense of what exactly is happening.)
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
My point is that the ministerial exception should be broadly construed
and applied. In the specific context of clergy, the state should not
quickly or easily claim that a religious organization is ineligible for
a subsidy if it is guilty of what the state claims is discrimination.
The question
I actually agree that religious groups should have a right to
discriminate in choice of clergy, much as nonreligious groups should
generally have a right to discriminate in choice of leaders, speakers,
and members (see Boy Scouts v. Dale). (The precise contours of the two
rights may be
Here is the text of the resolution:
SECOND REGULAR SESSION
House Concurrent Resolution No. 13
93RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY
4572L.02I
http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htm
Whereas, our forefathers of this great nation of the
United States recognized a Christian God and used the
*soapbox mode on*I read stories like
this, and I say to myself that it's no wonder so many people think conservative
Christians are intolerant idiots. Doesn't this guy understand that
stupid things like this accomplish nothing other than leaving a mess for
others to clean up? *soapbox mode off*
Not that I agree with the resolution, but it does not say half of the
things attributed to it in the summary circulated by Jean...we all need to be
much more precise
Donald C. Clark, Jr.Counselor at LawBannockburn Lake
Office Plaza I2333 Waukegan RoadSuite 160Bannockburn, Illinois
Thank you, Winston. Once again, the media tends to overdramatize
issues with incendiary titles/headlines. I'm not sure that Missouri is
declaring Xianity a state or official religion, but the wording of this
resolution surely smells of it. Besides, it's plainly a way to have
prayer in
Agreed, Donald. I was in the process of googling for the actual
wording of the resolution when Winston got there first.
On Mar 3, 2006, at 11:53 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Not that I agree with the resolution, but it does not say half of the
things attributed to it in the summary
In this particular, specific instance, I believe that the answer is
yes. Otherwise, the state winds up making what are essentially and
unavoidably theological judgments. That is not true in the other
examples that you give.
-Original Message-
From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL
As a fairly new resident of the state of Missouri, I agree with Eugene
that the resolution deserves condemnation, but is it, if it passes,
unconstitutional? I ask this as someone who ought to know, but perhaps
owing to the fact that it's Friday afternoon of a long week, I can't say
that it is. I
Now this I'm not sure I quite grasp. Why is the state's
judgment that the Catholic Church discriminates based on sex in hiring
clergy -- followed by the application of a (hypothetical) generally
applicable rule that sex-discriminatory groups aren't entitled to tax
exemption (a rule,
A brief comment, my last for a few days at least due to press of other
matters:
If the government says that those churches with a certain kind of mix of
persons in their clergy are entitled to a tax-exempt charitable status
(given to churches without regard to any proof beyond proof that they are
A not-very-analytic observation on a Friday afternoon:
I happened to read these posts on the Missouri resolution at about
the same time as I was taking a look at a remarkable document called
the Flushing Remonstrance, written in 1657, in which the leaders
and citizens of Town of
Hi all,
I forgot to include a link to the text of said Flushing Remonstrance:
http://www.nyym.org/flushing/remons.html
Perry
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I wonder how many of them would have the courage of their convictions if that
were the likely outcome of their little legal-literary exercise.
I suspect that large numbers of them -- or of their fellow travelers -- would
be willing to suffer legal sanctions for their opinions. I think that
Eugene,
I believe that the idea of revoking the Catholic Church's tax-exemption
because of their all-male priesthood is fraught with constitutional
problems (for some of the reasons already stated by others). But I am
more interested in your statement, which I agree with, concerning such
I agree with other commenters that we need not assume the bad faith of this
resolution's proponents. What I find striking about it, though, is both the
odd marriage of different ideas contained in its propositions and the
strange letdown -- and, I think, mismatch -- between its propositions
is this much different from Reagan's [in]famous proclamation that we are Christian country? The resolution seems not to be any sort of law with impact -- just some hortatory language about how school-sponsored prayer and public-sponsored creches should be allowed. From: Winston Calvert [EMAIL
Isn't this a rather milquetoast resolution? Could we not make a case that voluntary prayer and creches on public property are already legal -- in fact, hasn't the ACLU been defending exactly those things in the past five years?One might wonder if these same legislators are among those who
I have a fairly
straightforward question or set of questions: What does it mean to say that the
United States is a Christian country or that Christianity is, in the United
States, the "official" religion? Is this a descriptive claim? More
Christians than members of other religions? A
Well, I don't see christianity becoming a minority religion in the US any time in my lifetime or my grandchildren's. Unless, of course, one excludes Spanish-speaking Catholics from being Christians.On Mar 3, 2006, at 8:57 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I have a fairly straightforward
Creches on public property are only legal if surrounded by Santa, a few clowns,
candy canes and enough other junk to destroy the religious meaing; the 10
commandments on texas lawn was legal only becauase it is "not sacred." The
Court essentially tells those who insist on putting up their
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